

E-PAPER

Policy Paper  
**Strengthening  
the EU's Global  
Capacity to Act**

Impetus for the  
EU reform debate

**BY JANA PUGLIERIN**

**WITH REINHARD BÜTIKOFER, NICOLE KOENIG,  
SERGEY LAGODINSKY AND SARA NANNI**

A publication of the Heinrich Böll Foundation, October 2024



# Strengthening the EU's Global Capacity to Act

By Jana Puglierin

## Table of contents

Abbreviations	3
Foreword	4
Executive summary	5
1 Challenges	7
2 Political objectives	9
3 Reform proposals for European external action	10
4 Potential for reform and Germany's role	17
The author and the members of the expert group	18

**Note:** This policy paper was written under the leadership of the author with input from a group of experts. The members of the group contributed to the further development of the text with comments and remarks at two meetings. The views and opinions expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of all members of the expert group. We also note that editing of the original German language version of this paper was completed in April 2024.

# Abbreviations

AFET	Foreign Affairs Committee
EEAS	European External Action Service
EDIP	European Defence Industry Programme, i.e. first legislative proposal to implement the EDIS strategy
EDIS	European Defence Industrial Strategy, i.e. Strategy for the defence industry at EU level
EDTIB	EU Defence Technological and Industrial Base
EC	European Commission
EP	European Parliament
EUCO	European Council
EU	European Union
EUMS	EU Member States
TEU	Treaty on European Union, EU Treaties
DEVE	Development Committee of the European Parliament
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU
HR/VP	High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/ Vice-President of the European Commission
JCPoA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, i.e. nuclear agreement with Iran from 2015
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation, i.e. permanent structured cooperation of EU member states in the area of security and defence.
QMV	Qualified majority voting

# Foreword

The war in Europe, the worsening climate crisis, the pressure on liberal democracies and Europe's unresolved position in the global power structure – the European Union is facing historic challenges. In order to maintain its future viability, the EU must become more capable of taking action. The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine also shows us that the enlargement and neighbourhood policy is in urgent need of readjustment. However, the enlargement process makes the institutional reform of the EU, which is already needed to strengthen its ability to take action, even more urgent. There is currently no uniform position in the EU on the question of how broadly such a reform should be structured and how it should be implemented. Suggestions and ideas have been put forward, but reservations and concerns have also been expressed. An agreement can only be reached if all sides are listened to and taken seriously. As the largest Member State, Germany has a special responsibility in this regard.

Against this backdrop, the Heinrich Böll Foundation has invited experts from various policy areas to provide impetus for the EU reform debate. Based on current challenges, common goals for sustainable policy-making and recommendations for institutional reforms have been formulated. In their entirety, they are intended to better equip the EU to take action, as well as make it more democratic, ecological and socially just. In doing so, we have not limited ourselves to the interaction of the EU institutions in the narrower sense but have also looked at policy areas that are central to the future viability of the EU: European foreign and security policy as well as energy, agricultural, fiscal, and enlargement policy. The result is a series of policy papers, some of which propose pragmatic approaches, others a change of direction. Many of the recommendations can be achieved without treaty amendments. What is needed above all is the political will to exploit the existing potential. All texts conclude with the question of how Germany can contribute to the success of the reform process. We hope this will provide impetus for the relevant debate.

This policy paper deals with the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. We would like to thank the author Dr. Jana Puglierin and the members of the expert group – MEP Reinhard Bütikofer, Dr. Nicole Koenig, MEP Dr. Sergey Lagodinsky, and Member of the German Bundestag Sara Nanni – for their valuable contributions.

Berlin, April 2024

Jan Philipp Albrecht, *Co-President*  
Eva van de Rakt, *Head of EU and North America Division*  
Dr. Christine Pütz, *Senior Policy Advisor European Union*  
*Heinrich Böll Foundation*

# Executive summary


The EU's reactions to the current challenges in the areas of security and trade policy, for example, highlight that a resolute and coherent common European foreign policy does not primarily fail due to a lack of instruments, structures, or deficient institutions but, rather, depends on the political will of the Member States and their willingness to overcome their differences. Although the Treaty of Lisbon obliges Member States to coordinate their policies with the aim of achieving the greatest possible European coherence, the principle of loyal cooperation is de facto unenforceable.

With his term «Weltpolitikfähigkeit» (the ability to engage in global political strategy), former European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker described the ultimate goal of European external action in just one word in 2018. The aim must be for Europeans to jointly consider their international commitment across different policy areas and act accordingly in a strategic manner. It is about improving coherence, overcoming the silo mentality, and a stronger willingness to cooperate at all levels in order to create a greater joint capacity to act and thus increase Europe's impact on the world stage.

The institutional reforms of the past have not provided the necessary push forward. This will only succeed if EU Member States are prepared to pull together and relinquish control.

In this sense, the recommendations for action in this paper are to be understood primarily as a call to Member States to make better use of the existing scope for action within the EU treaties and support ambitious reforms through political will. The EU enlargement process has created room for manoeuvre that was unthinkable before the start of the war. The EU now needs a pragmatic approach that exploits all the potential. Germany can contribute to this by making the «Zeitenwende» policy more European in character.

With one exception, the proposed recommendations for reform do not require any treaty changes and can be implemented within the existing EU treaties.



# 1 Challenges

In response to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, the European Union (EU) has surpassed itself in terms of foreign policy. Things that previously seemed unthinkable suddenly became possible. EU Member States reacted decisively, promptly and flexibly. They imposed extensive sanctions, put together large financial aid packages for Ukraine, and created unbureaucratic facilities to accommodate Ukrainian war refugees. Additionally, the EU is financing weapons and equipment for Kyiv on a large scale. For the first time, European Member States are jointly procuring ammunition and training Ukrainian soldiers as part of the European Union Military Assistance Mission Ukraine (EUMAM UA). The decision to initially grant Ukraine and Moldova candidate status and then open accession negotiations in December 2023 initiated and advanced the second major eastward EU enlargement. To be sure, cracks have appeared in this European consensus over the first two years of the war. The governments in Hungary and Slovakia, for example, increasingly demanded a departure from this course, while Germany and France disagreed over the question of how far EU Member States should go in providing military support to Ukraine. Overall, however, the EU has so far demonstrated an unusual capacity to act.

The European reaction to the armed attack on Israel by the terrorist organisation Hamas on 7 October 2023 and the subsequent military strikes by the Israeli army in Gaza was completely different. Europe's Middle East policy appeared utterly chaotic in the weeks following 7 October. The President of the European Council, the President of the Commission and the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the European Commission (HR/VP) wrangled over responsibilities, with chasms opening up between Member States both in the European Council and the United Nations.

Both reactions show that a resolute and coherent common European foreign policy does not primarily fail due to a lack of instruments, structures, or deficient institutions, but depends on the political determination of the Member States and their willingness to overcome differences between them. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that although the Treaty of Lisbon has significantly strengthened the EU's foreign policy structures in Brussels, these are often disconnected from the actual decision-making processes in the European capitals. While the treaty obliges the Member States to coordinate their policies with the aim of achieving the greatest possible European coherence, the principle of loyal cooperation is de facto unenforceable.

The result is a vicious circle: As long as EU Member States do not want to limit their sovereignty in foreign policy and hand over decisive competence to Brussels, the EU institutions only have limited possibilities to shape European foreign policy. The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is one of the few remaining policy areas that still requires

unanimity. The European External Action Service (EEAS) is still too rudimentarily equipped to fully perform its tasks.

What is more: Today, European foreign policy encompasses more than the classic CFSP. For example, it includes trade, development, environmental, enlargement and neighbourhood policy, as well as external aspects of migration, digital, and industrial policy. That is why the EU's global strategy in 2016 already called for a more integrated approach that combines different policy areas in a strategic manner. In practice, however, thinking and acting in silos still prevails. This is due to different decision-making mechanisms and responsibilities. While the CFSP is intergovernmental and is decided by the Member States, other policy areas are largely the responsibility of the Commission and are supranational. While the European Parliament has far-reaching co-determination options in these policy areas, its role in foreign policy decision-making is limited in formal terms. Internal European regulations have substantial foreign policy relevance in this respect, e.g. with regard to Europe's China policy. Competence disputes at European level between the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the HR/VP make it difficult to achieve a coherent policy.

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), a sub-area of the CFSP, poses particular challenges. Russia's war of aggression has massively increased the importance of the military. In the Versailles Declaration of March 2022, Member States resolved to strengthen their defence capabilities and significantly increase their defence spending. As described above, the EU has broken new ground in terms of equipping and training the Ukrainian armed forces. It has also launched several initiatives to provide incentives for joint procurement and increased ammunition production as well as strengthened the technological and industrial base for defence.

At the same time, however, Russia's war has revealed just how poor Europe's defence capabilities really are and how significant the shortfalls are. The capacities of the European arms industry have not been ramped up quickly enough to meet Ukraine's needs in the long term. Even though national defence budgets have increased, efforts to coordinate European procurement are not working; national reflexes often prevail. EU initiatives such as the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) or the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) suffer from a lack of financial and political support. The EU ammunition initiative has missed its target by half. Because European capabilities are often not available in a timely manner and gaps need to be filled quickly, many European countries also resort to non-European solutions, which increases dependency on third countries and weakens their own defence industry base in Europe.



## 2 Political objectives

With his term «Weltpolitikfähigkeit» (the ability to engage in global political strategy), former European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker described the ultimate goal of European external action in just one word in 2018. The aim must be for Europeans to jointly consider their international commitment across different policy areas and act accordingly in a strategic manner, both within the framework of European coalitions and the Brussels institutions. It is about improving coherence, overcoming the silo mentality, and a stronger willingness to cooperate at all levels in order to create a greater joint capacity to act and thus increase Europe's impact on the world stage. As explained above, the institutional reforms of the past have not provided the necessary push forward. Europeans will only succeed in this if they overcome their national egoisms and are prepared to pull together more, even if this means relinquishing control and in some cases subordinating their national interests to an overriding European interest. With this in mind, the following recommendations for action should primarily be seen as a call to Member States to make better use of the existing scope for action within the European treaties and support ambitious reforms through political will. With one exception, the following reform proposals can be implemented within the scope of the current EU treaties.

### 3 Reform proposals for European external action

#### Making the most of the scope provided by Lisbon

In Germany, the discussion about an EU that is more capable of acting globally often focuses on the topic of qualified majority voting (QMV). In the past, the principle of unanimity in the CFSP has encouraged Member States to use their veto as a means of exerting pressure to force concessions in areas that have nothing to do with the issue actually being voted on. It has also created incentives for third countries to instrumentalise individual Member States as Trojan horses. The focus of the reform debate should therefore rightly be on measures that prevent the CFSP and CSDP from being completely paralysed. The gradual transition to QMV on decisions in areas of the CFSP that have no military or defence implications is a sensible proposal, but one that requires the political will of all Member States. Since the beginning of the Russian war of aggression, there has been some movement in this debate – inter alia on the initiative of Germany. There is much to be said in favour of including majority decisions in the reform package that needs to be put together within the framework of EU enlargement. Nevertheless, QMV can only be one building block on the way to a more coherent and assertive CFSP and should not be the sole focus of these efforts.

The Treaty of Lisbon offers more scope for the Europeanisation of foreign policy than is currently being exploited. In addition to the possibility of applying qualified majority decisions, this primarily concerns the possibility of «constructive abstention» (Art. 31 (1) TEU). Previously used only once in 2008, the neutral countries of Austria, Ireland, and Malta decided to constructively abstain from voting on the use of the European Peace Facility for the supply of military equipment to the Ukrainian armed forces in 2022. «Constructive abstention» was also employed during the Council vote on the EU training mission for Ukraine in October 2022, as well as the decision for an EU naval mission in January 2024. This is a very welcome trend that should continue. In particular, the principle could increasingly be applied to the many decisions that are made through «soft law» in the EU, i.e. legally non-binding agreements where the consensus principle has applied to date.

## Greater coherence through clear responsibilities and structural integration

Institutionally, the EU's external action would benefit from the clearer delineation of competence as well as stronger structural integration. The relationship between the President of the Council, the President of the Commission, and the HR/VP was also characterised by competence disputes, personal vanities, and animosities in previous formations.

However, a more integrated approach to external action absolutely requires particularly good and seamless cooperation between all involved departments. As part of the reform debate, it should therefore also be discussed how the job descriptions of the relevant positions can be adapted to clarify their respective responsibilities. For the Presidency of the European Council, the greatest potential for strengthening unified European external action lies mainly in its internal impact. Although the European heads of state and government play a decisive role in shaping European foreign policy, the European Council still deals too little with foreign policy issues. The President of the European Council should therefore place these issues higher on the agenda, strategically steer the relevant debates in the European Council, and see their primary task in creating coherence between the European Council and the Member States.

At the very least, however, the responsibilities and role of the HR/VP should be clarified in the upcoming institutional cycle. Little has remained of the expectations and enthusiasm associated with the strengthening of this office in the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon. The full potential of the office has never been exploited. Certainly, a lot depends on how the respective incumbent understands and fulfils their role. In the future, Member States should appoint a strong and experienced person to this office who can exert extensive influence in an informal setting. However, the fact that the position is structurally located between the Council and the Commission means that each HR/VP inevitably sits between two chairs instead of forming a bridge between both institutions. As Vice-President of the Commission, they are supposed to coordinate European foreign policy, as set out in the Treaty of Lisbon, but lack the necessary authority, especially if they are not a member of the Commission President's core team. If they are to ensure the coherence and consistency of all the Commission's work in the area of defence, the responsibility for the Directorate-General for the Defence Industry and Aerospace and the European Defence Fund must also lie with them. Particularly in view of the prospect that the next EU Commission could include a Commissioner for Defence, this Commissioner should report directly to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in the latter's capacity as Vice-President of the Commission, in order to establish a direct link between the supranational and intergovernmental spheres, as well as between defence policy and the EU internal market.

## Greater involvement of the European Parliament

In order to promote a unified foreign and development policy, the AFET and DEVE committees for foreign and development policy should be merged. At the same time, the EU has become increasingly involved in security and defence policy in recent years and has made a quantum leap in this regard as a result of the Russian war of aggression. To account for this, a fully-fledged Committee on Security and Defence in the European Parliament would be an important step, alongside an independent Council of Defence Ministers, which should also be instituted in the next institutional cycle.

For reasons of democratic accountability, it would be important to involve the European Parliament more actively and to strengthen its oversight and control rights in the decision-making processes; not only in the area of CSDP, but also with regard to initiatives affecting the European defence industry. The most impactful power of the European Parliament, namely budgetary power, could only become effective after an amendment of the Treaties, given that operational expenditure for measures with military or defence implications would need to be included in the common budget, which is currently prohibited under the Art. 41 TEU. As this is unlikely to happen (in the near future), new ways should be explored to strengthen inter-institutional relations between the Parliament, the EEAS, and the Commission. This includes strengthening the accountability and transparency of the EEAS and the Commission's external services vis-à-vis the European Parliament and involving the European Parliament more closely in the implementation and monitoring of matters of strategic importance for the EU's external action on the part of the Council and Member States. Inter-parliamentary exchange between national parliaments and the European Parliament should also be extended.

The reform debate provides an opportunity to emphasise the importance of parliamentary diplomacy and recognise the added value of the European Parliament as a complementary part of the «Team Europe» approach. The diplomatic activities of the European Parliament offer an opportunity for European foreign policy. For example, it can enter into dialogue with actors with whom the Commission and the Council have limited opportunities for cooperation for political reasons, as in the case of Taiwan. It can also express itself more freely on sensitive issues concerning human rights and democracy.

## Extending flexible cooperation

As long as the CFSP is based on consensus, there will always be situations in which EU Member States will have to decide what is more important to them: the unity of the EU or its capacity to act in the area of foreign policy. At the European Council in December 2023, the Hungarian blockade of EU financial aid for Ukraine once again highlighted the disruptive potential of a single Member State. Viktor Orbán finally relented in February 2024 because the other Member States successfully stood up to him. The openly formulated willingness to implement political goals creatively and flexibly - outside the EU framework, if necessary - was an effective instrument in this regard. EU Member States should therefore not shy away from «27 minus 1» formats in the event of a blockade by an individual Member State.

Opportunities for flexible cooperation between those Member States that are willing and prepared to act together should be strengthened in the future. Theoretically, this could also take place as «enhanced cooperation» within the framework of the existing treaties. However, «enhanced cooperation» must involve at least nine Member States and can only be used as a «last resort» after the Council has determined that the objectives of the cooperation cannot be achieved by the Union as a whole within a reasonable period of time. As a result, «enhanced cooperation» is a mechanism that has never been used before; Member States are deterred by the conditions associated with it.

Smaller groups of EU Member States have therefore repeatedly joined forces outside the treaties in minilateral formats in order to act together on foreign policy. The E3+3 negotiations with Iran are a fitting example. The aim is to find ways to ensure that these coalitions do not undermine the cohesion of the EU. Instead, they should strengthen the EU and increase its credibility as a foreign policy player based on tangible political achievements. An important strategy here is to bring a representative of the EU institutions to the table. This happened during the JCPOA negotiations with Iran, when the High Representative of the EU at the time joined the E3. This should become standard practice.

It would also strengthen Europe's foreign policy appeal if it were to become common practice for Member States to invite other EU heads of state and government or representatives of the EU institutions to bilateral talks. This is what happened in 2019, when French President Emmanuel Macron invited both then German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the European Commission's then President Jean-Claude Juncker to attend President Xi Jinping's Chinese state visit to Paris.

In cases where Member States agree in principle, but see their own interests affected to differing degrees, the European Council could assign individual foreign ministers as special envoys. In the past, Finland's former Foreign Minister Pekka Haavisto, for example, was asked to negotiate on behalf of the EU in Sudan and Ethiopia. A «Special Envoy for Global Gateway» would be desirable, as the Global Gateway Initiative is a cross-cutting task that

requires special coordination. The EU could also offer special «packages» of resources and instruments to support the commitment of the Member States.

Another possibility for more flexibility within the existing legal framework in the area of military operations is the use of Art. 44 TEU, as already envisaged in the EU's Strategic Compass. Article 44 TEU states that the European Council «may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task». Although operations pursuant to Art. 44 TEU would still be decided unanimously by the Council of the EU and be subject to the supervision of the Political and Security Committee, they could enable a faster and more flexible response. Article 44 TEU is certainly not a panacea, but it could make it more attractive for Member States to provide forces and capabilities for operations. Successful application could provide significant long-term impetus for integration of the armed forces, cooperation between EU states in the arms industry, and for decision-making processes in the Common Security and Defence Policy.

The EU should also be more flexible with regard to cooperation with partners. Unfortunately, it has been impossible to establish a partnership between the EU and the UK in the area of foreign and security policy since Brexit. In the future, however, the need for the UK and its EU partners to work together to tackle common challenges in an increasingly hostile international environment will continue to grow. The EU should therefore renew its efforts and develop «docking mechanisms» that would allow the UK to cooperate more closely with the EU, should a pro-European government come to power in London again. Opening up the EU's Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects in the area of defence to partners such as the United Kingdom was the right strategy. A more far-reaching idea would be to allow British representatives to attend Foreign Affairs Council meetings and other CFSP processes as observers on an ad hoc basis.

The EU candidate countries in the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe should be more closely involved in EU foreign, security and defence policy and could also take part in selected meetings as observers. The sectoral integration of these countries could be promoted in selected policy areas even before formal accession. One practical possibility for closer cooperation would be, for example, greater involvement in the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), which would improve coherence between the capabilities of the EU and the candidate countries. Among other things, the new European Defence Industrial Strategy promotes Ukraine's participation in the EU's defence industry cooperation. Ukraine should be treated as an equal Member State with regard to measures to strengthen its defence industry. This is a correct and important step.

To date, there is no cooperation framework, in which Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific allies and partners can exchange technologies or develop joint defence innovations. Cooperation with countries such as Australia, Japan, or South Korea is not currently included in any of the capacity-related EU frameworks (such as PESCO or the so-called «Administrative

Arrangements» of the European Defence Agency). As such, there is still a great deal of potential here for intensifying security policy exchange.

## Greater European contributions to our own security

The financial commitments made within the NATO framework and the «Pledge of Versailles» must be permanently honoured by Europe. More money is not the only solution, given that without the reorganisation of existing structures and processes, European armaments cooperation will not become more innovative or more effective. However, there are no incentives for joint development and procurement without sufficient and sustainable funding. In addition, the months-long dispute over topping up the European Peace Facility has shown that ad hoc contributions from Member States do not provide sufficient planning security and that instead, reliable and long-term perspectives are needed. To achieve this, the financial scope for security and defence in the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) must be significantly greater than it was last time. Instruments such as the European Defence Fund must be attributed more resources to strengthen standardisation and interoperability in Europe.

With this in mind, the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy presented the first, very ambitious strategy for the defence industry at EU level (EDIS) at the beginning of March 2024, combined with an initial legislative proposal to implement this strategy (EDIP). However, even if the goal of pooling armaments efforts within the EU is widely shared, many Member States are sceptical about such a far-reaching expansion of the Commission's competence as sought with this initiative. In order to be effective, it would need political buy-in and sufficient financial resources.

In addition to the necessary strengthening of the EDTIB, which promotes the development of a European defence sector, the EU should also try to develop a transatlantic agenda together with the USA to constructively reconcile each other's (sometimes controversial) interests.

The Administrative Arrangement between the US Department of Defence and the European Defence Agency is a positive step. Both sides could identify opportunities for the co-production and development of key components, subsystems, munitions, and possibly even platforms where the development of additional production capacity would enhance US and European security. They should develop incentives to facilitate partnerships between European and American defence companies (reduction of export controls, export licences, legal agreements, more information exchange between the EU and NATO, etc.). For this to happen, however, the US side in particular will need to move significantly on its positions.

A Europe capable of defending itself can only exist with a European defence industry. A stronger Europe does not imply a weakening but, rather, a strengthening of transatlantic relations. At the same time, it would also prepare Europe for the possibility of Donald Trump – an anti-EU president who no longer feels bound by American security guarantees for Europe – moving into the White House again.



## 4 Potential for reform and Germany's role

Two external factors have created potential for the European Union to make far-reaching progress in its capacity to act at international level in the next institutional cycle. On the one hand, Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has already produced a completely new security landscape in Europe. On the other hand, the prospect of Donald Trump's election victory in the USA also urges Europeans to cooperate more closely – to ready themselves against a possible strategy of «divide and rule». And even if Kamala Harris is elected as US President in November 2024, the successful blocking of American financial aid for Ukraine in the US Congress has made it clear that Europe urgently needs to take care of its security and defence in a more independent manner. Europe's precarious security situation will either bring EUMS closer together, or tremendously weaken the EU as a political project. A united European presence on the world stage is a much more pressing issue and is no longer just a «nice to have». The fact that a large number of players now see EU enlargement as a «geopolitical necessity» offers hope. It opens up scope for political concessions in the course of an EU reform process that were unthinkable before the start of the war.

The increased need for security as a result of the current crises could weaken the hardened lines of conflict that have demarcated the debate around QMV or the transatlantic alignment in recent years. Smaller Member States could see a greater advantage in an EU that acts more coherently and efficiently in terms of foreign and security policy than before, and may attach a higher value to the greater protection that comes with it. Such windows of opportunity should be taken advantage of. Germany has a special responsibility in this regard. By taking on a mediating role beyond its own openly formulated position, understanding the needs, concerns and interests of its small and large EU partners in an empathetic way, exploring common ground, and developing constructive proposals, it can work towards win-win situations.

As the most powerful and wealthy country in the EU, Germany is expected to provide more proactive leadership in order to strengthen Europe's capacity to act both internally and externally. Germany's European partners have so far not experienced very much of the intention to define «German interests in the light of European interests», as the SPD, Greens, and FDP had set out to do in the coalition agreement. Berlin should make its «Zeitenwende» policy more European. The recently revived Weimar Triangle could now be the decisive nucleus for this. With Donald Tusk's government, Germany finally has a point of contact again – and one, who explicitly seeks European cooperation in the area of security policy. The Federal Government must not miss out on this momentum and get carried away in the minutiae of Franco-German disputes. It should do everything in its power to ensure that Germany, Poland, and France develop a common agenda that other European Member States can identify with. The EU now needs a pragmatic approach that exploits all the existing potential. Germany can make a major contribution to this.

## The author

**Dr. Jana Puglierin**, European Council on Foreign Relations

## Members of the expert group

**Reinhard Bütikofer**, Member of the European Parliament, Greens/EFA

**Dr. Nicole Koenig**, Munich Security Conference

**Dr. Sergey Lagodinsky**, Member of the European Parliament, Greens/EFA

**Sara Nanni**, Member of the German Bundestag, Alliance 90/The Greens

## Project design and implementation

**Roderick Kefferpütz, Eva van de Rakt, Dr. Christine Pütz** and **Georg McCutcheon**,  
all Heinrich Böll Foundation

## Imprint

Publisher: Heinrich Böll Foundation e.V., Schumannstrasse 8, 10117 Berlin

Contact: Dr. Christine Pütz, EU & North America Division **E** [puetz@boell.de](mailto:puetz@boell.de)

Translator: Brussels Language Services

Place of publication: [www.boell.de](http://www.boell.de)

Publication date: October 2024

Licence: Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)

<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0>

This publication does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Heinrich Böll Foundation. Publications by the Heinrich Böll Foundation may not be used for election campaigning purposes.

More e-books to download at: [www.boell.de/publikationen](http://www.boell.de/publikationen)