GUIDE FOR JOURNALISTS AND MEDIA PROFESSIONALS

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE OLYMPIC CITY
There is an invisible side to the Olympics, a side that is not shown at the beautiful and impressive television ads. Hidden behind billboards of the major brands, vanished from the postcards, it echoes the pain of an entire city, a pain bred and experienced during all the years of preparation to host the biggest sporting event on the planet. Tears in Rio are not of joy from victory. They are tears of pain, coming from the loss of homes, the loss of one's place of origin, traditions, workplace, freedom and life.

The period of preparation for the Olympic Games resulted in radical changes in the way of living and moving around the city. It’s not just about the construction of major Olympic facilities, or the execution of urban infrastructure works; rather, it’s about an idea of a city project that has been implemented since the announcement of the host city, in October 2009. Rio would wear “new clothes”, and in this process it has turned into a trading desk for the benefit of major construction companies, contractors, transportation companies, the private capital. The “Olympic legacy” has turned itself into the aggravation of social and spatial segregation processes, control and privatization of the public space, the extermination of poor and black people.

Our goal with this Guide is to expose the myriad of rights violations that form the less obvious side of the Rio 2016 Olympic Games. Such violations affect the environment and the traditional ways of life – as it has been happening in the Guanabara and Sepetiba Bays. The violations affect brutally the right to housing. It promoted the greatest forced eviction policy in the city’s history, with more than 77,000 people displaced. Urban control policies have been updated and expanded a segregation and racist component that resulted in the repression and
expulsion of street vendors, the compulsory removal of homeless people from the streets, mass incarceration and deployment of military troops into slums and suburbs.

The violations also changed the way the population moves around the city; billions of Brazilian Reais were spent in the construction of a new downtown zone in Barra da Tijuca, where the main Olympic facilities were installed, at the expense of projects that would favor the majority of the population. There has also been the creation of exception laws and austerity measures, aimed at the criminalization of social movements, promotion of informal/precarious labor and privatization of public spaces. Not even athletes, sports enthusiasts and amateurs were spared: training complexes, such as the Julio Delamare Aquatic Park, the Celio de Barros Athletics Stadium or the Lagoa Rowing Stadium were destroyed or disabled.

The purpose of this Guide certainly is not to account for all the arbitrary acts of violence promoted in the name of the Olympic Games, but to help journalists and media professionals to get hold of information and sources that they wouldn't get from the official sources. Our organization is also ready to help in the search for more data and people to interview about other issues related to human rights violations. We hope that this guide will help readers realizing that, like all stories, the Olympics also have a different side.

Justiça Global

ABOUT

Justiça Global is a non-governmental organization working with the protection and promotion of human rights and with the strengthening of civil society and democracy. Established in 1999, our actions aim to denounce human rights violations; cause an impact on policy-making processes, based on fundamental rights and equity of gender and race; promote the strengthening of democratic institutions, and demand the guarantee of rights for victims of violations and human rights defenders.

In the Institutional Violence and Public Security field, our work is focused in fighting police violence and the militarization of cities, as well as mass incarceration in prison and juvenile rehabilitation systems. Under the scope of Human, Economic, Social, Cultural and Environmental Rights, Justiça Global deals especially with violations perpetrated by transnational corporations, the impacts caused by the implementation of major development projects and conflicts over land and territory. In the Human Rights Defenders area, the focus is on the protection of people working on the frontlines of the most diverse struggles, such as indigenous, quilombolas, rural workers, those struggling for housing, among others.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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- Associação dos Usuários da Marina da Glória
- Associação Nacional dos Centros de Defesa da Criança e do Adolescente (Anced)
- Campanha Baía Viva
- Campanha Nacional pelo Direito à Educação
- Comissão Brasileira de Desportos Aquáticos (CBDA)
- Comissão pela Reabertura do Julio Dellamare
- Comitê Popular da Copa e Olimpíadas do Rio de Janeiro
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- Rede de Comunidades e Movimentos contra a Violência
- Rede Rio Criança
Stage of the opening and closing ceremonies of the Olympics, the Maracanã Stadium is part of a sports complex that has undergone a dismantling process during the preparation for the Olympic Games and for the 2014 World Cup. Today, the stadium is undergoing a serious financial crisis, in which the current grantees want to return the stadium to state government control. In addition to this, the two main venues for Athletics and Swimming in Rio de Janeiro, the Célio de Barros Athletics Stadium and the Júlio Delamare Aquatic Park, which are also part of the Maracanã complex, have been closed since 2013, forcing top athletes, beginners and other practitioners of these sports to seek other cities or even stop training.

A stadium that has undergone continuous renovation works over the last 15 years, which consumed approximately R$ 1.6 billion, Maracanã was granted to the Maracanã S.A. consortium, composed by Odebrecht, IMX and AEG companies, in May 2013, for a 35-year period. In order to win the contest, the group offered a grant value (to be paid to the State in exchange for the granting) of R$ 5.5 million annually, paid in 33 installments, totaling R$ 181.5 million. The group would also invest another R$ 594.162 million in the demolition of the Célio de Barros Athletics Stadium and Júlio Delamare Aquatic Park, as well as the Friedenreich Municipal School, which is beside Maracanã, and the Presidio Evaristo de Moraes, one kilometer...
The Maracanã Stadium away from the complex. In the place of the demolished facilities, the consortium would have the right to build parking lots and a shopping center.

The continuous protests that took to the streets of Rio de Janeiro and Brazil in 2013 and 2014, however, were able to stop the demolition of the sports complex. The protesters denounced that the destruction (which was called "investment" in the bidding) only benefited the winning companies, since private enterprises would take the place of the sports complex. Besides, the actual amount paid by the consortium nowhere near covered all the public spending on the stadium. Considering the preparation for the World Cup alone (not including the previous renovations), R$ 1.343 billion were consumed in the stadium. Even adding the supposed investments in the surrounding area (R$ 594.16 million) to the amount that would be paid at the end of the 33 installments (R$ 181.5 million), the total amounts to R$ 775.6 million, an amount still far from the one funded by the government. On the other hand, according to the feasibility study of the enterprise, the profits of the grantee could reach R$ 1.4 billion over 35 years.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that one of the companies from the Maracanã S.A. consortium, IMX, was also responsible for the feasibility study of the concession that the very IMX won. Its partner Odebrecht worked on the renovation of the stadium – this is also the same company that plays a central role in the corruption accusations by the federal government, within the so-called Operation Lava-Jato. Currently, the former governor Sergio Cabral is being investigated for allegedly receiving 5% of the total value of the contract for the renovation of Maracanã. With it, he could have allowed Andrade Gutierrez construction company to associate with Odebrecht and Delta contractors in the consortium that would bid for the renovation works in 2009.

Irregularities in the process of granting the stadium prompted the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office (MPF) and the Rio de Janeiro Public Prosecutor’s Office (MP-RJ) to file a lawsuit to suspend Maracanã privatization process in March 2013. However, they failed to reverse the situation. The request for the renegotiation of the contract and its eventual termination is happening now just because, according to the consortium, it is not being profitable.

After the renovation and privatization of the stadium in 2013, tickets for the games skyrocketed from an average of R$ 14 to R$ 45; an effect that was seen in other stadiums renovated for the World Cup. Even with the soaring prices, the stadium recorded a R$ 77.2 million loss in 2014. In 2013, the loss reached R$ 48.3 million. The 2015 total figures were not disclosed, but a R$ 57 million loss is expected.

Amid financial losses and mass protests, the consortium wants to return the stadium or renegotiate the contract, while the State, in turn, has no interest to take over Maracanã. One solution could be that control of the stadium is taken over by a football club. Flamengo has publicly affirmed its interest in controlling Maracanã. For now, however, the fate of what once was the largest stadium in the world remains uncertain.

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**FIND OUT MORE**

**DOSSIER ON THE VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO SPORT AND CITY**
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"CABRAL DEMANDED 5% BRIBE IN RENOVATION WORKS OF MARACANÃ, WHISTLEBLOWERS SAY," ÉPOCA MAGAZINE, 05/10/2016 bit.ly/guia_maracana1

"MARACANÃ CONSORTIUM SAID TO HAVE STARTED NEW NEGOTIATIONS WITH RIO GOVERNMENT", VALOR ECONÔMICO NEWSPAPER, 06/28/2016 bit.ly/guia_maracana2


"MP SEES FAVORING OF EIKE COMPANY IN PRIVATIZATION OF MARACANÃ," UOL WEBSITE, 03/20/2013 bit.ly/guia_maracana4

**COURT OF AUDITORS OF THE STATE OF RIO DE JANEIRO BLOCKS R$ 198 MILLION DUE TO IRREGULARITIES IN MARACANÃ STADIUM** bit.ly/guia_maracana5

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Célio de Barros, Rio’s only public athletics training track, was closed on January 9, 2013. On that date, athletes, coaches and other users arrived at the stadium and found the gates closed. Without any notice, they found that they could no longer use the stadium, which opened in 1974 and was one of the main references for the sport throughout South America.

With its closure, most of the athletes had to find another solution, either leaving Rio or using the Olympic Stadium of Rio, the Engenhão. This, however, has never been an actual Olympic stadium, because it is controlled by football team Botafogo (which restricted the use of the venue for athletics) and was used almost exclusively for football. The situation has worsened with the closing of Engenhão in March 2013 because of structural problems that put it under risk of collapsing – a problem that is being solved for the Olympics, but no one has been held responsible for the structural errors in the stadium.

With the closing of Célio de Barros and Engenhão, some athletes had to train on the streets, in an effort to not abandon the sport. Coach Edneida Freire ran a project that served more than 300 students in the stadium. Since then, the number of students decreased and she had to use places such as public parks for their activities.

Even with the closing, popular manifestations were able to prevent the total destruction of Célio de Barros. Its stands are still intact, but its running track turned into a storage yard and a parking lot for Maracanã during the 2014 World Cup. After continuous failed promises, state government said on September 2015 that the stadium would be renovated and reopened in the first half of 2017. Nevertheless, it has already been open since June 2015 to other activity, namely musical events, provided a rental value is paid.

Célio de Barros Athletics Stadium is ours. Its demolition is absolutely non-negotiable!

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JÚLIO DELAMARE AQUATIC PARK

Training and aquatic competitions center, plus venue for swimming lessons and water aerobics for the population, Júlio Delamare had undergone a R$ 10 million renovation in order to be used in the 2007 Pan American Games competitions. With the privatization of Maracanã, its destruction was also planned in 2013, which ended up being barred by popular pressure on the streets. Even so, the government managed to close the venue in May 2014, on the grounds that it would be used as temporary facilities for FIFA during the World Cup. During the preparation for the football tournament, a crane demolished the diving platform. The pool, that was kept empty, was also damaged and cannot be used.

The aquatic park was a training site for at least 40 high-performance athletes seeking classification for the Olympic Games. The case of the diving athletes was even more serious, because they were all transferred to the Maria Lenk Aquatic Park, competition venue for the Olympics. The problem is that the new venue does not have a dry training center, which corresponds to 80% of the preparation of these athletes, who were forced to adapt their training or leave the city.

As opposed to what happened to Célio de Barros stadium, the athletes hoped that the aquatic park would be reopened for the Games, because it was announced that the water polo competitions would occur in that venue. However, the first modification in Rio-2016 official program was precisely the abandonment of this proposal, on May 2015.

Excluded from the Olympic schedule, without having been demolished, but also pushed away by the State, the future of the park was uncertain until this year. In February, the government of Rio de Janeiro granted the administration of Delamare to the Brazilian Confederation of Aquatic Sports (CBDA). According to the announcement, the venue will undergo renovation works until July, but the date of reopening has not yet been announced. For the swimming of Rio, however, the games are already lost.
Among Olympic sports, those practiced in the water may be the most affected during the whole preparation. The issue of pollution has high prominence, whether in the case of Guanabara Bay (see article about it) or at Lagoa Rodrigo de Freitas, site of the canoeing events, where 1.7 billion of adenoviruses per liter were found at its upper end and 14 million at its lower end. On California beaches, viral counts reach 1,000 per liter, according to a study commissioned by the Associated Press. This type of virus is known to cause digestive and respiratory diseases.

Polluted waters, however, are not the only legacy of the Games for water sports. The opportunity to invest in the sport, with the creation of training venues and a new generation of athletes, was already disregarded during preparation. As for rowing, athletes and users complain that the city’s main venue for the sport, the Lagoa Rowing Stadium, will continue to function as a small shopping mall with bars, restaurants and movie theatres after Rio 2016, with no chance of returning to its original function.

Inaugurated in the 1950s, the stadium was handed over to private enterprise in 1997, without a bidding process, by means of a Use Permit Term to Glen Entertainments Ltda. After several projects that did not materialize, Glen was able to build the shopping mall in 2005, which was named Lagoon. To adapt the venue to the company’s purposes, the old stands were demolished, giving way to one that is smaller than the original. Moreover, two training tanks were covered with earth to become a parking lot.

When in 2009 the city was chosen to host the Games, there was hope that the situation would change. The “Rio 2016 Lagoa Rowing Stadium - Sports Client Brief” document, sent by the Rio 2016 Committee to the IOC, stated that the stadium would be turned into a training and research complex, with facilities for education, training of managers and coaches, scientific research and talent hunting, in addition to being a center of excellence for athletes from all over Latin America.

Of the entire project, only minor renovations remained for the stadium to have minimum conditions for the Games, such as a new arbitration tower. Not even the rowing training center, which is required to welcome athletes, will remain at the stadium. It will be located in the Olympic Park, 22 kilometers away from Rodrigo de Freitas Lagoa, as denounced by the SOS Estádio de Remo movement. After the Olympics, it is expected that the shopping mall will reopen.
Main site for the Olympic sailing competitions, located on the shores of Guanabara Bay, the Marina da Glória, like the rest of the bay, has pollution high levels. And, as with the Lagoa Rowing Stadium, the venue ended up in the hands of private enterprise, becoming more of a place for private events and pier for private boats than an actual sports venue. Founded in 1984 as part of the Flamengo Park, the Marina was granted in 1996 to the Brazilian Company of Earthwork and Engineering S.A. (EBTE), when first started talks about changing the function of the area.

In 1998, a project that intended to turn the marina into a shopping mall with restaurants, parking lot and conventions center was rejected by the Institute of National Historical and Artistic Heritage (IPHAN), since the area is listed as cultural heritage, as is Flamengo Park. That did not stop other attempts made over the years by various owners of the marina - the EBTE was bought by the EBX group in 2009 and, in 2014, was sold to BR Marinas.

The latter finally got the authorization to construct on the site. These construction works cut down about 300 of the Park’s trees. There was also the construction of buildings taller than the 10-meter limit, disregarding recommendations from the Special Committee of the Marina da Glória. For athletes and other practitioners of the sport that cannot afford to leave their boats in the marina, there was no investment. In fact, there were losses. The only public ramp for the access of boats to the sea, the Calabouço ramp, was closed by BR Marinas, which is aided by IPHAN’s and SPU’s (Federal Secretariat for Property Management) quiescence, despite continuous complaints from groups such as Aterro Vivo and Ocupa Marina.

The company authorized to implement the construction works cut down about 300 of the Park’s trees.

**FIND OUT MORE**

Dossier on the violations of the right to sport and city
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Since the preparation for the Pan American Games (2007), the larger process of forced evictions in Rio de Janeiro’s history was initiated. In 2009, when Rio was announced the host city for the Olympics, the process intensified. Only in the period between 2009 and 2015, 77,206 people were evicted from their homes by the City Hall, according to government data.

These forced evictions follow a clear pattern of expulsion of the black, poor population from areas that are undergoing massive real estate valorization and are also included in the projects for the mega-events. In their book “SMH 2016: Remoções no Rio de Janeiro Olímpico” (“SMH 2016: Removals in Olympic Rio de Janeiro”) (Môrula Editorial), Lucas Faulhaber, architect and researcher at UFRJ, and Lena Azevedo, journalist and researcher at Justiça Global, show on map how evictions forced residents of areas with a better infrastructure – and most valued – to peripheral regions. In addition to all this, thousands of houses were destroyed in a city that has a housing deficit of 220,774 units, according to data from the João Pinheiro Foundation.

Rio City Hall makes use of several arguments to justify the removals. Among them is that some favela dwellers would be living at areas of risk. However, besides not thinking of ways to ensure that these houses are not placed at areas of risk, for instance, by taking measures to contain slopes at risk of
collapse, the City Hall repeatedly ignores that the resettlement of families could be done inside their own community.

Within the context of mega-events, the main reason given for the evictions was the conduction of urban intervention works. This is noticeable in emblematic cases like Favela Metrô Mangueira, which, situated less than a kilometer away from Maracanã Stadium, was removed on the grounds of turning the place into a parking lot – a project that had never been presented officially by the City Hall.

In addition to the proximity to sites of the Games, another reason often used by the City Hall to justify evictions is the opening of transport routes, as the World Cup and Olympics Popular Committee of Rio de Janeiro denounces. Due to the construction of the Transoeste corridor, City Hall initiated the forced evictions of the Restinga, Vila Harmonia and Vila Recreio II communities, located in the Recreio dos Bandeirantes neighbourhood, in Rio’s west zone. The three favelas housed altogether almost five hundred families, which have been living on the premises for decades.

In the case of the Restinga community, for instance, in 2010 the residents were notified by the City Hall that the implementation of Transoeste would be initiated, and that they had five days to vacate the premises. The residential houses were entitled to derisory compensations, which merely covered the cost of building materials (without assessing the value of the land). At the time, commercial enterprises were demolished without any compensation.

During the eviction process, the municipal administration had adopted practices to frighten residents. State agents started to carry out frequent visits to the communities, threatening to evict people without compensation if they did not accept the terms presented by the City Hall. In addition, the houses were marked with the acronym SMH (from Secretaria Municipal de Habitação – Municipal Housing Secretariat). Those that received the mark were doomed to be destroyed by the City Hall. These practices were adopted in Vila Recreio II and Vila Harmonia, for instance, as shown in the document “Report on forced evictions in the city of Rio de Janeiro”, by the People’s Council.

The resistance of the residents managed to curb or stop the eviction processes. This is the case of Vila União de Curicica, in Rio’s west zone, which would have 800 houses removed for the construction of TransOlímpica, an expressway connecting the BRT bus system to Barra da Tijuca and Deodoro, sites of Olympic competitions. The residents’ struggle led the City Hall to modify the route of the expressway. On March 2015, the Official Gazette stated that 340 houses would be demolished, but the project of the expressway route was never presented and the possibility of fewer evictions was never discussed. For the houses that remained in the community, no urbanization plan was presented. It is also interesting to note that, although this process occurred because of the construction of TransOlímpica, the City Hall said publicly that it has nothing to do with the Games.
Vila Autódromo is located in a privileged area of Rio de Janeiro’s west zone, a region in which, for the past 20 years, there has been a large increase in the number of buildings, accompanied by increases in land prices and strong real estate speculation. With the Olympic Games, the surroundings of Vila Autódromo began to suffer even more voraciously this process of real estate speculation. The Olympic Park - a multi-million construction designed to be the Olympics main stage - is installed on the terrain adjacent to the community.

The announcement of the arrival of this new neighbour brought fear and uncertainty to the almost 600 families living in Vila Autódromo. The multi-billion dollar contracts have as stakeholders some of the biggest contractors in the country, such as Carlos Carvalho - the sole shareholder ahead of construction company Carvalho Hosken (valued at R$ 15 billion) - who owns more than 10 million square meters in Barra da Tijuca, the most expensive neighbourhood in the city’s west zone. He takes part in the works at the Olympic Park, along with construction companies Odebrecht and Andrade Gutierrez, by means of a Public Private Partnership (PPP). Under the agreement, after the Olympics, the consortium will build luxury real estate projects in the region occupied by the Park, since part of the sports structures will be dismantled after the Games. Then, Vila Autódromo began to suffer forced evictions threats.
Vila Autódromo emerged as a fishing community in the 1960s, when the west zone was an almost rural region. Its name is due to its proximity to the Autódromo de Jacarepaguá, also known as Nelson Piquet Autodrome, which was destroyed to house the Olympic Park. Urban development of the area and the emergence of several real estate projects prompted the forced evictions threats. It was the 1990s, during former mayor Cesar Maia’s administration, and his then deputy mayor for the region, Eduardo Paes, now city mayor since 2008. This relationship shows how, for over 20 years, the current mayor has been involved with the eviction of the community.

After much pressure from residents, the State Government finally granted them the use of the area for 99 years, still in the 1990s, during Governor Marcelo Alencar’s administration. Later, in 2005, the City Council approved the supplementary law 74/2005, which turned the community into a Special Area of Social Interest. These are the documents that residents use, to date, in the struggle for guaranteeing their right to housing.

In addition to the legal guarantees that grant residents their permanence, the very argument that they needed to leave to allow the construction of the Olympic Park was overturned in 2012, with the presentation of the Plano Popular da Vila Autódromo (People’s Development Plan). The document was prepared by residents, with the help of the Institute of Urban and Regional Planning and Research from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, and the Center for Housing and Urban Studies and Projects from the Fluminense Federal.

The environmental study of the Faixa Marginal da Lagoa de Jacarepaguá, showed that it was perfectly possible to urbanize the community, and listed several advantages: it was possible to offer larger and better quality houses – from 58m2 to 95m2, depending on the size of the family – versus the 45m2 to 62m2 houses in the municipal resettlement project. From an environmental point of view, by means of small investments in drainage and plumbing, it would be possible to eliminate risks and floods, with the recovery of the Vila (thus, only 15% of residents would have to leave their homes, being resettled within their own community). It would be possible to preserve the community itself, their social bonds, and their proximity to places to workplaces and schools. The cost of the People’s Plan would be much lower – costing around R$ 13.5 million – than the eviction and resettlement actions planned by the City Hall, which has so far spent R$ 204 million [2] of public funds in order to remove the community’s houses, just to serve private interests. On August 16, 2012, the Mayor received a copy of the People’s Plan of Vila Autódromo and committed himself to respond within 45 days with a technical analysis, but did not fulfill his promise. This same plan was the winner of the Urban Age Award, an international prize awarded by the Deutsche Bank.

Despite all the arguments in favor of the community, City Hall went on a campaign to evict it anyway. Residents report receiving threats to leave their houses. Many ended up giving in and negotiating. Others, even not wanting to negotiate, were forced to accept court decisions that granted City Hall the right to tear their homes down.

Winning image from the Olympic Revelations photo contest, held by the Rio’s Popular Committee for the World Cup and Olympics.
Those who remained in the community were forced to live next to rubble, which soon became foci of vector mosquitoes of diseases such as dengue and zika. In addition to this, basic services (water and electricity) were constantly cut out because of the destruction of the houses.

Thus, little by little, City Hall removed the families from Vila Autódromo. However, despite all attempts to completely end the community, Mayor Eduardo Paes was forced to revise his plan this year. On the eve of the Games, showing the destruction of Vila Autódromo, just beside the Olympic Park, would be very bad for the city's image. Thus, on March 8, after destroying the house of one of the community leaders, Maria da Penha Macena, the Mayor finally announced that he would arrange for the urbanization of the village.

The proposal, however, was first presented to the press and only afterwards, to the residents, who had to accept the City Hall project and could only suggest minor changes. Therefore, when the Games begin in August, possibly there will not be any more rubble, but new houses, which should not add up to more than 30 – in a community that initially had about 600 families.

For the residents of Vila Autódromo, their permanence is a great victory, which is also celebrated by the entire civil society. It is necessary, however, to point out that if there are some houses left in Vila Autódromo, it is thanks to the residents, especially because everyone expects the City Hall to advertise immensely the construction of new houses, trying to erase the entire history of violations against the right to housing of the community.

In the center of the interventions promoted by the urban revitalization project of the Port Zone (see entry Porto Maravilha) is Morro da Providência. The occupation of the area began between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, initially receiving the name Morro da Favela. The first name became so well known that, until today, it is used to name informal settlements throughout Brazil.

The City Hall attributed most of these evictions, a total of 515 families, to the fact that part of the houses were located in areas of risk, according to a report by GeoRio (Geotechnical Institute.
Foundation), a City Hall organization. However, residents presented a report showing that there was no technical justification for these removals.

The project was announced without any popular participation. Not even the removal and resettlement plan was presented to the threatened residents. The Municipal Housing Secretariat (SMH) started marking houses without opening any dialogue channel with the residents.

In 2012, the State Public Defender filed an injunction and was able to stop the construction works. They demanded the presentation of the project to residents, the construction and planned removals schedule, as well as debris removal from the houses already demolished.

The mobilization of residents during 2013 managed to terminate the works. However, more than a hundred families had already been removed. The cable car project linking Central train station, Morro da Providência and Cidade do Samba, even under protest, was completed in 2013. The construction costed the City Hall R$ 75 million.

The residents of the area surrounding Morro da Providência also suffered with the eviction process and the harassment by the City Hall. In Livramento Street, according to a report by the Fórum Comunitário do Porto, there were even cases of SMH community agents addressing families with identification cards hidden, and without any documents or any official information about the motivations for the registration or eviction.

Housing alternatives given by the City Hall were also insufficient to guarantee the same conditions of life, such as resettlement in a Minha Casa Minha Vida housing development in Senador Camará, Rio’s west zone (about 40km away from Livramento Street) or the granting of social rent in the amount of R$ 400.

The urban revamping process of the Port Zone, along with other plans for the requalification of the city’s downtown area, such as Lapa Legal, also reached homeless occupations in the region, making clear, once again, its elitist and commercial character, thus dislodging hundreds families.

An emblematic case in this context is the Ocupação Quilombo das Guerreiras, which brought together about 50 families that lived, since 2006, in a building that had been abandoned by Companhia Docas for over 20 years.

In 2012, Mayor Eduardo Paes announced the construction of the Trump Towers - mega buildings from businessman and US presidential candidate Donald Trump - at Avenida Francisco Bicalho. The towers would become “the biggest corporate center of the country.” Residents of Ocupação Quilombo das Guerreiras learn that the towers would be built in their address through the press. In 2013, the Ocupação Quilombo das Guerreiras building was expropriated.

Since 2011, residents of the occupation were already enrolled in a resettlement project in the Port Zone, called “Quilombo da Gamboa”, with funding from the former Fundo Nacional de Habitação de Interesse Social (National Fund for Social Housing – FNHIS), but, to date, they remain having no permanent homes.

Find out more

REPORT ON VIOLATION OF RIGHTS AND CLAIMS (FÓRUM COMUNITÁRIO DO PORTO)
bit.ly/guia_RelatorioFCP

REPORT ON THE TECHNICAL VISITS IN THE COMMUNITIES OF MORRO DA PROVIDÊNCIA AND PEDRA LISA (MAURIÇIO CAMPOS DOS SANTOS AND MARCOS DE FARIA ASEVEDO)
bit.ly/guia_contralaudo

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In the Rio bid to host the 2016 Olympics, the government of Rio de Janeiro had promised to treat 80% of the sewage that is dumped in the Guanabara Bay, site of the sailing competitions, as well as being one of the city’s main postcards. The promise, however, was soon frustrated by the very governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro, Luiz Eduardo Pezão, who admitted the impossibility of cleaning the Bay before the beginning of the games. A study released by the Alberto Luiz Coimbra Institute of Graduate Studies and Research in Engineering of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (Coppe-UFRJ), says that, considering the pace of the cleanup project, the pollution will only be eliminated in ten years, i.e., 2026.

In fact, the bay waters already affected athletes who will compete in the Olympics. Sailors Erik Heil, from Germany, and Wonwoo Cho, from South Korea, experienced health problems after sailing at the bay in August 2015. Heil underwent minor surgeries in Germany for treating a multidrug-resistant infection that he suspects having contracted due to the pollution in Rio de Janeiro. Cho was hospitalized in Rio with fever, chills, vomiting and dehydration, which prompted his coach, Danny OK, to blame the waters in a posting on a social network.

Researcher Kristina Mena, an expert on viruses and associa-
A professor of public health from the University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston, did a study at the Associated Press’s request on the quality of the waters of the bay and other venues of competition (such as Copacabana Beach and Lagoa Rodrigo de Freitas). According to the research, athletes would have a 99% chance of infection by ingesting only three teaspoons of water, although the likelihood of a person getting sick depends on the immunity and other factors.

The athletes may feel the effects of pollution during the 15 days of competition, but there are those whose life depends on the Guanabara Bay and who are becoming increasingly hopeless. Pollution and continuous environmental disasters in the waters have already caused the disappearance of 38 fish species from the bay, such as whiting, stingray and yellow catfish, among others, according to the Men and Women of the Sea Association (AHOMAR), which comprises about 4,200 fishermen from Rio and other neighboring cities, such as Niterói, Duque de Caxias, São Gonçalo and Magé.

The fishermen denounce especially the impacts of projects related to the petrochemical industry at the bay. With the massive presence of vessels in this sector, in addition to the existence of large reservoirs, refineries and pipelines, the fishermen were increasingly losing ground with the creation of extensive areas that exclude the fish trade. Moreover, spills and cleaning operations carried out by this industry have contaminated the water and caused the death of thousands of fishes.

The fishermen’s denunciation against the petrochemical industry soon led to attacks and reprisals, resulting in the death of four fishermen directly connected to AHOMAR’s struggle. Paulo César dos Santos, treasurer of the association, was beaten and murdered with a shot in the head in front of his wife and children in May 2009. In 2010, Márcio Amaro, one of AHOMAR’s founder, was also killed in his house. Almir Nogueira de Amorim and João Luiz Telles Penetra were found in the Guanabara Bay in June 2012. Preliminary investigations by the homicide division of the Civil Police indicate that they were both tied before being drowned. To this day, the crimes haven’t been solved yet. The president of AHOMAR, Alexander Anderson, has escaped at least six assassination attempts, entering the National Program for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders.

Threats, however, are not limited to those received by Alexander Anderson. Other fishermen are also being attacked for their struggle in the Guanabara Bay. With the worsening of the water pollution and the advancement of the petrochemical industry, they claim that the situation will not improve any time soon.
Responsible for the emission of 76% of the carbon dioxide (CO2) of the City of Rio de Janeiro, the Thyssenkrupp Atlantic Steel Company (TKCSA) operates illegally since its opening in August 2010. Unable to conform with the Brazilian legislation, the steel processing plant works by means of a Conduct Adjustment Agreement (TAC) signed between the company and the Rio de Janeiro Public Prosecutor’s Office (MP-RJ). This agreement has been renewed three times, the last one in April this year, since the enterprise has never managed to – and probably never will – adapt to the environmental laws of the country.

The German company’s plant, which is the largest in Latin America, had already been rejected by other cities such as São Luís, capital of Maranhão, a northeastern state of Brazil. Upon arriving in Rio de Janeiro, the enterprise soon proved disastrous for the environment and for the population of Santa Cruz, a neighborhood in the west zone of Rio (the same area where most of the Olympics facilities is). The opening was on June 18, 2010. On August 7, 2010, Extra, a Rio-based newspaper, published: “Glossy powder scares Santa Cruz - Residents report health problems due to the steel company.”

According to reports of local residents, TKCSA expels a silver-colored material during processing. According to the Rio de Janeiro State Secretariat for the Environment (SEA/RJ), the material expelled by the company has cadmium, lead, copper, chromium, nickel and other heavy metals that can endanger human health. A 2010 study by the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz) showed the presence of 24 chemical elements in the air of Santa Cruz that can cause many problems, from allergic reactions and cognitive disorders to cancer. In its turn, TKCSA claims that it is only graphite powder.

Located on the shores of the Sepetiba Bay, TKCSA is also affecting the lives of fishermen and their families. The main access of the fishermen’s boats to the bay, the São Francisco Canal, in Santa Cruz, had its passage blocked by the company. According to the Institute of Policy Alternatives for the Southern Cone (PACS), about eight thousand fisherfolk and other professionals who lived directly from this local economy lost their jobs. In comparison, the steel mill has created 5,500 jobs, according to data from ThyssenKrupp. On account of all these damages caused by TKCSA, there are 238 ongoing individual civil actions and a Public Civil Action, all sponsored by the Public Defender’s Office of the State of Rio de Janeiro.

FIND OUT MORE

CAMPANHA PARE TKCSA http://paretkcsa.org/
PACS - INSTITUTO POLÍTICAS ALTERNATIVAS PARA O CONE SUL http://www.pacs.org.br/
RELATÓRIO DA FIOCRUZ SOBRE IMPACTOS SOCIOAMBIENTAIS DA TKCSA bit.ly/guia_fiocruz

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Target of real estate speculation, with new enterprises springing up all the time, Barra da Tijuca, a neighborhood in Rio’s west zone, will house most of the Olympic facilities, and is also the site chosen to receive the Games golf course. Its construction is shrouded in allegations of environmental violations. Built in an area of 970 thousand square meters of native vegetation, the course, in fact, is part of a real estate enterprise. Along with the authorization for its construction, Fiori Empreendimentos Imobiliários and its partner, real estate developer and building company Cyrela, received permission to construct 22 22-story buildings in the same grounds.

For the construction of the golf course, announced in 2011, Rio’s City Hall used an environmental permit that had expired on July 20, 2009, according to lawyer Jean Carlos Novaes, from the Ocupa Golfe movement, which protests against the devastation of the site. The permission for the construction of the golf course and buildings came by means of the last voting session of Rio’s City Council in 2012. This last-minute authorization, however, attracted the attention of Rio de Janeiro’s Public Prosecutor’s Office (MP-RJ), which denounces the unconstitutionality of the law that authorized the construction.

Opened on November 22, 2015, the golf course costed R$ 60 million and was fully paid by Fiori and Cyrela – who will sell the cheapest apartments in the buildings for R$ 5 million each. The golf course, which in theory should be public, is already shifting to a private control. The Brazilian Golf Confederation, which will be responsible for the site after the Olympics, is looking for private partners to help paying the monthly R$ 500,000 needed to its maintenance. The offsetting to this investment, however, are not yet clear, as well as the fees that will be charged to users of the “public space”.

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970.000 (M²)
Of native vegetation devastated.

FIND OUT MORE
IN A LETTER, ITANHANGÁ GOLF CLUB REVEALS THAT IT WAS NOT SOUGHT TO HOST 2016 OLYMPICS. ESPN ON 20/12/2012 bit.ly/guia_campodegolfe
THE SOCIAL & ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF RIO’S OLYMPIC GOLF COURSE. RIO ON WATCH, ON 16/06/2016 bit.ly/guia_golfe

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RIO DE JANEIRO’S POPULAR COMMITTEE FOR THE WORLD CUP AND OLYMPICS comitepopulario@gmail.com
After Rio de Janeiro was chosen to host the Olympic Games, urban renewal policies and actions to promote tourism in the Port Zone have intensified. At that time, the Porto Maravilha project had already been launched by federal, state and municipal governments, but the choice of Rio as host city did accelerate the schedule of revamping works.

Porto Maravilha is aligned with other restructuring projects of port areas around the world, such as Barcelona, London and New York. The potential for real estate renovation is made possible by the presence of large vacant lots and unused warehouses. The project, designed to attract tourists and investors, completely ignored the needs of those who have been living in that region, leading to gentrification of the area and modifying the housing, work and sociability dynamics, even generating a major process of forced removals and evictions (see entry Housing).

The project involves the revitalization of the Area of Special Urban Interest (AEIU) of the Port region, a 5 million square meters area covering the districts of Gamboa, Saúde and Santo Cristo, as well as part of Downtown, São Cristóvão and Cidade Nova.

In order to make the project viable, an Urban Consortium Operation (OUC) was instituted based on Municipal Law No.
101/2009, which authorizes the executive branch to modify the city’s Master Development Plan, granting legal support to changes in the form of appropriation of the urban space. It establishes new rules for land use and urban development patterns in the region, enabling the construction of high-rises, through the elimination of previous building-height restrictions. In order to that, the Certificates of Additional Construction Potential (CEPACs) were created.

CEPACs are bonds issued by the municipal government in order to raise funds that will be spent in public investments, in this particular case, to finance the OUC. It is a compensation that investors pay to construct buildings with more floors than what was originally allowed in the area (the Porto Maravilha project now provides for buildings up to 50 floors), thus increasing their profit margin. CEPAC therefore enables the maximization of the use of land and, consequently, leads to the loss of the area’s characteristics.

In the case of Rio’s Port, despite the publicity surrounding the sale of the bonds, there was only one investor interested. In 2011, the Porto Maravilha Real Estate Investment Fund (Fundo de Investimento Imobiliário Porto Maravilha), created by Caixa Econômica Federal (public bank) with resources from the severance indemnity fund (FGTS - Fundo de Garantia por Tempo de Serviço) - which consists of money collected monthly from workers’ salaries – purchased, in a single package, all the CEPACs issued by the City Hall for R$ 3.5 billion. Each of the 6.4 million certificates were sold for R$ 545.

The CEPACs purchased can be renegotiated by Caixa, which according to the rules of the Invitation for Bid, also became responsible for the entire investment of the urban renewal project - estimated at R$ 8 billion over 15 years - after winning the auction.

The use of FGTS money to fund the project is now under investigation by the Attorney General’s Office (PGR). A plea agreement involving Ricardo Pernambuco and Ricardo Pernambuco Junior, from the construction company Carioca Engenharia, showed that Eduardo Cunha (PMDB-RJ), speaker of the Lower House of Congress currently suspended from duty, demanded bribes from Carioca and other construction companies in order to release the money from the fund for the companies. The PGR claims it has evidence that R$ 52 million in bribes, divided into 36 installments, was paid to unknown accounts in Switzerland and Israel.

In addition to this, the investment made to purchase the CEPACs has proved to be a bad deal for the fund. A report published in the Official Gazette, on December 2015, points out that, until then, only 8.79% of the certificates had been sold. Caixa still owns more than 90% of the bonds, and there is little prospects of selling them and recovering the workers’ money.

In the Port area, unlike the rest of the city, the Porto Novo Consortium, formed by construction companies OAS, Odebrecht and Carioca, is responsible for the infrastructure renovations as well as for the provision of city services such as garbage collection and traffic maintenance in the port area.

The consortium was chosen after winning a bidding process (an administrative concession), a form of Public Private Partnership (PPP) in which the compensation is given by means of public installments (regular contributions from Government resources). In this case, the money came from the sale of CEPACs.

Of the R$ 8 billion due for the project, R$ 7.6 billion will be used to hire concessionary companies in a PPP regime and R$ 400 million will be used for the administration of the Urban Development Company of the Port Region of Rio de Janeiro (CDURP), a municipal (mixed-investment) company created to coordinate the Porto Maravilha implementation process.

The population did not have the opportunity to discuss neither the scope of the project nor the reasons that led the City Hall to yield the administration of municipal services in the region to the private sector.
R$3.5 BILLION

The Porto Maravilha Real Estate Investment Fund, created by Caixa Econômica Federal (public bank) with resources from the severance indemnity fund (FGTS) - which consists of money collected monthly from workers’ salaries – purchased, in a single package, all the CEPACs issued by the City Hall for R$ 3.5 billion.

FIND OUT MORE


“THE PORTO MARAVILHA CERTIFICATES FLOP” EXTRA NEWSPAPER, 12/10/2015 bit.ly/guia_portomaravilha2

“EDUARDO CUNHA CHARGED R$ 52 MILLION IN BRIBES TO RELEASE MONEY FROM FI-FGTS,” ÉPOCA MAGAZINE, 12.16.2015 bit.ly/guia_portomaravilha3

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PUBLIC SPENDING_46
Public spending during the World Cup was heavily criticized in Brazil before, during and after the event. The excessive amount of money spent in buildings and repairs in stadiums, especially those that have become “white elephants”, led Rio’s City Hall to always highlight in their arguments that the Olympic Games would be paid for by the private sector, with little public spending. The question, however, becomes a little more complex when one realizes what is considered and what is left out of the budget.

According to the Public Olympic Authority (APO), the latest estimate of the cost of the Olympic Games in Rio is of R$ 39.1 billion. In 2009, when Rio de Janeiro bid to host the Games, the organizing committee estimated the games would cost R$ 28.8 billion (in values at the time, inflation adjustment not applied). A survey by Rio de Janeiro’s Popular Committee for the World Cup and Olympics, from September 2015, shows that 62.1% of the expenditure on the Games were worth about R$ 2.716 billion. It is important to emphasize that the very contractors hired by the government earned the right to use the park area for the construction of high-end apartment buildings after the end of the Olympics.

Moreover, the money being spent on public security is not included in the estimates made by the APO or the People’s Committee. Just to illustrate the impact public security can have on the budget, the State of Rio Janeiro has raised a R$ 2.9 billion loan from the federal government in June this year just to cover security spending during the Games. No one knows for sure how much money has been spent so far.

In the case of the Olympic Park alone, the People’s Committee estimates showed that the 800 thousand square meters of the terrain were worth about R$ 2.716 billion. It is equally important to understand the poor distribution of sports facilities throughout the city and, consequently, the poor distribution of urbanization and transportation investments, all in the name of the Games. According to the latest version of the Responsibility matrix from the Games, 84.72% of all investments are being made in Barra da Tijuca, an elite neighborhood that has been going through real estate speculation and receiving new real estate projects.

Another expense that has risen exponentially during Mayor Eduardo Paes’s administration is advertising. The news portal RioOnWatch published a survey on the amount spent on marketing since Paes took office and the city was chosen to host the Olympics in 2009. Data from the city’s financial management information system (FINCON) show that, between 2006 and 2009, the city spent between R$ 100,000 and R$ 800,000 per year in “advertising, marketing and media.” In 2010, this budget leaped to R$ 29 million. Last year, it amounted to R$ 127 million.

Much of this money is spent on Rio de Janeiro’s traditional media, which affects the way the media publicizes the city’s image and the effects of mega-events.
Public spending not only increased but also exceeded the initial budget. It is important to note that much of this money is spent on Rio de Janeiro's traditional media, which also affects directly the way the media publicizes the city's image and the effects of mega-events.

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SOURCE: FINCON (ACCESS EM 13/04/2016)

**FIND OUT MORE**

“OS PROPRIETÁRIOS DO BRASIL – OS DONOS DO RIO” (“BRAZIL’S PROPRIETERS – RIO’S OWNERS”) REPORT FROM INSTITUTO MAIS DEMOCRACIA
proprietariosdobrasil.org.br/donosdorio/

PORTAL TRANSPARÊNCIA, DATA FROM THE OLYMPIC GAMES’S RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX
bit.ly/guia_matrizderesponsabilidades

“RIO DE GASTOS” (“A RIVER OF EXPENSES”), PACS REPORT ON THE OLYMPIC BUDGET
bit.ly/guia_riodegastos

“RIO VAI GASTAR ATÉ R$ 1 BILHÃO COM PARQUE OLÍMPICO APÓS OLÍMPÍADA”, DO UOL,
08/07/2016 bit.ly/guia_gastos

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The logic of war has historically guided the model of operation of the Brazilian police. They are the most lethal police forces in the world, according to Amnesty International. In 2014, 15.6% of homicides reported in the country were committed by a police officer. In Brazil, the Constitution divides the police force into three groups – federal police, civil police and military police. The federal police is responsible to investigate crimes committed against federal properties, services and interests. The civil and military polices are structured under the federal states. The civil police is responsible for inquiry and investigation, while the military police plays the part of ostensive police force. The military police, as the name implies, is described in the 1988 Constitution as an auxiliary force and reserve troop for the Army. This feature, largely inherited from the period of the corporate-military dictatorship, implies the adoption of a military chain of command, of combat training, of a specific military regulation and of an exclusive military jurisdiction. It is on this institutional architecture that lies the war practices, which structurally guide the policing logic, applied in the country and in the city of Rio de Janeiro in particular.

In general, cases of killings committed by police officers are administratively classified as “resistance killings” – i.e., homicides allegedly committed in conflict situations, in order to “overcome the resistance” of alleged perpetrators of crimes or as self-defense. Although they are actually homicides, cases registered as “resistance killings” are classified separately by the police, for they are theoretically considered as “justifiable homicides”. It means that the homicide committed by a police officer immediately assumes the presumption that it is not unlawful. The effects of this presumption of legality of the police action are not exhausted in the mere classification of cases – the consequences will be verifiable throughout the treatment granted by the criminal justice system. Rare are the cases where police officers even go to trial on account of the murders committed.

A study conducted by the Research Center on Citizenship, Conflict and Urban Violence (NECVU), at UFRJ, analyzed the processing of cases registered as “resistance killings” throughout the criminal justice system. The study used the year 2005 as a reference, and found out that 707 victims of resisting killings that year resulted in 510 criminal complaints. These records resulted in only 355 investigations, which resulted in only 19 criminal cases at the Rio de Janeiro Justice Court. From the follow-up of these cases, researchers were able to conclude that the number of filed investigations – i.e., cases that are terminated in police investigations, without ever reaching the procedural stage – reached the incredible figure of 99.2%.

The lethality of police action does not operate uniformly in the different areas of the city of Rio de Janeiro. The geographical distribution of police killings reveals a huge concentration in the favelas and surrounding areas. Black youngsters living in these areas are the preferred targets of police action, revealing a policy of extermination of the black population that is aggravated in the context of mega-events. In 2007, the year the city hosted the Pan American Games, the unbelievable figure of 1,330 resistance killings was recorded in the state, with 902 occurring in the capital of the state, according to data from the State's Public Security Institute (ISP). One of the police operations considered top priority to the security of the event was held at Complexo do Alemão. The police siege involved a high number of agents and began in May, extending to July. In a single day, June 27, 19 people were killed, in what became known as the “Pan Massacre.”

Since 2013, the number of resistance killings increases every
year in Rio de Janeiro. According to the ISP, 416 resistance killings were recorded throughout the state. In 2014, when the World Cup was held, this number jumped to 584 resistance killings, a 40% increase compared to 2013. In 2015, the numbers get even higher: 644 resistance killings, a 10% increase over the previous year.

And the situation has already worsened again this year. During May alone, there were 40 homicides resulting from police actions in the city of Rio de Janeiro, an increase of 135% compared to 2015 when 17 were killed, according to the Public Security Institute (ISP). According to the survey, the situation is the same at the state level, with 84 killed this year, compared to 44 last year, an increase of 90%.

The numbers refer to very concrete pains. Police operations in Rio de Janeiro favelas intensified with the upcoming Olympic Games. Areas such as Maré, Complexo do Alemão, Acari, Mangueiros, Jacarezinho, among others, began to register weekly episodes of intense shootings and executions. Among the emblematic cases that have occurred in recent months, there is the murder of 5 youngsters last November in Costa Barros, in the northern zone of the city. The boys were shot by police officers of the 41st Battalion when returning from a stroll in the Madureira Park. The car where they were in was shot more than 100 times. Neighbours and relatives reported that the police officers tried to forge a “resistance killing”, i.e. a confrontation and alleged resistance by the boys coldly executed, putting a gun under the left wheel of the car.
Equipped with machine guns and mortar launchers, the battle tank points its guns toward the favela of Rocinha. The scene, captured during the Rio-92, illustrates the front page of the June 2, 1992 edition of the newspaper Folha de São Paulo, under the headline “Rio Besieged”. The strong military scheme set up at the time employed more than 17,000 agents, in addition to a warlike apparatus of terrestrial fleets that took the city streets during the days of the conference.

Schemes of this kind are not new in the city. Besides Rio 92, the city has had, in recent years, major military operations to receive the Pan American Games, the Confederations Cup, the World Youth Day and the World Cup. The trail of truculence and criminalization left by these actions has been absolutely brutal.

In the two months leading up to the Pan American Games in 2007, a large police siege began at the Complexo do Alemão, a set of favelas located in the northern zone of the city. The operation reached its culmination on June 27, when the Complexo was invaded by more than 1,300 police officers, three armored cars (“caveirões”), a helicopter and a dozen police cars. On that day, 19 people were killed by the police, in what became known as the Pan Massacre. In total, the siege of Complexo do Alemão ended up with 44 people dead and 78 injured.

In late 2008, the state of Rio de Janeiro’s government started the implementation of the Pacifying Police Units program. The experiment was advertised as a permanent occupation policy of the city’s favelas by the military police, with the mission, as the name implies, of “pacifying” areas with a strong presence of organized crime. This supposed “pacification” would presumably include the adoption of a new policing model, guided not by confrontation but by a community police, of “proximity”. The experiment also advertised the idea of improving and normalizing the provision of public services in these areas, such as electricity, sanitation, education, health.

The first Pacifying Police Unit (UPP) was installed in the favela Santa Marta, in the southern zone, the city’s prime area. The following year, in 2009, 4 more UPPs were installed, and in 2010, 7 more. Gradually the project configuration made it clear that it was an initiative to create a “security belt” for the World Cup and the Olympics, favoring tourist areas, access corridors to the international airport and the city neighbourhoods that received Olympic facilities.

There are currently 37 UPPs implemented in the city, and one in the city of Duque de Caxias, in the Baixada Fluminense. The program received broad support from the media, which promoted it as the great solution to the issue of public security. The problems with the UPPs, however, became more and more visible. The militarization of everyday life in the favelas was only the first facet of the program’s shortcomings. Under surveillance by police officers, residents had their routine activities subjected to police control and authorization. Youngsters felt these changes most immediately and sensitively, either by police control of their leisure activities – and criminalization of the main cultural event of Rio’s favelas, funk music – by either aggressive approaches and routine police searches.
Gradually, the routine shootings started again. A survey by the newspaper Extra revealed that in March alone this year, 112 shootings were registered in UPP-controlled favelas, where police fired at least 3,693 shots. An average of one every 12 minutes. The recurring human rights violations committed by police officers from UPPs showed that the program had nothing to do with the implementation of a new culture or form of policing, but rather with the updating of old confrontational practices. Rapes, summary executions, enforced disappearances and torture became constantly reported.

The most emblematic episode of this setting was the kidnapping, torture and murder of Amarildo Dias de Souza. Amarildo disappeared on July 14, 2013, after being approached by police officers near his home, in Rocinha, and taken to the UPP headquarters. The cameras that could have recorded his exit from the building allegedly failed at that precise moment, and Amarildo was then reported missing. The immense impact of the case, at the height of the 2013 huge demonstrations, prompted the investigation of 25 police officers stationed at the UPP of Rocinha, leading to the conviction of 12 – among them, the then commander of the unit, Major Edson Santos.

Other experiments of military control of areas occurred during the city’s preparation period for the World Cup and the Olympic Games. In 2010, the Army stormed the Complexo do Alemão, with a strong military apparatus. The action was widely covered by national and international media. The Army remained in the Complexo until 2012, when four UPPs were installed.

In April 2014, the Army invaded the favela complex of Maré, a few months prior to the World Cup. Heavily armed troops and war tanks remained in the favela until June 2015, leaving a trail of rights violations. The action involved about 3,000 soldiers, between army and navy soldiers. Many had been recruited from the Brazilian Armed Forces experience in Haiti, which reveals a kind of military social laboratory of urban control practices. Among the cases of violence recorded in Maré during the Army’s occupation, there is the brutal approach by soldiers of a group of young people returning by car to the favela, after watching a football game. The car was shot for allegedly not stopping in a police roadblock. Vitor Santiago, a black youngster who lived in the favela, was one of the vehicle occupants. He took two rifle shots, had his leg amputated and he is in a state of paraplegia.

Another arbitrariness also committed during the period of stay of the armed forces in the city’s favelas is the criminal charges filed in the military justice against residents of these localities. More than 30 years after the end of the corporate-military dictatorship, civilians are still tried in a special justice, generally by army officials, for alleged crimes committed against military personnel, especially for contempt and disobedience. A survey conducted by Justiça Global found out 25 criminal charges in the Superior Military Tribunal pertinent to the period in which the army occupied the Alemão and Penha complexes between 2010 and 2012. All resulted in convictions. In Maré, during the military occupation period, there were 42 civilians responding to 39 criminal charges. Such cases generally relate to a process of resistance and denunciation of violations committed by the military themselves, and that end up criminalizing the resident on charges of contempt.

During the Olympics, the Army will occupy again the city’s favelas. The press reported that six favelas should be invaded by the armed forces in regions considered strategic for the circulation of tourists and athletes.
Camelôs and the Municipal Guard

Within the urban planning policy for the Games, the social cleansing of streets was a core point for the City Hall. In addition to the persecution of homeless people, one of the main targets were informal street vendors, the camelôs. In 2009, the same year when the city was chosen to host the Games, Eduardo Paes’s office held an alleged organization of informal workers, in which four thousand workers were reregistered and 14,400 of them were registered. However, according to the United Movement of Camelôs (MUCA), the city has about 35,000 fixed street vendors - with or without a permit - in addition to about 25,000 who work on an itinerant basis.

The figures thus present a large discrepancy, leading to a direct confrontation between the workers and the City Hall. Through an operation called “Shock of Order”, which began in September 2009, there was a systematic persecution of the street vendors. For this purpose, the government also introduced new laws removing the right of workers. For instance, the traditional work of the street vendors around football stadiums - especially Maracanã - was prohibited within a radius of two kilometers.

Because they need to work to survive, many street vendors venture to continue to sell their products in prohibited places. In some cases, this resistance has even led to death, as happe-
Camelôs and the Municipal Guard

In October 2014 - a few months after the World Cup - the street vendor was run over by a car in the Radial Oeste Avenue in front of the stadium, as he tried to escape from repression. In anger, a group of people attacked with stones the headquarters of the Public Order Unit (UOP) of the Municipal Guard, which is also next to the stadium, and some Unit vehicles. Windows and four vehicles were damaged.

Directly responsible for the repression of street vendors, the Municipal Guard is also acquiring a military feature in the city. Created to take care of public property, the guard is used against workers and acts with violence in many cases. And the situation may worsen, because Law 13,022/2014 allowed guards of all cities to carry lethal weapons, assuming even more its policing nature. However, this measure has not yet been implemented in Rio de Janeiro, where the municipal guard uses less lethal weapons.

It is also the Municipal Guard who ends up being employed by the City Hall in the process of eviction of poor communities. They directly attack the residents in order to ensure the evacuation of buildings to be demolished, as is the case of Vila Autódromo, referred to in another entry in this guide.

The current mayor, Eduardo Paes, is carrying out the compulsory removal from the streets of the homeless population, within his urban planning actions, which are called Operation Shock of Order. Acting especially in the most valued areas of the city, such as Downtown and the Southern Zone, City Hall teams withdraw residents violently and forcefully, employing lethal and less-lethal weapons (such as shock weapons). Even without committing any crime, these people are taken to a public shelter, far from the urban center, sometimes with the use of handcuffs.

This action was denounced by Rio de Janeiro Public Prosecutor's Office (MP-RJ), which filed a public civil action in April 2013, asking for the removal from office and a five-year suspension of the political rights of Mayor Eduardo Paes and of the Interior Minister, Rodrigo Bethlem, on account of the compulsory removals, which violates constitutional principles. Also, the Public Prosecutor’s Office asked for the payment of a fine of up to a 100 times their salaries.

In the civil action, the Public Prosecutor Rogério Pacheco Alves, from the 7th Prosecutor’s Office of Collective Protection of Citizenship, denounced that the municipal shelter, in Paciência, in the west zone of Rio, was "an actual overcrowded and infectious deposit of human beings, which are treated there in an
inhuman and humiliating way”. Although the violation of rights is clear, the mayor, also in 2013, made a public statement defending the measure: “We will continue with the removals,” said Eduardo Paes to UOL news site.

The situation is not restricted to adults. The National Association of Defense Centers for the Rights of the Child and the Adolescent (ANCED), Justiça Global, the Center for the Defense of the Rights of Children and Adolescents of Rio de Janeiro and the Coordination for the Defense of the Rights of the Child and Adolescent from the Public Defender’s Office filed, in February this year, a complaint to the Committee on the Rights of the Child of the United Nations (UN) on the segregation and compulsory removal of poor, black children and teenagers in Rio de Janeiro, in the context of the 2016 Olympic Games.

The text recalls that the cleansing operations have been extended precisely because of the Olympic Games, the 2014 World Cup and the 2013 Confederations Cup. “Throughout this period, included the current moment of preparation for hosting the 2016 Olympic Games in August this year, the compulsory removals of homeless girls and boys have been frequent. These actions arbitrarily established by the state and municipal governments are contrary not only to already existing public policies for the reception of youngsters, but also to the infraconstitutional legislation, the Statute of Children and Adolescents, and international treaties ratified by Brazil, such as the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), adopted by the UN General Assembly”, states an excerpt of the document.

The situation is further aggravated by recent actions such as the creation of the monitoring program “Segurança Presente” in a public-private partnership system. The Trade Federation (Fecomercio) of Rio de Janeiro now has an agreement in which it pays Rio’s government R$ 44 million for the policing of three regions in Rio de Janeiro (Flamengo, Lagoa and Mêier) for two years. In addition to military police officers, military police reservists, retired military police officers, and youngsters fresh out of the Army are also employed within this partnership.

The teams are composed by two military police officers and an agent acting as a civilian, who can use firearms, pepper spray and stun guns. They fill Police Stations and Youth Councils with poor children and adolescents from low-income suburbs who move around the city without documents and money for public transportation tickets, but who did not commit any criminal offense. These reported practices are violations of the rights of children by the State, especially of the articles of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and Recommendations Adopted by the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child.
Brazil has the fourth largest population of prisoners in the world, according to the National Survey of Prisons Information, by the Ministry of Justice, published in April 2016. There are 622,202 persons incarcerated in the country, placing Brazil only behind the United States, Russia and China. Even compared to the total population, Brazil ranks fourth in numbers of prisoners per capita, behind Thailand (3rd), Russia (2nd) and United States (1st). The numbers become even more impressive when one realizes that there has been an exponential increase of prisoners, jumping from 232,000 in 2000 to the current 622,000, a 167% increase. And the state of Rio is the third in number of prisoners, with 39,321 people, behind São Paulo (219,053) and Minas Gerais (61,286).

For human rights organizations and much of civil society, the increased incarceration worsens the precarious situation of the prison system, rather than solving the structural problems that cause violence in the country. This position is also supported by the UN in a survey conducted by the Special Rapporteur against torture, Juan E. Méndez, released in March this year: “The continual increase in the prison population, combined with an official penitentiary capacity of merely 376,669 prisoners, has created a penitentiary system marked by endemic overcrowding.”

In addition to overcrowding, the UN has also confirmed the continuous denunciations that the human rights violations, rather than being exceptions, are the recurring practice of the Brazilian prison system. “Conditions of detention often amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Severe overcrowding leads to chaotic conditions inside facilities, and greatly impacts the living conditions of inmates and their access to food, water, legal defense, health care, psychosocial support, work and education opportunities, as well as sun, fresh air and recreation”, the rapporteur asserts.

The expansion of the incarceration policy even reached the mega events. In 2012, Rio’s state government obtained a R$ 2.9 billion loan from Banco do Brasil on the grounds that it would be used for essential construction works for the hosting of the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics. Among these “essential construction works”, four new penitentiaries to the state. The State Mechanism for the Prevention and Fight Against Torture, connected to the Legislative Assembly of Rio de Janeiro, also released the “Mega Events, Repression and Deprivation of Freedom in Rio de Janeiro” report, which reported that there was a significant increase in internment of adolescents during the days of matches, as well as homeless people taken to shelters and people, especially demonstrators, arrested.
Racism is also evidenced in the prison system. People who self-declare as brown and black constitute 61.6% of prisoners in the country. According to data from the IBGE 2010 Census, 53.6% of the population is black or brown. In the state of Rio, this is even more evident. A survey by the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV) shows that 71.6% of prisoners are black or brown.

When it comes to education, 75% of prisoners finished elementary school, and only 9.5% finished high school. In the Brazilian population, 32% finished high school, according to IBGE.
Cycling Infrastructure

One of the commitments made in Rio de Janeiro’s Candidature File for the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games, which was presented to the International Olympic Committee in January 2009, was the “development of the city’s network of bike paths to connect the Games zones and within each zone, connect the Games facilities” (p. 98). Such action was planned in the scope of a long-term sustainability plan, joining concerns regarding mobility and the environment.

In January 2016, Rio de Janeiro’s City Hall released a list of the bike paths, lanes and shared lanes being implemented in the city. Of the 270 km planned, only 17.19 km had been completed. This amounts to less than 7% of what was planned for the cycling system.

Among the completed projects, there is the bike path built on a rocky cliff at Niemeyer Avenue. The path collapsed on 21 April this year, killing two people. Designed to connect the beachfront of Leblon and São Conrado, the construction had opened only three months before the accident. The severity of the episode raises questions among the international community about the safety of the preparation works still to be completed for the Games.

The entire 4-kilometer bike path at Niemeyer Avenue costed R$ 45 million. The structure could not stand the impact of the waves, although it was built in a place where this kind of impact is expected. Six months before its inauguration, the Municipal Court of Accounts had pointed out flaws in the design, such as cracks and sagging areas on the track at Niemeyer Avenue.

The bike path was built by the construction company Concremat, in a consortium with Concrejato. Concremat signed a R$ 12-million contract with the City Hall to run seven other Olympics-related works, and it belongs to the family of Rio’s tourism secretary.

At a moment when Brazil is going through a scandal and a major political crisis associated with schemes favoring contractors and politicians, the collapse of Niemeyer Avenue bike path emerges as a tragic example of a bidding process that often involves shady connections, which not only had serious financial consequences but also directly caused the loss of two lives.

FIND OUT MORE

RIO DE JANEIRO’S CANDIDATURE FILE bit.ly/guia_ciclovia1
BIKE PATHS PROJECT - RIO DE JANEIRO’S CITY HALL bit.ly/guia_ciclovia2
ON THE COLLAPSE OF THE BIKE PATH
“DEATHS ON COLLAPSED RIO DE JANEIRO BIKE PATH DEAL SAFETY BLOW TO OLYMPIC HOST”, THE GUARDIAN, 21/04/2016 bit.ly/guia_ciclovia3

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In the history of Rio’s subway lines construction and expansion, enthusiastic statements coming from successive governors almost always turned out to be unfulfilled promises. The route that exists today is nothing more than a poor imitation of projects designed to serve the city and metropolitan area.

Currently, Metro Rio is 41 km long and has 36 stations running. The size of the subway network at Rio’s capital amounts to almost half of São Paulo’s subway, which is 74.3 kilometers long and has 65 stations. Compared to other cities in the world, such as Paris or London, the difference is ludicrous - the French capital metro network has 303 stations and 214 km in extension and the English has 270 stations and is 402 km long. Latin American examples also show the modesty in the expansion projects of Rio’s network - the city of Buenos Aires has 102 stations and its tracks are 61km long; Mexico City’s subway is 226 km long, which are distributed among 195 stations.

The construction of the subway line 4, thought to be the milestone of the city’s preparation for the Games, was surrounded by dissatisfaction and protests. The original design goes back to the 80s, and planned a route connecting Carioca Station, in downtown Rio, to the Alvorada Station in Barra, with stops at Laranjeiras, Humaitá and Jardim Botânico neighbourhoods. This configuration has been turned down, and a straight-line route connecting Ipanema to Barra da Tijuca was chosen, thus making Line 4 actually a mere continuation of line 1.

Deemed crucial to the transportation scheme during the Olympics, metro line 4 route has frustrated urban mobility experts - and has also created a huge hole in public coffers. According to the State Court of Accounts, its construction will cost the state government 21 times more than originally predicted in the contract. The construction was planned to begin in 1998 and to be completed in 2003, still following the original Downtown-Barra da Tijuca route. It would then have cost to state coffers R$ 392 million.

The R$ 392-million project was not put into practice, and was implemented 12 years later, after Rio de Janeiro was chosen to host the Olympics. The inclusion of contract amendments catapulted public investments in the project to R$ 8.4 billion. Adding public and private contributions, Line 4 costs are now estimated at R$ 9.77 billion, and there are still R$ 989 million left to be raised to complete the promised stretch in time for the Games. On the eve of the Games, safety is a major risk factor: if Line 4 is completed in time for the Olympics, it will be used during the mega event without going through a period of tests, which could end up having serious consequences for users.

From the perspective of urban mobility infrastructure, the chosen extension and route show that, in fact, the concern with the execution of the Games occurs at the expense of choices that could benefit most of Rio’s population. As mentioned, the original route for line 4 was not respected, and instead, a straight-line route was chosen, thus making Line 4 a mere continuation of an existing line. The original design, which surrounded the Rodrigo de Freitas lagoon via Jardim Botânico, was devised to complement the – also put off - project for extension of Line 1. In this proposal, Line 1 would become a circular line connecting Gávea and Tijuca neighbourhoods.

Meanwhile, the project for Line 3 of the subway remains shelved. The line was first designed in 1968, and it would connect downtown Rio de Janeiro to the city of Visconde de Itaborai, passing through São Gonçalo and Niterói, all part of Rio metropolitan area, located across the Guanabara Bay. Construction of Line 3 was a campaign promise made by the current
governor Luiz Antonio Pezão (currently on leave due to health problems). Claiming lack of resources, the governor even proposed the construction of bus lanes (BRT) instead of the subway, which was severely criticized by mobility experts, who understand that the demand that the bus lanes would likely meet would fall short of the actual demand of locations served by the subway.

Among the subway expansion projects, there are also plans for the construction of lines 5 and 6, promised for the 2007 Pan American Games. Line 5 would start at Ilha do Governador, passing through the International Airport, UFRJ, Novo Rio Bus Terminal, Santos Dumont Airport, finally arriving at Carioca Station. Line 6 would go from the International Airport to the Novo Rio Bus Terminal passing through Leopoldina and West Zone neighbourhoods. In the city’s preparation plan for the Olympics, these subway courses were turned into bus lanes.

Deemed crucial for the transportation scheme during the Olympics, metro line 4 route has frustrated urban mobility experts - and has also created a huge hole in public coffers.
In October 2015, Rio’s City Hall began a process of reduction and changes in bus lines serving the city. Disclosed under the euphemism of the “streamlining” of the transportation system, the changes were implemented in two stages, and completed in late February 2016. In all, 50 lines were eliminated, 26 had their routes modified, and 21 new lines were created. This whole process has adversely affected urban mobility in the entire city.

The reductions and changes have been the subject of widespread criticism. Crowded bus stops reveal the long wait for transfers – routes that were previously served by a bus line now need two or three other buses in order to be completed. The lack of information just adds to the hard routine in which cariocas began to live daily. Both the City Hall and the grantee companies systematically failed in divulging the alterations, causing widespread confusion that did not even spare drivers and bus fare collectors, who cannot inform passengers about the routes anymore.

Researchers have pointed out that this process of alleged “rationalization” of the bus lines do not follow a demand planning to meet the population’s needs. Rather, it has been done in order to benefit the grantee companies. In the current model, the granting of bus lines in a region is made to one company, which involves removing competitiveness. From a business point of view, bus lines that circulate certain areas of the city, or at certain times, are unprofitable - an argument that directly attacks public interest and the rights of the population.

This chaotic state of bus lines has also been shown to be an exclusionary policy, focused on the insulation of prime areas of the city, making it difficult for residents of low-income suburbs to access them. Organized youth groups from the west zone have denounced that the changes do not occur for the benefit of local residents, which are the first to suffer from the city’s so-called streamlining, with the elimination of bus lines after the implementation of the Bus Rapid Transport (BRT). Tired of the situation, youngsters created the “Ônibus me Pega!” movement, after conducting several workshops in public schools in the region. The campaign was launched in an activity at the bus station in Campo Grande in 2014.

The termination of bus lines is accompanied by a gradual escalation of bus fare prices. In January 2015, the bus fare increased from R$ 3.00 to R$ 3.40. A year later, a new readjustment raised the price of the fare to the current R$ 3.80. From 2009 - year in which Eduardo Paes took office - to 2015, bus fare prices rose 54.54%, with readjustments 38.6% higher than the inflation of the period, which was of 39.34%, according to the calculations of economist Gilberto Braga.

"After 5 months, users disapprove bus rationalization in Rio", G1, 03/03/2016 bit.ly/guia_onibus1

"Bus fare rose 38% higher than inflation since the beginning of Paes government", O Globo newspaper, 01/03/2015 bit.ly/guia_onibus3

FIND OUT MORE

"AFTER 5 MONTHS, USERS DISAPPROVE BUS RATIONALIZATION IN RIO", G1, 03/03/2016
bit.ly/guia_onibus1


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The right to move around the city is also a precondition for the right to leisure. An effective and high-quality public transportation must exist not only to ensure workers’ access to their workplace, but also to serve the population in their hours of leisure. In Rio de Janeiro, the uneven concentration of public and private culture equipments imposes on much of the city’s residents long-hour journeys in their leisure time. Similarly, the access to beaches suitable for bathing involves commuting to the city’s prime areas – notably the southern zone and Barra da Tijuca.

The beach, in this fiction created about the city, is commonly described as a place of “meeting”, of “democratic” coexistence among different social groups. However, empirical experience eventually knocks down this myth about the “wonderful” city. Between September 2015 and March 2016, the Military Police of the State of Rio de Janeiro set up a special scheme for policing the city’s beaches and its accesses, called “Operação Verão” (Operation Summer). The experiment is not new – on the contrary, it usually happens every summer, when there is a significant increase in the number of tourists, on the pretext of providing security to the population.

Operação Verão had a staff of 700 agents policing on weekends and holidays, according to state government information. The scheme also counted on a helicopter, used to capture and transmit images from long distances, and a mobile command center. This entire apparatus reveals, in fact, a large social control scheme that operates racist and sectarian actions against the youth residing in the poorest areas of the city.

The approaches were often made in police blockades set up in the roads between the favelas and low-income suburbs to the beaches of the southern zone. Black youngsters, many of them below legal age, were taken off from the buses and prevented from reaching the beaches, seized by the police over the most shameful reasons – they were barefoot, shirtless, or had no money on them.

The mass seizure of youngsters has become a routine on weekends in the city, and has led the Public Defender’s Office to file a habeas corpus to prevent the seizure of children and adolescents, except in cases provided by law. According to the Public Defender’s Office, there was a frank illegality in this practice of “guessing” who might commit crimes, which, in fact, made evident a segregative and racist practice.


“Pezão says that the removal of youngsters from buses is to prevent crimes on the beaches,” EBC, 08/24/2015 bit.ly/guia_opverao2

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Mega events such as the World Cup and the Olympic Games, given its global repercussions, are often accompanied by government initiatives that create specific laws to regulate activities during their realization. In many cases, however, these standards lead to the violation of enshrined fundamental and social rights. A clear example of this is the approval, just as it had happened previously in the World Cup 2014, of the General Law of the Olympics (Law n° 13,284 of 2016).

The law restricts several rights, such as freedom of speech. There are some articles in the law limiting the kind of protest acts that can be held in Olympic venues - banners and signs, for example, are not allowed to show any “offensive messages” and must have as its sole purpose the expression of “festive and friendly” messages (Chapter IV).

The prior determination of which contents are allowed or prohibited is a clear limitation to protests and to the free expression of ideas and opinions. This is particularly worrying since it is widely known that the population does not unanimously accept the conduction of mega events in Brazil, and the constitutional right to freedom of speech must be guaranteed in any situation. It is unacceptable that organizers want to shield themselves against criticisms or prevent the public space to be...
used for events of all kinds through this expedient.

Moreover, the law also condemns the use by citizens of all official symbols related to the competition, with penalties ranging from fines to criminal punishment. According to this set of articles, the production and distribution of goods that reproduce official symbols of the competition, and the mere modification of any symbol, even with the intention of parody (section V) are punishable by imprisonment of up to one year. In addition to this new violation of the freedom of speech, there are also attacks to the rights of informal workers exercising their activities.

In addition to the briefly mentioned points, there are other worrying elements in the law, such as the closure of public areas exclusively for the circulation of previously registered persons (which affects the population’s freedom of movement), the restriction of the right to record images and sounds (which interferes with the freedom of the press), among others.

Unfortunately, violations of human rights during mega events preparations are common occurrences – such as the thousands of families who lost their homes - widely criticized by social activists and movements. The law approved by the Congress and ratified by president Dilma Rousseff shows that such violations are not limited to the preparation for the Games, but will persist during the competition itself, in the form of disrespect to various rights, such as freedom of criticism and artistic expression, the freedom of movement, labor-related rights, among others.

Among the legislative preparations for the Games, the State ended up approving Law nº 13,260/2016, the so-called “Anti-Terrorism Law”, which defines the crime of “terrorism” and correlated crimes. As reported by movements and organizations such as Justiça Global, ARTIGO 19 and Instituto de Defensores de Direitos Humanos (Human Rights Defenders Institute) all actions prohibited by law already have legal classification in the saturated Brazilian legislation, which contains more than 1,600 criminal offenses.

Generally speaking, the crime of terrorism (art.2) requires three elements for its configuration, two of a subjective nature and one of an objective nature: a) on account of xenophobia, discrimination or prejudice of race, color, ethnicity and religion; b) intention of causing social or generalized terror, endangering persons, property, public peace or public safety; c) practice of at least one of the actions described in items I, IV and V (art. 2nd), all of which totals at least seventy-eight prohibited actions.

For example, the mere possession of means capable of causing damage is a conduct that can be typified as terrorism. An absolutely generic conduct that may be punishable by 12-30 years of imprisonment, i.e. the same penalty as the one provided for aggraved murder. It is, therefore, a clear violation
of the constitutional principles of strict legality, offensiveness and proportionality.

After many protests, the text of the law was modified before its approval, with the removal of the terms “politics”, “political extremism” and “ideology” from the reasons for committing terrorist acts, which reduces the risk of criminalization of social movements without, however, eliminating this risk. The potential intimidating character of the law remains, since police and judicial authorities can interpret situations the way they see fit.

Since the approval of the law, the country proceeded to criminalize a number of actions that can be arbitrarily classified as “terrorist”. Thus, there are losses to social movements, human rights, and, ultimately, to the whole society.

FIND OUT MORE
LAW 13,260, THE ANTI-TERRORISM LAW

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Guide for Journalists and Media Professionals
Human Rights Violations in the Olympic City

Map - Human Rights Violations in the Olympic City

Olympic Clusters:

1. Maracanã Stadium
2. Vila Autódromo
3. Marinha da Glória
4. Mar del Plata

Cycling Infrastructure:

5. Vila Autódromo
6. Morro da Providência and Downtown Rio
7. Sepetiba Bay
8. Guaíba Bay
9. Mar del Plata
10. Vila Autódromo
11. Marinha da Glória
12. Guaíba Bay
13. Porto Maravilha
14. Subway
15. Military Control of the Territories