

G20 UPDATE

E-NEWSLETTER

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NO THEY CANNES'T



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Global Governance

Managing the decline

Günther Maihold discusses European and US strategies to master the global power shift. He argues that the upcoming G20 Summit will be an important moment for the new international order.

Pages 3-4

Must Reads

Infrastructure Special

The G20 will put forward very concrete infrastructure project proposals. Hence, the must reads focus on infrastructure with selected texts from the World Bank, The Brookings Institution and the Heinrich Böll Foundation

Page 5

Civil Society

Civil Society Reports from around the globe

We have prepared a selection of articles mirroring the increased attention on the G20 from civil society organizations around the world. They include a report on a congressional hearing on G20 in Brazil, an analysis of a conference on the WTO and the G20 in Argentina, an event in Delhi promoting a G20 focus on "equitable economic growth", a discussion in Johannesburg regarding the G20 & BRICS, a piece on France's attitude about corruption and finally lessons from a G20 workshop in Washington, D.C.

Pages 6-16

Introduction:

Does the G20 Wield “Veto Power” over the Global Governance System?

by Nancy Alexander

The French Presidency of the G20 began the year with sweeping ambitions of overhauling global governance. But now, on the eve of the Summit, its greatest accomplishment may be a more or less convincing plan to save the Eurozone. The latest [newsletter on “EU financial reforms” by SOMO](#) and WEED, provides important perspectives on EU and G20 approaches to the crisis.

If China and other emerging market countries sink money into a special purpose vehicle (SPV) for the rescue, it will jolt the tectonic plates of the geopolitical world. In return, the rescuers will demand a bigger voice in global decision making, as noted by the article, “Managing the Decline” by Günther Maihold, Deputy Director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

This issue also brings reports from civil society events on the G20 in five countries: Brazil, India, Argentina, the U.S. and France. Business has plenty of clout in the G20, as described in the box below. Civil society also wants to make democracy work and, wherever possible, work with elected officials to influence G20 member countries and bring in the views of constituencies in non-member countries. Some reports of civil society events – such as the one from India – reflect frustration with the corporatist agenda of G20 governments. Others – such as the one from Brazil – reflect genuine

headway in government-civil society dialogue about the G20.

The case of government-civil society cooperation in Brazil is unusual. For the most part, civil society is excluded from governmental decisions-making processes and mystified about how these processes work.

While the G20 is open to business, it is relatively closed to civil society (see box, page 2). Nevertheless, civil society is committed to influencing the G20, particularly in the area of development. In this area, the French Finance Minister and Central Bank Governor, Francois Baroin and Christian Noyer, respectively, told their colleagues at the 14-15 October G20 Finance Meeting that they expected Cannes to produce an agreement on innovative financing for

credentials to which the G20 might aspire. As also [described by International Rivers](#), the [G20 High-Level Panel \(HLP\)](#) selected these projects without consideration of sustainability factors (e.g., the carbon footprint; carbon resilience; the rights, priorities and consent of affected populations).

To inform its decisions on climate financing, the G20 commissioned a paper, “[Mobilizing Climate Finance](#),”. Preparation of the paper was led by the World Bank and excluded the UN, despite the fact that the UN had [led earlier work](#) on climate financing and climate governance concerns fall under the purview of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

The topics of environment, climate, and energy governance will also be included in a broad-ranging report on global governance that will be presented to Leaders at the French G20 by the UK Prime Minister. Commissioned by President Sarkozy, the report will also encompass governance of the international financial and trading system; global standards; and the G20, itself.

In preparing for the Mexican G20 Summit on June 18-19, 2012, the G20 will wade even

deeper into climate “waters,” since “Green Growth” will be on the G20 agenda for the first time (see box, page 2). Although touted as a solution, the dynamics of “Green Growth” can intensify the privatization and financial “enclosure” of nature as speculators include natural resource investments in their portfolios.

Many governments and civil society groups are concerned about the impact of the G20 on global governance, including the role of the UN. The head of the UN’s informal [Global Governance Group \(3G\)](#) has [stated](#), “If the G-20 continues to gain



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development, including introduction of a Financial Transactions Tax (FTT) ([Why We Need a Financial Transaction Tax: A Proposal for the G20](#)) in a core group of countries and a common framework for regulating and supervising commodity derivatives trading.

They also expect an agreement on resources that can be used for climate financing and the launch of exemplary region-wide public-private partnerships (PPPs) in infrastructure. However, the proposed PPPs, which are listed and critiqued by the Heinrich Boell Foundation (“[Beyond the Public Eye](#)”) tarnish any “green”

'legs,' some predict that this exclusive grouping will challenge and perhaps even annex other bodies of global governance, such as the UN."

Some claim that is far-fetched, but they also ask: Will the G20 pre-empt the plans of the June 2012 [UN Conference on Sustainable Development \(Rio +20\)](#) to set up the "institutional governance for sustainable development"? Will it sway the already-contested preparations for the upcoming negotiations of the Conference of Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC, which among other things, is [attempting to create a Global Climate Fund](#)?

G20 Veto Power at the Committee on Food Security?

It is astonishing that, at the October 2011 [negotiations in the UN Committee on Food Security \(CFS\)](#), the G20 had effective "veto power" over the proceedings. That is, government representatives asserted that they could not contradict the G20 Ministers, on key issues – commodity

price volatility and biofuels – under negotiation.

What had the G20 done on biofuels? The G20 Finance Ministers [commissioned research](#) on the topic from ten international institutions, which concluded that "the diversion of food crops for use as fuel represents a permanent re-structuring of the food economy, which will exert continuing pressure on food prices in ways that will adversely affect vulnerable consumers." The paper called upon the G20 to eliminate government mandates and subsidies that have spurred the production and consumption of biofuels. But, meeting in June 2011, the G20 Agriculture Ministers [communiqué and action plan](#) rejected this call.

Among the many statements and petitions presented to the G20 are the following:

- [Global Unions Statement](#)
- A [Coalition](#) urging that human rights norms and principles guide decision-

making on financial regulation and climate change

- [International Working Group](#) on Trade-Finance Linkages on G20 Development Agenda
- [Consumers International](#)
- [New Rules for Global Finance](#) (FSB)
- [WWF](#)
- 72 civil society organizations sent [this letter](#) to the High-Level Panel on Infrastructure

New to the G20?

To find out more about the G20's history, the power dynamics and the issues the group addresses, click on the link below.

INTRODUCTION
TO THE G20

The Business-20: the 1%?

As is customary now, the days of the business summit – the B20 – overlap with the Leaders' Summit. In Cannes, the [B20](#) is on November 2-3; the G20 is on November 3-4. At these Summits, the Presidents of the business confederations of the G20 countries, as well as 120 CEOs and Chairmen from global companies are delivering messages on 12 themes to the G20.

Many of these Ultra-High Net Worth Individuals (HNWIs) live in a rarified world according to the [World Wealth Report 2011](#). A world far from the "99%" of the population represented by the "Occupy" protests or the [civil society mobilizations in Nice](#) on 2-3 November.

The G20 Advisory Group of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) is already [working closely](#) with its counterparts on the June 18-19 G20 Summit in Los Cabos, Mexico.

Seven Themes of the Mexican G20 Summit

The Mexican G20 Presidency plans to hold the Summit in Los Cabos on June 18-19, 2012. (Source: Office of the Mexican Sherpa)

- Financial regulation and supervision
- Reform of the International Financial Institutions
- The International Monetary System
- Financial inclusion
- Commodity price Volatility and Food Security
- Green Growth
- Challenges for Economic Growth

Managing the decline:

European and US strategies to master the global power shift

By [Günther Maihold](#) ([Colegio de México](#), Mexico-City)

The upcoming meeting of the G20 in Cannes, France will be an important moment for the configuration of the new international order: Europe is in crisis; the US economy lacks economic dynamism; and a group of 12 emerging countries consider the new decade as their opportunity to change the terms of the international power game. The secular rise of China as well as of the economic boost of the rising nations of Brazil, India and South Africa are the most important changes that have affected international relations in the last decade.

While there is much study relating to the future of the rising powers, less attention is given to the ways the declining nations are coping with the loss of influence in international affairs. In everyday politics, we see a dominant attitude of denial about the change in the power structure of

world politics as has been demonstrated quite clearly by the response of President Obama to S&P's decision to lower the nation's long-term debt rating. The President stated, "The US will always be AAA-rated". But beyond political rhetoric, western nations have to re-define strategies in order to adapt to their decline in the international power game and control adverse effects that might occur in their societies.

Power transition and its dangers

China's growing economic strength is not only changing the balance of the international economic system. It might translate more rapidly than expected into political strength due to the impact of the economic crisis in Europe and the US. Since China is acquiring the role of the lender of "next to last resort", any solution to the financial disaster and the

The over-representation of Europe in the G20 will lead to a Europeanized agenda in Cannes

potential expansion of the European currency crisis to the rest of the world will depend upon the response of the Chinese government to the request for fresh money from European countries. But the question does not only relate to whether the political elite of China is prepared to assume this new responsibility (since to date it has mostly looked to its national economic objectives without much attention to international political dynamics).

Even more important is the need to grasp the imponderables of the adaption strategies of the declining



nations about which there is less public discourse. The political, economic, and social problems that arise in the context of a nation's decline (even of the perception of diminishing influence) should not be underestimated, since, historically, the decline of a major power has generated military conflicts and long-standing civil turmoil. Disputes over the distribution of income and social rigidities are factors which have to be managed internally so that new "social contracts" can be reached. Certainly the uproar of indignant groups all over Europe as well as globally shows the frustration of young people and others as their expectations for a decent future are extinguished.

But the power transition and the concomitant changes among the elite define internal adaption processes in European societies and the US in a broader way than mortgage rates can express. Nationally, and most visibly in the international realm, Europe and the US have to show new negotiation capacities and more than symbolic gestures in order to adapt to changes.

From power sharing to burden sharing in the international arena

The G20 Summit in Cannes will be a new opportunity for Western countries to show that they are aware of the changing balance of power in the international arena. Due to the economic crisis, they can take an additional step and integrate the emerging economies into burden-sharing agreements and share their power by redistributing voting rights

Whether Mexico, as the incoming president of the G20, will be able to develop a clearer vision of the interests of the emerging powers is not quite clear

in the IMF on an expedited schedule. The rising powers will be obliged to assume some burden of the economic crisis in Europe and the US and close ranks with the International Financial Institutions as the IMF and the World Bank.

The G20 itself must develop a viable consensus in order to foster the confidence of the markets in the recent decisions of the countries of the Eurozone and avoid further turbulence and distrust. So, the over-representation of Europe in the G20 (with 5 of 20 seats) will lead to a Europeanized agenda in Cannes, relegating the original objectives of the French government to second place. Topics such as excessive commodity price volatility, particularly of agricultural prices, unemployment and the social dimension of globalization or even the important G20 development agenda might be of minor interest to the participants. At the end of the day, the result of the meeting will be that the emerging powers such as China, Brazil, India, South Africa and Mexico will have to overcome their reluctance to assume costs of the economic crisis and be integrated into the logic of the game of the international financial organizations that they resisted in the past.

The G20: Bilateralism in place of group thinking

In the West, mastering the global power shift seems to be an easy game as long as the emerging powers can't agree on common strategies. Until now, Europe and the US approach them on bilateral terms because they can count on the dominance of national interests in the group. China is acting as a "lonely power" on its own and the other BRIC members as well as South Africa and Mexico have divided loyalties to regional and other worldwide groupings that they do not want to damage through a



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deeper engagement with the G 20. Whether Mexico, as the incoming president of the G20, will be able to develop a clearer vision of the interests of the emerging powers is not quite clear – particularly since the government of President Felipe Calderón is in its last year and, to date, has not shown major interest in building strong coalitions in the G20. Therefore, at the moment, this new G20 arena represents a space for piecemeal negotiations that might move too slowly to rise to the challenges presented by international crises. Meanwhile the declining nations of the West are buying time in order to master the adaptation strategies they need to develop in the immediate future.

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G20 MUST READS

INFRASTRUCTURE

Transformation Through Infrastructure

by World Bank Group
May 2011

Link: <http://www.worldbank.org>

The World Bank is updating its Infrastructure Strategy. The Concept and Issues Note was endorsed by the Bank's Board of Executive Directors on May 25, 2011, and is envisioned as a platform for consultations with governments, development partners, civil society organizations, the private sector and academics. The final Strategy Update is to be presented to and adopted by the World Bank in the Fall of 2011.

The Concept Note proposes to continue to support the core business of infrastructure for access, with an enhanced focus on:

- transformational infrastructure
- mobilization of private capital

Interestingly, the WB argues that "by putting infrastructure back on the global agenda, the G20 meetings in Seoul and Cannes have and will offer new opportunities to approach infrastructure ... the WB has been given a prominent role in engaging with the High-level Panel on Infrastructure established by the G20". Moreover, the WB states explicitly that it conducted the strategy review in order to position itself in international fora such as the G20 Summit.

The connection between the G20's infrastructure agenda and the strategy revision of the WB becomes apparent in the common goal of an "active private sector" in infrastructure. The concept note praises private companies in making "tremendous progress in addressing environmental stewardship and social responsibility".

Overall, it becomes clear that the new approach to infrastructure pushed by the G20 is trickling down to organizations such as the World Bank who are changing their strategies accordingly.

Time for a Big Push on Infrastructure in Africa: What the G20 Can Do

by Homi Kharas and Katherine Sierra (The Brookings Institution) August 2011

Link: <http://www.brookings.edu>

The paper states clearly that "What the G20 decides on infrastructure will be a critical test of whether it can amount to more than a talk-shop".

Hence, Brookings understands that the G20 considers infrastructure to be "the jewel in the crown" of its approach to development. The focus on the private sector for financing of infrastructure in Low-Income Countries is thought to showcase the potential of PPPs. Indeed, several G20 officials have reiterated that the concrete projects to be adopted in Cannes will give much needed momentum to the group.

The authors believe that the infrastructure agenda of the G20 can only be successful if the group figures out how to be a "catalyst". Hence, it should focus on regional (cross-border) projects in Africa and on filling the financing gap that exists between project identification and the start of construction.

It is believed that with political backing from the G20 as a whole and financial backing from individual members such as China and India, private capital would be "likely attracted" to undertake the high return projects that have been identified.

The paper calls for a "Revolving Fund for Regional Infrastructure Project Preparation". This would not require new funding, but a "mindset change" to using aid as catalytic funding rather than for direct costs and a change in approach toward how multilateral institutional funds are used.

Beyond the Public Eye: High-Level Panel on Infrastructure to Unveil its Recommendations for G20 Leaders

by Nancy Alexander (Heinrich Boell Foundation, North America) October 2011

Link: <http://boell.org/web/index-843.html>

The G20 Leaders will review recommendations from a High-Level Panel (HLP) on Infrastructure at their Summit in Cannes on November 3-4. It proposes a global process for scaling up and streamlining public-private partnerships (PPPs) for large-scale, regional infrastructure projects.

The author criticizes this approach because of insufficient consultation with affected governments and no apparent consultation with affected communities and parliaments. Moreover, the criteria used for selecting infrastructure projects lack a range of sustainability elements such as: the carbon footprint or climate resilience; the rights of and impacts on communities and the environment; risk analyses including implications for national and local budgets; and the priorities of affected populations.

Citing conversations with the staff of G20 sherpas, the author lists (among others) the following projects:

- West Africa Power Pool (WAPP)
- Europe-Middle-East/North Africa (MENA) solar project (Desertec)
- Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan and India (TAPI) Natural Gas Pipeline

The role of the HLP and the dominance of private financiers in its composition create the impression that, hand-in-hand with the MDBs, the G20 has created a mechanism to design and implement an infrastructure agenda with minimal involvement by the governments and stakeholders of affected low-income countries and much less any democratic debate or processes.

Brazil:

International Seminar and Congressional Hearing on G20 in Brasilia

By Dawid Danilo Bartelt (Director, [Heinrich Boell Foundation](#), Brazil)

Latin American governments and civil society organizations (CSOs) do not yet have fully elaborated strategies for their work within and on the G20. But civil society organizations are making progress, as an international seminar held in Brazil's capital Brasília on October 17-19, 2011 demonstrated. The seminar, organized by Rebrip (Brazilian Network for People's Integration) and Rede Brasil (Brazil Network on Multilateral Financial Institutions), was preceded by the first ever public hearing on G20 in the Brazilian Congress.

Congressional Hearing

At the hearing, government representatives tried to talk down the political impact of the G20, underlining its informal character and the fact that G20 decisions are non-binding for UN member states. "We want to support the United Nations, not substitute for it," Luis Antonio Balduino of the Ministry for Foreign Relations affirmed. According to Carlos Márcio Cozendey, secretary of international affairs in the Ministry of Finance, Brazil is still actively promoting reform of the Bretton Woods institutions – without much success, one could add. Nothing was heard on the ambiguous position Brazil holds toward commodity price volatility. On the one hand, Brazil promotes food security, while on the other hand, the country's economy is benefitting from high commodity prices on the world markets. Representatives of CSOs stressed the need for more transparency in financial markets, including commodity markets.

CSOs also shared the view that, since the beginning of the crisis, the G20 has emphasized orthodox measures to save banks in the U.S. and the EU while flagging in its attempts to

create a new model for the international economy by, for instance, regulating and democratizing financial sector and institutions and closing down tax havens. Indeed, the Bretton Woods institutions, reinvigorated by the G20, are imposing structural adjustment programs, only this time in Europe. "We should make this move a primary issue, since we know exactly what it means and that in the end everyone will be dead," Argentine participants said half-jokingly.

The hearing made clear that the Brazilian Congress is not focused on the G20 and most members know little about it. Moreover, there do not seem to be articulated strategies among the three G20 member countries in the region – Brazil, Argentina and Mexico – much less with G20 non-member countries in the region.

International Seminar

The 20+ participants from Argentina, Mexico, Brazil and (via live video stream) France represented networks on free trade and financial issues including ATTAC, trade union associations, development organizations and universities. They agreed to send a proposal for a final declaration to the Alternative Summit to be held in Nice, France, during the G20 Summit in Cannes. This declaration will point to the illegitimacy of the G20, call upon the G20 not to tackle the climate issue but rather focus on unemployment, decent working conditions and social protection floors, and emphasize the importance of agricultural issues, including the need for public investment in family agriculture, small and indigenous farmers, and agroecology.

There are many obstacles to G20 work. The timing of the 2011 presidential elections in Argentina and the Mexican elections, which come only 11 days after the G20 Summit on June 18-19, 2011 make it difficult (if not impossible) to put non-domestic issues on the agenda. Mexican CSOs are less engaged in G20 issues than Argentine or Brazilian CSOs. The logistics of the 2012 G20 summit, which will be held in Los Cabos, in a remote area of Mexico, will also make engagement and mobilization difficult.

Latin American governments and civil society organizations do not yet have fully elaborated strategies for their work within and on the G20

Despite such obstacles, social movements in Argentina have been working on G20 issues for several years now. In Brazil, the unions and Rebrip have been working on G20 for some years, but it was only this year when Rede Brasil and Rebrip set up a working group to enhance civil society work on G20. Brazilian civil society has established direct channels to the Ministries of Finance, responsible for the G20 process within the Brazilian Government, and External Relations, maintaining both formal and informal dialogues with them.

REBRIP agreed to organize a national workshop – possibly with international presence – on Financial Transaction Taxes, financial regulation and fiscal policy in 2012.

Argentina:

Conference on “Debates for the Construction of a New International Economic Order: The WTO and the G20”

By Manuel Pérez Rocha ([Institute for Policy Studies](#), Washington D.C.)

Sponsors: FOCO (Citizens' Forum for the Participation on Justice and Human Rights, Argentina); the CEFIDAR (Center of Economy and Finance for the Development of Argentina) and the international network OWINFS (Our World is not for Sale).

For a full Spanish language report of the conference, click [here](#)

The objective of the conference was to foster a regional debate on the need of a new international financial architecture and to resist further initiatives to deregulate trade by the WTO and other international and bilateral entities.

The sponsors stated, “In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the push for further deregulation has increased despite the G20’s earlier calls for more fiscal and monetary stimuli of a Keynesian type. Also, the IMF has resumed its role as dictating protagonist for orthodox economic recipes, although with more caution and acceptance of certain flexibility. In this context, the conference sought to address these issues in order to help to strengthen the participation and positions of civil society organizations”.

While the organizers planned this seminar at a regional level and invited experts from various countries in the hemisphere, they also wanted to put these themes on the political agenda in Argentina not only because the presidential elections were approaching, but also because the country holds the presidency of the G77 at the United Nations and plays a

key role in Mercosur, UNASUR, and the G20.

Context

Argentina has experienced amazing GDP growth rates – 9.2% in 2010. Unemployment has declined from a record high in 25% in 2001 and 11.6% in 2005 to 7.9% in 2010. As the saying goes, “Argentina does well when the entire world is doing poorly and vice versa.” In general, the public supports the policies of President Cristina Fernandez (as her subsequent, overwhelming electoral victory shows), which emphasize the development of the internal market, including industrialization) over serving certain external markets. Ironically, despite its booming economy, the country has low credit ratings.

The conference occurred at a time when relations between Argentina and the United States were tense. In particular, the U.S. had threatened to retaliate against the government for not complying with rulings by the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The Obama administration has threatened that it will vote against World Bank, IDB and IMF loans to Argentina, as well as cut its bilateral aid unless Argentina pays what it owes to the corporations that have sued it in international tribunals.

Highlights

On a panel on “Financial liberalization, the Role of the WTO and G20,” Todd Tucker of Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch described the campaign against the deregulatory Financial Services Agreement (FSA) of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) which seeks to influence the WTO’s ministerial meeting in December.

I spoke about the irony that, on the one hand, there is a growing consensus in favor of using capital controls as a tool to address high and volatile capital inflows and outflows, but on the other, many bilateral investment agreements (BITs) prevent their use. Even the IMF acknowledges the need to use capital controls, however it attempts to limit their use in an unacceptable way. I also highlighted the contradiction between the calls by the G20 for the completion of the Doha Round including further deregulation via the WTO’s Financial Services Agreement, on one hand, and on the G20 calls for increased financial regulation on the other.

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the push for further deregulation has increased despite the G20’s earlier calls for more fiscal and monetary stimuli

Paul Clooney of the Federal University of Para in Brazil described the process of de-industrialization in Brazil accompanied by an increase in the export of primary commodities, including, biofuels. To some extent, these dynamics are seen as a consequence of the way in which President Dilma Rousseff has emphasized trade with Asia over integration within South America. Concerns were also expressed related to the impact of an eventual slump in commodity prices, particularly in light of the expanding levels of domestic consumption.

Other panels throughout the day included “Argentina and the Construction of a New Economic and Financial Order” with the

participation of Argentine experts like Matías Kulfas, director of Argentina's National Bank, Enrique Arceo and Diana Tussie of FLACSO and Julio Sebares of the University of Buenos Aires; and "New Rules for another Globalization Model" with the participation of prominent civil society leaders including Roberto Bissio, director of Social Watch, Ariana Sacroisky of FOCO and Alberto Croce of Latindadd.

The final panel, "Financial Liberalization in the WTO and the G-20: Conditions and Possibilities for Argentina's Position" included government officials, such as Maria Cristina Pasín, the General Manager for International Agreements of the Central Bank of Argentina; Minister Eduardo Michel, the Vice Director of Multilateral Economic Negotiations and Victor Fuentes Castillo, Adviser of the Secretary of Finance. Of particular interest to me was Maria Cristina Pasin's presentation in which she explained the constraints and possibilities that Argentina faces given its BITs and its position in relation to the GATS, which was negotiated by previous governments under erroneous assumptions.

Some conclusions

The conference was closed by Alejandro Robba, Vice minister of Economy and Finance, and Jorge Carpio director of FOCO.

Carpio expressed one of the main conclusions – namely that the convening organizations would attempt to convince the Argentine government to give priority to the introduction of a Financial Transaction Tax to curb speculation and for social spending purposes, as opposed to bailing out the national financial system.

FTT

While there is not a G20 consensus in favor of the FTT, there is strong leadership from Germany and France. Robba told the audience that the Ministry has not yet taken a position on the FTT, despite the fact that Cristina Fernandez has made declarations in favor of such taxes.

Priorities

Important elements of a new financial order include: appropriate use of capital controls, an end to Doha Round negotiations, stronger internal markets and regional markets (including a regional fund to confront speculation) and an emphasis on promoting industrialization (as opposed to dependence on primary products, especially mining, biofuels etc.).

Public Goods/Social Concerns

It is critical to employ redistributive social programs, particularly given the inequalities and poverty exacerbated by the financial crises. We also need to strengthen the argument that, globally, there are resources for development (vs. the recurring argument that governmental commitments since the Copenhagen or Beijing UN conferences can't be met due to lack of resources).

Trade and Investment Agreements

Argentina resists further deregulation through the WTO, but it should also refrain from negotiating BITs and Free Trade Agreements or any investment treaties that submit the country to the jurisdiction of international investment tribunals, such as the ICSID.

G20

In Cannes, while there is a Business Summit (B20), it is up to each government to decide how to engage with its civil society and this is a disadvantage because, from country to country, engagement with civil society is different and, in general, it has been unsatisfactory.

Brazil and Argentina maintain their alliance and an interest in coordinating positions with the rest of Latin America (with the exception of Mexico). While both countries are in favor of capital controls and emphasize social/labor dimensions of development, there is a need for more research and strategic thinking about the growing influence of China in the region as well as the implications of the decline in Brazil's interest in the regional integration process (as compared to Argentina's). However, the increased "decoupling" of these countries from the "core" economies was viewed in a very positive light.

India:

Event in Dehli Promotes G20 Focus on “Equitable Economic Growth”

By Shalini Yog and Almut Buechsel ([Heinrich Boell Foundation](#), India)

Civil society must interface with the leaders of emerging economies to bring in the issue of 'equity in economic growth' in the upcoming G-20 summit.

On October 14, 2011, an inclusive civil society meeting organized by India's largest network of Civil Society organizations, VANI (Voluntary Action Network India) in cooperation with the EED (Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst) offered an opportunity for activists of India's vibrant civil society to formulate a common viewpoint of India's position in the G20.

With the next G20 summit on 3-4 November 2011 approaching, the question arises, what role might the so called 'developing countries' take on the international stage? Whose interests are countries such as India, China and Brazil representing at the summit? And how will these interests influence the process of international decision-making? The fundamental question, not only for the international community but equally for civil society organizations from these 'emerging economies' is whether the official agenda will truly reflect the interests of all segments of their respective national societies.

India: Defender of the Poor?

The importance of India within the G20 is undisputed: still termed 'the world's biggest democracy' the country's image as well as its actual political stand on the stage of international governance has changed dramatically. Since opening its economy to the global markets in the early 1990s, India has not only generated massive economic growth, but also experienced the ambivalent effects of this process. It remains controversial how much of the newly-

generated prosperity is actually 'trickling down' to India's poor. Today, India has the largest percentage of population below the poverty line of any country in the world. On the global stage, India could represent the interests of less developed countries which are excluded from the informal yet powerful structure of the G20. However, India's agenda seems to be torn -- just as the country itself is torn between the sometimes contradictory economic interests of its population.

India's new status as a donor of development aid is symptomatic of the remarkable change in the country. But how is India deploying its external aid? The question of whether emerging market countries are using their status as aid donors to advance their own national economic interests should be examined at the level of G20 summit preparations.

Morally, it may be right to demand that India align itself with the interests of the world's poor, but given India's corporate interests, this is unlikely to happen. Nevertheless, it is exactly this insight into India's new role in the international decision making process, which leads civil society organizations (CSOs) in India to consider their own role prior to the G20 Summit in Cannes. Civil society activists have to confront the new context of international relations, given that the general public awareness about the actual linkages between India's day-to-day politics and G20 policy decision has been extremely low. With the objective of raising the interest in and consciousness and awareness of these linkages, the conference on 'G20 and Civil Society Alternatives' was held. Until now, participation in the G20 has not been a high priority within Indian governmental circles. India's financial sector has been relatively

protected from the vagaries of global financial flows; the interest in the G20 process derives rather from the political goal to guard its stakes in this and other premier global assemblies of governance, not least vis-à-vis China. But as the political agenda of G20 expands into development issues, such as food security, India will need to take a stronger stand on things. The country could play a distinctive role in delivering on the developmental challenges by promoting economic growth with social justice.

The Role of Civil Society

During the meeting in Delhi it became evident that civil society in India is

On the global stage, India could represent the interests of less developed countries which are excluded from the informal yet powerful structure of the G20

still grappling to shape its role and to conceptualize its terms of engagement with the G20 process. Certain priorities were highlighted: the need to lobby political elites and foreign policy decisions and to demand that, in its G20 positions, the Indian Government should be accountable to domestic constituencies: the parliament, members of the cabinet, mayors, elected representatives and the citizenry. To date, there has been no information-sharing or dialogue process between government and civil society in India.

The discussion emphasized that, even though the G20 represents an historic step forward in terms of inclusivity and representation as compared to the G8, the deficit in democratic legitimacy remains. Neither the G8

nor the G20 should replace the democratic, multilateral UN institutions. Nonetheless, the civil societies must continue to engage since the domestic consequences of G20 policies influence India's economic policy in some remarkable ways. Just as 'emerging countries' are adjusting to their roles at the 'high tables,' so too their civil societies are learning how to address the implications of their governments' new roles. The civil society meeting was reflective of the start of such a process in India. CSOs stressed their own role in facilitating a greater understanding of the various facets and implications of the G20. As numerous civil society actors came together to engender a domestic political consensus, they also see a great need to foster co-operation and build solidarity with global civil society.

CSOs noted the different fora, such as the BRICS Summit (Brazil-Russia-

India-China-South Africa) and IBSA process (India-Brazil-South Africa), and underscored the need to simultaneously engage with G20. They recognized that the members of BRICS, as an 'emerging country caucus,' have internally divergent interests, e.g., different positions on climate and trade. These diverging views can make consensus just as difficult to attain as it is in the G20 framework. For some, this diminishes the attractiveness of 'South-South Cooperation.' However, the civil society meeting called for upholding such cooperation, which represents a possibly powerful alternative to the G20, (which, for many civil society actors in developing countries, still embodies 'Northern' hegemony).

India's role in the G20 is not only a matter of national interest. Regarding the G20's position on development policy, it is essential to remember that India experienced both the benefits and pitfalls of the development

process. It is now the task of CSOs to shape their governments' G20 agenda by emphasizing these lessons.

Overall, our concern is that, with a G20 core agenda focused on stimulating global economic growth, the issue of equity is likely to take a back seat. In communicating with global leaders, CSOs in India and abroad need to highlight the needs of poor populations in countries, such as India, Brazil and China. While India plays its role on the global stage, the country's civil society -- through interface with political leaders -- must ensure that concerns for the poor and a need for inclusive growth is related not only to the problems of development, but also to international finance and governance. Since India has not been deeply affected by the financial crisis, the country's experience and policy should present a crucial input into the process of international decision-making.

Even acknowledging that the G20 remains an exclusive structure lacking democratic legitimacy, civil society activists in developing countries still have to recognize its importance and influence on global as well as domestic politics. The participation of countries like China, Brazil and India in processes that were formerly an exclusively 'western' preserve presents an opportunity to publicly intervene in the negotiations and raise awareness of G20 issues within national civil society. Besides engaging on this horizontal level of activism, it is essential for the CSOs of the 'emerging economies' to connect and network with the global civil society. Specifically, Indian CSOs need to engage more actively with the country's rapidly expanding media to amplify their voice in the decision making process. For the first time in recent decades, developed countries, including European countries where protests rage against austerity measures, are looking 'South' to sustain their economic growth. India must advocate a better deal for the poor in its own country as well as others, so civil society needs to keep exerting pressure on the government not to deviate from the issue of 'equitable growth'.



South Africa:

Event in Johannesburg Conveys Concerns regarding the G20 & BRICS

For more information please contact Mercia Andrews (mercia@tcoe.org.za) or Jochen Luckscheiter (jochen@boell.org.za)

In an effort to contribute to the formation of a global civil society network to shadow the G20 and related global governance processes, concerned South African civil society organizations convened a meeting on 17-18 October 2011 in Johannesburg to:

1. raise awareness of the role of the South African Government in the G20 and other multilateral processes such as BRICS;
2. develop the capacity of civil society organizations relative to the role of the G20 and its impact on the South African policy environment and its common goods; and
3. strengthen the capacity of civil society to propose alternatives to the dominant global architecture and to hold policy makers accountable and transparent.

The meeting concluded with the following media statement:

"G20 & BRICS – A Source of Concern" Says South African Civil Society

As the global economic crisis deepens and unrest spreads from Wall Street to Athens, the people of the world are making it clear that they are unwilling to pay for the venal, corrupt and downright criminal actions of global elites. Daily, the impacts are felt more and more directly by ordinary people across the globe. Over a two day period, the representatives of diverse civil society organization in

South Africa gathered to share information, experience and strategies to respond to the global crisis and its implications and impact on South Africans.

The crisis of the global economy was recognized as being a multiple in its causes and impacts, namely:

- A crisis of the financialisation of the global economy, neo-liberalism and rampant speculation;
- A crisis of global governance, democracy, accountability and national sovereignty;
- A crisis of the natural and human environment; and
- A crisis of sustainable, people-centered and environmentally sound development.

Already facing what government calls the "nexus of poverty, unemployment and inequality", the global crisis raises new fears and dangers for the unemployed, rural people, women, farm-workers, those affected by HIV/AIDS, those living in destitution and without basic services and the vast majority of young people facing a future without hope, jobs or quality education. These groups, our constituencies, find themselves structurally marginalized and locked out of the discourse and decision-making processes surrounding governments role in the so-called "premier forum of world economic co-ordination", the G20 and the forum of the "new kids on the block", Brazil, Russia, India, China & South Africa (BRICS).

The overwhelming message from delegates affirmed the preparedness and necessity of those gathered to mobilize their constituencies and partners in response to the G20 & BRICS. The delegates committed to actively hold the South African government accountable – through the

institutions of our democracy such as Parliament and National Economic Development and Labor Council (NEDLAC) – but also to build strong and direct relations with civil society organizations and peoples' movements in India, Brazil and the global South pursuing a common agenda of justice for the peoples of the world.

Among the key content areas and issues for concern are:

- Food Security, including food price volatility, land, seeds and reserve stocks;
- Financial Transaction Tax, as the most rational and effective instrument to reduce levels of speculative transactions, generate revenues and improve the regulatory framework;
- Climate justice and building a just green economy;
- The role and function of the regional, national and international Development Finance Institutions, including the ever-narrowing scope of development financing as an instrument for physical infrastructure development with little or no focus on social infrastructure investment which protects and promotes the well-being of people.

South African civil society is committed to holding the South African government accountable to transparent and democratic policy-making processes which serves the best interest of the peoples of South African and the African continent at large. The G20 & BRICS can no longer be the preserve of elite interest masquerading as our "national" interest. Civil society calls on the South African government to heed the call for open and honest engagement with the broad diversity of public opinion and hear the voices of the poor and marginalized.

France:

The Task Force on Financial Integrity and Economic Development asks: Did France “get the message”?

By Maria José Romero (Latindadd and [Task Force on Financial Integrity and Economic Development](#))

Over time, civil society organizations (CSOs) have emphasized the importance of increasing domestic resource mobilization in developing countries in order to finance sovereign and self-sustainable development. In the last two years, G20 Leaders have expressed concerns about the lack of transparency of and cooperation from secrecy jurisdictions and the need to regulate them. In November 2009, they also made a commitment to “make it easier for developing countries to secure the benefits of a new cooperative tax environment.”

Meeting in Seoul in November 2010, the G20 leaders issued the “[Seoul development consensus for shared growth](#),” which includes old and new commitments on tax matters, particularly in relation to its “pillar” of the G20 Development Action Plan (DAP) on domestic resource mobilization. This pillar, led by South Africa and Spain, aims at supporting the development of more effective tax systems and preventing the erosion of domestic tax revenues, including by curbing tax evasion by non-cooperating jurisdictions as well as trade mis-pricing. Multinational firms engage in mis-pricing when they under-value goods shifted from overseas subsidiaries to other subsidiaries or parent entities to avoid taxes. As a result, poor countries lose massive financial resources which, according to [Christian Aid](#) amount to as much as \$ 160 billion per year, more than one and a half times the total of international aid flows.

However, the final [communiqué](#) of the ministerial meeting on development (Washington DC, September 23) watered down some of the language of a preliminary report to the G20 and failed to take forward concrete measures on these issues. Instead, G20 ministers focused their attention

on food security and infrastructure under the work of the G20 DAP. Although the communiqué acknowledged that taxes are crucial to fund infrastructure and protect the most vulnerable, it failed to recommend the policies needed to collect taxes.

On October 6-7, the [Task Force on Financial Integrity and Economic Development](#) met in Paris, France to call upon the G20 for a strong political statement on the tax and development agenda and build upon its success in recent years raising awareness of the importance to address the loopholes of the financial system.

This global coalition of civil society organizations and more than 50 governments, organized its 2011 annual conference, entitled “[Tackling the shadow financial system. A Working Plan for the G20](#)”, which gathered around 150 participants from several countries, including 35 from the South. The conference brought together civil society groups, experts, decision-makers and some private sector representatives, among them, John Christensen (Tax Justice Network), Anthea Lawson (Global Witness), Ingrid Fiskaa (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway), Jeffrey Sachs (Columbia University), Harry Roodbeen (Ministry of Finance of the Netherlands), Sanjay Mishra (Ministry of Finance of India), Philippe Meunier (French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs), Heidi Finakas (KLP Kapital Forvaltning AS) and Giuseppe van der Helm (EuroSIF).

The conference was an opportunity to evaluate progress made so far by recent policy reforms and official initiatives and to discuss concrete policy proposals to push forward in

the G20 agenda ahead of the November French Summit. Participants addressed a number of topics related to the implications of and solutions to the shadow financial system, including: country-by-country reporting by multinational companies, beneficial ownership of accounts, automatic exchange of tax information, tax evasion as a predicate offense for anti-money laundering and curtailment of trade mis-pricing through increasing transparency of multinationals operations and promoting ‘best practices’ that developing countries can consider in order to close existing loopholes.

Civil society engagement and public pressure have been important to move this agenda forward, including in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform from 2010

According to Ingrid Fiskaa from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, civil society engagement and public pressure have been important to move this agenda forward, including in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform from 2010 in the US, the review of legislation at the European level (transparency and accounting directives), and the Open Government Partnership launched in September by the US and Brazil.

Groups at the Task Force conference were eager to hear the speech of Philippe Meunier from the French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs. However, he did not say anything new and, in response to several questions about the possibility of including a strong political statement in the G20 communiqué on

the need for tax transparency and for country-by-country reporting by multinational companies, Meunier was unable to make any concrete commitment and just said “I got the message”.

Finally, speakers and participants crafted a [message to the G20 member governments](#) on how they can take the following concrete actions to make a breakthrough contribution to increase domestic resource mobilization:

1. Greater transparency and accountability of Multinational Corporations (MNCs). Specifically, (1) support full implementation of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2011 as well as similar legislation that is currently moving through the European Union, and encourage G20 member countries to adopt similar provisions for country-by-country reporting by MNCs in the extractive industries; (2) explore mechanisms and standards to increase transparency on MNCs
2. Promote multilateral tax cooperation by encouraging members to commit to the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters. The G20 can use their leverage to get secrecy jurisdictions to sign the convention.
3. Urge the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to include (1) establishment of tax evasion as a predicate offense for money laundering, and (2) improvement of the peer review process for member countries in the 40+9 Recommendations as a result of the Review of the Standards currently underway (see [Task Force response](#) to the FATF consultation paper).
4. Strengthen anti-bribery provisions by implementing and enforcing laws criminalizing foreign bribery and prohibiting off-the-books accounts.
5. Call upon member countries to establish national registers of companies, trusts, and other legal entities with information on accounts, beneficial owners, nominee intermediaries, managers, trustees, and settlers. This information should be made available to any tax authority that requests it. It is clear that in order to move this agenda to the next level and to implement the initial commitments, G20 leaders have to take these recommendations into account, not just as a list of good intentions, but as steps – which need to be urgently taken – in the right direction.

Progress on Anti-Corruption: Smoke and Mirrors?

By Angela McClellan (Senior Programme Coordinator, Global Outreach and Campaigns Department Transparency International (TI), Germany)

At the meeting of civil society representatives with several G20 Sherpas in Paris on 30 September, we learned that the G20 will release an “Anti-Corruption Progress Report” at the Summit. But, what does this progress look like? As evidence of its success, the G20 points to the new laws in Russia, China, India and Indonesia criminalising foreign bribery. While this is a positive development, the actual proof of intentions (beyond lip service) will lie in the enforcement of these laws. For the first time, TI’s annual [Progress Report](#) on the enforcement of the OECD Convention Against Bribery of Foreign Public Officials indicated no progress in enforcement by signatories to the Convention in comparison to 2010. This sets a bad example for new signatories to the Convention, such as Russia.

Another area of progress is the expected adoption of ‘best principles’ in whistleblower protection legislation, as prepared by the OECD. TI was very supportive of a previous version of these principles. However, we await the final version and the extent to which commitments are translated into legislation by the G20 governments by their June 2012 Summit.

Especially following the Arab revolutions, we are looking to the G20 for stronger commitments to facilitate the recovery of stolen assets. Asset recovery is hampered by the lack of legal and administrative capacity in the relevant countries as well as by the lack of effective cross-border mutual legal assistance. The G20 should commit to support concerned countries through effective legal procedures and capacity-building. Above all, the G20 should ensure that the enforcement of requirements in the UN Convention Against Corruption prevents money laundering, e.g. through bank compliance with due diligence requirements relating to Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs).

United States:

Workshop on G20: Impacts on Governance for Human Rights and the Environment in Washington, D.C.

By [Nancy Alexander](#) (Director Economic Governance Program, Heinrich Boell Foundation North America) with Bhumika Muchhala ([Third World Network](#))

On September 24, 2011, Heinrich Boell Foundation convened a G20 workshop in Washington, D.C. involving 37 people from 16 countries to discuss and strategize in relation to four themes: global governance, financial regulation, infrastructure, and food sovereignty.

Democratic Governance

The G20 undermines democratic global governance in several ways.

1. The G20 is giving mandates, not recommendations, to international institutions in ways which bypass the governance bodies of these institutions.
2. The G20's Development Action Plan (DAP) focuses on growth, as measured by traditional metrics such as GDP, which subordinates other goals of the international system relating to equality, human rights, climate, and food sovereignty, for instance.
3. In its work on the DAP's nine pillars, the G20's Development Working Group (DWG) marginalizes the United Nations. For instance, the infrastructure pillar, which is the most important pillar (the "jewel in the crown" of the DAP, according to the French), does not involve any UN body.
4. The DWG has 35 members and only one member, Ethiopia, is a low-income country (LIC). By marginalizing LICs in implementing a Development Action Plan (DAP) intended to benefit them, the DWG violates the Seoul Development Consensus principle relating to country partnership.
5. The G20 and its 2011 Chair, President Sarkozy, is commissioning reports from a variety of individuals and institutions in a way that centralizes power in the G20.

For instance, the G20 has commissioned the World Bank to collaborate with institutions (but not the UN) about how to mobilize climate finance. This makes many CSOs nervous because they support the position of most developing countries, which favors management of climate finance by the UNFCCC, not the World Bank.

In another example, President Sarkozy asked the UK Prime Minister, to prepare a report on global governance which will focus on the role of the G20, financial and trade governance, and coherence within the international system, including environment, climate, and Rio +20. Sarkozy also asked Bill Gates to prepare a report on new and innovative sources of finance for development. In such ways, the G20 usurps the financing agenda from the UN Financing for Development process or the environmental governance agenda from Rio+20.

6. The G20 is working closely with business, not civil society. The French business association is coordinating input to the G20 from eleven task forces. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) has created an advisory group to the G20. Meanwhile, civil society has ad hoc interactions with the G20 and, in some regards, it lacks the information to engage in an informed way.

Strategic Implications

Participants urged a concerted focus on promoting more representative forums, especially the UN, and the transparency of the G20, since basic facts about its working groups, agenda, and proceedings are not known. Some felt as though an

excessive focus on the G20 would legitimize the body.

Civil society needs to articulate:

- its own agenda, propositions, solutions, proposals, strategies on the root cause of the problems in each sector or topical issue, but NOT focus on the G20 as a body.
- a counter-narrative – a meta-model of development that reclaims key concepts (sustainability, policy space) and principles: the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, the precautionary principle, the right to development, etc.

The G20 is working closely with business, not civil society. Civil society has ad hoc interaction with the G20 and lacks the information to engage in an informed way

With these things in mind, CSOs need:

1. Unity - across sectors and geographic regions.
2. Encouragement of Southern leadership. On a global CSO level, we cannot recreate the power dynamics of governments.
3. Connections with local communities. We need to listen to peoples' articulation of problems and respond to needs, demands, and desires of the grassroots as well as connect to the various regional meetings.
4. Information and Education at multiple levels. Greater awareness amongst the general public of key issues; greater financial literacy as well.
5. Clear political agenda -- not just information + advocacy process.

6. Capacity to intervene and influence G20 and non-G20 governments. In some countries, such as Brazil, civil society can assist emerging market countries in building their own agendas and priorities for the G20 so that they are not just riding on the “coat tails” of the G7.
7. Institutional mechanisms. Unlike other fora, civil society have a role in relationship to Committee on Food Security (CFS), which has a key role in a range of sustainability issues, including boosting the role of smallholders and women farmers. CSOs need more mechanisms, such as the CFS, through which to express their views.
8. Capacity to mobilize. Huge mobilizations of people are needed to make the powerful aware of the real consequences of their economic decisions.

With these approaches, we can follow a roadmap – dealing with the G20 in France, the Durban COP, Porto Alegre, the Commission on the Status of Women, Rio +20, the G20 in Mexico, and so on.

Infrastructure and Agriculture

The primary purpose of the DAP is to promote the use of public guarantees

and streamlined preparation and procurement processes for PPPs (public-private partnerships) in infrastructure and agriculture, particularly in low-income countries. The agenda is brown – that is, there is no indication that the G20 is promoting equitable, low-carbon approaches to agriculture or infrastructure (e.g., energy, transportation) – despite the profound impacts of these sectors.

Another prominent theme is the weakening of social and environmental safeguards by the multilateral development banks and the G20. Many G7 countries feel as though the safeguards inhibit their competition with emerging market countries. Therefore, the struggle to retain and strengthen safeguards needs to be reinvigorated in a variety of countries.

Participants emphasized that, in the infrastructure, energy, and agriculture sectors, we see the phenomenon of “financialization” – that is, the use of financial instruments to invest in and reap profits from these sectors. This agenda requires campaigners and advocates to move beyond our comfort zones and silo areas to understand commodity market speculation and

agricultural risk management instruments, for instance.

An abundance of great reports showing the role of speculation in driving up the levels of volatility and prices of food. There is near consensus that financialization of commodity markets is driving up prices and is a key structural problem of deregulation. In addition, the financial crisis in the EU and US has affected food and other prices through exchange rates. The appreciation of the Mexican peso makes food imports more expensive into Mexico and undercuts exports.

Agriculture

The G20 has narrowed the debate on issues. For instance, after five years of the food crisis, the G20 has deepened the old neoliberal model as it relates to austerity, investment liberalization, and gambling in the financial markets. It has rejected the notion of food sovereignty which requires that countries maintain major reserves – emergency food storage. Instead, the G20 is entertaining a proposal for a small pilot for humanitarian emergencies on a regional basis (e.g., ECOWAS), whereas purchasing of food should be done locally.



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The G20 has rejected recommendations to remote targets and subsidies for biofuels, despite the fact that costs outweigh benefits in biofuels production.

Food markets are concentrated in a few companies and in the last few years hundreds of small agricultural companies have gone bankrupt. CONSECA, BIMBO, CARGILL, MONSANTO are all profiting handsomely. One consequence is the proliferation of false solutions, including GMOs and land grabbing. In countries such as Mozambique, foreigners are seizing huge swathes of land to produce soya, sugarcane and other biofuels sometimes under conditions of quasi-slavery. Food insecurity increases as the land available for food production diminishes.

Strategically, the central focus should be food sovereignty and decision-making power should be transferred from corporations to small and medium producers.

Infrastructure

We are seeing developing countries trying to replicate the dominant model of development (high-carbon path, ecological havoc, inequality, accumulation of financial capital, social displacement, private sector takeover of resources, etc.). So it is problematic to design a campaign on an infrastructure project that addresses the negative externality

problems (e.g., displacement), while the project itself is implemented and the model of development persists.

Investment liberalization and rampant privatization of assets (using public backing/guarantees to protect investors) is privatizing power and exacerbating tremendous tensions that exist between investor rights and human rights on multiple levels.

Public sector investment in infrastructure during a time of widespread fiscal contraction creates painful trade-offs at the national and local level wherein basic safety nets could be sacrificed to give comfort to foreign investors.

Various strategies should be considered:

- identifying issues that are important to excluded countries and groups
- defining transformational infrastructure (defining the positive vision of infrastructure and the purpose it serves), especially links between climate, infrastructure, decentralization, and energy--engaging in debates about the role of the Global Climate Fund and other Funds under the purview of the UN and World Bank
- identifying the role of national development banks, such as BNDES
- "shaming" around damaging projects (knowing what we are for or against)
- analyzing PPPs (and risk sharing) to inform struggles (e.g., Cochabamba water)

- focusing on financial markets and procurement processes, not just physical projects
- including people from LICs in designing/organizing campaigns

Financial Markets

There is great momentum behind the FTT in Europe, with the European Commission releasing a legislative proposal, Bill Gates supporting it, and a plan for an announcement of a "coalition of the willing" to move ahead with the FTT at the November Summit. Groups need help with is an international parliamentarian declaration. We have about 900 signatories, but more international signatories are needed to move toward the goal of 2,000 endorsements.

Alternative regional financial architecture

We are inspired by reports on the development of alternative regional financial architecture in South America. We discussed whether it would make sense to push the G20 to support regional mechanisms. (This has been tried and it backfired. The Korean government pushed this last year, and what emerged was a new IMF global financial safety net, which involves IMF lending to regional financial arrangements and the application of IMF conditions.) Instead, the message to the G20 urge it to "do no harm" with regard to regional initiatives.

Role of emerging market countries in debates

The presence of the emerging market countries at the table made no difference in the G20's decision to vastly increase the power and resources of the IMF. One reason for the ineffectiveness of these governments is that they are not seeing big mobilizations in their home countries. In the case of Korea, civil society showed that big mobilizations can have some influence, at least in creating an educational opportunity. We all agreed that there is a strong need to do more education on how G20 issues link to the 99% and the key issues for excluded groups.



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G20 Database & E-mail Group

Stay informed

Database

If you would like to read more on the G20, recent changes in Global Governance and what it means for specific regions or issues, the G20 Database of the Heinrich Böll Foundation is the right place to go. It is subdivided into the following folders, so you can easily access the analysis and information that is of interest to you

G20 Database Structure

- 1 - Background
 - 1.1 - G20 Info & History
 - 1.2 - Global Governance
 - 1.3 - G7 & G8
- 2 - Summits
 - 2.1 - G20
 - 2.2 - Finance Ministers
- 3 - Issues
 - 3.1 - Finance
 - 3.2 - Climate Change
 - 3.3 - Development
 - 3.4 - Energy
 - 3.5 - Trade
 - 3.6 - Food Security
- 4 - Country Specific
 - 4.1 - Africa
 - 4.2 - Canada & US
 - 4.3 - South America
 - 4.4 - Asia
 - 4.5 - Middle East
 - 4.6 - Europe
- 5 - Power Dynamics
 - 5.1 - Within the G20
 - 5.2 - G20 to non-members
- 6 - Civil Society

In addition, every folder contains both a Word and PDF document with annotations of the documents included in the folder. The database is designed in a way that every member can add documents himself, which are then instantly synchronized so that everyone can access it. This is a great way to share information and build up institutional capacity.

If you would like to know more about the Database or sign up for access please send an Email to g20-newsletter@boell.de. To get started right away, here are the 3 easy steps to install the Database on your computer:

1. Install the Programm "Dropbox" from <https://www.dropbox.com/install>
2. Write to g20-newsletter@boell.de, you will then receive an Email invite to share the G20 Database folder.
3. Accept the invite and you should be able to access the database through a Dropbox icon on your Desktop.

E-mail Group

In addition, the Heinrich Böll Foundation is part of an international network of NGOs and policy-analysts, which have set up a G20-related E-mail Group.

To subscribe, send email to: alternative-g20+subscribe@googlegroups.com

To unsubscribe, send email to: alternative-g20+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com

To customize your subscription, go to <http://groups.google.com/group/alternative-g20> (but you need to create a Google account, if you do not have one)

Replies automatically go the whole group. To minimize email traffic, please do only reply to the whole group if necessary. There is no moderation.

Impressum

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