Political Orientations, Values and Activities of Hungarian University and College Students

Andrea Szabó (ed)

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Preface

Nearly 25 years have passed since the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe. Has this period allowed for the emergence of a new generation of democrats? Have young people successfully come to terms with their countries' authoritarian past and developed a commitment to democracy as a system of rule? Are they ready to defend it in the face of challenges? These questions are all the more timely as social scientific research focusing on youth has highlighted the emergence not only of progressive tendencies in the region, but also of the rising influence of social organizations and networks that propagate ultranationalist, xenophobic, and authoritarian views and values.

This study was commissioned by the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung with a view towards gaining a deeper understanding of the political values, orientations, and activities of Hungarian full-time university and college students. The decision to focus on Hungary was warranted by recent social and political developments there, which have laid bare socio-political contradictions and ills that are also palpable in other countries of the region but have not manifested themselves in such obvious ways as – to name but the most worrisome trend – widespread support enjoyed by Jobbik, a xenophobic party whose hate campaigns targeting Roma and Jews have raised concerns all over Europe.

By publishing this study, the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung would also like to draw attention to the problems that young Europeans find themselves confronted with in the current epoch and, more specifically, to the link between the prospects offered to upcoming generations by political elites and the prospects of democratic citizenship for our European societies. Instead of branding certain segments of this generation as 'hopeless', 'irrational' or 'inherently xenophobic' politicians and policy-makers should identify legitimate claims and concerns with a view to creating discourses and policies that offer new paths of integration for those approaching adulthood. This study goes a long way in highlighting some of these concerns in one particular country, but we trust that it will help the work of policy-makers and other professionals committed to democratic values in the whole region and perhaps even beyond its confines.

We would like to express our gratitude to the editor and the authors of the study for their efforts and hope that they will have the opportunity to pursue this important line of research in the future.

Kristóf Szombati   Eva van de Rakt

Coordinator of activities in Hungary   Director, Prague Office

Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung   Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung

Research methodology

This research has applied qualitative and quantitative methods of empirical social science research to this question. As part of the qualitative study, seven focus group discussions were organized at the country's major academic centers (Budapest, Debrecen, Pécs, Miskolc, Szeged and Győr). During the focus group discussions, the characteristics of youth radicalism and post-materialistic values were tested for and examined. Information was collected about student organizations working in universities, about the motivations for youth political participation, and about patterns of students' socialization.

The focus group interviews were then completed through 20 in-depth personal interviews with leaders of student governments and activists from youth NGO's linked to higher education. Qualitative techniques were used to provide a more in-depth exploration of the topic. Among the subjects of the 20 in-depth interviews there were student government leaders in higher education, activists from youth organizations, and the leaders of the political parties' youth sections.

Examinations of new issues and problems were also built into the second stage of our analysis within these interviews and focus group discussions. For example, during the empirical stage, student emigration and the permissive attitudes of youth towards dictatorship were closely examined.

In March–April of 2013 an empirical survey was conducted utilizing a sample of **1300 students.**[1] The survey was conducted with the hybrid technique: **859 persons** (66% of the sample) filled out an **online survey** at www.aktivfiatalok.hu through the website, while another **441 persons** (34% of the sample) were asked to answer questions via **face-to-face interviews.**

The face-to-face interviews took place between 11 and 25 April 2013 in 35 institutions across the country. Following the personal interviews, the results of the two different survey techniques were weighted for representativeness at a three-dimensional faculty-level. The aspects and considerations of weighting were:

- The composition of the institution's faculty;

- The distribution of men and women within the faculty;

- The distribution of the levels of training within the institution and the faculty (university-college, BA, MA, undivided training, PhD).

The margin of error for the 1300 person sample is ± 2.9 percentage points (with a 95% confidence interval) in the course of the examination of the submanifolds; however, the margin of error could be even higher.

The structure of the study

The first chapter analyses college and university students' relationships to democracy and dictatorship and asks how Hungarian university and college students relate to "ideal" and "real" democracy. The second chapter examines the extent to which students are interested in politics and public life. As is repeatedly pointed out in later chapters, not only is political interest is a key factor explaining the level and forms of activity that characterise different groups of young people, but it also plays a decisive role in the development of their preferences, values and ideological orientations.

The third chapter examines the value system of Hungarian university and college students. The chapter begins with Inglehart's theory and tests how post-materialistic and materialistic values permeate students' thinking. In connection with post-materialistic value orientation, the main features of "green students" are also explained. The fourth chapter describes the political activity of the student population. The analysis distinguishes between three forms of political participation (traditional, collective, and virtual), examining each with the same methodological framework. The section concludes by presenting a general model of participation.

The last chapter analyses the relationship of Hungarian university and college students to political parties. Among the youth the most popular parties are the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik), Fidesz, and Együtt 2014–PM. Voters of these three parties are analysed in detail.

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Our special thanks to Eszter Vay-Farkas and Kristóf Szombati for their contribution to and comments on a previous version of this study.

Authors who contributed to the preparation of this analysis:

András Keil

Dániel Oross

Dániel Róna

Andrea Szabó

Budapest, November 2013.

Andrea Szabó
Editor

I. Students' relationship to democracy

"Even in 2013, we Hungarians pity ourselves. It is true that there have been a lot of disappointments in our past, which we must remember, but it is time finally to move on. This continuous self-loathing is completely useless to us. It is what weakens Hungary and Hungarian democracy. Perhaps our generation will change this tendency."
(T., focus group discussion, Szeged)

I. 1. Introduction

One of the main challenges of this study is to explain dissatisfaction with democracy in Hungary, particularly among the youth. We therefore begin by reviewing Hungarian students' thoughts and opinions about democracy and dictatorship. This topic is of special interest to us as it touches on many ideas that are important to modern political systems, including civic duty, values, ideology, and relationships between individuals and political parties. As a first step in our research it is crucial to begin by examining an important question: do individuals who grow up in a democratic system think democratically?

Orit Ichilov, a prominent Israeli sociologist, wrote in 1990 that even if a generation grows up and matures in a democratic system, this does not guarantee that a democratic political culture will take root in society (ICHILOV 1990). According to Ichilov, the most important goal of political socialization in democracies is to prepare society for civic engagement and active participation in politics.

Studies related to political socialization in Hungary have traditionally focused on citizens' opinion of and relationship to the political systems of democracy and dictatorship. According to the *Iskola és Társadalom* 2005[2] study, high school students' understanding of democracy is highly passive. The teenagers in the study ranked personal security, privacy, and equality under the law as the most important components of democracy. Few of them thought of multi-party systems, freedom to assemble, freedom of expression, or minority rights as important elements of a well-functioning democratic system. The 2008 *Iskola és Társadalom[3]* study did not find a significant change in young people's perception of these matters; political and social rights continued to be seen as less important than personal and financial security by Hungarian youth. The data showed that young Hungarian students showed a minimal degree of solidarity with members of minority groups as well as with people occupying marginal positions in society.

The first time a study of a large sample was conducted pertaining to this topic was in 2008 (*Ifjúság2008)* (Youth2008). That study found that 14% of 15–29 year olds believe that under certain conditions, dictatorships are superior to democracies (while another third claimed that for them there is very little difference between living in a dictatorship and living in a democracy).

2 See more about the research: https://sites.google.com/site/mcsako/kutatas/iskola-es-tarsadalom.
3 See more about the research: https://sites.google.com/site/mcsako/kutatas/iskola-es-tarsadalom.

According to data collected by the *Magyar Ifjúság 2012* (Hungarian Youth 2012) study, the percentage of Hungarian youth accepting democracy as a legitimate system of government was 40%, the same as in 2008 (Szabó A.–Kern 2011a, 53). There was also little change in the percentage of youth who did not see a difference between dictatorship and democracy (30% in 2012, and 33% in 2008). Those who thought dictatorship was preferable under certain conditions had decreased by nine percentage points to 5%. It is important to note, however, that the percentage of those who did not disclose their views on the matter was especially high in 2012 (24%), and it is possible that many of these individuals actually prefer dictatorships, but were uncomfortable with disclosing this information.

When the results are sorted by educational background, we find that almost a quarter (24%) of those who have less than a high school education could not answer questions relating to the comparison of democracy and dictatorship, and that this proportion is even worse among those who have finished professional schools and apprenticeships (40%). These statistics support the claim made by many studies that the primary education system has largely failed to play a positive role in the democratic socialization of young citizens (Szabó I.–Örkény 1998, Csákó 2004, 2008). Other recent studies focusing on institutions providing professional training (Szabó A.–Kern 2010) further support this conclusion.

To contextualize the surveys we have just summarized, it is important to compare the views found therein to the views of adult populations within the European Union Member States. In the fall of 2012, *Standard Eurobarometer*[4] conducted a survey including the question "How satisfied are you with democracy in your home country?" Hungary ranked in the bottom third for this question: 29% of respondents were satisfied, while 70% were dissatisfied with democracy in their home country. In the European Union as a whole, the results were significantly more promising: on average 49% of the respondents were satisfied and 49% were dissatisfied. At the top of the ranking we find Denmark, where 90% of respondents reported satisfaction. On the other end of the spectrum in Greece, a mere 11% of the respondents reported satisfaction with democracy. In Eastern Europe, the Poles expressed satisfaction rates similar to the EU average (48%–47%), while the Czechs and the Slovaks (30%–70% and 29%–70% respectively) had very similar opinions to the Hungarians. The Bulgarians (24%–74%) and especially the Romanians (13%–85%) were even more dissatisfied than the Hungarians.

I. 2. Key findings from interviews and focus group discussions

For the *Aktív Fiatalok Magyarországon 2013 (Active Youth Hungary 2013*) study, 20 interviews were conducted with youth and civil movement leaders and seven focus group discussions were held in the country's largest university towns. Before we begin our analysis of the survey's results, we find it important to share the thoughts and predictions of our interviewees regarding young Hungarians' attitudes towards democracy and dictatorship.

During the series of interviews we conducted, we asked all of our interviewees what democracy meant to them. Here are some of the answers that were presented to us:

- I think I speak for everyone when I say that democracy is very important to us. Relatively little is discussed about democracy at the state level, rather, there is more of a focus on civil-level-democracy, or "base democracy", at the micro-society level, as well as a focus on the freedom to express and represent oneself at the local level. I think it is understandable that we often ostracize those organizations that openly exhibit a hierarchical system, because we find those unfair. I think this whole story begins from there. We are very self-reflecting in this sense, and when we feel that we are oppressing each other, or we are not listening to certain rural cells, or we are not inquiring about them, then we tend to discuss it. (A.,[5] Hallgatói Hálózat [Student Network]).[6]

- Practically speaking, the point of democracy is that an opinion, a stance, cannot be forced onto people through power, but rather through reason and logic. If someone claims something, if someone would like to say something, he or she must also answer the question of why. The practical essence of democracy is the clash of opposing opinions through human logos, pathos, and ethos and the process of providing a forum for the debate and discussion of these opinions and claims; democracy means everyone has the right to say what he or she wants to say or claim, and everyone has the right to judge, according to their convictions and beliefs, how true and logical each statement argued is. When a bad decision is executed because it was not debated in a democratic forum that is when we lose the efficiency and advantages of a democratic system. (D., Bibó István Szakkollégium [Bibó István Professional Fraternity[7]]).

- The word that comes to my mind when someone says democracy is "active". Democracies only work when you actively take part in them. Clearly there are serious barriers in democracy pertaining to self-defense. Thus if one does not vote, there is no point to the whole thing. In any case this is a very good question, especially here in Hungary, and in post-communist countries in general where we do not have too many roots connected to democracy, and the ones we do have are from about 100 years ago. Because of this, it is very difficult to find a historical moment in our past that both sides of the political aisle can relate to positively, where there is even a minimal amount of consensus between the two opposing political ideologies. I was just in London for a month for an internship. The depth and number of cultural differences between England and Hungary was breathtaking.

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4 Standard Eurobarometer 78 (Fall 2012) p 53; available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb78/eb78_en.htm

5 These interviews have been translated from Hungarian to English; though they have been translated to represent the interviewees' words as closely as possible, because of the nature of translation, they are not exact. The interviewees' first initials and their respective organizations are provided in parentheses after their statements.
6 *Hallgatói Hálózat* [Student Network]: a self-organizing grassroots group of students and teachers that originally came to life because of the Higher Education Act that was tabled by the government in the fall of 2011 (and adopted by Parliament in December 2011). Members of the group found the drastic cuts in state-sponsored tuition and the cost of self-tuition unacceptable and started protesting against the reckless, rash and unpredictable concept for such reforms in higher education. The long-term goal of the Student Network is to mobilize students to recognize their common interests. To achieve all of this, the Student Network is open to all local initiatives of students and/or teachers. Their goal is to gather and collect all these initiatives, plans, suggestions and ideas, to discuss them, and to help in their realization.
7 A "Szakkollégium", or collegial association is a school organization similar to a fraternity/sorority in the United States. However, these institutions are not gender-segregated, and tend to be more professional in nature than American fraternities/sororities.

For example, how easily a voter can influence his or her parliamentary representative. Of course this is partly because of the dominance of voting districts in England (over parliamentary lists), thus the discipline of the factions is not as strong there as it is here; however, it is still surprising that if someone wants to see something change, the first thing he or she does is ask his or her supporters to contact their representatives. And they do this, because it works. (D., Társadalomelméleti Szakkollégium [Professional Fraternity of Sociological Theories])

- Democracy, if we build off of the original concept, basically gives the power to the people, if not directly, then indirectly through representation. In my opinion, democracy has the fundamental ability to be a well-functioning system. Especially if the citizens of this democracy possess a good intellectual background, and have enough motivation to make important decisions responsibly. In these situations democracy could be a well-functioning system... The disadvantage, however, is that democracy naturally comes with the popular media's manipulative powers, and gives everyone the right to vote and express their democratic rights without any form of censorship. Because of this, certain groups of people gain decision-making powers and gain the opportunity to answer decisive questions even though they might not have the required intellect to answer these questions appropriately and effectively. All in all, I still have to say that democracy is the best-functioning of all available state formations. (M., Batthyány Lajos Szakkollégium [Professional Fraternity of Batthyány Lajos]).

- What I am about to say is very textbook-like; however, here at IKSZ we interpret democracy (and we want a democratic Hungary) to be a system where citizens with voting rights can make decisions about matters pertaining to them either through plebiscite or through representation. We find it important that certain socio-ethical and moral rights and norms transcend everything else, and that no one has power over these norms and rights. This is why we say Hungary is a democracy, and we cannot let it become anything else (there are some disagreements within our organization, but certainly everyone agrees with this last statement). For us, the fundamental law (constitution) and those norms that Hungary finds democratic are very important. (I., IKSZ [Youth Christian Democratic Coalition][8])

- Jobbik IT functions as a political organization that accepts the democratic system we live in, and strives to achieve change within the constraints provided by democracy. Democracy is not the best system, but currently there is no better alternative. In terms of the voting system, one important reform that would not conflict with democratic values would be to introduce an educational requirement for voting. This would be crucial because social and political awareness is important for responsible voting, to ensure that one can vote deliberately, and to prevent most types of outside pressure on voting decorum. (G., Jobbik IT [Jobbik[9] Youth movement])

We made a special effort to examine and understand the reasons behind the fact that within the younger generation, the acceptance of democracy is especially low. The following narratives reflect the views of individuals belonging to conservative and right-wing organizations:

- Before 1989 there was a parliamentary dictatorship in which the politics were "unique", and so were the people who participated in politics, and because of this, most people began to distance themselves from politics. This changed somewhat because of the atmosphere of the 90s, and the expectation of the time period, specifically, the expectation that everything will be better. After four years the country fell into an exceptionally bad situation and it became clear that nothing is so simple. Our factories were inefficient and had to close. The privatization was conducted in a flawed way, leading to a lot of failures. It became clear that it is not so easy to bring forth paradise in Hungary after all. This is why many people began to think that no matter what the political system is, it is best to keep your distance from politics; it is not worth having high expectations of politics. Capitalism added to this apathy because of its incentives to increase consumption. In capitalism, people are disincentivized to participate in politics; everyone is driven to do one thing: make money, and then spend that money. (L., Fidelitas[10] [Youth Movement of Fidesz])

- What I see, without knowing the results of this survey, is that historically, especially in liberal arts and engineering circles, there is a need for a certain dictation from above. In the social sciences, free-liberal values seem to be stronger. I believe that this new tendency, in which the proportion of those who want to see an authoritarian leadership from above is increasing, can be explained by an historical analysis of the current situation in Hungary. (D., HÖOK [Unified Student Union][11])

- It is very difficult, but clearly one of my tasks is to assess Hungarian youths' thoughts [on democracy...]. One of the possible reasons behind the drop in the acceptance of the democratic system is that the younger generations want to see a real change. It is no wonder that people say extremists gain strength during times of crisis; many believe these radicals are capable of solving our problems. They do not want to start a debate between the parties - they do not want them to waste their time criticizing each other's work. Let's instead give power to one of them: the one which is the lesser of the many evils. Let that party lead the country alone.

8 IKSZ [Young Christian Democratic Union] is the partner youth organization of the Christian Democratic People's Party (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt, "KDNP"), the fourth-largest political group in the Hungarian Parliament and a member of the European People's Party. Established in 2001, IKSZ is the only youth organization representing Christian Democratic values in Hungarian political life.
9 Jobbik IT [Jobbik Youth Platform] is the partner youth organization of the Movement for a Better Hungary, commonly known as Jobbik, a Hungarian radical nationalist, far-right political party enjoying large (10-20%) voter support. The party has been criticized for its anti-Roma rhetoric and its support of the illegal Hungarian Guard.

10 Fidelitas is the youth movement of the governing central-right party Fidesz, the party that currently holds an absolute two-thirds majority in parliament. This party has been plagued by accusations of anti-democratic tendencies and anti-market policies.
11 HÖOK [National Union of Hungarian Students] represents approximately 400 000 students around the country. It has a right to express its opinion and to make proposals about any questions concerning higher education. The historical predecessor of the HÖOK was the MEFESZ, which played an active role in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, when Hungarians revolted against communist oppression. HÖOK completes national-level tasks regarding higher education and youth policy that cannot be carried out at the institutional or regional levels. The National Union of Hungarian Students has a local student union (HÖK) in every higher education institution in Hungary.

Efficiency and speed are probably the leading motifs behind this belief and logic. Unfortunately, many people do not realize that speed is not always the answer to our problems. (E., Nemzeti Ifjúsági Tanács [National Youth Council][12])

- Despite the fact that in certain situations, and I emphasize "in certain situations", a centralized, authoritarian system can function more efficiently than a populace-driven democratic system. I believe democracy is crucial, and I am a supporter of it. I cannot assess any of history's dictatorships positively. I'm not saying that it could not be done better, but what we have seen thus far in history has been executed badly. I can't really think of a dictatorship where people were happy in general. (P., Szent Ignác Szakkollégium [Saint Ignác Professional Faternity]

I. 3. Full-time college and university students' views on democracy

Our initial hypothesis was that for the generations growing up after 1990, the difference between the "general idea of democracy" and "democracy in practice" in post-1989 Hungary is of key importance. This is because the two in reality are different, and this difference has yet to be recognized in either academic discourse or by the general public. In our research we hypothesized that it is exactly the subjects of our study, the younger generation, who are confronting the differences between an ideal democracy and democracy in practice in Hungary. The *Aktív Állampolgárság Alapítvány* (Active Citizenship Foundation) summarized the developing Hungarian situation and the young generations' position in society at a conference about democracy in the following manner (KENDE 2008, 6):

> Since the change of regime, a new generation has matured in Hungary. This generation's political activism, political attitude, and relationship to democracy does not diverge completely from those of the previous generation. The new generation of «Homo Kádárikusz»[13] grew up short-sighted and overly concerned with materialistic needs. Though their society was freer, it lacked both the social solidarity and certainty of the previous era.

Even though the new system is different both institutionally and functionally from the previous one, and despite the current system being the antithesis of the previous system ideologically (SZABÓ I. 1994, 62–63), to this day there are certain patterns remaining in the new system from the Kádár period that suggest some sort of continuity between the two. The generations that grew up after the regime change do not have direct memories or experiences of the Kádár era; their views on socialism are thus primarily shaped by the contemporary institutions that play a key role in the political socialization of youth (e.g. family, school, peer group and media).

In the *Active Youth Hungary 2013* study, full-time students were asked to compare the Kádár era with the current system along nine dimensions. The majority of the students surveyed were born during the early stages of the transition from dictatorship to democracy (1990–1993), i.e., for the majority of them the previous era is purely history.

We found that most Hungarian university and college students are indecisive when it comes to expressing their views on democracy. This appears to stem from difficulties in critically evaluating and synthesizing the available information rather than a general lack of information related to politics and society. Many of the youths we surveyed gave contradictory statements when answering different sections of the survey. Some individuals, for example, gave responses in favor of dictatorship while conveying satisfaction with the current democratic system and simultaneously signaling a willingness to support a green party, the LMP.[14] Other respondents declared their support for the state-financed tertiary education system and protested against the reduction of the number of state-financed positions in higher education while at the same time supporting the governing party (Fidesz)[15] which bears responsibility for introducing this policy. These contradictions may, in our view, have to do with the predominance of the affective domain in the articulation of political affiliation in contemporary Hungary.

The opinions of our respondents about the late communist Kádár era[16] versus the new capitalist era can be summarized in 3 points:

1. Respondents believe that under the Kádár era, social security was the greatest priority, with university and college students listing the guarantee of day-to-day survival as a specific (positive) component of the previous system. They also believe that finding an apartment and finding a job were both easier in the Kádár era.

2. They equate the new capitalism with new personal freedoms, for instance an increase in the opportunities offered by the emergent entertainment industry. However, many of our young respondents felt that their generation was progressively losing access to higher education and tended to associate this worrisome trend with the new system too. We must mention that there is some confusion in this regard, as the 2000–2010 period was characterized by a strong increase in state-funded university places.

3. According to our data, the current younger generation judges both the Kádár era and the current system based on the individual's ability to succeed. In this framework, the current system – which they have come to know through experience – is perceived as better than the previous one, but our overall impression is that members of this generation do not feel a belonging to contemporary society and are dissatisfied with its workings.

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12 Nemzeti Ifjúsági Tanács [National Youth Council - NYC] was founded on 1 December 2012 for the purpose of supporting both young people (between 18 and 35 years) and the representation of different youth organizations. The NYC aims to be the coordinating partner of Hungarian decision-making in all cases regarding youth. The NYC represents Hungarian youth and their standpoint both in Europe and worldwide. The establishment of the NYC opened the way for the representation of the young people of Hungary in foreign countries and also for joining the European Youth Forum.
13 This refers to the generation socialized during the Kádár era, the era named after János Kádár (1912–1989) who was the General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and presided over the country from 1956 until his retirement in 1988.

14 LMP [Politics Can Be Different] is a green Hungarian political party. Founded in 2009, it was one of four parties to win seats in the National Assembly in the 2010 parliamentary election.
15 Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union is the governing conservative party and currently holds an absolute two-thirds majority in the parliament.
16 Under the leadership of János Kádár Hungarian society began building a socialist Hungary. The regime's legitimacy was built on the claim that everybody could work and that the majority of people had an acceptable life, a secure present and a predictable future. Due to great industrialization efforts during the Kádár era, industrial production grew tenfold and 400 000 new flats were built to speed up the urbanization of the country.

Figure 1.
Students' opinion of the Kádár system and the current system, 2013
multidimensional scaling

Source: Active Youth Research, 2013.

Figure 2.
In your opinion, in the following dimensions, which system is better: the previous one (Kádár regime)
or the current (capitalist) one?
(2013, ±100 percentage scale, in which negative results refer to the percentage of respondents who preferred the
Kádár era in a particular dimension and positive results refer to the percentage who preferred the new capitalist era)

Source: Active Youth Research, 20
13.

These general claims are backed by our survey data. In the past four to five years, the number of students who are able to or who do not want to compare the two systems has grown substantially. While earlier studies (Ifjúság 2008) showed that the percentage of such respondents was around 10%, our data puts them somewhere between 14% and 24%.

The questions that produced the greatest uncertainty were those where the respondents were asked to compare the two systems; 38% of Hungarian university and college students were either incapable of saying or unwilling to say whether the new capitalism or the Kádár era was better. Additionally, both in the online and in-person surveys, a measurable percentage of the respondents claimed that neither system is better. In total, 44% of the students found the current system to be superior, while 18% thought the previous system was better. However, in our opinion the most interesting result is the extraordinarily large proportion of students who did not provide an answer to the survey questions.

I. 4. Students' views of the "existing" democracy

The consequences of the fragmented, semi-peripheral political socialization that we find to be characteristic of Hungary have influenced not only students' views of the Kádár era, but also their assessment of the new capitalist system's performance and their general expectations towards the political system. Those born after 1989 do not have direct memories of the dictatorship, and because of the shortcomings of the institutions responsible for their political socialization, they have very little information about the "old" era. Because of this, their opinions do not derive from ideological considerations of democracy, but rather from the direct experience of living in the "existing democracy". This powerfully shapes their views on democracy in general and in turn, has had a substantial impact on their choice between democracy and dictatorship.

Figure 3.
How satisfied are you with democracy in Hungary?
(2013, Distribution in Percentages)

Source: Active Youth Research, 2013.

As is apparent from this third diagram, almost three-quarters of the students surveyed were unhappy with democracy, while only 23% were satisfied to some degree. The most important factors influencing the level of satisfaction were religion and party preference. The most satisfied group was Christians, of whom 17% were completely satisfied and 28% were somewhat satisfied with democracy in Hungary. In contrast, 47% of atheists and 35% of non-religious respondents were completely dissatisfied with democracy in Hungary. Concerning party preference, we found that **a striking 70% of Fidesz supporters were somewhat or completely satisfied with democracy, while supporters of center-left parties were especially critical.** Among the supporters of Együtt 2014–PM[17] and smaller left-of-center parties, almost 90% of respondents were somewhat or completely dissatisfied with the state of democracy in Hungary. The supporters of the radical right-wing Jobbik party and the green party (LMP) were slightly less dissatisfied (with approximately 80% of supporters of both parties voicing dissatisfaction with democracy).

It is important to note that these numbers should not in and of themselves be read as a rejection of democracy as such, since high levels of dissatisfaction may only pertain to the "existing democracy", not to democracy as a system of political rule. Because of this, we decided to probe whether Hungarian university and college students would choose dictatorship over democracy. Beyond the standard large-sample survey answers to this dilemma ("democracy is better than all other political systems"; "in certain situations dic-

tatorships are better than democracy"; "for me, there is no difference between political systems") we added a fourth option, "the current situation is so bad that a dictatorship would be a better option"[18].

As the fourth diagram shows, **only 36% of respondents believe democracy is better than all other political systems.** Exactly one quarter of our respondents claimed that for them there is no difference between political systems, while another quarter claimed that dictatorship would be better than the current democratic system under certain conditions (20%), or even now (5%).

As is apparent from the third diagram, almost three-quarters of the students surveyed were unhappy with democracy, with only 23% of respondents reporting any satisfaction. There is no doubt that one of the most indicative factors for this question was religion, as well as party preference. The most satisfied group were Christians, of whom 17% were completely satisfied and 28% were somewhat satisfied with Hungarian democracy; in contrast, 47% of atheists and 35% of non-religious respondents were completely dissatisfied with democracy in Hungary today. Among political party supporters, a striking 70% of Fidesz supporters were somewhat or completely satisfied with democracy, while center-left supporters were especially critical. Among Együtt 2014–PM and smaller liberal party supporters, almost 90% of respondents were somewhat or completely dissatisfied with the state of democracy in Hungary. Among Jobbik supporters, 80% were dissatisfied, a similar result to LMP voters.

Figure 4.
Among the following statements, which one do you agree with the most?
(Percentages)

Source: Active Youth Research, 2013.

17 Együtt2014–PM [Together 2014-PM] is a political and electoral coalition of two parties: Együtt2014 [Together2014]) and Párbeszéd Magyarországért [Dialogue for Hungary]. Együtt is a completely new centrist liberal party that has no parliamentary representatives but is led by a fairly popular former Prime Minister, Gordon Bajnai. The PM party was formerly a branch of the LMP (a green party), which split off over battles over whether to ally with the Socialists and Együtt in an electoral battle against Fidesz. PM does have eight parliamentary seats in the National Assembly.

18 This additional option allows us to assess whether the same proportion of youth would prefer a dictatorship to a democracy if democracy functioned in a more ideal manner.

The assumption that students are comparing dictatorship to the current existing democracy, and not to an ideal democracy, is supported by our survey results (which show a relationship between the two variables).[19] Those who believe that the current situation is so bad that a dictatorship would be better logically display the highest disapproval rating (90%) of the current "existing" democracy in Hungary. It is also true, however, that those who think democracy is better than all other systems are still highly dissatisfied with the current democratic system.

During our research we were also interested in what factors make someone more likely to support a dictatorship. To answer this question, we created a binary logistical regression, in which we included all of the explanatory variables that the preliminary information suggested were relevant. These were the variables included: age, gender, number of unemployed family members, father's education level, perception of one's own financial situation, religion, place of residence, profession, party preference, as well as several identity explanatory variables such as whether the respondent is an environmentalist, nationalist, liberal, or conservative; a believer in order and stability; and interested or not in politics.

After running the regression, only a couple of the variables showed significant explanatory value. That is, there are only a few variables that are strongly correlated to perceptions of dictatorship. **The data suggests that those who are more conservative and who have stronger nationalistic identities, as well as those who believe in order and stability, are more likely to support dictatorship over democracy. Furthermore, men are 60% more likely to prefer dictatorship over democracy than women, while Jobbik voters tend to be on average 1.785 times more willing to support dictatorships than voters of other parties.** (For further statistical details, please see appendices).

II. Interest in "public affairs" and in "politics"

Politics is a power struggle, and in Hungary this struggle now has a strong negative connotation, conjuring images of mudslinging and personal attacks. Because of this, politics and politicians bring out very negative associations in people's minds. This is true for the younger generations too, and that just worsens the social crises. The interest in the public sphere and public issues, those problems, challenges, opportunities that surround us, the responsibility not just for oneself, but for those around us as well, these, on the other hand, are very positive things…P., Rajk László Szakkollégium [Rajk László Fraternity]

Sociological studies conducted in recent years in Hungary unanimously suggest that youths' level of political interest strongly shapes their assessment of the political system, their acceptance of political actors, and also the modes in which they become integrated into society (Szabó I.–Örkény 1998; Gazsó–Szabó A. 2002; Gazsó–Laki 2004; Szabó A.–Kern 2011, Laki–Szabó A. 2012a; Laki–Szabó A. 2012b.; Szabó A.–Oross 2012). Many previous studies have also pointed out that in international comparisons, Hungarian young people appear particularly uninterested in politics (Szabó A.–Kern 2011; Szabó A.–Oross 2012). The 6th wave of the European Social Survey, which was conducted at the end of 2012 and beginning of 2013, verified this worrisome tendency. If we compare the results obtained in Hungary in 2013 to those obtained in Hungary previously, the 6th wave of the survey suggests that among 15–29 year old citizens, interest in politics has dramatically decreased compared to both the 4th (2008) and the 5th (2010) waves of research.

Figure 5.
15–29 year old Hungarian citizens' interest in politics on a 4 point scale
according to ESS surveys (2002–2012) (average)

Source: European Social Survey (ESS – Hungary).

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19 A Pearson type Khi squared test statistic of 32.22. Significance level: 0.000, Phi value: 0,172.

The past 10 to 15 years of data collection pertaining to political socialization and voter behavior have also shown a tendency in the population of turning away from politics. More specifically, they showed a shift in the meanings attributed to politics. "Politics" had a neutral connotation until the mid-1980s, but youths' perception of the concept has steadily deteriorated since, with the word now having a strongly negative connotation (Szabó I. 2000, Laki–Szabó A.–Bauer 2001, Zsolt 2005). One paper on political socialization (Szabó I.–Örkény 1998) draws the conclusion that, compared to the results found in Szabó's earlier research conducted during the Kádár era, youth interest in politics has significantly fallen.[20] The authors hypothesize that one of the reasons for this tendency is a change in what that concept encompasses. This calls attention to the impact that semantic shifts can have on youths' perception of politics, as well as their views on political activism.

Building on previous research, the *Active Youth Hungary 2012* study hypothesized that since the change of regime in 1989–1990, the concept of politics has gone through a process of discreditation. The increasingly negative connotations associated with the concept have compelled members of the younger generation to subsume certain forms of social action (previously associated with politics) under the heading "public affairs." Because of this, we asked questions related to interest in a dual form, inquiring separately about politics and about public affairs. We hypothesized that the two would be correlated, but that interest in politics, because of its negative connotation, would be significantly smaller. We made the same type of distinction in other cases too. For example, instead of asking whether the respondent participated in some kind of online action pertaining to political issues or questions, we asked whether they post, vote, "like" or engage in other forms of action connected to social problems and public affairs. Our data from 2012 confirmed the importance of recognizing the negative connotations associated with politics, so we kept the politics/public affairs distinction in the second wave of our data collection (in 2013). Our newest data show that while the two conceptual domains (politics and public affairs) are closely connected, they are not the same for Hungarian college and university students.[21]

The *Active Youth Hungary 2013* study measures political interest on a five-point scale in order to conform to the standards set up by the previous *Ifjúság*-studies (Youth-studies).[22] In this way the results could be easily compared to the *Ifjúság2000*, *Ifjúság2004* and *Ifjúság2008* studies' sub-data sets containing university and college students. The results from the sub-data sets of all of *Ifjúság* studies suggest similar results, with an average interest of 2.6, and a standard deviation that would suggest that about 20% of the respondents were interested in politics (defined as a four or a five on the five-point scale). In comparison, our results suggest a higher level of interest, with the average being 3.0 (2013 second wave) and 3.1 (2012 first wave), and where 35% and 39% of respondents were respectively interested in politics. When asked about public affairs, the Hungarian students gave statistically significantly higher responses, averaging 3.7; 60% of the students were interested in public affairs, and only 10% were not interested at all.

Figure 6.
How interested are you in public affairs? How interested are you in politics?
(Scale 1 through 5; 1=not at all, 5=very interested)

Source: Szabó–Oross 2012 and Active Youth Research, 2013.

In our research we tried to locate the sociological variables with statistically significant explanatory value in explaining political interest. This topic has been researched at a deeper level in the recent past (Örkény–Szabó I. 1999, Szabó A.–Kern 2011, Laki–Szabó A. 2012). From these studies it becomes clear that interest in politics is correlated with several important explanatory variables. The effect of political socialization is obvious; family background, such as social status of the parents, also seems to be important; personal attributes do not seem to be irrelevant either. The *Active Youth Hungary 2013* study examined these interests through the binary logistic model.[23] The results of this analysis are outlined in the next section.

II. 1. Interest in "public affairs"

Interest in public affairs is correlated with the respondent's family background. The children of fathers holding a college or university diploma are 1.315 times more likely to be interested in public affairs than the children of lesser-educated fathers. (For further statistical details, please see appendices).

If we look at differences between fields of study (majors) a respondent is engaged in, we find that those studying in technical and legal departments show significant deviations from the average. Those in the technical departments are 0.693 as likely to be interested as the average student, while those in the legal departments are 1.974 as likely to be interested in public affairs as the average.

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20 While in the 70s and 80s 12% of youth responded that they were interested in politics, by the mid-90s this number fell to between 3 and 6% (depending on the age group).
21 The correlation between the two variables is extremely strong in both waves of data collection: Cramer type V value: 0.420 sig=0.000. r2=0.7, significance 0.000 and r2=0.65 significance 0.000. In addition, the symmetry between the two variables is relatively high, that is, low values in one variable tend to suggest low values in the other, and vice versa.
22 In contrast to the European Social Survey where they use a 4–point scale.

23 The dependent variables: (1st model) take on 1 if the respondent answered 4 or 5 in interest in public affairs. In the 2nd model, the dependent variables take on 1 if the respondent answered 4 or 5 in interest in political matters.

Ideological self-positioning matters too. If the student describes himself or herself as a "rightist", he or she is expected to be 1.133 times as likely to be interested in public affairs. Supporting one of the right-wing parties (Fidesz or Jobbik) does not seem to affect the level of interest in public affairs; however, Együtt 2014–PM voters are 1.85 times as likely to be interested in public affairs as others.

The conduciveness of interest in public affairs to translate into political participation is supported by our empirical findings: a one-unit increase in the number of traditional activities a respondent has participated in correlates with a 26% increase in the chance that the individual is interested in public affairs. Similar results can be found regarding online political participation; however, the coefficient there is significantly larger. One additional online activity is paralleled by a 117% increase in the chance the respondent will be interested in public affairs.

II. 2. Interest in "politics"

Unlike in the previous model, there is no significant correlation between the interest in politics of young people and whether their fathers hold college or university degrees, nor any correlation between interest in politics and an individual's field of education (consult table 3 in the appendices for detailed results). There is a strong link, however, between interest in politics and the gender of the respondent: men tend to be on average 1.785 times more interested in politics than women. There is also a connection between interest in politics and the acceptance of dictatorial systems. Respondents who tend to favor authoritarian systems are on average 1.305 times more likely to be interested in politics. Concerning party preference we would only highlight one finding: supporters of Együtt 2014–PM are 3.154 times more likely to be interested in politics than the average respondent.

II. 3. Online news consumption

Because online news portals have become the dominant source of news among young Hungarians too (SÁGVÁRI 2011), we attempted to identify the preferential choices of college and university students. Focusing on those who revealed their party preference, we can say that *index.hu* is the most-read online news source within every political group. For liberal party supporters, *hvg.hu* is second, followed by *origo.hu*.[24] Among those who vote for right-wing parties, we see that the aforementioned news portals switch places in popularity. *Kuruc.info*, a news portal operated from the US which provides space for extremist, xenophobic voices, is the most read online news source among supporters of Jobbik (with more than 26% claiming to be frequent visitors of the website).

The least-popular news portals were the sites of the dominant right-wing and left-wing national newspapers (*Magyar Nemzet – mno.hu* and *Népszabadság – nol.hu*). However, the political orientation of their readers is clear: 8% of the individuals favoring Fidesz read *mno.hu*; 14% of MSZP (Social Democratic Party)[25] and 12% of Együtt 2014–PM voters read *nol.hu* regularly.

Table 1.
Distribution of on-line news portal readers with respect to their preferred political party
(Distribution in percentages)

	DK[26]*	Együtt–PM	Fidesz	Jobbik	LMP	MSZP
Index.hu	54	58	40	31	50	32
Origo.hu	25	36	28	25	31	27
Hvg.hu	8	48	18	15	35	32
Mandiner.hu	0	5	6	1	9	3
Nol.hu	8	12	5	1	7	14
Mno.hu	0	4	8	2	3	3
Hir24.hu	0	6	7	5	4	3
Stop.hu	0	1	1	1	0	3

* Because of the low number of respondents who disclosed themselves as DK supporters, the data for DK is only for indicative purposes.

Source: Active Youth Research, 2013.

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24 In terms of ideological oritentation it is not easy to characterize these portals (except for hvg.hu, which can be qualified as liberal or social-liberal). Index.hu and Origo.hu are both characterized by deep political scepticism and by a commitment to a liberal minimum (to basic human and political rights, to the maintaining of checks-and-balances, and to the rule of law).

25 The Hungarian Socialist Party (Hungarian: Magyar Szocialista Párt, MSZP) is a social democratic political party in Hungary. MSZP lost the 2010 elections (won by Fidesz with a 2/3 majority), gaining only 19.,3% of the vote and 58 seats in the parliament. Currently they are the biggest opposition party in Hungary. The MSZP has low support among young people. This finding has held true since the regime change, and over time the disproportionate age composition of the party has become an increasingly serious problem for it. Only 15% of MSZP voters are under 30 years old, 43% are over 60 years old, and the average age of the membership is 55.9 years (Bíró-Nagy 2012, 203).
26 The Democratic Coalition (Hungarian: Demokratikus Koalíció), abbreviated to DK, is a center-left political party in Hungary led by former Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány. Founded in 2010 as a group within the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), the party split from the MSZP on 22 October 2011 and became a separate party. It has ten MPs in the National Assembly.

III. Hungarian university and college students' values

There are many perspectives from which it is worthy and legitimate to study students' values. While this study is principally concerned with analyzing Hungarian students' relationship to politics, it is worthwhile to briefly examine potential shifts in values and the role of values in shaping political preferences. To this end, we have turned to Ronald Inglehart's analytical framework and examined whether a "post-materialistic"[27] perspective has emerged in Hungary too amongst youth. Could the significant societal transformations that took place in the last 20–25 years have created space for values that mark a departure from the past generations' materialistic value-system?

III. 1. Methodological framework

In our data collection process, we ensured that it would be possible to distinguish between materialistic and post-materialistic value-structures. One of the questions in the survey was: "among the following eight values, please select the two that you sympathize with the most." These were the possible values that one could choose from:

- More power to influence government and public affairs
- Thoughts are worth more than money
- More beautiful cities
- War on crime
- War on inflation
- Economic growth
- Order in the country
- Less impersonal society

The categories were created according to Inglehart's analytical framework. The values are divided in the following way between the two categories:

Table 2.
The division of values between materialistic and post-materialistic according to Active Youth Hungary 2013

Post-Materialistic Values	Materialistic Values
More power to influence government and public affairs	War against crime
Thoughts are worth more than money	War against the rise in pries
More beautiful cities	Economic growth
Less impersonal society	Order in the country

Source: Active Youth Hungary Research, 2013.

Respondents who chose two post-materialistic items (out of the four) were categorized as post-materialistic. Conversely, those who selected two materialistic items were classified as materialistic. Furthermore, those who selected one of each group were classified as "mixed value-structured."

III. 2. Findings

Our findings show that there is a new type of mindset present amongst the Hungarian youth, one that is characterized by an openness to new values considered post-materialistic according to Inglehart's framework. This is even more interesting because up until this point, the traditional materialistic value-structure has been the dominant one for all generations; it is only in this millennium that a new trend has emerged among the youth. It is important, however, not to over-emphasize the importance of these developments. The current socio-economic and political environment is not particularly favorable for the emergence and strengthening of post-materialism. It is also important to note that, despite their appearance in the sample, post-materialistic respondents make up a small minority.

Figure 7.
The distribution of students according to their value preferences

Source: Active Youth Hungary Research, 2013.

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27 In his Silent Revolution (1977), Inglehart addressed transformations in Western European value-structures since the end of the Second World War. (See Inglehart 1997, 33–34).

III. 2. 1. What we know about those who prioritize post-materialistic values

As the diagram above shows, about 10% of Hungarian students are post-materialistic, strictly speaking. Unsurprisingly, those who describe themselves as green are almost twice as likely to prioritize post-materialistic values. In Hungary, however, there were even stronger predictors. Those who study social sciences or were enrolled in liberal arts programs were twice as likely to choose post-materialistic values over materialistic ones.

Another predictor was one's relation to traditional male-female roles. Those who found traditional male-female roles important, or more precisely, who agreed with the statement "a man's responsibility is to make money, a woman's responsibility is housekeeping and to take care of the children" were almost three times less likely to pick post-materialistic values.

The strongest negative indicator of post-materialistic values, however, happened to be support of Jobbik. Among Hungarian university and college students, Jobbik supporters are almost three times less likely to commit to post-materialistic values than the average student. It is important to emphasize that we cannot know for sure the direction of the causal relationship, that is, whether support of Jobbik induces one to prioritize materialistic values, or whether materialistic values induce one to support Jobbik, or whether the relationship is multi-directional (with both indicators mutually influencing each other).

A vote for LMP also has strong explanatory value in predicting post-materialistic values. LMP voters are almost 1.7 times as likely as the average Hungarian student to choose a post-materialistic value-set. (It is perhaps noteworthy that those who prioritize post-materialistic values are more likely to find democracy superior to dictatorship in all situations).

Earlier research has linked the emergence of post-materialism to the so-called Critical Mass generation (Szabó A.–Kern 2011). These researchers describe members of this subcultural category as individuals possessing substantial social capital, coming from highly educated families and living in or around the capital city. Importantly, they also tend to emanate from the ranks of those who have been called the "winners" of the transition. Our 2013 data set, qualitative interviews and focus group discussions confirmed the salience of these characteristics and thereby strengthened the claims of earlier research (Szabó A.–Kern 2011, and Keil 2012).

III. 2. 2. What we know about those who prioritize materialistic values

Materialistic values are considered to be traditionally dominant in Hungarian society and this dominance has undeniably left a strong mark on political culture and political thinking. After the Second World War, most notably during the period of 'welfare socialism', the satisfaction of material needs became the primary goal of most Hungarians. Additionally, traditional societal values – such as family and the local community – were relegated to the background based on ideological considerations. Taken together, these two trends largely explain why the primary expectation of the Hungarian population during the period of regime change was an improvement in living standards rather than an expansion of political freedoms.

Our data show that materialistic values are still predominant amongst college and university students today. More than half of our respondents can be characterized as materialistic based on their choices among the eight values cited above. This substantiates our previous claim that post-modern values have barely penetrated even the best-educated segment of Hungarian society. The dominance of materialistic values is unquestionable, despite the appearance of a counter-trend.

Table 3.

Explanatory variables and students' value system according to the 2013 data collection. Binary Logistic regression

Explanatory Variables	Materialistic Values	Post-Materialistic Values	Mixed Values
	Exp(B)	Exp(B)	Exp(B)
Would vote for Jobbik	1.925***	0.364**	0.727
Would vote for Együtt–PM	0.673**	0.969	1.634**
Would vote for LMP	0.580**	1.680	1.342
Subscribes to green values	0.652**	1.900**	1.157
Believes that "Democracy is better than all other political systems"	0.721**	1.313	1.219
Studies Economics	1.352	1.033	0.661**
Studies Liberal arts/Social sciences	0.791	1.968**	0.887
Agrees that "A man's responsibility is to make money, a woman's responsibility is housekeeping, and to take care of the children"	1.284	0.385**	0.951
Lives in Budapest	0.783	1.473*	1.062
Father has college or university diploma	0.784*	1.101	1.248
Would vote for Fidesz	1.288	0.721	0.943
Technical Studies	1.191	0.628	0.945
Legal Studies	1.196	1.068	0.851
Male	0.855	1.173	1.075
"I don't have problems"	1.348	0.590	0.893
Participation in offline organizations/events	0.965	1.068	1.005
Participation in on-line organizations/events	0.906	1.026	1.074
Agrees that "Among the poor, most are at fault for their situation"	1.057	0.529	1.162

Source: Active Youth Hungary Research, 2013.

When considering explanatory factors explaining the materialistic/post-materialistic divide we found that support for Jobbik is one of the factors which most strongly pushes students to prioritize materialistic values. Someone who supports this radical, right-wing party is twice as likely to prefer materialistic values over post-materialistic ones compared to someone who does not. It is also noteworthy that respondents who support traditional gender roles – that is, those who agreed with the statement "a man's responsibility is to make money, a woman's responsibility is housekeeping, and to take care of the children" – were statistically more likely to choose materialistic and mixed values than the average population.

When we examine which explanatory variables statistically decrease the chance of someone preferring materialistic values, we see that voting for LMP, defining oneself as green, and supporting Együtt 2014–PM stand out. Additionally, agreeing with the statement "democracy is better than all other political systems" and having a father possessing a college or university diploma also make someone less likely to be "materialistic" in value-orientation.

All in all, respondents who chose a purely materialistic value-set were more likely to be Jobbik voters and to manifest traditional views on gender roles. On the other hand, someone subscribing to non-materialistic values is more likely to be green and to vote for either LMP or Együtt 2014–PM.

III. 2. 3. How to characterize people with mixed values?

The third group of people in our study included those who picked one materialistic and one post-materialistic value out of the eight value items we presented then with. This group encompassed nearly four-tenth of the sampled population, thus they cannot simply be excluded from this analysis. Among explanatory variables, support of Együtt 2014–PM stands out. This correlation also highlights the socio-cultural heterogeneity of Együtt 2014–PM's support base among university and college students.

Briefly about green youth

In this section we briefly characterize the respondents who labeled themselves as green in our survey. **Female students, those who live in Budapest, and those who have fathers holding a college and university degree are more likely to qualify themselves as green.** On the left/right political-ideological scale, it is true that the more "rightist" someone is, the less likely s/he will be identify himself of herself as "green." In terms of political interest the findings formulated in relation to Western Europe are also valid in Hungary: the more interested an individual is in "public affairs" or "politics", the more prone s/he will be to call himself or herself "green".

As one may well intuit, membership in an environmental organization also increases the chances of someone self-identifying as "green." In terms of education, **those who study liberal arts or social sciences are more likely to be green than those pursuing other tracks in higher education.** Finally, LMP voters are also more likely to be "green", while **support of Jobbik is one of the strongest barriers to this kind of self-ascription.**

IV.   Political participation among Hungarian youth

Studies conducted in the 90s and focusing on different forms of democratic participation (Stumpf–Gazsó 1992) found a reticence towards traditional forms of political participation was strong in all of the age groups. One noteworthy analysis (Gazsó–Laki 2004) attributed this self-conscious distancing from politics to negative connotations associated with political parties. In the following decade, studies focusing on youth and politics all drew on the large-sample *Ifjúság (*Youth) surveys conducted every four years (Szabó A.–Bauer–Laki 2002, Bauer–Szabó A. 2005, Bauer–Szabó A. 2009). While these datasets restricted their analyses to an investigation of young people's attitudes towards political institutions, the most recent international studies have fortunately utilized a wider definition of what participation is. This shift allows us to make the following assertions.

While in the past decades there has been a clear decrease in traditional forms of political participation (voting, participation in political organizations, connection to political institutions) in Western Europe, other indicators show an increase in issue-driven civic participation (Dalton 2008; Inglehart 1997; Norris 2002, 2007; Klingemann–Fuchs 1995; Pattie et al. 2004; Kriesi 2008; Dalton et al. 2004). In other words: voting, campaigning, and participation in political parties may have become unpopular, but participation in protests and citizen lobby groups have clearly become more popular. While some researchers have interpreted these trends as reflecting growing skepticism and apathy (Henn–Weinstein–Wring 2002) others have called attentions to the danger inherent in formulating oversimplified claims such as "the youth have become disillusioned with politics" (Zukin–Keeter–Andolina–Jenkins–Delli Carpini 2006, 118–189). It may well be the case that the upcoming generations are simply interested in inventing novel forms of political participation (Phelps 2004).

The emergence of novel forms of participation presents a theoretical challenge, prompting researchers to come up with new concepts and distinctions. One such innovation has been the separation of the "political" and "civic" forms of participation. (Dahlgren 2000; Dalton 2004; de Vreese 2006; Dunleavy 1996; Livingstone–Bober–Helsper, 2005; O'Toole–Lister–Marsh–Jones–McDonagh 2003; Phelps 2005; Verba et al., 1995). Other salient theoretical attempts include: Banes and Kaase's (1979) distinction between "traditional" and "non-traditional" forms of participation, Inglehart and Catterberg's (2002) focus on "elite-driven" and "anti-elitist" mobilization, Norris' (2002) "citizen-oriented" and "case-oriented" participation, and Dalton's "responsibility-based" and "commitment-based" participation.

These different attempts at conceptualization have engendered an emerging methodological consensus according to which research focusing on explaining political participation should seek to group different forms of participation into clusters. We draw on this insight, as well as on Verba, Scholzman, and Brady's advice (1995) to approach the explanation of participation through a focus on resources as key conditions of existence. This led us to create the following group of three categories:

1. "Traditional" forms of political participation: Using the approach suggested by Andrea Szabó and Tamás Kern (2011, 18–19) we subsumed participation at elections and participation in political organizations (political parties, unions), as well forms of participation related to these organizations (such as campaigning, participation at meetings, wearing the symbols of these organizations, etc.) under this label. These forms, which have been around since the dawn of democracy and have become interconnected historically, usually require different levels of individual involvement and achieve different results from the perspective of the collective and the individual.

2. "Collective" or "direct" forms of political participation: These comprise forms of participation that require personal involvement but do not require long-term commitment on behalf of the actor. We further distinguish between face-to-face activities that require significant resources and intensive involvement from activities that do not require these. Examples of the former subtype include direct forms of protest such as sit-ins, blockades, expressive and symbolic acts (such as hunger strikes). Direct forms of political participation that require few resources, come with low risk and require low levels of commitment include the signing of statements, petitions and initiatives.

3. "New" or "virtual" forms of political participation: With the help of the internet it has become possible to take part in both traditional and collective forms of political participation, for example, through blogging, posting, and other forms of social media use. This new form of participation typically requires low levels of commitment and few resources.

One of our key aims was to analyze whether a new form of political activism is present among Hungarian university and college students and whether this new form of online political participation and activism is truly different in nature and consequences from those which have been identified hitherto. Additionally, we wanted to examine the connections between different forms of political participation.

Before conducting this study, we formulated a hypothesis that can visually be represented with the help of a simple diagram (see Figure 8). In brief, our hypothesis was that participation in elections and membership in organizations would strongly dominate the space of political mobilization, that collective (or direct) forms of participation would play a significantly smaller role, and that new (virtual) forms of participation would play as prominent a role as traditional forms of participation. Naturally, all three types have overlapping areas, where the middle area, overlapped by all three political spheres of activism, encompasses those young individuals who are the most active in society. On the other end of the spectrum we hypothesized that the relative majority of youth would not actively take part in "politics", and would not participate in "public affairs" either, i.e., the majority of youth is completely passive in this sense.

Figure 8.
Hypothesis relating to political participation

Source: Szabó A.–Oross 2012, 95.

IV. 1. Traditional forms of participation

From the traditional forms of participation prevalent in liberal democracies we chose one factor, young people's willingness to vote in the upcoming parliamentary elections, to measure involvement in traditional forms of political participation.

IV. 1. 1. Level of organization

There have been a number of studies conducted in the past ten years regarding the level of formal organization among Hungarian youth (e.g., the *Ifjúság* studies), which unanimously describe youth as a disorganized, fragmented generation. All of the examinations showed, however, that among the youth, those in university and college form a small isolated island that is somewhat of an exception to the general rule. They are the ones who are relatively more active, of whom a relatively large proportion (e.g.– 55% of those studying at university) have some form of organizational affiliation (Szabó A.–Kern 2011, 69). The *Active Youth Hungary 2012* study backed up this assertion (Szabó A.–Oross 2012).

As in the study conducted a year and a half earlier, our 2013 study found that sports organizations are by far the most popular terrains for youth participation; it would, of course, be an exaggeration to define their participation in such organizations as "political". The second most popular type of youth organization was academic (scientific/ professional) organizations, which attracted every fifth respondent, followed by cultural, arts-related clubs and organizations, as well as religious organizations. The remaining organizations

(we listed twelve in our survey) did not draw large crowds and were therefore significantly less relevant than the previously mentioned categories. Perhaps the most important development of the past year with regards to higher education, and one which generated widespread media attention, was the revival of student mobilization with the lead of one informal organization, the HaHa (Hallgatói Hálózat – Student Network), with which 2% of our respondents claimed to be affiliated.

Figure 9.
Are you affiliated with the following groups or organizations?
(Distribution of groups mentioned by more than 10% of respondents)

Source: Active Youth Research, 2013.

The results showed that 40% of Hungarian university and college students responded negatively to all of the organizations, that is, they were not formally affiliated with any of the listed types of organizations; 29% were affiliated with one organization, and a further 17% were affiliated with two organizations. Only 15% of the students were affiliated with more than two organizations. (The average number of affiliations was 1.4, where 0 is being affiliated with none of the types listed, and 12 is being affiliated with all twelve types of organizations).

The data suggests that the likelihood of developing formal ties to civil society grows in parallel with respondents' education levels. The strength of the relationship also increases linearly with the time spent in higher education, and it is those enrolled in PhD programs who are most likely to be affiliated with a formal organization. What the respondent was studying was also an important factor in determining how many and what types of organizations the respondent joined. Those enrolled in religious studies, for example, though there are relatively few of them, were living a much more active organizational life than those in other programs. Perhaps it is not completely evident, but there is no significant difference between supporters of different political parties with respect to their levels of organizational affiliation.

With a view to measuring informal participation in civil society, during the data collection

process we asked respondents to indicate whether they were involved in the activities of informal groups and communities (such as a music group, hobby group, or film club). Our examination and survey finds that about 56% of youth take part in such informal social and cultural activities.

Because it became clear from the data that youth connection and relation to politically active organizations or organizations related to public affairs is significantly weaker than their participation in non-political organizations, we created an indicator from the results of our research specifically regarding participation in public affairs and politics-related organizations. Only organizations were listed that have an important political or public-affairs related role. These organizations include:

- Hök (local student union) (see footnote 11)
- HaHa (Student Network) (see footnote 6)
- other student unions and organizations
- churches and other religious groups;[28]
- human rights organizations
- political parties' youth wings
- environmental organizations
- other organizations involved in public affairs or politics

Our data shows that **36% of students**, i.e., slightly more than a third, **are affiliated with organizations involved in politics or public affairs**. More than half, or 58% respondents, are not connected to such organizations (6% provided no answer).

Figure 10.
Affiliation with organizations involved in public affairs and/or politics among Hungarian university and college students
(Distribution in percentages)

Source: Active Youth Research, 2013.

28 In Hungary, religious organizations often play a strong role in public and political life.

IV. 1. 2. Participation in elections

Sociologists who specialize in electoral participation examine willingness to participate before an election with the following question: "If there were a parliamentary election this Sunday (and you had the right to vote), would you definitely take part, likely take part, likely not take part, or definitely not take part in the voting?" When examining willingness to vote, it is not the past that is examined, but rather the future. Because of this, it is very difficult to compare this statistic with actual electoral participation rates, or with levels of organizational affiliation. To bridge this methodological gap, researchers suggest restricting the analysis to respondents who said they would "definitely participate" in an eventual election, because they are likely to actually vote in the future.

Comparing the results derived from the two waves of data collection (one at the end of 2012, and one at the beginning of 2012), the percentage of those who are certain of their electoral participation appears to have decreased. While at the end of 2011 and beginning of 2012 50% of university and college students were certain they would take part in an election next Sunday, in 2013 this statistic decreased to 47%. During our research we attempted to find answers to what factors affect youth willingness to participate in an election. In order to address this question, we conducted a binary logistic regression analysis.[29]

According to the regressions we ran, the models suggest that none of the following explanatory variables had any significant effect on willingness to vote: enrollment in technical studies, place of residence, subjective perception of one's own financial situation, opinion of dictatorship, parents' education level,[30] or whether the individual plans to work or study abroad. Interestingly, on-line activism (where a respondent can rate his or her activeness in the online community on a 1–5 scale) did not significantly influence voting behavior, while offline activism (which can produce a score of 1–14, depending on how many offline activities a respondent takes part in) did.

The models suggest that for each unit showing an individual is more interested in public affairs, the chances of participating in voting grow by a factor of 1.818.[31] When a respondent claims to be one unit more radical, his or her chances of taking part in voting are multiplied by 1.171.[32] **It is important to mention that Együtt 2014–PM voters are 4.033 times more likely and Fidesz voters are 2.691 times more likely to vote than the average student.** Those studying economics and related fields are 1.572 times as likely to vote as everyone else on average, while an increase of plus-one offline activity in public affairs or politics results in the model predicting a 28.9% increase in willingness to vote.

Willingness to vote and affiliation/membership in organizations are correlated, though not too strongly. In short, it can be said that the higher the probability that someone will take part in voting, the higher the probability that individual is affiliated with at least one organization.

Willingness to vote and affiliation with organizations openly involved in public affairs or politics are more strongly correlated. Those affiliated with such organizations are more willing to vote than those who are not members of such organizations and vice versa: the ratio of those affiliated with formal organizations is 5% higher among those who are certain they will vote.

All in all, based on the strong correlation between activism in public affairs and political organizations and willingness to vote, we can conclude that 30% of the students in Hungarian higher education are not involved in traditional forms of political participation. One quarter of them only declared willingness to vote (but had no affiliation with political or public affairs organizations), while 14% of them declared affiliation with such organizations but were not certain whether they would vote or not and **19% of the studied population participates in politics or public affairs in the traditional sense. They are the ones who would certainly take part in an upcoming election this Sunday, and who are also members of public-affairs and politics related organizations.** In the future we will refer to this small group as *traditional participants*.

Figure 11.

Different forms of traditional participation in public affairs/politics among Hungarian university and college students
(Distribution in percentages)

Source: Active Youth Research, 2013.

IV. 2. Collective participation

One of the important conclusions of the last wave of our research was that the stereotypical image of Hungarian students as a homogenous group of politically passive citizens needs to be revisited (Szabó A.–Oross 2012). The *Active Youth Hungary 2013* study, as in most dimensions, strengthened the results and the conclusions of the previous year's study in this field as well. We can now decidedly claim that the image of students spending all of their time in ruined pubs chugging beer has become outdated. We are not claiming that students like these do not exist, but to expand this stereotype to the whole of the student population is far from accurate.

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29 The model was significant.
30 Whether the father has a college diploma was used as a proxy for parents' education.
31 The interest in public affairs in the survey was stated on a scale of 1–5 (5 being very interested, 1 not at all interested).
32 A respondent could rate his or her opinion on a 1–7 scale. (1 being moderate, 7 radical).

University and college students were given 14 collective/direct participation activities,[33] and asked to specify whether they had ever participated in such events. According to our hypothesis, the frequency of these activities could be ranked based on the difficulty of partaking in such events.

The results suggested that only 26% of college and university students did not involve themselves in any of the listed activities. The rest partook in at least one, but most in more than one of the listed activities. In fact, one fifth of the respondents participated in four or more of the protesting activities associated under "collective/ direct participation." If we were to create an index based on the results of participation in the 14 listed events, where 0 would be equated with an individual not taking part in any and 14 describing an individual who partook in all 14 activities at least once in his or her life, then the average result would be 2.1. This strengthens the claim that those participating in one type of event are more likely to participate in a similar type of event.

According to our 2013 spring data collection, **the most popular form of *collective/direct* democratic participation among full-time students is boycotting;** 36% of respondents chose this answer. About 30% of respondents took part in petitions or signing political statements (asked separately), while **approximately 30% took part in protests** and 21% of respondents answered that they have contacted their local or national representatives.

Figure 12.

Have you taken part in the following activities?

(The distribution of answers that received more than 10% yes)

Source: Active Youth Research, 2013.

2012 was an important year for political protests, as Hungarians familiarized themselves with a new type of demonstration: spontaneous protests and marches. This form of protest has become the sixth most popular form of direct participation; 16% of tertiary education students took part in such activities, which is especially high considering that this form of protest did not really exist in Hungary previously.

This was the first time in our series of studies that we have measured "donations to organizations," because our experiences have shown that more and more political and civil organizations have been asking for donations from their supporters and sympathizers. About 16% of the responding students donated some amount of money to their preferred organization.

Only approximately one tenth of Hungarian college and university students were committed directly to a political party, which is proven by the fact that nearly one tenth of them participate in campaign activities or purposely wear symbols promoted by political parties. Finally, 10% of respondents "have been elected an official of an organization."[34]

The intensity of collective participation correlates with certain sociodemographic explanatory variables. These significant variables have changed somewhat since the last wave. While in the *Active Youth Hungary 2012* study high income, Budapest residence, and male gender were the strongest predictors of activism, this year lower-income students showed a drastic increase in direct/collective participation. This could be a result of a new level of dissatisfaction among students in Hungary.

Those who studied social sciences, arts-related studies, or religious studies were more likely to partake in *direct/collective* forms of participation. In terms of education, those who have taken part in higher education for several years (i.e., students in PhD and Masters programs) exhibited the highest level of political activism. Institutionally speaking, by far the most active students were those attending religious higher education institutions, as well as those attending private institutions. The least active were those attending state colleges. Those who follow the teachings of a church tended to have higher than average rates of activism, but the same could be said for those who claimed to be atheists. The two groups presumably support different political goals and ideologies.

When we examine the supporters of political parties, supporters of Együtt2014–PM are the most active, followed by Jobbik supporters, and then Fidesz supporters. The least active students with political preferences seem to be those who prefer MSZP.

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33 Signature collection on petitions; signing a political declaration; participation in a demonstration; spontaneous protest; marching on the street; boycott; campaign activity; wearing a button; contacting a politician; activity within a political party; running for office; becoming an elected official of an organization; donating money to a party or to an NGO.

34 It is important to mention that because of the strong aversion to political parties, we decided not to narrow down this question to one that distinguishes between political parties and organizations. Presumably the responding students understood this statement, legitimately, to encompass official positions in student unions and student legislative branches.

IV. 3. Virtual participation

"Seven years ago, to convince people to attend a protest required a very large effort from the organizers… There were events and protests that were planned and advertised half a year before the event. Today Matolcsy makes a speech in the morning, and by nighttime we have a protest in front of the National Bank." (András, Budapest)

"I think the internet has a positive effect. When there was no Facebook, not only were there fewer protests, but a section of the population had opinions, but was hidden. That section is finally revealed. Many people do not want to go to protests but still want to express their opinions. Facebook and the Internet give them a forum to do so. Because of this forum, many of these people have been encouraged, and very little is stopping them from actually participating in a protest. Perhaps Facebook can have a nourishing effect." (Noémi, Budapest)

Questions raised concerning the internet, the informational-communicative technologies connected to the internet, and political participation hosted online can be summarized by one question: does on-line activism mobilize new social groups? Does it provide a viable form of political participation to those who would otherwise not be willing to participate in public affairs or politics (see Szabó G.–Mihályffy 2009, 87.)? A recent study that focused on Hungarian youth and online political activism strengthens the earlier contention (Hári 2010, 104), that, at least among youth, the political potential of the internet is exploited primarily by those groups who are already committed and politically active.

The previous wave of our research found no or very slight differences between those in this third group of political participants (Virtual) and those in the first two (Traditional and Collective). In that wave, it appeared that the availability of new virtual forms of participation had not democratized the polity, i.e., these new modes did not mobilize new social groups (Szabó A.–Oross 2012). The Active Youth Hungary 2013 study, utilizing the previous results, also tested virtual participation. We asked five questions concerning online participation in connection with public affairs and social problems. The intensity of participation in the activities we asked about produced a clear hierarchical scale.

Figure 13.
Different forms of virtual participation
(Percentage of respondents who participate occasionally or frequently in the following activities)

Source: Active Youth Research, 2013.

When considering both occasional and sustained forms of participation, we found that more than half of the students who responded to our survey said they vote on-line, and 49% "liked" certain pages. About 41% of our respondents claim that they create events online too, 32% respond to others' comments, while 12% of them have their own blog.

Contrary to our expectations (we hypothesized that the radically decreasing "costs" associated with online participation would significantly increase participation rates), merely one tenth of the students in the survey report participating in the activities we listed on a frequent (systematic) basis. (When looking at the numbers, we see the same hierarchy as the one represented in Figure 13; it is nonetheless worthwhile to note that among the frequent/systematic participants in online activities, voting and the creation of events are similarly frequent.)

The truly interesting results come from the diagram presented below, which examines the activities that college and university students do *not* participate in. Almost one half of the students do not participate in "liking" issues related to public affairs. The proportion of students who engage in online voting on such issues barely reaches the fifty percent mark.

Figure 14.
Different forms of virtual participation (Distribution in percentages)

Source: Active Youth Research, 2013.

These results further reinforce the claim that virtual activism takes on more of a periodical and complementary role. In other words, on-line activism does not substitute for *traditional* or *collective/direct* forms of political participation. We note that because there is such a large gap between frequent/systematic and occasional online participation, we have chosen to utilize only the data from the frequent/systematic online participants in the following analysis.

IV. 3. 1. What factors influence online activism?

In our last research publication (SZABÓ A.–OROSS 2012) we hypothesized that online communication and participation is mostly characteristic of liberal and left-of-center students, while those positioning themselves on the political right will prefer offline participation. In our research we were also looking for answers to what explanatory variables help predict online political behavior. For this we conducted a linear regression model.[35]

Of the 33 possible explanatory variables, it was affiliation with public affairs/political organizations that had the strongest statistical effect on online participation. Pupils who disclosed affiliation with such organizations are characterized by 0.222 units higher reported online activity on average. The same went for interest in "public affairs": for each unit of increased interest in public affairs, the model predicted a 0.184 unit increase in online activity. "Political interest", similarly, had a strong positive effect; i.e., a one-unit increase in political interest, holding all other explanatory variables constant, leads the model to predict a 0.115 unit increase in online activism.[36]

In terms of political values and ideologies, only those who refer to themselves as "radical" showed a higher-than-average participation online. A one-unit increase in self-ascribed radicality predicts, on average, a 0.083 increase in political activism on-line.[37] **The hypothesis that perhaps liberal, center-left students are more active online than their classmates does not seem to be backed up by the data we have collected.**

Among the sociodemographic factors, we found a significant correlation for gender and a subjective view of one's own financial situation in predicting online participation and activism. Interestingly enough, perception of one's own financial situation shows a negative correlation, that is, the worse a student's perception of his or her financial situation is, the likelier it is that this person is politically active online.

Among the majors, only social sciences stood out: those enrolled in such studies are characterized on average by 0.107 units higher online activity than those enrolled in other studies. This is an important conclusion, because we hypothesized that the internet would activate social groups who do not have enough time to partake in traditional and collective forms of political participation because of associated "costs" (i.e., time). This hypothesis, as we have already claimed, turned out to be unfounded. The remaining 25 explanatory variables did not show significant results.

The data on virtual participation, therefore, does not validate the hypothesis that virtual participation replaces or substitutes for other forms of political participation. Virtual and non-virtual political participation are not alternatives of each other, but complement each other. **The internet provides a new complementary form of activism for those students who have been already been classified as politically active.**

The question is whether this generalization is true for occasional on-line activism as well. Perhaps it is occasional, infrequent participation that allows otherwise politically inactive students to express their opinions. Perhaps for those with fixed schedules and little free time, periodical online participation is a type of refuge from passivity, an appropriate channel that allows these otherwise passive students to, on occasion, express their opinions and become politically active, even if only through virtual mediums.

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35 The model was significant.
36 The interest in public affairs and in political matters in the survey was stated on a scale of 1–5 (5 being very interested, 1 not at all interested).

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37 A respondent can scale his or her opinion on a 1–7 scale. (1 being moderate, 7 radical).

Table 4.
On-line participation according to respondent's major*
(Distribution in percentages)

	No partici-pation	Occasional Participation	Frequent Par-ticipation
Computer Science	46%	41%	13%
Doctoral Science	46%	44%	9%
Medical Science (not doctoral)	41%	47%	12%
Agrarian Sciences	38%	45%	17%
Technical Sciences	33%	53%	14%
Economic Fields	31%	53%	16%
Average	31%	52%	17%
Artistic Training	30%	45%	25%
Natural Sciences	27%	56%	17%
Legal Studies	26%	54%	20%
Teaching	22%	67%	12%
Liberal Arts	20%	57%	23%
Social Sciences	16%	51%	33%

*Only majors with at least 20 respondents included

Source: Active Youth Research, 2013.

The above table suggests that natural science, legal studies, liberal arts, and pedagogy students showed higher-than-average participation rates in "occasional" online activism. Among the listed majors, those in the legal studies and liberal arts programs already exhibited higher-than-average "frequent" online activism, i.e., the new group in this segment seems to be natural science students and future teachers. In their cases it can be argued that they have made use of the new opportunities offered by virtual forms of participation to engage in political activism. **In the cases of the other majors tested in the hypothesis, however, (such as medical science, technical, and computer sciences), there is no such connection; students enrolled in these programs are overrepresented among those who do not engage in virtual activism.**

IV. 3. 2. How to explain students' participation in protests organized online?

"The advantages and disadvantages of communication online are the same. The news and communication reaches many people, many of these people commit to coming, but then many forget about it altogether. That' because after a while people are invited to so many events that they don't even check what they are invited to anymore. This takes away from the quality and importance of an invitation, and from that point on, invitations are not taken seriously (on either side). It's different from when you get an invitation by hand. That you do not forget. This is why (in this dimension) it is worthwhile to stay with the traditional approach." (Marietta, Szeged)

" So many stimuli affect us on a day-to-day basis in the world of smartphones and wifi that we don't even notice posters anymore. It's good to have movement-organizations on the web, as well as communication, we just have to be very careful with it. We have to make sure a message does not register as spam for someone. Instead, a message should include useful information. That is, we cannot overstep the stimuli threshold, after which the targeted audience will ignore the message presented to them." (Tamás, Szeged)

After the importance of the internet became clear during the 2012 student protests[38] our research group decided to directly ask respondents whether they have ever taken part in protests organized online. One fifth of the respondents reported taking place in protests, demonstrations and movements of which they had been notified online.

To understand which factors have influenced someone to participate in a protest organized through the internet, we examined the responses with the help of a binary logistic model. Of the relevant explanatory variables in the model,[39] the largest effect is exhibited by organizational affiliation. Provided the respondent was a member of HaHa (Student Network), the model predicts a 9.157 higher probability of the individual partaking in an internet-organized protest.

In terms of party-preference predictors, Együtt 2014–PM voters are predicted to be 2.063 more likely to participate in an internet-organized protest, while those who support Fidesz are three times less likely as the average student to engage in such an event. Respondents' place of residence also proved to be a significant predictor: living in Budapest increased the model's prediction of an individual's chance of participating in an event organized through the internet by a factor of 1.782. Some of the explanatory variables which proved to be insignificant were radicalism, interest in public affairs, the field of one's major, or one's view on dictatorship.

38 Students protested against the Hungarian government's planned cuts in state subsidies to finance college tuition in Budapest on 10 December 2012. More than 1000 students rallied, blocking bridges over the Danube in freezing weather, and marched to Parliament. The protest later became a nationwide movement and students organized similar actions in different Hungarian cities over the course of several weeks.
39 The model was significant.

An important result of our research is that we can confirm the expectations of skeptics with regard to online participation. **In our model, online participation and activism did not show a statistically significant, important role in determining whether an individual participated in protests organized through the internet. That is, just because someone systematically, frequently reads and clicks on online news headlines, blogs, pages, "likes" and comments, he or she is not any more likely to participate in an offline demonstration.** When analyzing this conclusion, it is also important to consider (for comparative reasons) that one additional offline event participation correlates with, on average, a 45.6% increase in the chance of an individual participating in protest organized through the internet.

IV. 4. Conclusion

Leading up to our study, we hypothesized that voting and organizational membership would be the primary determinants of political mobilization, that direct forms of participation will play a significantly smaller role and will be trumped by new, virtual forms of participation. We also hypothesized that the three types of participation would mobilize overlapping constituencies, with the "middle region" encompassing the politically most-active Hungarian youths.

Contrary to our predictions, direct forms of participation ended up taking the most dominant position; almost three-quarters of youth participated in some form of direct participation in their lives. This means that to understand Hungarian college and university students' participation it is vital to closely examine these direct forms of participation; 19% of the students reported participating in traditional forms of political activities, while the ratio of those who claimed to participate in virtual activities was significantly below our expectations – only 17% claimed to have done so. We summarized our results in an aggregated diagram presented below.

It is interesting to note that singular participation is very rare (less than 10% of all cases). If a student is at least occasionally active in one form of activity, s/he is likely become active in other forms too.

Figure 15.
The aggregated model of participation in public affairs and/or politics

19% Traditional

Traditional and collective 11%

32% Either not active in any sense, or there is no data available.

Traditional participation 2%

ACTIVE 6%

Collective 40%

Virtual participation 1%

17% Virtual

Virtual and collective 9%

74% Collective

Source: Active Youth Research, 2013.

32% of the surveyed students distanced themselves from all forms of political activity (or the data on them was not adequate) and were thus **passive**. These passive youth, compared to the average, are less interested in public affairs, barely interested in politics, and do not talk about public issues and questions at home or with friends. **Importantly, those who place themselves in the middle of the liberal-conservative and left-right divide are overrepresented in this group of young passive citizens.** Moreover, those belonging to this group tend to be rather skeptical and cynical, as almost 40% of them believe that "for people like them, one political system is just like another". Their political preferences, as one might presume, are hard to characterize. There is a rather high level of uncertainty among them, and a large portion of them would certainly not take part in an election held this upcoming Sunday.

Medical, technical, and computer science students are overrepresented among the politically passive. So are those who are not religious (but not atheists), and those who "live without problems".

Were there to be a parliamentary election held this Sunday, 47% of our respondents claimed that they would certainly take part in it. In terms of affiliation with organizations, 29% are affiliated with one, 17% with two, and 15% of students claim to be affiliated with three or more civil society organizations. Directly or indirectly, based on a student's affiliation with public affairs and issues-related organizations, 36% of Hungarian college and university students, a bit more than one-third of them, have connections to political or public-affairs-related organizations; 58% of them are not connected to such an organization at all. Only 2% of those questioned responded that they were affiliated directly with a political party. Analyzing this data, we can conclude that 19% of the students questioned took part in traditional forms of political activity.

Three-quarters of the students (74%) took part in collective/direct forms of political participation. The most popular form of direct political participation was boycotting; 36% of the students claimed they have boycotted before. About 30% of the students partici-

pated in protests, and close to the same proportion engaged in some form of petition or political statement signing. **Though spontaneous protests are a completely new form of demonstration in Hungarian society, they have already become the sixth most popular form of demonstration among Hungarian youth** (16% of respondents have taken part in spontaneous protests). Those enrolled in the social sciences or arts departments and those in religious studies showed the highest willingness to partake in collective/direct activism.

Though the internet has spread to almost 100% of Hungarian college and university students, contrary to our hypothesis, virtual activism is not as prominent as could be expected. Virtual participation plays a complementary role and does not substitute for traditional or direct forms of participation. **Our 2013 research strengthens our previous claim that virtual participation does not encourage new, previously passive individuals to partake in public affairs and politics.**

The 2012 student protests resulted in an especially interesting overlap between the members of the virtual and collective forms of political participation (9% of the examined population). The correlation between collective/direct participation and virtual participation is strong: the model predicts that an individual participating in one additional type of offline activity will be on average 1.456 times as likely to have partaken in a form of virtually- organized demonstration. Online activity (news clicks, blogs, page likes) in and of itself is not correlated with participation in virtually- organized protests and demonstrations.

The area overlapped by all three forms of political participation (active youth) in our sample consisted of only 6% of respondents. This population represents those youths who actively engage in all three forms of political participation.

Studying the three participation forms, one can establish that some of the more important predictors with significant explanatory value that help predict an individual's probability of lying in the "active" area include the student's family's sociodemographic background, sociocultural background, and certain individual competences. Male masters and PhD students are more likely to be "active" than their female counterparts. In terms of area of study, those studying social sciences and liberal arts are more likely to be "active." The data suggest that the level of activity is partially determined by one's parents' own political activity and interest in public affairs/politics. This is shown by the significant correlation between the positive responses to questions related to the prevalence of political discussion with family members and friends and respondents' own level of political activity.

Politically active youth tend to position themselves at either end of the liberal/conservative and left/right spectrum instead of the middle. Active youth, on average, also tend to be significantly more radical than the rest of the student population. Some of these active youth identify themselves as conservative, strongly patriotic, and Christian Democratic, while others strongly identify with left-radical, Social Democratic, green, and environmentalist labels. This polarization can also be observed with respect to students' views on democracy and dictatorships: **61% of active youth find democracy better than all other forms of political system, while a quarter of them could accept dictatorship under certain conditions.** Finally, it is important to note that while these active youth have varied party preferences, they – unlike the rest of the student population – have firmly decided whom they support and form part of the stable voting base of their respective political parties. The next section is dedicated to a deeper analysis of young people's party preferences.

V. Distribution of party preferences among Hungarian college and university students

The party preferences of youth have tended in the past to diverge from the preferences of the older generations in all historical periods. Recent Hungarian research regarding youth political preferences (Stumpf 1994 and 1996, Karácsony 2005) has followed in Mannheim's footsteps, and has mainly attributed this difference to political socialization patterns. For instance, the fact that the current generation of pensioners were socialized in the 1970s is used to explain why support for the MSZP (Hungarian Socialist Party) is far above average amongst the elderly. Similarly, today's 40–50 year olds, those who were politically socialized around the change of regime, are strongly driven by anticommunist emotions and rhetoric, and thus the majority of them have backed Fidesz (the governing right-wing party). At the same time, the generation that has matured since the transformation of systems in 1989-1990 does not have a distinctive political experience that would unite them. This generation[40] does not see Fidesz as a "game-changing" party. In the eyes of youth, both MSZP and Fidesz are old-fashioned, mainstream parties who have already swapped governmental and opposition seats twice and are continuously involved in meaningless wrangles with one another.

So who do youth support, then? **Pollsters Medián, Tárki**[41]**, and Ipsos**[42] **have released many polls regarding this question which have found that new political formations such as Jobbik (a far-right party) and LMP (a green party) receive far greater support among the youth than among the general population.** Because Fidesz's dominance among the political parties is exceptionally strong right now, it should come as no surprise that though the magnitude of their support is smaller, a relative majority of youth still support Fidesz. Nonetheless, the second-largest party is clearly Jobbik among the youth (which is not the case for the general population). Importantly, in certain polls even the LMP receives greater support than the Socialists.[43] We also know, based on these polls, that **LMP has greater support among those individuals who have higher levels of education, just like, contrary to common belief, Jobbik too** tends to have higher–than-average support among the more-educated societal groups. Those with lower levels of education tend to support the two older large parties (Fidesz and MSZP). If we consider the results of these polls and the two new parties' growing online activity, then the result of our own 2012 survey should come as little surprise.

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40 When referring to the 1989 generation, or to those from 1989, we are referring to the generation that was socialized (i.e., spent most of their 20s), during that era.
41 See Tárki institute's aggregated data for citizens aged between 18 and 37 for the year 2011: http://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2012/kitekint/20120207.html
42 See Republikon institute's aggregated data for the voter profiles of Jobbik and LMP voters (pages 33 and 45): http://www.republikon.hu/upload/5000269/partok%20felidben.pdf
43 According to 2012 data.

In the diagram below we compared the results of last year's survey with the survey data from 2013:

Figure 16.

Party preferences among university and college students in 2012 and in 2013 (Distribution in percentages)

Source: Active Youth Research, 2012 and 2013.

As in our dataset from 2012 (and contrary to the polls referred to above) Jobbik has emerged as the party with the largest support base amongst youth in our most recent research. Because overall support for the radical right has decreased and support for Fidesz has grown slightly, the difference between the two right-wing parties has almost disappeared. Consequently, the proportion of students who would vote for the right (among decided voters) has not changed much since 2012. **Slightly more than half of all college and university students would vote for one of the two right-wing parties in 2013. Similarly, the proportion of undecided voters among youth has remained around 40%. While support for the left is similar to what it was a year ago, there have been significant shifts between the parties.** The emergence of the **Együtt 2014–PM** has stirred up the youth base, as the alliance **has already reached a level of support almost as high as Fidesz**, and they are by far the most popular left-wing party among youth in Hungary. We could not examine this in our data collection so we cannot be certain about this, but it is highly probable that between 2012 and 2013, many voters changed their support from LMP to Együtt 2014–PM. (This may be explained by the fact that the politicians who left LMP in early 2013 and joined Gordon Bajnai's Együtt 2014 could have attracted a significant part of LMP's support base.)

In the next section we will introduce what type of characteristics describe the young supporters of each political party, who would vote for each party, and what motivates them to do so. Because in our survey sample of 1300 the number of those who selected LMP, DK, and MSZP was too low to make statistically sound inferences and conclusions about them, we will refrain from generalizations about their youth voter base. The three most popular parties among youth, though, had high enough support to make statistically significant inferences; the next section will, therefore, describe and analyze youth supporters of Jobbik, Fidesz, and Együtt 2014–PM.

> Pertaining to LMP supporters, even though only 97 respondents selected the LMP as their favored party, a couple of short, cautious generalizations can still safely be made about them. It seems that young LMP voters place themselves in the center on the left-right spectrum. They consider their views as somewhat liberal and definitely green; they do not consider themselves radical, and they are supporters of democracy over all other political systems. In the focus group discussion, "green" and "liberal" were the most common words to describe LMP voters.

V. 1. Jobbik

Jobbik is a political party that draws significant support in every corner of the country. It should be clear just from the support base's sheer size that Jobbik is a highly colorful and diverse party, and that it is not at all true that it is the party of "the losers of the transformation", of those who have experienced material deprivation after 1989 (KOVÁCS 2013; RUDAS 2010; BÍRÓ NAGY – RÓNA 2011). Among university and college students, like 2012, Jobbik **had supporters from all major social strata and income categories.** The party, however, **was slightly over-represented among men, those studying in BA programs** (that is, those under 22 years of age), **those who were not living in an intimate relationship**, **those who live in villages**, and **those who regularly experience financial difficulties.** It is crucial to note that these sociological variables did not show strong explanatory value and that Jobbik had support among contrasting sociological groups as well. In a multivariate analysis, that is, controlling for all the explanatory variables we considered relevant, there was only one demographic variable that maintained statistical significance as a non-joint explanatory variable: **Jobbik supporters are often first- generation intellectuals**, who fathers only have a high-school education.

In last year's study we found that Jobbik's support among first-time voters can be retraced to cultural factors: Jobbik voters are often first-time voters in their teens or early twenties who are still unemployed, are generally not in an intimate relationship, often are not members of civil society organizations or voluntary associations, and thus have a significant amount of free time and energy to spare. Some youth use this energy to feed their interest in politics and public affairs. For many of them there are not many options to choose from. **In eastern Hungary, Jobbik and the extreme right-wing cultural organizations supporting it have dedicated significant resources and energy to magnetizing the youth.** Jobbik has organized a large number of concerts, festivals, get-togethers, professional forums, and many other youth events on a systematic basis (RÓNA-SŐRÉS 2012). **This year's survey results strengthen the claim that Jobbik is the most active organization in the eyes of youth: 26% of respondents found Jobbik to be active in their community**, compared to 30% of respondents who found Fidesz to be active in their community. Even more stunning is that only 18% found the LMP, MSZP, DK, and Együtt 2014–PM parties to be active in their community *combined*.

When it comes to ideological profiling, we begin by noting that 57% of young Jobbik supporters identify with the labels "patriotic" and "favoring order" (in comparison, only 28% of Fidesz voters identify with these). When it comes to choosing a position on ideological scales (left-right, liberal-conservative, radical-moderate) Jobbik supporters tend to identify themselves as radical, right-wing and conservative, although it should be noted that only a slight majority of Jobbik supporters identified themselves as strongly

conservative. Because of Fidesz's dominance among those considering themselves to be conservative, only the "radical" slogan gained significance in our multivariable regression. In our opinion, one difference between the conservatives supporting Fidesz and those supporting Jobbik is that the latter do not blame the poor for their predicament; in other words, they do not claim that the poor are to blame for their poverty. (Students who blame the poor for their own situation are half as likely to be Jobbik supporters, according to the multivariate statistical analysis.)

Only one in five Jobbik supporters rates democracy as the best political system. This is significantly lower than supporters of the other parties. Support for law and stability is also highly indicative of Jobbik support, but it must be noted that identification with this label was only significant in a two-variable regression. In the multivariable regression, that is, after we controlled for all explanatory variables, **the best predictor of Jobbik support proved to be anti-Gypsyism.** Our model predicts that someone who agrees with the statement "Crime is in the blood of the Roma people" is on average three times more likely to be a Jobbik supporter than are students in general.[44]

Jobbik offers a compact solution to most social and economic problems. Often this is done through scapegoats, or vast overgeneralizations, but the simplicity of Jobbik's rhetoric seems to be attractive to those in their teens. This does not, however, mean that those who support Jobbik's simple rhetoric agree with the totality of their favorite party's program. Many of Jobbik's younger supporters also took part in the higher education protests, many of which were organized by HaHa, a student network supported mostly by intellectual students on the left. More than half of Jobbik youth supporters claimed that they took part in the educational protests, while only about one in four took part in demonstrations organized by Jobbik.

Perhaps the best tool for mapping the reasons and motives behind youth support of Jobbik is our survey question asking respondents to describe each political party using the 11 descriptive adjectives and phrases provided. Answers to this question showed just what the qualities are that the youth admire about Jobbik: **36% of the sample surveyed said that Jobbik does a good job appealing to youth;** this percentage (which is higher than the ratio of Jobbik's supporters in our sample) indicates that youth who do not support Jobbik also believe the Jobbik party is successful in appealing to their age group). LMP received similar results, but Fidesz and Együtt 2014–PM received this compliment only half as frequently, while there was almost no one who would claim MSZP appeals to youth. Perhaps an even stronger message regarding Jobbik's support was that **24% of college and university students expressed the belief that Jobbik is the most serious party when it comes to the fight against corruption, more than for any other party.** (LMP came in second place, as 14% of the respondents agreed that such a description characterizes this green party.) Finally, **the party's third and perhaps most important strength lies in its stance on the Roma situation: 76% of Jobbik supporters and 26% of the general youth population considers that Jobbik has "a satisfactory solution to the problems derived from the conflicts between the Roma and non-Roma population".** Its fervent anti-Gypsyism and ownership of the "Roma issue" has allowed Jobbik to magnetize sympathizers outside of its core support base.

Finally, we claim that next to the three strengths of Jobbik mentioned above, **nationalism is the fourth and key factor that explains students' support for the party.** In the open-ended section of our survey 8% of respondents claimed that "patriotic" was the most important signifier to come to mind when they thought of Jobbik. Our focus group discussions, in which the representation of national interests and the love of the homeland were often cited in connection to Jobbik, confirms this claim.

The open-ended question also allowed us to identify negative connotations associated with Jobbik: **40% of all respondents associated Jobbik with racism, extremism, anti-Gypsyism, anti-Semitism and Nazism.** These were also the most common negative descriptions provided by participants in our focus groups: 6% of our respondents described the party as "aggressive" above all, while 10% of them criticized the party without referring to anything concrete ("disgrace", "unacceptable", etc.). We note that these negative associations were provided to open-ended questions; we took care not to influence our respondents. **Thus, in conclusion, we can say that despite the party's growth and successes, it continues to face serious limitations as to its potential for expanding its support base.**

V. 2. Fidesz

In the *Active Youth 2013* study, Fidesz gained second place in terms of support among the questioned college and university students; 16% of respondents claimed to support Fidesz. **Since the 2012 study, the governing party's support has grown marginally among youth, but this growth is small enough that it could just be statistical error.** One of the plausible reasons for Fidesz's potential strengthening can be attributed to the **collapse of LMP's youth voter base, which has dropped from 18% to 8% since the 2012 survey.** Again, it must be emphasized that this is within the margin of error, but it is still important to mention that Fidesz was the only party that was able to gain youth support compared to the 2011-2012 survey (with the exception of Együtt 2014–PM, which did not exist in the previous survey). Fidesz's dominance nationally as the largest political party with the most extensive and active political network is abundantly clear. **Even among youth Fidesz is found to be the most active political party.**

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44 The strength of this explanatory variable is also shown by the fact that the multi-regression model that predicted this strong, significant correlation also incorporated another anti-Roma statement as an explanatory variable; this correlation of a factor of three held true even after controlling for that other variable.

Figure 17.
According to your opinion, how active are the political parties where you live?
(e.g., local forums, protests, program organizations, posters, etc.,
in percentages)

☐ Very Active   ■ Not Active At All

Source: Active Youth Research, 2013.

The strongest explanatory variable responsible for Fidesz voters was self-declared religious affiliation. A student who considers him or herself to be religious, controlling for all other explanatory variables, was 3.5 times more likely to vote for Fidesz than a random student from the general population. Another fairly strong explanatory variable was a positive association with the ideal of *individual responsibility*. A student who votes for Fidesz is about twice as likely to agree with the statement "Instead of the state being responsible, people should be responsible for themselves." This ideological standpoint is paralleled by Fidesz voters' views on poverty. A university or college student sympathizing with Fidesz is almost 1.8 times more likely to agree with the statement "the majority of those in poverty are responsible for their own situation."

Those who believe that their opportunities for employment are favorable are 70% more likely to vote for Fidesz. Similarly, those who are confident about their future are 1.5 times more likely to vote for Fidesz than the average person. In this regard we see an interesting parallel: support for Fidesz drops to 2/3 of students who believe that one of the biggest social problems in Hungary is uncertainty and unpredictability. Similarly, among those youth who believe that one of the biggest social problems in Hungary is a lack of culture, motivation and determination, the probability for a Fidesz vote is almost one and a half times larger than among the general population. The same goes for those who believe in law and stability: Fidesz's popularity grows by about 50% in this group.

As with other parties, the field of education turned out to be an important predictor of support for Fidesz. Students who study law were twice as likely to vote for Fidesz than other students, holding all other variables in our explanatory model constant.

A negative explanatory factor in determining the youth votes is opinions of desegregated Roma education. On average, **those who believe in desegregated education, that is, an education system that does not relegate Roma children to separate classes or schools, are about 30% less likely to vote for Fidesz than someone from the general youth population.** In this respect, Fidesz voters are actually very similar to Jobbik sympathizers. The conservative worldviews are also reflected in Fidesz supporters' views on female roles. Those who agree with the statement **"***a man's responsibility is to make money, a woman's responsibility is housekeeping and to take care of the children***" are more likely to vote for Fidesz by a factor of 1.6.**

In the qualitative portion of the research several participants of our focus groups described Fidesz with the words "authoritarian", "power-hungry," and "disillusioning". **The most common negative quality of Fidesz described by focus group participants was abuse of authority. Positive associations with Fidesz were focused on patriotic identity politics and support for Hungarian ethnic groups living outside the country's borders.**

As mentioned beforehand, the survey portion of the research also included a couple of open-ended questions that could be used to better understand the exact nature of the youth population's opinion of the parties. A quarter of the respondents gave phrases or words to describe Fidesz that were simply descriptive, such as "Viktor Orbán", "government", "right-wing", etc. About one fifth of the answers were general criticisms, while about one tenth of the respondents used the word "dictatorship" in describing Fidesz and 8% of the respondents used the word "lying/liars." From these statistics it is clear that most Hungarian students are not satisfied with Fidesz's achievements, and have a negative image of the party. In spite of this, Fidesz's popularity has grown marginally since the last survey, and they are now the second most popular political party among university and colleges students (according to this research).

One of the lessons of the focus groups is that among the party politicians, the one word that describes Prime Minister Viktor Orbán the best for students is charisma. For János Áder (the President of Hungary), the descriptive word most often used was "the president," and adjectives to describe his personality or characteristics were rarely used. Most students had negative opinions of László Kövér (speaker of the Hungarian Parliament), often describing him as arrogant, and hypocritical. Lajos Kósa (First Vice President of Fidesz), on the other hand, was much more respected for his achievements as mayor of Debrecen. Deputy Prime Minister Tibor Navracsics, is less well known than the others talked about in the focus group; he received the description of "man in the background" very frequently during the qualitative portion of our research.

All in all Fidesz seems to be perceived as an elitist party among Hungarian college and university students. Fidesz-supporting students seem to be optimistic about their future, believe their chances for employment are good, find personal responsibility important, and do not host strong solidarity towards those in poverty. **The youth supporting the governing party find the most decisive problem in Hungary to be internal to society, that is, a "lack of culture" (e.g. the inability to plan, set goals, etc.) and determination among youth.** It is worthwhile to emphasize that post-materialistic life values have not spread among Fidesz-supporting students. More precisely, Fidesz-supporting college and university students are not to be differentiated from students supporting other political parties based on their value system, but rather on their perceptions of their life chances, as well

as their self-assuredness. While in this sense – as well in objective social markers (e.g., religiosity) – Fidesz supporters form a distinctive group, their political beliefs, on the other hand, are significantly less coherent. Young Fidesz supporters described themselves as conservative, Social Democratic, or green, as well as through many other political identifiers equally frequently.

V. 3. Együtt 2014–PM

During the 2013 data collection wave (2013 March through 2013 April) Együtt 2014–PM was considered a completely new political formation. The party, headed by ex-Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai quickly expanded among college and university students in Hungary. **In a matter of weeks it became the third most popular political organization among youth.** About 14% of respondents backed the party; this relatively high support alone gives us a reason to examine the factors that have strengthened Együtt 2014–PM. It certainly was not the organizational power of the party, as during the data collection the party was so young that only 8% of respondents registered any type of activism by it (such as protests, events, or discussions) in their home district. As a means for comparison, 17% of respondents sensed such activism coming from LMP (a significantly smaller party), and 33% sensed it from the Socialist Party (MSZP).

It is important as a preliminary step to understand the types of students who would support Együtt 2014–PM. In general, instead of believing in "patriotic" politics, Együtt 2014–PM supporters seem to support "European" politics and are also more willing to accept the label of "liberal". Among the party loyalists, 44% consider themselves liberal, while 26% consider themselves pro-Western/European when describing their views. A smaller proportion of these students prioritize law and stability (12%), but even for those who do, the open-ended portion of our questionnaire suggests that this label has a different meaning for them than for Jobbik supporters. (These students rank uncertainty and unpredictability as one of the major sources of problems in Hungarian society, and for them the emphasis is probably on stability rather than order. For Jobbik supporters, however, the label is probably linked to a will to preserve or reinstate social and ethnic hierarchies.)

In terms of their value system, Együtt 2014–PM supporters are most like supporters of the left-liberal coalitions that were in power in the 2000s. These voters tended to be characterized by a moderate leftist world view but adopted liberal positions on certain issues. One of their important characteristics was a preference for moderate political solutions and a strong rejection of radical politics.[45] This is one of the main differences between Jobbik and Együtt 2014–PM supporters.

Males, especially those who come from highly-educated families, are overrepresented amongst Együtt 2014–PM's young supporters. **Support for the alliance is significantly higher in Budapest, and one central characteristic of Együtt 2014–PM supporters is their activeness online.** The internet seems to be the best tool for reaching them: our multiple variable logistic regression shows that among the youth active online there is a statistically significantly larger chance of them voting for the Együtt 2014–PM coalition than youth in general.

As for their basic beliefs, **Együtt 2014–PM voters are strong believers in democracy.** Our multiple variable regression model shows that a youth's belief that democracy is better than all other available political systems increases the probability that s/he will vote for Együtt 2014–PM by 80%. Furthermore, respect for authority does not seem to be essential to their values and beliefs, while they are strongly reticent towards a cult of political leaders. These characteristics set Együtt 2014–PM youth supporters apart from the rest of the youth population which (as with preceding generations) exhibits a penchant for charismatic leaders. This is, of course, especially true for the supporters of the two right-wing parties in contrast to whom Együtt 2014–PM supporters appear to define themselves. This is also apparent in their attitudes towards minorities (specifically to Roma living in Hungary). Holding all other variables in our regression constant shows that an approval of desegregation of the schools increases an individual's chances of voting for Együtt 2014–PM by almost twofold. Another level of acceptance is exhibited by their beliefs and values when it comes to gender roles. Együtt 2014–PM supporters mostly disagree with the statement "a woman's place is in the kitchen." This belief in gender and racial equality distinguishes Együtt 2014–PM university and college students strongly from the supporters of other parties. With this in mind, it is still important to mention that in comparison to Fidesz's young supporters (who, as we saw, are easily distinguishable in many ways from the supporters of other parties), Együtt 2014–PM supporters (similar to those favoring Jobbik) have a more fluid and ambiguous profile.

It is worthwhile to examine what those students who support Együtt 2014–PM think of it, as well as what the general student population thinks of the party. Együtt 2014–PM supporters have faith in the party's ability to lead the country (60%) and believe their candidates are highly prepared to change the country for the better (57%). The general student population tends to believe that this political formation caters to the young and that its only goal is power. Nevertheless, **most respondents agreed that the organization has competent politicians who are ready to lead the country.**

In the focus group discussions, as for the other parties, there were both negative and positive descriptions given of Együtt 2014–PM. In terms of negative descriptions, many participants referred to the representatives of the PM as "traitors",[46] but the label "inexperienced" was used for both Együtt 2014 and the PM. Positive descriptions included references to "diversity", "a potential to govern successfully", and to a less nuanced impression that the formation instilled "hope".

All in all, among Együtt 2014–PM college and university student supporters we have a greater chance of finding someone who is from Budapest, has highly educated parents, and who is attracted to "modernity", to racial and gender equality and to other values associated with the signifier "Europe". **This profile is basically the antithesis of that identified for college or university students supporting Jobbik.** It is politically moderate students who exhibit left-liberal values, strongly believe in democracy, and are opposed to authoritarianism who are more likely to be Együtt 2014–PM supporters. Compared to the previous Active Youth studies conducted and their previous data collection waves, one thing can definitely be said: among college and university students, Együtt 2014–PM has become a force to be reckoned with. **It is questionable, however, whether the formation,**

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45 On the radical–moderate scale they are much closer to the moderate end.

46 Those who founded the PM party broke off from the green LMP based on their belief that Fidesz could only be defeated in the upcoming parliamentary elections if broad electoral cooperation were to be forged on the left.

which likely won over much of its support from LMP, will be able to maintain its level of support among youth. LMP's example shows that voters' volatility is rather high among this age group. The question in the open-ended portion of the questionnaire underlines how, in contrast to the two right-wing parties, Együtt 2014–PM has not managed to attract a stable following to date. This is revealed by the character of the positive connotations associated with this formation, which are often ambiguous compliments reflecting its unstable temporal context (terms such as "hope", "new", "co-operation", etc.) and are not ideological in nature. Positive ideological evaluations would be more likely to have long-term effects.

Table 5.
Explanatory variables for political parties
Logistic Regression

Explanatory Variable	Jobbik	Együtt-PM	Fidesz
	Exp(B)	Exp(B)	Exp(B)
Religious	1.038	0.330**	3.547***
Father with diploma (proxy for parents' education)	0.554***	1.232	1.185
Agree: Democracy is better than all other political systems	0.690*	1.810***	1.164
Agree: Roma children have the right to study in a school along with non-Roma kids.	0.605***	1.895***	0.682**
Agree: Instead of the state taking responsiblity, people should be responsible for themselves.	0.940	0.822	1.972***
Moderate or radical	1.950***	0.784***	0.993
Confident in his/her future	0.906	0.813	1.526**
Confident in opportunities for employment	1.145	0.844	1.668***
Agree: Uncertainty and unpredictability are the youth's greatest problems (in Hungary today).	1.340	2.683***	0.632
Agree: Most of those in poverty are personally at fault for their situation.	0.494**	0.660	1.758**
Agree: Increased discipline is necessary to maintain and defend order.	1.358	0.802	1.517**
Agree: A man's role is to make money.	1.048	0.405**	1.630**
Agree: A drive to crime is in the blood of the Roma.	2.909***	0.982	0.956
How many online (political/ public affair) activities do you partake in?	1.112	1.244**	0.821**
Are you from Budapest?	0.655	1.641**	1.260
Legal studies student	0.903	1.603	2.073**

Explanatory Variable	Jobbik	Együtt-PM	Fidesz
	Exp(B)	Exp(B)	Exp(B)
Male	0.925	1.406*	0.843
How many offline (political/public affairs) activities do you partake in?	1.082*	0.994	1.056
Agree: A lack of culture and motivation are the biggest problems among the youth.	1.239	1.193	1.476*
Economic Studies Student	1.149	1.246	0.901
Technical Studies student	1.206	1.146	0.966
Liberal Arts and Social Sciences student	0.912	1.167	1.451
Living in deprivation	0.896	1.003	0.758
Kids should learn respect and discipline	1.251	0.849	1.347
Agree: The country needs strong leadership	1.330	0.718	0.900
How many organizations are you an active member of?	1.019	1.017	0.897
Post-materialistic values	0.838	0.616	0.753
Materialistic values	1.339	0.745	1.208
Agree: Unemployment is the biggest problem for the youth.	1.465	1.098	0.952

Note: binary logistic regression models. Dependent variables: would vote for Jobbik, Együtt 2014–PM and Fidesz (dummies). Independent variables are dummies as well.

*significant at the 90% level; ** significant at the 95% level; ** significant at the 99% level

Source: Active Youth Research, 2013.

In the next section we summarize the answers provided in the open-ended section of the survey in the form of a table so the statements can be compared. The question in the questionnaire was phrased as follows:

"*In the following section you will be provided with the names of political parties. What comes to your mind about each of the parties listed? We ask you to write down the single descriptive word or phrase that comes to your mind first. The description can be positive or negative, depending on what comes to your mind first!*"

Table 6.
Associations related to Jobbik
(Distribution in percentages)

Jobbik	Relative percentage
Radical (positive)	20
Extremist	12
Descriptions that are somewhat positive	10
Especially positive descriptions (nationalistic, patriotic)	8
Nazi, Fascist	7
Racist	6
Anti-Roma	6
Other	6
Aggression	5
Ranting, silliness, frivolous, stupid	3
Disgrace, shameful	3
Lack of expertise	2
Hungarian Guard	2
Negative feelings without any specifics	2
Stability (positive)	2
A lie	1
Anti-Semitic	1
Hatred, Hate-loving	1
Revival of Great-Historic Hungary	1
Corruption, thieves	0
Total	100

Source: Active Youth Research, 2013.

Table 7.
Associations related to Fidesz
(Distribution in percentages)

Fidesz	Relative percentage
Descriptive (Fidesz, Orbán, governing party, rightist)	26
Non-concrete criticisms	20
Dictatorship	9
Lying	7
Demagogue, populist brainwashing, populist promises	4
Good-hearted, hardworking, acceptable, sincere (somewhat positive)	3
Hubris, egotistical	3
Corrupt, thieves	3
Other	3
Last chance for hope, for the youth and a successful future	3
Failure, did not work out, without success	3
Centralization, strong state	2
Family	2
Successful, crisis management, fight for freedom	2
Especially positive descriptions	1
Oligarch	1
Dilettantism, arrogance	1
Tuition fees, compulsory work in Hungary in exchange for education	1
The crises and scandals associated with the party, austerity measures	1
Hungary, Hungarian, patriotic, protecting Hungary's interests	1
Professional, capable of governing	1
Decisive, self-confident	1
Divided, scary	1
Old, outdated	1
Family, family-centered	0
Total	100

Source: Active Youth Research, 2013.

Table 8.
Associations related to Együtt 2014–PM
(Distribution in percentages)

Együtt 2014–PM	Relative percentage
I don't know them, who are they?	34
A joke, funny, non-concrete criticisms	14
Somewhat positive descriptions ("chance", "promising", "opportunity")	11
Bajnai	7
New	5
Hopeless, without power	4
Other	4
Not established, unconfident, directionless, goalless, without direction, no courage	3
Especially positive descriptions	2
A lie	2
Foreigners, in the pocket of the Americans	2
SZDSZ 2, liberal	2
Goose[47]	2
Hope	2
Collaboration, working together, dialogue	2
Corruption, stealing	1
Jews	1
Failures return, unbelievable	1
Communists, MSZP, Gyurcsány (an ex-Prime Minister highly disliked by the public)	1
Bankers, thieves,	1
Technocrats, experts	1
Total	100

Source: Active Youth Research, 2013.

47 A reference to one of Bajnai's former agricultural enterprises that went bankrupt and caused losses to many farmers who raised geese.

Table 9.
"Do you think the following statements correctly describe the Hungarian political parties?"
(Student Population, in percentages)

	E-PM* voters on E-PM	General population on E-PM	Fidesz voters on Fidesz	General population on Fidesz	Jobbik voters on Jobbik	General population on Jobbik	LMP voters on LMP	General population on LMP	MSZP voters on MSZP	General population on MSZP
1 Caters to the young	50%	18%	47%	16%	67%	36%	65%	37%	27%	3%
2. Has competent politicians	57%	14%	77%	35%	55%	17%	31%	10%	49%	19%
3. Is power-hungry	5%	16%	19%	48%	10%	26%	7%	13%	19%	45%
4. Represents green values	15%	5%	13%	4%	19%	5%	70%	50%	5%	1%
5. Is more interested in serving economic powers than its own constituents	9%	11%	19%	31%	11%	8%	6%	8%	16%	30%
6. Is genuinely interested in the fate of the disadvantaged	45%	13%	55%	17%	38%	15%	47%	23%	38%	13%
7. Fights against corruption with the most credibility	34%	7%	36%	8%	65%	24%	41%	14%	11%	2%
8. Consults the people before making decisions	49%	7%	58%	18%	52%	17%	44%	18%	32%	8%
9. Capable of leading the country if elected	60%	14%	80%	27%	65%	15%	28%	6%	57%	12%
10. Fights for gender equality	29%	10%	23%	10%	22%	8%	43%	27%	35%	9%
11. Has a proper answer for the conflicts between Roma and non-Roma	23%	5%	32%	9%	73%	26%	23%	7%	27%	4%
88. I do not recognize this party	8%	15%	6%	13%	6%	14%	12%	13%	3%	15%

Note: E-PM means Együtt 2014 –PM. / Source: Active Youth Research, 2013.

VI. Conclusion

VI. 1. Political clusters of Hungarian college and university students

So far we have analyzed separately and in detail the political values, orientation and activities of full-time Hungarian college and university students. We conclude our study with a multivariable model that contains all the questions, topics and problems analyzed above with some additions (including gender and father's level of education). The multivariable statistical procedure groups the students into six clusters. For simplicity and easier understanding, the clusters have been named after the political parties (i.e., which one weighed the most in each given cluster). We need to note, however, that political affiliation is not necessarily the most important characteristic of a given cluster. The table below summarizes the most important characteristics of each cluster. Probably one of the most important conclusions that we can draw from the table is that the LMP party does not form a separate cluster of its own.

Table 10.
Political clusters of college and university students*

	Size (%)	Name	Most important characteristics
1. cluster	42	undecided	sceptical towards the system, uncertain, indeterminate, mostly women, maybe green
2. cluster	20	Együtt—PM	democrat, liberal, European, atheist, interested in public affairs, likely to vote LMP
3. cluster	18	Fidesz	Christian Democrat, religious, right-wing, conservative, satisfied
4. cluster	14	Jobbik	radical, in favour of dictatorship, strong anti-Roma sentiment
5. cluster	5*	MSZP	Social Democrat, left-wing radical, liberal, moderate, democrat
6. cluster	1*	DK	Iliberal, interested in public affairs, democrat, activist

Note: K-Means Cluster method. The clusters are in order in increasing size.

**The cluster is so small, that statistically interpretations cannot be made based on it.

The largest cluster is called "undecided" and is comprised of 42% of students. This group does not feature a single strong trait but is characterized by several less marked characteristics. Of these, the most important characteristic is a generalized skepticism: those who are in this cluster do not particularly care what kind of political system they live in.

In addition, they are unsure whether they want to vote in the upcoming parliamentary election and, if they do want to vote, they are uncertain about which party to vote for. One element binding those in this cluster together is their loose identification with the label "green". However, since they are completely passive and disinterested in social and political issues, this identification does not mark an ideological commitment to the politics of the LMP. One of the most important conclusions that we can draw from the table, therefore, is that **LMP does not form a separate cluster**. In a sense, the green orientation of those belonging to the cluster of the undecided can be simply interpreted as the choosing of the "lesser evil"; it perhaps also marks a loose identification with healthy eating, organic foods, selective waste-management and other superficial elements of the "green consumerist" lifestyle that is in vogue in Budapest. As to the other attributes that define this group, we note that people with undergraduate degrees are overrepresented in it, along with those studying hard sciences (computer science, medicine, etc.). Compared to their proportion of the total number of students, members of this group are overrepresented in state schools.

The second-largest group is named the Együtt 2014–PM cluster because party preference is its most important characteristic. In the question which prompted respondents to choose between Hungarian and Western values, those who ended up in this cluster markedly identified themselves with the latter. They are also strongly in favor of democracy even though they are skeptical about the current democratic system. Their mindset is liberal and pro-European. They are interested in politics and in social problems. Based on their fathers' level of education, they can be characterized as coming from highly-educated backgrounds, as urban dwellers and as atheists. Their preferred method of political participation is being active on the Internet. They are overrepresented among students holding Masters and PhD degrees (therefore, among older students) and also among students majoring in the social sciences (economics, political science and the liberal arts).

Being a Christian Democrat is the best predictor of the third group, followed by three equally important traits: religion, being a Fidesz voter, and satisfaction with the current democratic system. The members of this cluster are conservative, lean right, and are mostly active in traditional forms of political participation. It is important to note regarding this group that while they hold traditional values, they also deem democracy the best type of system. This group is overrepresented among degrees that are not split into undergraduate and master's studies, among them religious studies majors, legal studies majors, education majors and students pursuing advanced theological studies.

Another cluster among full-time university students in Hungary is the cluster named after the Jobbik party (the name also reflects its most important characteristic). Members of this group are strongly nationalistic, radical, and denounce all forms of Western ideology. On the left–right scale they strongly pull to the right. They believe "Gypsy-crime" is a fact and would, under certain circumstances, be willing to trade democracy for authoritarian rule. This is the sole cluster where gender plays an important role, given that the majority of this group consists of males.

The Jobbik cluster is formed by active individuals who make use of both traditional and virtual forms of political participation. They are overrepresented among students pursuing a degree under the pre-Bologna system[48], among students pursuing Bachelor's degrees, as well as among those enrolled in computer science, engineering and liberal arts majors.

The cluster named MSZP is composed of active left-wing students who are ideologically more difficult to identify. Due to a lack of a statistically significant number of observations about the group, we can only make a few cautious observations. It is certainly noteworthy that this group is comprised strongly of individuals who are highly interested in politics, are staunch defenders of democracy, and who are at the same time extremely dissatisfied with the current democratic system. Certain individuals belonging to this cluster form a strongly pro-European subset, which shows many similarities with the supporters of Együtt 2014–PM.

Below we have plotted each cluster along a left-right and moderate-radical axis and also along a left-right and liberal-conservative axis in order to visualize the similarities and differences among the clusters and their distances from each other.

Figure 18.
Hungarian university and college students' cluster map
on Left-Right and Moderate–Radical Scale

*The clusters received their names based on the party that was supported by the biggest number of individuals within the cluster.

Figure 19.
Hungarian university and college students cluster map
on Left-Right and Liberal-Conservative Scale

*The clusters received their names based on the party that was supported by the biggest number of individuals within the cluster.

VI. 2. Key conclusions of the study

The significant proportion of students who could not compare the Kádár system with the current democratic one and the fact that many respondents question the core values promoted by the current system highlights the difficulties and failures of political socialization in the period that followed 1989. Though the current system received higher marks overall, both the Kádár era and the democratic era are perceived negatively by Hungarian college and university students. (Our respondents tended to associate the current system with increased opportunities for entertainment and higher quality of life, but viewed socialism as superior in terms of access to housing, social security and job opportunities). Overall, our findings outline the contours of a semi-peripheral society burdened by repressed social conflicts.

It is not only the past which has not been reworked properly. Hungarians have not come to terms with the present either. There has been little to no discussion regarding the formation of democracy in Hungary since 1990, how this democracy is related to "democratic ideals", or to what degree it has managed to promote democratic values in everyday practice. This is perhaps one of the reasons why, since the end of communism, satisfaction with democracy has been decreasing continuously, and with it the system's legitimacy in the eyes of youth. Meanwhile, the political discourse that does exist does not revolve around the possibilities of reforming democracy into a better, more efficient system, but rather around the potential benefits of an alternative authoritarian system. The other key reason explaining young Hungarians' dissatisfaction with democracy, as other studies have found (e.g. Laki–Szabó A. 2012a and Laki–Szabó A. 2012b), has to do with the fact that the

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48 Within the framework of the Bologna Process the gradual transition from a dual system awarding college-level (főiskolai oklevél) and university-level (egyetemi oklevél) degrees to a higher education system based on three consecutive cycles started in 2004 in Hungary. At present pre-Bologna and Bologna-type programmes run parallel. For more information see: http://www.nefmi.gov.hu/english/the-hungarian-higher/the-pre-bologna-system.

younger generation mainly expected – and continues to expect – material advantages from an economically functioning democracy. The fact that neither the country's economic performance nor the personal circumstances of the average student have improved in recent years explains why young Hungarians tend to be strongly dissatisfied with democracy as a system of rule.

Nonetheless, our research has highlighted the emergence of a new type of mindset amongst Hungarian youth, one that is primarily characterized by openness to values considered post-materialistic (as per Ronald Inglehart's pioneering research). This is surprising for two reasons. The first is that the current socioeconomic and political environment does not appear particularly favorable to the emergence of post-materialism in Hungary. The second is that up until now the traditional materialistic value-structure has been the dominant one for all generations; it is only in this millennium that such a trend has been noticed among the youth. It is important, however, not to over-emphasize the importance of these new tendencies in societal values. Despite their appearance in the sample, post-materialistic respondents made up a small minority of our respondents.

Our study revealed that 32%[49] of students have never engaged in any form of political participation and can thus be described as "passive" citizens. Another important finding is that while virtually 100% of students use the Internet, new (virtual) forms of political participation based on the Internet are not nearly as significant as we assumed. Only 17% of our respondents engaged in political activities online. On the other hand, direct forms of political participation proved to be much more important than we hypothesized: 74% of respondents have participated – at least once – in direct political activities. The importance of gaining a deeper understanding of direct forms of participation is also driven home by the finding that those who engage in direct forms of participation – which come with higher risks for the individual – tend to be more likely to engage in other forms of participation as well. (As mentioned above, these other – traditional and virtual – forms of participation appear to be less prominent compared to direct forms of participation, with 19% of respondents having engaged in traditional forms of political activity.) Virtual participation is best to be regarded as an auxiliary form of participation that does not substitute for other forms and, importantly, does not mobilize previously inactive groups. The most active youth group engaging in all three forms of participation represents only 6% of the student population.

Our data show that the two right-wing parties are supported by more than half of the youth generation. Support for parties of the left (if we include LMP) is, however, only marginally lower. Among the youngest cohort (first-time voters), Fidesz and Jobbik are somewhat more popular than among the general student population. The three most popular parties among youth have a distinctive demographic and ideological profile.

While **Fidesz** appears to be a "catch-all party" in terms of the Hungarian population as a whole, our research revealed that student support for this party is characterized by elitist features. Students who sympathize with Fidesz stand out as individuals who feel confident about their employment prospects and personal future. With this comes a world view whose cornerstone is a faith in individual responsibility, which leads young Fidesz sympathizers to blame those who are in difficulty – whether other students or Roma living in the countryside – for their own predicaments. The strongest characteristic of this political group is, however, its extremely high proportion of religious students. As to classical questions related to value preferences and ideology, the group is very diverse and there are no indicators separating the individuals belonging to this group from the total population.

It is more difficult to draw a portrait of the Együtt 2014–PM and Jobbik supporters based on demographic characteristics. We nonetheless note that Együtt 2014–PM students are more likely to be born into well-educated families and to live in Budapest, whereas Jobbik supporters are often first-generation intellectuals and are more likely to live in villages. These correlations are, however, statistically much weaker than they were for Fidesz. This means that both parties also draw sympathizers from diverse backgrounds (e.g. Együtt 2014–PM from students born into less educated families and Jobbik from students living in the capital). Perhaps the only commonality between the two parties' bases is that their support bases are comprised of individuals who are highly interested in politics and who are rather active too (with sympathizers engaging in a number of offline and online political activities). In ideological terms, however, Jobbik and Együtt 2014–PM are easier to define. Együtt 2014–PM is mostly composed of liberal, pro-European students, while Jobbik supporters characterize themselves as patriotic and supporters of law and order policies. Supporters of the two parties can, in fact, be described as the antithesis of one another. While Jobbik supporters tend to be those in favor of exclusionary policies targeting Roma, who are powerfully disillusioned with democracy, and who exhibit authoritarian tendencies, supporters of Együtt 2014–PM are in favor of democracy and of racial equality. In other words, these two camps are poles apart along the liberal-conservative, left-right and moderate-radical divides.

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49 This subset also includes respondents for whom we have no relevant data.

Appendices

Explanatory variables for the support of dictatorship
(binary logistic model/ logged linear regression coefficient values)

	B	Exp(B)
Liberal	-0.121	0.886
Conservative	0.651	1.917***
Strong national sentiment	0.811	2.251***
Order and stability	0.5	1.649**
Green	0.391	1.478
Gender	-0.511	0.6***
Type of place of living	0.064	1.066
Education level of father	0.004	1.004
Age	-0.042	0.959
Religious	0.196	1.216
Atheist	0.261	1.299
Jobless	-0.162	0.851
Subjective economic state	-0.102	0.903
Politics	0.095	1.1
Humanities	-0.171	0.843
Informatics	0.381	1.463
Legal studies	-0.065	0.937
Engineer	0.236	1.266
Social sciences	0.227	1.255
Együtt2014	-0.231	0.794
Fidesz	0.378	1.459
Jobbik	0.585	1.794***
LMP	-0.178	0.837
MSZP	-0.489	0.613
Constant	0.008	1.008

-2 Log likelihood=1218,485a; Nagelkerke R Square=0,117.

*The significance level; the greater the number of *, the higher the more significant.

Interest in public affairs
Values of logistic regression

	B	Exp(B)
Postmaterialism_d(1)	-0.012	0.988
Offline_participation	0.231	***1.260
On-line_participation	0.775	***2.170
Fidesz(1)	0.113	1.119
Jobbik(1)	0.275	1.317
Egyutt(1)	0.615	**1.850
In favour of dictatorship(1)	-0.037	0.964
Men(1)	0.025	1.026
Subjective economic state (1)	-0.153	0.858
Graduated father (1)	0.274	*1.315
Left/right	0.125	*1.133
Economist(1)	0.096	1.1
Engineer(1)	-0.366	*.693
Legal studies(1)	0.68	**1.974
Constant	-1.005	0.366

Nagelkerke R Square= 0.201.

* The significance level.

Interest in politics

Values of logistic regression

	B	Exp(B)
Postmaterialism_d(1)	0.132	1.141
Offline_participation	0.141	***1.151
On-line_participation	0.319	***1.376
Fidesz(1)	0.234	1.264
Jobbik(1)	0.055	1.056
Egyutt(1)	1.149	***3.154
In favour of dictatorship(1)	0.266	*1.305
Men(1)	0.582	***1.789
Subjective economic state(1)	0.188	1.207
Graduated father(1)	0.227	1.255
Left/right	0.247	***1.280
Economist(1)	0.317	1.374
Engineer(1)	-0.128	0.88
Legal studies(1)	0.295	1.343
Constant	-3.007	0.049

Nagelkerke R Square= 0.202.

*The significance level.

Determinants of electoral participation

Values of logistic regression

	B	Exp(B)
Publicaffair	0.598	1.818***
Moderate/radical	0.158	1.171**
Együtt(1)	1.395	4.033***
Fidesz(1)	0.99	2.691***
Economist(1)	0.452	1.572*
Engineer(1)	-0.194	0.824
Village(1)	-0.344	0.709
Subjective Economic State Deprivation(1)	-0.194	0.823
Dictatorship(1)	-0.093	0.911
Offline_participation	0.254	1.289***
On-line_participation	0.067	1.069
Graduated father(1)	0.147	1.159
Planning abroad(1)	-0.05	0.951
Constant	-1.932	0.145

Nagelkerke R Square= 0.217.

*The significance level.

Explanatory factors of on-line participation

Values of linear regression

	B	Beta	Sig.
Member of public organization	25.071	0.222	0
Are you interested in politics?	12.92	0.184	0
Social science 1 yes 0 no	37.926	0.107	0.001
MSZP 1 yes 0 no	43.455	0.087	0.006
Are you interested in public affairs, social problems?	11.076	0.115	0.009
Subjective economic state	-8.101	-0.08	0.015
Moderate / radical	5.315	0.083	0.021
Gender	-10.505	-0.059	0.099
LMP	14.734	0.043	0.188
Conservative	15.088	0.046	0.204
Együtt14	11.458	0.043	0.217
Liberal	11.183	0.053	0.229
Informatics	-13.819	-0.04	0.234
European	10.775	0.04	0.318
Jobbik	8.867	0.036	0.336
Atheist	9.541	0.03	0.348
Democrat	5.002	0.027	0.475
Teacher	10.981	0.021	0.513
Green	6.944	0.025	0.525
Engineering	4.482	0.02	0.581
Graduated father/mother	-3.293	-0.018	0.589
Sciences	-5.735	-0.017	0.606
Order and stability	4.39	0.018	0.657
Maximum vocational training Mother/father	-7.611	-0.012	0.708
Fidesz	-2.569	-0.011	0.756
Medicine	-2.77	-0.009	0.787
Strongly nationalist	3.166	0.01	0.799
Lives in a village	-1.614	-0.007	0.827
Legal studies	-2.757	-0.007	0.832
Religious	-2.162	-0.007	0.841
Lives in Budapest	-1.251	-0.006	0.852
In favour of dictatorship	-0.299	-0.001	0.968
Vote on DK 1 yes 0 no	-0.041	0	0.999
(Constant)	-43.194		0.073

R Square = 0.275. | *The significance level.

Factors affecting likelihood of taking part in protest organized on the Internet

Values of logistic regression

	B	Exp(B)
Moderate/radical	0.059	1.06
Publicaffair	-0.003	0.997
On-line_participation	0.181	1.198
Offline_participation	0.376	1.456***
Economist(1)	-0.408	0.665
Engineer	-0.146	0.865
Együtt(1)	0.724	2.063***
Fidesz(1)	-1.108	0.33***
Lives in Budapest(1)	0.578	1.782***
Student network(1)	2.215	9.157*
In favour of dictatorship (1)	-0.185	0.831
Constant	-2.63	0.072

Nagelkerke R Square= 0,307.

*The significance level.

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Figures and Tables

About the Authors

Andrea Szabó, PhD,	sociologist – political scientist, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Social Sciences Institute for Political Sciences, senior research fellow.
Dániel Oross,	political scientist, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Social Sciences Institute for Political Sciences, junior research fellow.
András Keil,	political scientist, Corvinus University of Budapest, Institute for Political Sciences, PhD candidate.
Dániel Róna,	political scientist, Corvinus University of Budapest, Institute for Political Sciences, PhD candidate.

Nearly 25 years have passed since the collapse of communism in Hungary. Has this period allowed for the emergence of a new generation of democrats? Have young people successfully come to terms with the authoritarian past and developed a commitment to democracy as a system of rule? Are they ready to defend democracy in the face of challenges? These questions are all the more timely as former research focusing on youth has highlighted the emergence not only of progressive tendencies in Hungary, but also of the rising influence of a radical subculture that propagates ultranationalist, xenophobic and authoritarian views and values among Hungarian youth.

The findings of the researchers who authored this study focusing on Hungarian college and university students reveal the existence of a new type of mindset, one that is characterized by openness to new values that are considered post-materialistic, according to social scientist Ronald Inglehart. It is unclear if the unprecedented demonstrations organized by the Student Network (HaHa) in December 2012 contributed to this development. But the findings are certainly important in illustrating that those who prioritize post-materialistic values are strongly in favour of democracy as a political system, even if they are highly sceptical about the version of democracy they are currently experiencing in Hungary.

However, the data presented in this study also highlights an opposite, unquestionably more powerful and worrisome trend. The radical right-wing party Jobbik is, at least according to this research, currently the favorite party of Hungarian college and university students. 36% of the sample surveyed said that Jobbik does a good job appealing to youth; 24% expressed the belief that Jobbik is the most serious party when it comes to the fight against corruption; and 26% of respondents consider that Jobbik has "a satisfactory solution to the problems derived from the conflicts between the Roma and non-Roma population."

All in all, this research shows that democracy may open up new, unexpected channels of political participation and that organizations engaged in sustained effort to connect with young people are the ones who have the greatest chance to shape their views, values and agendas.

It is our hope that the empirical findings of this study can help the work of policy-makers and other professionals who are committed to democratic values and are striving to find answers to the political challenges of the 21st century.