

**1989 – 2009.**

**GODINE PREVRATA: POČETAK INKLUZIJE  
ILI EKSKLUZIJE?**

**1989 – 2009**

**YEARS OF UPHEAVAL: BEGINNING OF INCLUSION  
OR EXCLUSION?**





## **1989 – 2009. GODINE PREVRATA: POČETAK INKLUZIJE ILI EKSKLUZIJE?**

u saradnji sa



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BEGINNING OF INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION?**

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## PREFACE

The year 2009 is the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall and also the 20th anniversary of the *peaceful revolution*. These events caused far-reaching changes across the whole world. They marked the end of the Cold War and divisions across Europe. Many people still have vivid memories of the harrowing days in the autumn of 1989. The fall of the Berlin Wall was the new beginning for Germany, and also for the whole of Europe. Also, twenty years ago, the countries of Central, East and South-east Europe embarked on transition which implied rejection of the old and acceptance of the new system of government, economy and society.

But what exactly happened during those years in the former Yugoslav countries and especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina? And what is still going on in Bosnia and Herzegovina? Instead of radical changes, instead of a new beginning and new chances, Bosnia and Herzegovina saw a horrible war on its soil, a violent break-up of the country, divisions, genocide – in the very heart of Europe.

Here, on the soil of Bosnia and Herzegovina, nationalist and ethnic policies were destroying bridges, mosques, churches, synagogues, city halls, libraries, factories, hospitals... all those institutions which once symbolized a cross-cultural life in Bosnia and Herzegovina. ‘Unrestrained freedom’, left in the hands of the nationalist forces, turned BiH into the largest concentration camp in Europe.

Today, twenty years later, we can only ask: was the general ‘space of freedom’ conquered with the fall of the Berlin Wall? If it was, what kind of freedom do we enjoy here? The freedom to segregate children along ethnic lines, the freedom of ignorance, freedom in conformism, freedom in opportunism? Unrestrained freedom which resembles anarchy ever more?

“Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to experience divisions instead of integration; the walls which came down in other countries of Europe twenty years ago continue to be erected within Bosnia and Herzegovina, even at present day“, was said, among other things, at the two-day international conference on “1989-2009: Years of Upheaval: Beginning of Inclusion or Exclusion“, which took place in Sarajevo on 19-20 June, 2009. It was organized by the Heinrich Böll Stiftung Office for BiH and the Association for Political Science in BiH. Željko Komšić, member of the Presidency of BiH, who opened the conference, reminded the participants that there are many walls across BiH which separate us from the

European Union and ourselves. “The journey we embarked on leads us to the European Union; how long it is going to last does not depend solely on us. The question is how much we are indeed prepared for the European Union and the EU for us“, Komšić asked.

Twenty years ago, it was necessary to knock down the walls in order for the countries outside the European Community to integrate into the present-day European Union. Also today, it is equally necessary to remove the walls within and around Bosnia and Herzegovina in order for this country to move forward towards the EU accession as quickly as possible. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU accession process, the process which other countries of the region have successfully completed or they are moving along the road to success, looks – paradoxically – like the process at a distance.

These conference proceedings of academic papers by Ugo Vlaisavljević (Sarajevo), Asim Mujkić (Sarajevo), Wolfgang Klotz (Belgrade), Kurt Bas-suener (Sarajevo), Pavol Demeš (Bratislava), Gajo Sekulić (Sarajevo), Nenad Zakošek (Zagreb), Tanja Petrović (Ljubljana), Nerzuk Ćurak (Sarajevo) and Vladimir Pavićević (Belgrade), are published in an attempt to analyze the process of transition and to launch a broader discussion on the processes of transition from authoritarian towards democratic systems in Europe.

The authors provide the convincing comparative analysis of transition experiences with a special reference to Bosnia and Herzegovina and stress the need to develop a vision of the future of the whole region of South-east Europe.

We are glad to present the findings and attempts of the conference to you.

**Mirela Grünther-Dečević,**  
Director, Heinrich Böll Foundation  
Office for Bosnia and Herzegovina

**Nermina Mujagić,**  
President of the Steering Committee  
Association of Political Science in BiH



# **CHALLENGES FOR POLITICAL THEORY**



# Invisible Walls of Europe

Ugo Vlaisavljević

The fall of the Berlin Wall was the landmark event because it had divided not only a city but the entire continent. With the Wall torn down, Europe stopped being one name for two worlds, Western and Eastern Europe, and it could eventually become a single, united Europe. When we officially mark the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, we celebrate a united Europe. Still, this did not mark Europe's unification. Europe is not united even today. In fact, it was an announcement of the possibility for Eastern European countries to join the processes of European integration which were already considerably advanced in Western Europe. The fact that today most of East European countries are European Union members speaks of great successes made toward creating a truly united Europe. However, we cannot yet speak of united Europe, not only because barriers continue to divide some, like the Western Balkan countries, from the EU, but primarily because the EU itself is not united. Rather, it is still on the path to unification. Neither the fall of the Berlin Wall nor any subsequent political event produced that famous "We, the Europeans", the political people whose will the French Republic or the American Declaration of Independence expressed.<sup>1</sup> United Europe does not exist today as a state<sup>2</sup> but as a cluster of states which joined the integration process at some earlier or later stage, so that they find themselves in different orbits, moving at different speeds of integration. Ole Weaver described the EU with its complex and dynamic structure of integration as a certain cosmic nebula floating around its assumed centre.<sup>3</sup>

This figurative description, in which the European unification is understood not as one process but as a whole medley of integration processes, seen as lines of centripetal gravitational forces, can help us deal with the issue of present-day European borders. As Balibar pointed out, there are myriad borders – internal ones in particular – which are firmly set in the recent times of successful integration and which are often no more penetrable than the Berlin Wall was. Did the last great wall of

<sup>1</sup> See Jacques Derrida, "Déclarations d'indépendance" in: *Otobiographies*, Galilée, Paris, 1984, p. 13-32.

<sup>2</sup> Etienne Balibar, "Es gibt keinen Staat in Europa" in: *Nous, citoyens d'Europe? Les frontières, l'Etat, le peuple*, Ed : La Découverte, Paris, 2001, p. 221-241.

<sup>3</sup> Ole Weaver, "Identity, Integration and Security," *Journal of International Affairs*, Winter 95, Vol. 4B Issue 2, p. 389.

European partition fall together with the fall of the Berlin Wall or did the era of invisible walls, deep divides that no walls need to secure, begin with the fall of the Berlin Wall? The walls disappeared but still impenetrable borders remain. The walls disappeared because national borders are no longer the strongest lines of division. Should Europe, freed from great walls of division, be celebrated instead? Given the manner in which the EU has been delineating its internal borders of division, its external borders need no walls.

The borders which the EU set against the (still) non-integrated part of Europe are quite instructive in this respect. There are no walls there, at least seemingly, although the borders are secured well and hardly penetrable. The Western Balkans, as a remaining part of non-integrated Europe, or rather, as a disintegrated part of Europe, has been subjected for a long time, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, to strong attractions of the EU gravitational field, as it were. Just as local politicians and civil servants are experiencing it every day, integration begins much before the accession to the European community of nations, and it does not stop with the accession either.

State borders do not prevent integration into the EU nor does the integration eliminate the borders. It will be interesting to examine European integration processes regarding the state borders, given the fact that this integration does not undermine, let alone abolish them. There is some obvious link between the fact that the state borders did not become obsolete in the core of the European integration and the fact that the integration has a rather strong impact beyond the exterior state borders of the European Union. It is important to notice the impact of the integration processes on the state borders: they make the borders porous and leaky, without making them weak though.

Something does happen with the borders, especially in Europe and especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Balibar observes that the borders are “vacillating”. He said in his study “Borders of Europe”:

“Borders are vacillating: this does not mean that they are disappearing. Less than ever is the contemporary world a world without borders. On the contrary, borders are being both multiplied and reduced in their localization and their function, they are being thinned out and doubled, becoming border *zones*, *regions* or *countries* where one can reside and live. The quantitative relation between ‘border’ and ‘territory’ is being inverted. This means that borders are becoming the object of protest and contestation, as well as of an unremitting reinforcement, notably of their function of security.”<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Etienne Balibar, “Les frontières de l’Europe” in: *La crainte des masses. Politique et philosophie avant et après Marx*, Ed. Galilée, Paris, 1997, p. 386-387. “The Borders of Europe”, translated by J. Swenson, in: Pheng Cheach & Bruce Robins (eds.), *Cosmopolitics. Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota, 1998, p. 220.

Balibar affirms that the relation between border and territory is being inverted: external borders become largely internal, while physical borders become symbolic, and visible ones invisible. The wall which is guarded by the military became, among other things, a strict visa regime supervised by the police. This is so because the “borders“ /*frontières*/ have stopped *marking the limits* where politics ends“. Instead of being “shores of politics“ /*bord du politique*/ as they were in the past, the borders have become “*objects* within the space of the political itself“ where, according to Balibar, the role of the police has changed: “every border patrol is today an organ of internal security“.<sup>5</sup>

Balibar observes that Europe is not built as a “closed entity” which would be similar to a “federal state“ or a “multinational empire“. Instead of getting succumbed to the illusion of their elimination, we should rather look for frontiers of Europe as the frontiers of an “open aggregation“. A new entity imposes a new strategy for drawing frontiers:

“This externally open aggregation (..) is not and will not be any less *partitioned* by a number of ineliminable ‘frontiers’. These are not just political state frontiers but, above all, moving social frontiers, ‘invisible’ on the maps but materialized in administrative regulations and social practices; ‘inner frontiers’ between populations who differ in origin and in their location within the division of labour.”<sup>6</sup>

This inversion of borders is being very tangibly tried out in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a country outside the EU, but harnessed to European integration processes since a long time ago and subjected to the European border policy. Here, the European security politics emerges as a strict regime of controlling entries and exits of people and goods, and as a visa regime in particular. In fact, this regime is being implemented outside the EU state borders, in the “sovereign” territory of this country, but in the zones of the EU extraterritorial presence. The consular offices of the EU member states are functioning as police sections of those countries with specific procedures which are no different from internal security policies those countries apply to aliens who stay or reside in their territory. When it comes to tearing down the walls of divisions of states in the recent history of Europe, one should indeed come to Sarajevo and see those imported police bastions: huge walls, spear top wire fences, barbed-wire fences around the embassies of the states which the local citizens find most attractive in the EU, such as Germany, Austria and France. The torture of control and checks that passengers sometimes have to go through at the border crossings is applied to Bosnians and Herzegovinians in their own country: in most cases, it is a

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 387. Eng. translation *ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> Etienne Balibar, “Es gibt keinen Staat in Europa”, p. 228. Eng. translation *Es Gibt Keinen Staat in Europa: Racism and Politics in Europe Today*, New Left Review, (March-April 1991) p. 10.

humiliating and exasperating manner as if they were caught in crime by their own police.<sup>7</sup>

Despite the fact that “vacillation of borders“ has remarkable proportions, just as the recent replacements in the EU Embassies in which diplomats were replaced by professional police bureaucracy, have shown, Balibar goes too far when he claims that “modern, substantially ‘border-guard’ (customs, identitarian) equation of citizenship and nationality is already now in the process of being powerfully disintegrated“.<sup>8</sup> No matter how much they may become porous, hardly visible, moved from outer rims of territories to procedures and regimes of “home affairs“, the borders still remain, as borders of all borders, state borders. Not only does the EU keep in its heart, in the gravitational core of its integration, such borders but actually orders them to all those countries which have applied for accession to such integration. BIH’s numerous failures to fulfil the requirements which are necessary if BIH is to move forward to the EU come down to its inability to secure its own borders. This inability to secure its own borders is only an external sign of continuing failure of this country to get consolidated as a nation-state – which means to fulfil the equation of citizenship and nationality in a satisfactory, typically European way.<sup>9</sup>

Out of all Yugoslav secessionist states, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH) is in the most difficult situation to fulfil this equation. Under the *uti possidetis* principle, on the basis of which internal state borders of the former Federation gave a measure to the recognition of self-determination of the peoples, BIH is created as a state of three equal ethnicities.<sup>10</sup> As it could be expected, consociational organization of the former central Yugoslav republic placed it at the bottom of the states which are trying to fulfil the EU requirements. However, the failures related to the candidacy of this state with a complicated constitutional order do not speak only of the depth of its ethnic divisions but also of a crucial importance which the EU has attached to the fulfilment of the equation of citizenship and nationality. No matter how we can understand the purposes of a complicated fulfilment of the requirements for accession to the European community of states, this conditionality presumes *consolidation of a nation-state*. Among all candidate countries, mono-ethnic nation-states, like Slovenia, could be prepared best for such consolidation – it is easy to conclude – and such consociations as BIH is are least prepared. Of course, a nation-state is the model of a European state *par excellence*.

<sup>7</sup> See Ugo Vlaisavljević, “Njemački logor u Sarajevu”, *Pripitomljavanje nacionalizma*, Mauna-Fe, Sarajevo, 2007, p. 232-236.

<sup>8</sup> Etienne Balibar, “Les frontières de l’Europe“, *La crainte des masses*, p. 386.

<sup>9</sup> For that sacrosanct formula, see Etienne Balibar, “L’Europe des citoyens“ in: *Nous, citoyens d’Europe? Les frontières, l’Etat, le peuple*, p. 245.

<sup>10</sup> For more details see Allen Buchanan, *Justice, legitimacy, and self-determination*, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 340-341.

Does this mean that multiethnic states in the strong sense of the word, i.e. those which have at least two equal ethnic groups, cannot fit into a typical European frame? Did the fall of multiethnic federations, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, not offer to their constituent ethnic groups the possibility to accede to the EU? As Dominique Schnapper claims, the truth is that all big European nations are multiethnic or even multi-national<sup>11</sup>, but they all got successfully consolidated as nation-states thanks to the domination of only one core nation in every country. Following the disintegration of Yugoslavia, it turned out that the principle of recognizing secessionist states was, in fact, the principle of nationality (one nation, one state), but in its reduced form (one mono-ethnic nation – one mini-state).<sup>12</sup> Independent BiH emerged as a rather odd state in which it was not possible to apply this principle because of its territorial dispersion and ethnic patchwork. As Margaret Moore observes, neither the acceptance of a civic BiH nor the acceptance of national self-determination could be an acceptable arrangement for the international community. Thus the necessity to recognize equal rights to all ethnic groups has led to a certain “imaginative arrangement” which “moves beyond the Westphalian nation-state model”.<sup>13</sup> The Dayton Constitution seeks solution in the direction of a “loose federation”, “not only through devolved sovereignty, into relatively autonomous constituent units, but also by developing shared sovereignty arrangements where groups in the society wish this”.<sup>14</sup>

That there has been “the need to think imaginatively” about the organization of BiH is implied by double impossibility: neither a unitary civic state nor a secessionist arrangement present a plausible solution. Both should have been partly accepted. Still, we can say that in implementing a secessionist arrangement, the international community went as far as it was possible to go. Here we should keep in mind the entire territory of former Yugoslavia, and not only of BiH. When Moore gives the main reason why a secessionist arrangement could not be implemented in this country, she thinks that the reason is that such an arrangement would have led to a recursive secession, secession after secession, and in BiH “it would imply a patchwork of enclaves or pockets of sovereign units throughout that republic”.<sup>15</sup> If we take a look at the present political map of the West Balkans and see how far the state and sub-state borders stretch, we shall see precisely a whole patchwork of mini-states and quasi-state enclaves: from Slovenia, via Republika Srpska and Herzeg-Bosnia, to Kosovo and Western Macedonia. If we take a deeper look, we shall discern even smaller “pockets of sovereign units”

<sup>11</sup> Dominique Schnapper, *La communauté des citoyens. Sur l'idée moderne de nation*, Gallimard, Paris, 1994, p. 98.

<sup>12</sup> See David Miller, *On Nationality*, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 187-195.

<sup>13</sup> Margaret Moore, *The Ethics of Nationalism*, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 238.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 237.

within those enclaves, while we should keep in mind that neither it is true that those mini-states have the full sovereignty which they dreamed about, nor do those smallest units of collective ethnic possession of territory have any sovereignty. In its administrative fragmentation, BIH is no exception among its neighbouring nation-states; rather, it only provides an impressive image of the end of the path which the administrators of the international community have reached applying secessionist arrangements after the break-up of Yugoslavia.

This is precisely why a consociational organization of BIH and its strong dependence on the EU may in turn shed light on a completely new political system in the region. If we keep in mind the new mini-states, and especially their dependence on the EU – which is so strong that it does not matter in this context whether they are integrated in the EU, like Slovenia, or have not been integrated yet – we could say that the entire post-Yugoslav system is a complex consociational system. Thus, on the one hand, there is a thick mosaic of politeie-enclaves, while on the other, it seems without a doubt that without such EU this organization, which is so much reminiscent of medieval princedoms, could not exist.

As John Gray observed, consociational regimes are not stable and can survive only with the support from an “external force“. This theoretician could perhaps help us reinforce our thesis about a consociational organization of the whole region, although he hesitates to present this hypothesis. Let us focus on two interventions by the international community in the Balkans and the underlying reasons, according to Gray. The first is the intervention to prevent or at least to stop the war:

“Diplomatic and military intervention in the Balkans came about because establishing nation-states on the European civic model has proved impossible and attempts to establish ethnically homogenous nation-states have occasioned gross violations of rudimentary human rights. The upshot in parts of former Yugoslavia has been the establishment of a number of more or less consociational regimes whose stability has been guaranteed from outside, by the powers which installed them.”<sup>16</sup>

As part consociational (part liberal but also involving some *de facto* partitions), Gray then refers to the regimes established in Bosnia and Kosovo. These “hybrid forms of governance“ whose security does not depend on consent but on the support of external powers, he calls, without hesitation, protectorates. But are those two “dependent” regimes what this author thought of when he said “a certain number of more or less consociational regimes“? Then those would be exceptions, and not representative examples of the situation in this region. It would take away

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<sup>16</sup> John Gray, *Two Faces of Liberalism*, The New Press, 2000, p. 129.



the point from his interpretation of the main sense of international community's intervention after the war:

“Like that which prevailed under its Ottoman rulers, the peace that has been imposed in the Balkans rests on a foundation less uncertain than agreements among the various communities who are its beneficiaries. What we are witnessing in the Balkans at the turn of the twenty-first century may prove to be the reinvention of the institution of empire as a remedy for evils that flow from the attempt to construct ethnic nation-states. Yet it is far from clear that the imperial institutions that are under construction can recreate multi-ethnic societies.”<sup>17</sup>

When he talks about the reinvention of the institution of empire out of necessity, Gray has in mind a specific empire, the one which withdrew from this region like the tide, leaving to the future a restoration of some form of consociational order.<sup>18</sup> Of course, it is the Ottoman Empire, of which this author says that it “can be seen as a consociational regime“. If the EU is recreating in some way the imperial institutions, if external intervention, without which no local consociational regime can survive in the long run, implies imperial power, then the EU, in addition to the US which is not hiding its imperial face, is being established as a kind of empire, no matter whether we call it a quasi-empire.<sup>19</sup>

Mixed in the same territory, diverse ethnic communities - today in the Balkans, those are self-conscious ethnic nations - are ordering for the purpose of their peaceful co-existence “that legal jurisdiction be decoupled from territorial sovereignty“<sup>20</sup>, which is precisely what consociational arrangements offer. This decoupling is necessary precisely because those nations are unable to fulfil the equation of citizenship and nationality. The state borders which in the EU guarantee the security of the state/national identity indicate the importance of this equation also in the most recent phases of the European integration, so that the EU, regardless of some consociational elements in its organization, remains a union of nation-states in the first place.<sup>21</sup> If the dissection of the equation of nationality and citizenship is something which the EU will be facing under the main tendencies of integration processes while Balibar believes this is already largely the case, then the EU, walking the path from economic and military alliance to political community with its *demos*, has to go through consociational intermediate steps.

Is the model of consociation not closer to the ideal of a civic EU than the model of a cluster of nation-states, in which state borders continue

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 130.

<sup>18</sup> See Michael Walzer, *On Toleration*, Yale University Press, 1997, p. 22.

<sup>19</sup> Etienne Balibar, “L'Europe des citoyens”, *Nous, citoyens d'Europe?*, p. 253.

<sup>20</sup> John Gray, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

<sup>21</sup> See, for example, Matthijs Bogaards and Markus M. L. Crepaz, “Consociational Interpretations of European Union“, *European Union Politics*, Volume 3, 2002, p. 357-381.

to guarantee what was the most important even before the European integration: the equation of citizenship and nationality? The obvious strong affinity between the present-day EU and “ethnically cleansed“, sufficiently “consolidated“ mini-states in the Balkans, may be soon substituted by another affinity of a far more civic EU toward such consociations as BiH.

In the current constellation of states and political regimes in the Balkans, BiH, as a consociational regime, presents a huge problem being precisely a reduced image of the European multi-national community. More satisfactory impression, more of “European political spirit“, judging by the level of their ability to tackle with the challenges of EU integration, seems to be offered by the local caricatures of nation-states formed on the reductionist principle of nationality. The EU’s lack of will to intervene more vigorously during the war in Bosnia may be ascribed, among other things, to a disastrous overlapping of the principles of ethnic nationality, which was accepted as the main principle of state legitimacy in the state-building processes in the Balkans, and the ethnic cleansing principle. Bearing in mind the importance of fulfilment of the citizenship-nationality equation and its applicability for the EU candidacy, we could say without exaggeration that the occupations of territories during the war, and equally so the Srebrenica genocide, were a tacit part of the EU accession conditionality set forth for the young secessionist enclaves.

If the specific character of external and internal borders of the present-day EU is to be examined, then the view from Bosnia on those borders may be rather instructive. Apart from Kosovo and its exceptional situation, BiH is lagging behind all West Balkan states in its accession to the European integration processes. If the external borders of the “Europe fortress“ – as Balibar calls EU, having in mind its rigid border control policy – are to be analyzed, then BiH is the farthest from its walls or the walls are fortified most strongly against BiH. It is precisely this case of the special relation in which the border ensures the difference between the external and the internal and should be functioning in a classical way that shows how much Balibar is right when he points at the changing function of the borders and their moving inwards, so that the fortress needs no outer walls. Namely, the EU is present in BiH more than it is in any other country candidate for accession: through the military force (EUFOR), the police (EUPM) and the sovereign rule of its Special Representative (EUSR), who may be above the highest authorities of the state thanks to the special Bonn powers invested in him. So it seems that BiH, still incapable of getting integrated into the EU, is incorporated in a classical form of imperial rule.<sup>22</sup> Let us call it a paradox of post-imperial incorporation. It is that same rule which has been demolishing all the walls of division in today’s Europe.

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<sup>22</sup> Balibar speaks about a certain zone of “internal colonisation“ implemented by the EU as the “real Europe“ toward “external Europe“, and that zone includes Kosovo, Albania and the major part of former Yugoslavia. Cf. Etienne Balibar, “Europe difficile: les chantiers de la démocratie“ in: *Nous, citoyens d’Europe?*, p. 306.

# DER UNTERGANG: 1989-2009 – 20 YEARS OF LIBERALISATION OR CANNIBALISATION?

Asim MUJKIĆ

While freeing ourselves from communism, we believed that we were freeing ourselves from just any form of ‘correlating’ us, the ordinary people, with something which exceeds our day-to-day practice, with something non-human, abstract-categorical or ideological, generally with just any appropriation. We seem to have been steered in that direction by an emancipatory ‘liberalistic’ promise under which a combination of *parliamentary democracy + free market* represents a magic formula for success. From today’s distance, one might get the impression that in all that, and especially while insisting that ‘liberal democratic order has no alternative’, we showed nothing but our naivety, or rather, our political immaturity. On the other hand, also the liberal democratic order turned in 1990s and in the early new millennium in particular, into something completely different – a *neoliberal* capitalist order, developing its ideological narration of the so-called ‘free world’ which rests on the vision of deliverance through market democracy and consumerism. Walter Mignolo describes this trend as a process of consolidating “...naturalized belief that has now spread around the world that progress and development is good for all and everybody; the more you produce and the more people consume, the happier they – the consumers – are. Within that structure, those who are in it, live to work; live to consume. Success is the final horizon.”<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, radical and contemptible rejection of the Marxist re-descriptive vocabulary and the building of our identities over a good half a century, the narration of which was either imbued with metaphors of that vocabulary or developed in the opposite direction, made us blind to the fact that a new correlation with something non-human, which in the so-called ‘post-ideological’ constellation of neoliberalism was not visible, is concealed behind the ‘charters of human rights and freedoms’ and the liberalist mantra about ‘free flow of ideas, people, goods and capital’, enshrined even in the Preamble to the Constitution of BiH. An ideological “recurring theme“ of this post-ideological era is, in my view, best illustrated by Fukuyamin’s two positions which he made public immediately

<sup>1</sup> Marina Gržinić: “De-linking Epistemology from Capital and Pluri-Versality – A Conversation with Walter Mignolo”, *Reartikulacija*, No. 4, Ljubljana, poletje/summer 2008 (20-22); 21.

after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in his short essay entitled “...We Remain at the End of History”<sup>2</sup>.

1. “...Beyond liberal democracy and markets, there was nothing else towards which we could expect to evolve. ... While there were retrograde areas that resisted that process, it was hard to imagine an alternative civilization in which people would genuinely want to live – particularly after socialism, monarchy, fascism, and other varieties of authoritarian rule had been discredited“;
2. “...Democracy and free markets will continue to expand over time as the dominant organizing principles for much of the world.”<sup>3</sup>

First, it is an unusual intellectual arrogance to claim that any social construct is at the end of ‘evolutive scale’, that there is nothing left which people could aspire to. It is especially non-intellectual to say, implicitly here, and explicitly elsewhere, that a historical development of man comes to completion. The end of historical development would also be the end of historical being – the man. Each of those ‘authoritative rules’ which Fukuyama mentions had its own narration about the end of history, about the final *realization* of the man’s mission on the Earth which would in a way stem from its own transcendental substance. We can see, with Fukuyama also *neoliberalism gets its rounded narration about the completion of such a man’s mission*. It is almost incredible to hear in a post-metaphysical period such a rigid, ahistorical and deeply metaphysical position such as Fukuyama’s. Which positions does Fukuyama speak from? It is possible to claim the end of human historical development, an epoch the synonym of which is, paradoxically enough, ‘society without ideology’ only if we reach the position which Hilary Putnam calls ‘God’s-eye-view’, something which no human being – product of history and contingency – has so far managed to do. The only position which could justify Fukuyama’s assertions is *ideological* in metaphysical terms, which Friedrich Engels defined as “...specific structure of consciousness of a class society in particular and especially class ideologists as the layer of the people who give a theoretical shape to the class consciousness and who ‘are dealing with thoughts as independent substances, as if they existed for their own purposes.”<sup>4</sup>

Rejection of one, in this case, communist ideological matrix after two decades of the so-called transition of post-communist societies seems to have resulted in accepting a new, in our own case, neo-liberalist

<sup>2</sup> Francis Fukuyama: “We Remain at the End of History”, *Odjek* No. 2, autumn-winter 2001, Sarajevo, translated by Asim Mujkić, 38-39. (Francis Fukuyama: “We remain at the end of history”, October 11, 2001: <http://license.icopyright.net/user/viewFreeUse.act?fuid=NDA0Njc3NA%3D%3D> 06.07.2009)

<sup>3</sup> I wrote more extensively on this in Asim Mujkić: “...Liberalizam vs. neoliberalizam – rasprava u povu” in *John Rawls i perspektive liberalne demokratije u BiH*, Adnan Huskić, Asim Mujkić ed. (Sarajevo: Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, 2003); 19-33;

<sup>4</sup> *Enciklopedija leksikografskog zavoda*, 3, (Zagreb: Jugoslavenski leksikografski zavod, 1967).

ideological matrix. If we accept Engels's definition of ideology as the 'speech of substances' then we have to conclude that as the speech of substances, and not as a communicative co-action, ideology generally rests on the network of what Rorty defines as 'conversation-stoppers', as those building – we would say – doctrinal elements of ideological narration which must not be challenged. In this way, those narrative elements are nothing but a type of *Denkverbot* (thought embargo), so the transition of post-communist societies may be thought about – as a series of critical authors suggest – like a transition from one fundamental *Denkverbot* to another fundamental *Denkverbot*. Slavoj Žižek insists that

“Today's liberal-democratic hegemony is sustained by a kind of unwritten *Denkverbot* similar to the infamous *Berufsverbot* in Germany of the late 60s – the moment one shows a minimal sign of engaging in political projects that aim to seriously challenge the existing order, the answer is immediately: “Benevolent as it is, this will necessarily end in a new Gulag!” The ideological function of the constant reference to the holocaust, gulag and the more recent Third World catastrophes is thus to serve as the support of this *Denkverbot* by constantly reminding us how *things may have been much worse*: “Just look around and see for yourself what will happen if we follow your radical notions!” What we encounter here is the ultimate example of what Ana Dinerstein and Mike Neary called the project of *disutopia*, “not just the temporary absence of utopia, but the political celebration of the end of social dreams”.<sup>5</sup>

Most of citizens of European East, especially in the phase of transition, woke up not in the comfort of liberal democracy and capitalist consumerism, but amid the nightmare of corrupt selfish proto-capitalism, or, what is even worse, in the jaws of militant nationalism, this time without any utopian horizon as the hope with which they had embarked on adventure, revolution. Without *narration of hope* remains only *narration of facticity* – the seemingly realised hopes: the establishment of a liberal-democratic system. The fall from one to the other *Denkverbot* is for this part of Europe also the *fall into silence*: the elements of yesterday's identity are undesirable in the public discourse, some are even punishable under the criminal codes in place in some post-communist countries, and challenging the current dominant identity narrations is proscribed as silly. This entire situation or the “...political scene here“ is presented as the fall. The most devastating expression of that fall (...) is that the old failed ideology was not replaced by a political *opinion*; rather, it was replaced by a new *ideology*. The ruling ideology is a mixture of greedy pragmatism and trite moralizing“. <sup>6</sup> How such existence in inexpressibility, the *Denkverbot* silence, in 'non-thinking' looks in practice is illustrated by the following example:

<sup>5</sup> Slavoj Žižek, *Repeating Lenin* (Zagreb: Arkzin, 2001); 8-9;

<sup>6</sup> Karel Kosik, *On Dilemmas of Modern History* (Zagreb: Razlog, 2007); 236-7;

The only time being East German works negatively against you is when you express opinions that this bourgeois-democratic system does not represent the end of history. And, when you suggest that it is not final and that something may come after it one day. Because, like any system, it is going to come to an end sooner or later, maybe in fifty maybe in a hundred years and then one has to think about what will come after it and what kind of a society that should be. But that is completely taboo to talk about the end of this system because the moment they hear you say something like that they think, “Oh, she wants the GDR back,” which is not the point at all.... The West Germans have no problem asking us how we could have lived in the GDR, but I do not think they have ever thought about how they would answer an outsider’s question fifty years from now who would ask them, “How could *you* have lived in the Federal Republic of Germany with its unemployment, with hunger and homelessness.”<sup>7</sup>

The metaphor of Eastern Europe could thus be summarized in Friday, the character from Defoe’s *Robinson Crusoe*: “Friday was a cannibal whom Crusoe rescues from the danger of being eaten and converts, as a penitent, to Christianity”.<sup>8</sup> Did the West, playing the role of an enlightened, venturesome Crusoe, not saved in 1989 the ‘uncivilized’ from the East from being eaten in the fatal stranglehold of the cannibal Soviet empire? After Robinson saved Friday from being eaten, he started civilizing him – teaching him the language and the manners of his own civilization, while completely neglecting Friday’s previous identity (Why did Robinson not try to learn at least few words of Friday’s cannibal language?). Having saved him, he took a civilized Friday with him, to his world in which Friday’s cannibalism is a taboo, to the world in which Friday as such may survive only under Robinson’s fatherly protection, as his little, exotic savage. Friday may live in Robinson’s world only if he emptied his previous identity of all content. Here, there is a legitimate question: was Friday in the end completely eaten? The taboo of the pre-civilization identity may not be mentioned, although it can be legitimised in Robinson’s world only as goods. So the taboo of the pre-revolutionary identity of easterners – for example, the five-pointed red star – is regarded as a criminal offence in some countries of East Europe, although that same five-pointed red star may be freely displayed in those countries as the *Heineken* beer trade mark. The red star, as an ideological symbol, is forbidden, but is allowed as a capitalist brand.

This civilizatory appropriation of the East has its ideological foundation not only in neo-liberal narration. The classics of Marxism wrote

<sup>7</sup> Dominic Boyer: “...Ostalgija i politike sjećanja u Istočnoj Njemačkoj” (Ostalgie and the Politics of the Future in Eastern Germany), *Odjek*, LXII, No. 1, Sarajevo, Spring 2009 (53-63); 60;

<sup>8</sup> Steven Lukes, *Liberals and Cannibals / The Implications of Diversity*, (London, New York: Verso, 2003), 29;



about the necessity of capitalist 'to civilize' the East. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, in their own time, did not show even a modicum of mercy for those who should be 'appropriated', surveyed, disciplined, in short – *civilized*. Except for Polls, according to the classics of Marxism, there is no nation in Europe's East which could be characterized as modern in terms of its capability to produce its own bourgeoisie and consequentially, to create an operational national state, that "...*sine qua non* functional requirement for the survival of a national community in the capitalist mode of production. National communities incapable of forming national states are hindering the development of the progressive centralization and uniformation of humanity, and must therefore assimilate to more 'vital' and 'energetic' nations capable of forming national states with democracy 'as compensation'.<sup>9</sup> In what sense does this redescription of classics of Marxism define the identities of our small peoples in the context of capitalism that we 'returned to'? What are the national communities which have so far been incapable of forming national states, or the sound layer of bourgeoisie? It is horrifying even to think of what multi-cultural or multi-ethnic societies will face in such an appropriating vision.

According to classics of Marxism, those are 'non-historical nations'. If we return for a brief moment to the spiritual vocabulary of the 19th century, we could interpret it as nations which are not the subjects of their historical development, or the agents of "...historical transformation, that will further the formation of a strong capitalist economy..."<sup>10</sup> but subjects to someone else's mediation. The non-historical nations "were understood as incapable of having national states of their own because they were either 'too small' or they lived in areas of mixed population, in the midst of a 'more energetic stock' (usually German, but also Magyar), in a situation in which the other national community was considered 'more advanced' and 'better-equipped' in terms of its ability to build a national state. (...) but given that national communities persisted in preserving their 'backward' national identities and culture, they could only subsist on condition that they locate themselves within the sphere of influence of the equally 'backward' semi-feudal Russian absolutism"<sup>11</sup>. Thus, "The 'irresistible flow of progress' requires the voluntary assimilation or the annihilation of those national communities"<sup>12</sup>. For Marx and Engels, non-historical nations are 'feudal enclaves', the hotbed of reaction. Their national identities and culture, in comparison with capitalist nations, are

<sup>9</sup> Ephraim Nimni: "Marx, Engels and the National Question" in *The Rights of Minority Cultures*, Will Kymlicka ed., (Oxford University Press, 1997), 72.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 70.

<sup>11</sup> Paradoxically enough, did they not enjoy that kind of 'protection' within the Warsaw Pact? In this context, it could be said also of the federation of South Slavs that it had the same function Nimni mentions that according to Marx and Engels, "if the Slavonic East European nationalities cannot constitute national states, their only hope for survival was to constitute a federation of 'Slavonic Nations', under the leadership of the Czar of all Russia, the 'bulwark of European reaction'", *Ibid.*, 69.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 71.

retrograde. Their nationalism, unlike the nationalism of developed capitalist nations, is reactionary: If nationalism "...abolishes the feudal system building a 'national state', then the nationalist movement deserves support as a 'tool' for progressive social change. If, however, the nationalist movement emerges among linguistic or cultural communities incapable of surviving the upheavals of capitalist transformation because they are too small or have a weak or non-existent bourgeoisie, nationalist movements becomes a 'regressive' force—one which is incapable of overcoming the phase of 'peasant-feudal' social organization".<sup>13</sup> Such groups need to be assimilated, removed, in other words, eaten. Their fate will be that of Robinson's Friday.

A more sophisticated thinking about this part of Europe started precisely from the diversity of nations and peoples with the underlying question: can the plurality of our differences be the advantage? So in the emancipatory vision of dissidents in communism there were thoughts also about "...the realm of spiritual freedom, diversity and tolerance... a home of equal nations with an abundant, colorful culture, nurtured by a diversity of languages, religions, traditions and personalities"<sup>14</sup> (Einstein, Kafka, Lukacs, Krleža, Milosz, Havel, Kolakowski, Menzel and others). Transfer to a uniform nation-state, an ethnically homogenous capitalist matrix, with some exceptions though, turned this region into the area of "...hatred, intolerance, both ethnic and religious".<sup>15</sup> This alternative – here, I have to add, a genuine 'Mittel-European' narration about diversity, expressed in the works and thoughts of the so-called 'dissident intellectuals' and which, as the narration of social hope, paved the way for the 1989 revolution – simply did not have a chance in a clash with a new ideological wave from the West. Czeslaw Milosz, fearing, asked himself already in 1990: "...Will the years of suffering under totalitarian rule be obliterated, erased and the people start from scratch? Should the thinkers, poets, and artists join their Western colleagues in the somewhat marginal role assigned to them in societies busy with selling and buying?"<sup>16</sup> So, after communism was overthrown, it should have been reduced to 'nothing', to 'as if nothing had happened before', together with narrations of hope in social justice by domestic intellectuals, sunk into the silence of a new *Denkverbot*, free market and parliamentary democracy. Steven Lukes has been continually warning, since the very beginning of transition of Central and Eastern Europe, that "...one real possibility is that, in full recoil from real socialism, the post-revolutionary elites will embrace the full package of the counter-ideology of free-market liberalism, which,

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 63.

<sup>14</sup> Adam Michnik: "Gray is Beautiful: Thoughts on Democracy in Central Europe", *Dissent*, Vol. 44, Spring 1997.

<sup>15</sup> Michnik, *ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> Milosz according to Jerzy Jedlicki: "The Revolution of 1989: The Unbearable Burden of History" in *Eastern Europe / Transformation and Revolution 1945 - 1991*, Lyman H. Legters ed. (Lexington Mass., Toronto: D.C. Heath & Company, 1992); 635-43; 641;



like Marxism but on different grounds, also rejects the very notion of 'social justice'<sup>17</sup>.

Czech philosopher Karel Kosik described graphically such transformation: "...We are not going into Europe, rather, we go from one cave to another: from the gray, barracks-cave, besieged by barbed wire to a cave surfeited with comfort, lit with commercials that overshadow stars and the Sun..."<sup>18</sup> So the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, it seems today, followed an ideological dictum under which it is imperative for *ontogenesis*, or the building of a modern capitalist, democratic state, that it repeats the path of *phylogenesis* – the path of creating such a type of a state, an accelerated copying of capitalist development from a national referent of the state to a dominant form of *laissez-faire* capitalist egalitarianism in the form of consumerism. In short, it was necessary to recapitulate a two-hundred-year-long history of modern capitalism and a national state within twenty years only.

Re-contextualization of Central and Eastern Europe into the capitalist matrix was taking place simultaneously on two tracks in the form of "...restoration of the berserk capitalism of the 19th century<sup>19</sup> and also in the form of "penetration of the sophisticated neo-capitalism of the 20th century..."<sup>20</sup>, i.e. on the one hand, transition went towards establishing a classical national capitalist state which, under *laissez-faire* and Marxist doctrine, implied the establishment of a more powerful bourgeois class or 'lumpenbourgeoisie'<sup>21</sup>, as Kosik calls it, and at the same time, it took place within the context of global capitalism and neo-liberal 'supranational' narration, so that the act of *constitution* of a national state was almost at the same time the act of its *deconstitution* and coalescence into disciplining procedures of supranational integrations, such as the EU membership, and prior to that, the membership in NATO. At the end of the disciplining procedure, the disappearance, Kosik observes that "...it is said with pleasure with nobody breaks ranks any longer, all are performing, regardless of whether they have 'right' or 'left' governments in one order, in a disciplined manner."<sup>22</sup>

Still, is there any sense in talking about this area of the European continent as a separate region? First of all, that area, from the Baltic Sea down to the Adriatics, has not been fully appropriated. With the recent accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the European Union, the

<sup>17</sup> Steven Lukes: "...Marxism and Morality: Reflections on the Revolutions of 1989" in *Eastern Europe / Transformation and Revolution 1945 – 1991*, Lyman H. Legters ed. (Lexington Mass., Toronto: D.C. Heath & Company, 1992); 612-21; 620;

<sup>18</sup> Karel Kosik, *O dilemama suvremene povijesti (On Dilemmas of Modern History)* (Zagreb: Razlog, 2007); 246.

<sup>19</sup> Kosik, 250;

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 250;

<sup>21</sup> Kosik warns that 'lumpen-bourgeoisie' "...is recruited from the enriched ones, but unlike normal, polite members of its class, it ties together its entrepreneurship with the mafia rule, deceits, with the criminal underground", *Ibid.*, 238;

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 347.

circle around the so-called yet-not-appropriated West Balkan region is now complete, like a *cordon sanitaire* the aim of which is to form the boundary around the reserve of 'aboriginal' or, in Marxist terms, *non-historical* nations – members of divided societies and citizens of incomplete states who are still on the first step of transition – the establishment of a homogenous national state, then the insurance of a security environment, and eventually linking up with the global market. Europe seems to be closing up hermetically this region, while expecting a "...final solution" for such countries as Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro, or the entire, yet-not-ethnically-disentangled 'cannibal' archipelago in which each of the above countries poses a potential threat of further divisions and destabilization. At the same time, each of these states is a weak, incomplete and unfinished state and can be, to a larger or smaller degree, considered as an internally divided society. Following the Marxist-neo-liberalist ideological pattern, those states should, perhaps, be 'completed' by turning them into complete homogenous national states although such an effort could drag this region into a new wave of violence. Otherwise, the key question could be: how could multi-cultural and multiethnic societies be preserved precisely as we are discussing today those countries as the sources of insecurity? Would it be possible at all, no matter how fantastic or utopian it may sound, that those last, 'circumvented' yet-not-European countries find a new strength in their multi-culturism and offer a plausible model for Europe of tomorrow? This is why it would be necessary to explore the possibility for a vacant place of a dominant 'majority nation' to become a source of freedom instead of a source of conflict and frustration.

The lack of the ultimate, dominant, ethno-national referent – as the first phase of the post-communist transition – has so far encouraged evoking precise boundary demarcation, often bloody 'dissolution of plurals' into a number of separate singulars. It is in relation to the vacant position of a dominant national referent, following the fall of socialism, that dominant, or homogeneous ethnic identities were built in their pronounced singularity externally – through the attitude towards others, most often adversarial ethnic singularities, and internally – through an internal dynamics of an ethnic group within which the concept of a hegemonist ethnic identity is established and maintained by force (both economic and political). In this regard, perhaps it would be necessary to hash over the options available to those countries – if such options still exist – and also to try to understand the real meaning of that flagrant circumvention of the West Balkan countries in the 'Euro-integration' processes so far, except for the Brussels' official explanation that those countries have not yet met the requirements from the so-called road maps. We should ask openly: do the 'efforts' made so far by the international community and the European Union – although, of course, there is nothing coherently 'signified' behind these signifiers<sup>23</sup> - at least when it comes to the cases of BiH, Serbia and Macedonia – indicate clearly that, for the

<sup>23</sup> If we accept that what stands 'behind' is a neo-liberal ideology which follows the movement of global capital, then, as Marina Gržinić observes, an interesting horizon gets open which is characterized

time being, the only way in which the 'world' is coping with multi-ethnicity is its 'closing eyes' to the conflict until ethnic homogenization of some areas among which peace, guaranteed by NATO presence or 'Natoid' troops, is being implemented in search for an ad hoc modus of ethnic-territorial confederation at least as an interim solution? Does that approach not make our societies even more divided and our states, if they can be called a 'state', even more incomplete? Can the 'world' or at least Europe do it better? Otherwise, the vision of the West Balkans is horrifying: hermetically closed, in a bell jar, it will continue to implode into ethnic enclaves, hostile toward each other, until a clear geography of young 'sovereign' states is established with a clear 'ethnic titular', managed by ethno-political oligarchies to the detriment of their citizens, their human rights and freedoms. Does the fifteen-year-long experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina not show that the principle of ethnic territorialism endanger individual safety and rights, that it increases instability of citizens' expectations in the form of continual uncertainty, prolonged state of emergency; further, does it not obstruct the political participation of citizens thanks precisely to its discriminatory practices and characteristics on which its existence is based? If we want to *complete* our states in that way, then their full disintegration will be inevitable.

In broader terms, the Western Balkan dilemma cannot refer yet to the entire area of Central and Eastern Europe. The issue of this region is, I will take liberty to say, the key issue for the survival of pluralist democracy and the possibility of the vision of the society in which nothing will shape the human destiny, no metanarrative or naturalized ideology – either Marxist or neo-liberalist, it does not matter. Susan George quotes Karl Polanyi who said more than fifty years ago what we can call now a prophetic position: "...To allow the market mechanism to be the sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment ... would result in the demolition of a society..."<sup>24</sup>. The damnation or advantage of this area is that it has always been on the ideological periphery, as something always 'in between', doomed to the plurality of life forms and permanent, cyclical attempts to find final solutions, offered by the occupying ideologies. Contrary to this, Kosik observes:

The subject of Central Europe are the nations who are *seeking* – in conflicts, fallacies, misunderstandings – the way of living together and co-existence which would ensure their identity, and at the same time create mutual respect of *all* for all as participants in a single freedom and single justice. The history of Central Europe is search for power (and its symbols) which would bring together diversities, overcome separation, vanquish particularism and intolerance not by an external and brute force from above but by the will from within<sup>25</sup>.

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precisely by fragmentation of referentialism: "...it is precisely the capital that throughout the whole history prompted disintegration of every referentialism, every human goal and that fully loosened every distinction between false and true, good and evil, in order to introduce a relentless law of equal and replaceable values, the iron law of one's own power" See in M. Gržinič, *Estetika kibersvijeta*, 63.

<sup>24</sup> Susan George: "...A Short History of Neoliberalism", <http://www.tni.org/archives/George/bangkok.htm>

<sup>25</sup> Karel Kosik, *O dilemama...*, 69-70.



# Continuity versus Reference – Rhetorics versus Habitus

Wolfgang Klotz

In times, when the political joke disappears, it seems to be replaced by something we can characterize as “serious anecdote”. A typical sample of this genre could recently be read in the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” of May 29: in the Hungarian city of Szombathely a statue of Pushkin was to be put up again in the park after two years of restoration, but a public official of the city administration stopped the reinstatement of the statue saying, that “We do not provide public space for such communists”.

This short anecdote reveals a specific continuity and a well-known personal habitus: we can assume that this small clerk all his life had tried to be alongside with his chiefs (or at least where he supposed them to be). In case he were on duty already in Kádár times, he would certainly then have welcomed Pushkin as a hero of liberation.

More serious is the report on an exhibition shown in the city of Kőszeg, some 20 km from Pushkin’s statue, where the local museum had arranged a collection of documents from and about Ferenc Szálasi, the founder and chief of the “Arrow Cross Movement”. The way how the political attitude of Szálasi’s movement was characterized in the 2003 exhibition can be summarized by two documents presented in the showcases. The first is a quotation of Szálasi himself where he says: “*Among all those people who today (i.e. in 1944) determine the future of Hungary, half of them are no Hungarians at all, and half of them are bad Hungarians*” (while “not being Hungarian at all” means: they were Jews). And the second text, obviously written by the curators, says that the arrow cross movement was “*not identical with Italian fascism, nor German National Socialism, since the Hungarian Arrow Cross men did not propose a totalitarian state or racial supremacy. But they were fervent enemies of Bolshevism and international capitalism*” (while the term “international capitalism” again tends to the Jews). And of course the persons being blamed responsible for that exhibition, in which they praise “*the talent, the diligence and the absolutely non-materialistic character*” of Szálasi, claim that all that was “*free of politics*”.

This story shows us some specific references and a well-known rhetoric, which is far spread not only in nowadays Hungary, where the

“Black guard” is again regularly and publicly patrolling the streets of various cities and where, since the beginning of this year, we count numerous assaults on Roma people dwellings with a death toll of eight victims either burnt or shot down when they tried to escape from the fire. Explicit references are made here to “*Anti-Bolshevism*” as well as to “*Anti-Capitalism*” in order to mask the real references working in the minds of the authors, i.e. their references to Anti-Semitism.

### The case from Kozara

The Croatian writer Boris Dežulović published an article a few weeks ago in the Belgrade online-daily “E-Novine”, where he refers to a well known photography Žorž Skrigin had made in 1944. The photography is showing “*an exhausted mother, who runs away from Ustashas across the pathless Mount Kozara, holding her daughter’s hand and carrying her son on her arm*”. This picture is well known not only because it is displayed in the Holocaust Museum at Auschwitz. According to Dežulović – it had been printed in all the history textbooks used by school-classes of his generation in former Yugoslavia.

The writer continues telling us about Branko Tepić, “*a pensioner from Graduša near Sisak. He lived in Sisak until 1991, where from, fleeing the war he escaped to his summer house in Graduša. Croatian authorities confiscated his flat and he could not go back to Sisak. He lived in the summer house for four years until 1995 when, following the ‘Operation Flash’, he had to run away again, with his wife, son, daughter-in-law and grandchildren, this time towards the Mount Kozara. It would take him eight years before he could go back to Graduša, to end his life there.*” That Branko Tepić was none other than the young child on the arm of his mother on the photo from the Holocaust Museum and the schoolbooks of former Yugoslavia. “*That photo has predestined the path which I am still following,*” Branko Tepić said later. “*That photo has fated my trail of a refugee who never settled where his roots are.*”

This story shows us a continuity of suffering in a habitus of silence. It comes to us in a wonderful rhetoric, because it’s a talented writer who lends his voice to the tacit Branko Tepić and Branko himself doesn’t need any references, since it wouldn’t disburden his life at all to denominate those people who made him suffering as Bolsheviks or Capitalists, as Ustasha, Četniks or whatever.

The Heinrich Boell Foundation invited you to this conference in order to remember the year of the breakdown of the communist systems and to look at the divergent lines in social and political development different societies of the region were taking during those 20 years since then.

My text up to here makes evident that I’m neither a historian nor a social scientist nor an analyst from a political think-tank. I enjoy the

privilege of just being an observer of Central Europe since 20 years, even if I risk bothering you with banalities.

But more than in all those 20 years of observing Central- and Eastern Europe I've learned in the few months I'm now living in Belgrade, that any public discourse there (and may be also here) is cram-full with historical references, made either by individuals, by social groups or by an nearly entire society. References, on the one hand, are made to define and to justify the own position, and they are imputed to others in order to describe and to disqualify their position. People defining themselves as acting and thinking in the tradition of anti-fascism consider their antagonists as being "fascists". Vice versa those alleged or true fascists, considering themselves as heirs of a tradition of national greatness, glory and honour, impute to their antifascist adversaries being "communists" or "bolshevists", and only where – like in the Hungarian example of Szálasi – those heirs of national glory feel proud to be of an "*absolutely non-materialist character*" they may add even "capitalists".

It might be true that the only question, all post-communist societies between 1989 and 1991 had in common, was the need of a point of reference in their own national history, from where to start the post-communist future and the process of transformation. Only the German Democratic Republic was either deprived of the chance to find its own historical reference, or – as we can say in another interpretation – it just didn't need such a moment of self-assurance in order do find its way to future. Unification just made such a reference needless or – again in the other interpretation – unification dictated where to refer to. I'll come back to this German specification later.

If we look at all these various post-communist societies, there were, of course, significant differences already in the way how the communist system had collapsed in each particular society, as well as, even earlier, in the way how communist policy had been carried out in the decades before. And, of course, we have all in mind our stereotypes regarding so called "national characters", which pretend to explain us, why Václav Havel could become president in Prague, but no counterpart of Havel could do so in Belgrade.

Yet, there were at any time some Havels (Havels in terms of a personal habitus) in Belgrade as well, and the real question is why the mainstream of Serbian politics for decades fell into the hands of others. This definitely didn't happen because of a particular "Serbian national character", even if those, who assumed political leadership in Serbia, quite often referred to such thing as a "specific Serbian national character" and claimed to act in perfect accordance with it.

After the end of communism we can see continuities (and of course discontinuities) as well as references (and lacks of references). I would like to consider continuity as a phenomenon of both the individual and



collective unconscious, while references seem to me rather the result of an individual or collective decision. Therefore references tend to operate with words, with terms and with denominations. They are constructions and, hence, they are easily replaceable. As we know many big players of the former communist nomenklatura displayed no restraint at all to switch from one reference-system to the other over night, they called themselves devotional Catholics while one day before they still had been chief of the communist youth organisation – as happened for instance with Mr Orbán, the former and probably future Hungarian prime minister. So, in those cases, looking at their habitus will tell us much more about them than taking their referential change as serious.

I can't get rid of the impression that a great part of political confusion – including my own one – results from the more or less permanent interference of deliberate references and unconscious continuities with each other. To find some distinctness in this confusion I would like draw your imagination for just a moment into a kind of dream movie:

On the screen of this movie you can see a kind of platonic academic “parliament of philosophers” of Central Europe in the very moment of the end of communism. The assembly starts with Adam Michnik, Jacek Kuron, Bronisław Geremek, Tadeusz Mazowiecki from Poland, the camera slowly turns to the group of delegates representing the at that time still existing Czechoslovakia, we see Václav Havel, Ludvík Vaculík, Milan Šimečka, Jiří Dienstbier; the turn continues to Hungary with G. M. Tamás, Mihály Vajda, the old wise man Ferenc Fejt, István Eörsi, and so it continues showing a long line from Andrei Pleșu in Bukarest until Ivan Krastev and Alexander Kiossev from Sofia and Fatos Lubonja from Albania. What do they have in common? What do they represent as a common point of historical reference for the future of this part of Europe?

From my point of view what all of them share as a kind of common heritage, is not so much a common reference but a habitus. I dare assume that this habitus has its very roots in the tradition of the European bourgeoisie<sup>1</sup> of the late 19th and early 20th century. And I sometimes prefer this term of Bourgeoisie to the English equivalent of “civil society” just because this Bourgeoisie defines a personal habitus towards society rather than an institutional structure of social sectors.

I am, however, deeply convinced that the very different ways, post-communist societies were going in the last two decades, their divergent social and political development might become a little bit more plausible and comprehensible, once we consider them from the perspective of the representation of this European bourgeois tradition in these different societies. This question is closely linked to the existence and the social strength of a dissident movement in the 1950ies to the 1980ies, because

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<sup>1</sup> “Bourgeoisie” in the meaning of German “Bürgertum“



the dissidents were real substrate and bearers of this tradition through the entire cold war period.

The Czechoslovak society in 1990 reminded the period of Masaryk and the 1930ies, when the gross domestic product per capita in Czechoslovakia was higher than in France. And this reference proved to be strong enough even to tame nationalist energies in the process of state disintegration.

Poland, of course, got its own Holy Father who, despite of his traditional spirituality, prevented the country from a radical backslide into clericalist traditions, limited the re-appearance of clericalism to a “Radio Maria” radio channel, and allowed only a short three years revival of reactionary politics after his death. Without him, catholic Poland would perhaps from 1990 have gone the way on which we see catholic Hungary today.

### **Reference to European bourgeois tradition**

Everywhere, it seems the pace, the sustainability and the success of transition was and still is related to the collective reference to that European bourgeois tradition:

- how strong and deep were its social roots during the period referred to?
- how strong was it still represented in collective memory at the moment when the reference had been made?
- How strong was it physically represented in the society by persons incorporating it?

What does that mean regarding South Eastern European countries and especially the states on the area of former Yugoslavia?

I think all of you are more competent than me to evaluate the usefulness of this approach for an analysis and for the development of a perspective for the future. I have learned in that short time in Belgrade, that people there – when speaking to you about other persons – use to say, that he / she “belongs to us” and he / she “belongs to the other side”. This marks the line between the two political camps which can roughly be defined as conservatives and liberals, while being conservative ranges from the radical nationalists to the current government and liberals comprises nearly all those out of this range.

Yet one thing seems to me as a German really remarkable: it’s the fact that obviously nobody in Belgrade is going to claim for himself either a reference to or any continuity with former communism. This, at any cost, must be avoided like plague.

At the same time I'm reading German newspapers in Belgrade and I learn that in Berlin they run a serious debate whether or not we may characterize the German Democratic Republic as a "state without rule of law". So, obviously the German post-communists and these GDR-nostalgics have a much stronger position in society than their counterparts have in Belgrade. Otherwise they would not be able to impose on the German society such a discussion whether torture in the GDR was just an exception that proves the rule of an otherwise civil and lawful society.

But again on the other hand, I can't avoid the impression, that in fact those successors of the former communist nomenklatura are much stronger in today Serbia than in Germany. Why then this continuity is bewared like the most dangerous taboo?

Again we find some comprehension only if we make a specific distinction between reference and continuity: German GDR-nostalgics claim the right and the legitimacy of referencing: they want to refer to their "real existing socialism" as the still "better version of Germany". They at the same time accept discontinuity, because today they visit Mallorca and Antalya like their western compatriots and only habitual differences make them sometimes still distinguishable at the beach.

In Serbia, since Yugo-nostalgia was no appropriate point of reference any more, Serbia-nostalgia filled this vacant space. And since the late Yugoslav version of socialism had been declared an evil system of bureaucracy, the offspring from this evil system fiercely denied any such parentage. They instead made their reference to the realm of national symbols. But their habitus unintentionally still reveals where they are really coming from.

Let me finish with again an anecdote which I've been told some 30 years ago at the University of Nijmegen in the Netherlands: people there told me about a Jewish professor who taught medicine at this university in the 1940ies. The Gestapo arrested him in 1943 and SS deported him to a concentration camp where he survived one and a half years until the final liberation. He returned to Holland where, in 1947, he resumed his position as professor of medicine. And after nearly four years of absence he started his first lecture in 1947 by saying to the students: "As we have learned in our last lecture...."

I cannot prove the story to be true, but I very much like it to be so, since I do not know any expression of stronger sovereignty and more powerful self-assertion of a human being against all the burden, history and biography wants to impose us.

**TRANSITION EXPERIENCES IN THE  
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES**



# TRANSITION EXPERIENCES: THE DISSOLUTION OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK FEDERATION AND SLOVAKIA'S ROAD TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

Pavol DEMEŠ

Ladies and gentlemen, it is my great pleasure to be in my beloved Sarajevo again and to have the opportunity to address this audience, of distinguished experts in the social and political sciences. I must admit, I am rather a practitioner with a background in civic and political engagement in my home country, formerly Czechoslovakia and now Slovakia. Moreover, in the last decade I have been engaged in various countries experiencing the transition process, including yours, as a representative of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

I was invited by the organizers of this meeting to share some of our experiences following the split of former Czechoslovakia, and the integration of Slovakia into the European Union, which may be of relevance for your own “journey to Europe”. I am glad that the Slovak Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Miroslav Mojžita, who has served in the Balkans for many years, is with us today. As a true expert, he can surely enrich my presentation during the discussion period.

Slovakia, Bosnia and Herzegovina have several things in common – they have a similar population, are post-communist, predominantly Slavic countries, and both were created following the division of two larger Communist federations – Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, respectively. Both see their future in European and transatlantic institutions. Slovakia has already been integrated into the main Western structures of the European Union and NATO, unlike your country whose progress was seriously slowed down in political, social, and economic transition caused by the recent tragic conflicts. Similar to many other countries, we believe your future is in the democratic and prosperous European family. As you know, Bosnia and Herzegovina is among foreign policy priorities for Slovakia, and not only because our Foreign Minister, Miroslav Lajčák, who was until recently High Representative and EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, knows your country very well.

What are the key differences and lessons your country can learn from Czechoslovak, and particularly the Slovak road to modern Europe? Simply said, we did it in *velvet* way, refraining from using violence. The

Velvet Revolution in November 1989 peacefully abolished communism in Czechoslovakia, and the so-called velvet divorce on January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1993 ended without causing any ethnic hatred within the former Czechoslovak federation. Two new, closely cooperating states appeared on the map of Europe. In comparison with the Balkan situation, we can argue this was almost a fairy tale. But many things were not that simple, easy and predictable. An enormous amount of good will, negotiations, compromise, patience and luck were necessary. These things are always necessary in historical moments involving diverse people filled with emotion, uncertainty and hope.

The Velvet Revolution, which was sparked by a police attack on students during a peaceful demonstration in Prague on November, 17, first mobilized intellectuals across the country. Broad based non-partisan movements, namely the Civic Forum and the Public Against Violence, were created in Prague and Bratislava, respectively. The Communist party of Czechoslovakia gave up power within a few weeks and the new political elites, consisting mostly of former dissidents, cultural figures and experts from all walks of life, entered government offices on all levels. Former communist nomenclature was not allowed to occupy high government positions. This was a very important step, rather different from Yugoslavia, which shaped the style and future political course of democratic reforms and created a clear pro-western orientation for the former Communist federation.

There was little debate about the split in the newly free Czechoslovakia. Key slogans in both parts of the federation were “freedom and democracy” and “going back to Europe”. It was only later, that debate on constitutional reform and the redefinition of power between the federal and republic levels started among the Czech and Slovak political representatives. Significant differences occurred among key political players, which eventually proved to be so deep, that they agreed to take the decision to the Federal Czechoslovak Parliament to divide the country. It was a political act, without referendum, with a relatively well prepared and controlled process of division, that was unaccompanied by ethnic tensions and border disputes. The international community, therefore, accepted this peaceful division and the two new states – the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, were created on January 1, 1993 and quickly recognized by countries around the world. The most important thing was that we, the Slovaks and the Czechs, did it in a civilized way, respecting the constitution and laws, without disturbing the international community or threatening to destabilize the Central European region. There was no ethnic hatred fueled by politicians and media during the split. On the contrary, a large part of the population in both republics did not celebrate the end of a common state. The people accepted the new political reality as a pragmatic solution that opened the space for a new evolution of both close nations with their ethnic minorities. The most

evident proof of the maturity of the political elites and the population is the current viability of both states and continued excellent relations between the Czechs and Slovaks on political, cultural and social levels. The only problem is that the Czechs are now doing a bit better in ice hockey and football and the Slovaks have the Euro and produce more cars.

Slovakia's further modernization and entry into European and transatlantic structures was rather bumpy, but in the end successful. As a smaller part of Czechoslovakia, Slovakia had to develop, almost from scratch, both hardware and software for the new state. During the state building process, Slovakia had to develop relationships with neighbors, the European Union, and other parts of the world. Although the neighbors of Slovakia accepted the new political reality with understanding, I must admit that the broader international community was not very sympathetic to the division of Czechoslovakia at the beginning. It was not easy to explain to foreign audiences that this division is not based on ethnic tensions and that it would not enlarge problems linked to the separation of the other two post-communist federations. Moreover, many western experts and politicians were not sure if Slovakia had the potential to develop a functioning economy and EU style governance.

The first years of Slovakia's independence were a mixture of surprising achievements in the state building process, civil society development, and smooth entry and integration into international institutions. But, there were also some emerging negative trends in governance practices represented by the neo-authoritarian and politically dominant Prime Minister Vladimir Mečiar. While claiming strategic orientation at European and transatlantic structures, respect for political pluralism, and human and minority rights, Mečiar started to violate basic democratic principles. His regime was characterized by massive corruption and authoritarian attacks on political opponents, media, civic leaders and others who were critical of his practices and who threatened his power games. His nationalist and populist agenda dominated domestic political discourse and resulted in Slovakia's disqualification from the negotiation process to enter the EU and NATO. Out of the ten post-communist countries which have joined the EU so far, Slovakia was the only one, from all the ten, with which the EU interrupted accession talks due to democratic deficits. This negative trend mobilized democratic political opposition and broader civil society against the powerful regime, which was finally defeated during the regular electoral process in important parliamentary elections in the fall of 1998. Again, it was done peacefully and without foreign intervention. It was Slovakia's own game, but the country benefited greatly from the political, diplomatic and financial support from European and American partners who cared about this country and its ambition to be part of a civilized family. If you are interested in learning more about this peaceful democratic breakthrough in Slovakia and its influence on other countries, I invite you to read the book *Reclaiming Democracy*. Civil

Society and Electoral Change in Central and Eastern Europe, which we published two years ago, and is available on GMF's website.

After the new, broadly based coalition government, lead by Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda, came to power in 1998, Slovakia started its "catch up" period. Political elites, civil society, and population at large wanted to overcome the lost time in the accession process to the EU. Unprecedented political, economic and social reform started in order to fulfill the criteria given to all EU applicants. Reforms had temporarily painful consequences for Slovak citizens in the form of high unemployment and other social deficiencies, as well as impacting the popularity of those politicians who had introduced them. Slovakia showed remarkable focus on key strategic goals in this period and the capacity to reach consensus even among the most bitter political rivals. This resulted in narrowing the gap between the most progressive Central and Eastern European applicant countries and Slovakia. In the "big bang" EU enlargement, in spring 2004, after a true race with time, the country joined others in the Union, only a few weeks after joining NATO. Slovakia was finally anchored in the rules based, democratic and prosperous family, step by step dismantling walls and borders. This would have never happened if there had not been prevailing agreement among political elites, intellectuals and civil society actors who needed to translate reform and the integration process into action, and convince the public to support it.

Today, twenty years after the Velvet Revolution, sixteen years after the "velvet divorce" and five years after joining EU and NATO, Slovakia is a standard European country. We do not need a visa to enter the EU and many other countries around the world, including the United States. We do not have to debate which national hero will be depicted on our bank notes, since we successfully introduced the Euro in January of this year. We turned from a recipient to a donor country, and are now assisting others, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, with their transition processes. But, even with all of these macro-successes there are still numerous areas where we are far from satisfaction and can't "check many boxes". We discovered quickly that even if you join the EU and NATO you are not immune to populism, nationalism, extremism and corruption in public life. Deep social and regional inequalities, problems with the rule of law and education system have not disappeared. But the key is that we have the freedom and the chance to make corrections, and that the young generation is not dreaming about emigration as before. Moreover, we are part of family which is ready to be of help even in a period marked by the turmoil of a global financial and economic crisis.

I wish that the example of the bumpy road of my country will stimulate discussion today, and at least partly, serve as an inspiration for you who care so deeply about the well-being of your homeland - Bosnia and Herzegovina.



# 1989: What Really Came Down With the Fall of the Berlin Wall?

Gajo Sekulić

“...Jede politische Revolution ist die Revolution der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft“  
(Karl Marx, *Zur Judenfrage*, 1843)

In the study below, *first of all*, I problematize the method of a narrow, partial interpretation of the year 1989, *then* I indicate the historical structural link between important symbolic years – 1968, 1989 and 2009 – since only a broad historical perspective of interpretation of multi-meaning consequences of big transformations of the society after 1989 may provide an accurate insight into the situation and range of philosophical, social, economic and political theories of present day, and in *conclusion*, I articulate some suggestions for a research into the boundaries of classical and postmodern liberalism from the viewpoint of the real possibilities of the liberal-democratic socialism. (This structure is logical rather than formal.) In this way I am trying to provide a negative answer to the question from the title: was the idea of liberal-democratic socialism destructed in principle with the fall of primitive communism or the “...real-existing socialism“, and with it, the relevance of the original critical theory of Karl Marx and his original successors, such as, say, not only because of his 80th birthday, precisely on June 18 of this years, a philosophically open inter-disciplinary mixture of Habermas’s theories, but primarily because of an open critical level of his *political theory* which is both *for* and *against* Marx, superior to both classical and postmodern liberalism, let alone a theoretical wilderness of fanaticized and primitive ethno-liberals and false “...former“ Marxists within the space of the former real-existing socialism who were allegedly left without the subjects of criticism. This places the reminder of the main dimension of J. Habermas’s political theory in the context of meaning and consequences of 1989 *in the forefront* of this study.

## I

### 1989: Significance and Consequences

Seven thematic impulses for the understanding and surpassing pre-political ethnocentrism of new democracies and the crisis of the political theory today. Towards the opinion of chances of liberal-democratic socialism

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Anniversary just as any other anniversary. To think the year 1989 just as an anniversary would be senseless. It can *only* be an external stimulus for ahistorical academic theses about *the end of history* because it brought down the “...Cold War“ assumptions and replaced it, perhaps, with the “...Cold Peace“ as a long-term and ever more dangerous strategy for international relations. Behind this primitive ideology lies a very arrogant ideological triumphalist illusion about the realization of the dream about *the end of communism* as *the end of every idea about historical chances of the liberal-democratic socialism*, which, in principle, even Rawls<sup>1</sup> does not abjure, and/or different historical non-democratic radical alternatives with the minimum of at least sceptical ethics and humanism. The blind enthusiasm, demonstrated by, for example, Jacques Rupnik in 2001, is comic even today, although ideological phantasm of the new democracies has not yet been spiritually subdued. He says:

However, it would be inappropriate to consider 1989 only as a new edition or continuation of 1789. ... In this regard, 1989 completes the era of revolutions, which began in 1789 and gained new momentum in 1917. 1989 will go down in history as a peace “revolution“ *par excellence* and also as the “...revolution *qua* restoration.“ What remains of 1989 – seen with the 1989 eyes – is the idea of democracy to the detriment of the idea of revolution.<sup>2</sup>

It remains quite questionable whether democracy and revolution may be separated in such a touching Central European way. “...We“, from the South, are something different and we are not in the same boat. That year cannot be researched in isolation and beyond a broader historical context. Backwards – without understanding the consequences and meaning of 1968 and forward without understanding the crisis of financial capitalism in its latest phase of “...neuro-capitalism“ or, under the most recent syntagma, “...casino-capitalism“:<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> John Rawls, *Gustizia come equita. Una riformulazione*. Feltrineli, Milano 2002, p.154-155

<sup>2</sup> Jacques Rupnik und Dominique Moisi, “1989 in historischer Perspektive“, Merkur, 2/1991, S.7

<sup>3</sup> “Das Kasino Kapitalismus. Globalisierung und Krise“, Edition Blätter, Berlin 2009. The group of international left-oriented experts considers alternatives to “financial-market capitalism“ (Altwater, Fraser, Amin, Sassen et al.)

Phenomenology of spirit is being cast away with indignation. A dozen of sciences, like neuro-anthropology, neuro-pedagogy, neuro-theology, neuro-aesthetics and neuro-economics, emerged to the scene. Their self-confident appearance lays bare the neuro-science's usurping tendency to be not only the natural science spiritual science but also the leading science of the 21st century. The foundation, impetus and promise of this requirement are their maxim – that the overall human behaviour is determined by the regularities of the activities of nerve cells and the way in which they are organized in the brain. Even if the universal importance of this maxim is challenged, it is possible to postulate, with good reason, that there is a new, neuro-capitalism – or that as such it is in the making....<sup>4</sup>

Rupnik's illusion that the year 1989, "...revolution like restoration", was won over by democracy, or more precisely, that the "...idea of revolution" lost from the "...idea of democracy" would require an in-depth analysis. Instead, my choice is the general thesis of this study, which arises from the spirit of the critical interpretation of Marx's thesis about every political revolution as the revolution which inevitably belongs to important capabilities of the "civil society". This genitive is both *genitivus subiectivus* and *genitivus obiectivus*. Marx's level of thinking about political revolution can be comprehended only in the counterpoint of "...universal revolution", which is a separate topic, today more topical than ever before.<sup>5</sup> It is not just about the difference between universalism as the alleged essentialism and contextualism in the postmodern variants which surpassed, allegedly, every fundamentalist or essentialist foundation. Both lines are still closer than it is thought in the texts by Rorty, Derida or Liothard. Even the wisest ones keep forgetting that the democracy's birth place is largely in historical terms precisely revolution, as a political revolution. For me, it remains an open issue whether the boundaries of democracy are determined by the boundaries of political revolution. This question can be answered, in terms of method, also by testing how far liberalism goes, for which, in theoretical view, the most adequate starting point is the remarkable discussion between Habermas and Rawls.<sup>6</sup>

It would also be necessary to consider on another occasion, without irony, the presumed naturalist<sup>7</sup> neuro-scientific illusion that the nerve cells are adapted to the spirit of capitalism precisely by the way they are organized in human brain. From there to the thesis that the

<sup>4</sup> Henric Jokeit und Ewa Hess, "Neurokapitalismus", Merkur, Nr. 721, Jun 2009, S. 541

<sup>5</sup> In "our" domestic literature see especially: Gajo Petrović, *Mišljenje revolucije*, Izabrana djela, Naprijed, Zagreb, 1978; 2. edition, *Odabrana djela*, 2, Zagreb/Belgrade, 1986.

<sup>6</sup> See: G. Sekulić, "Da li je rasprava Habermas-Rawls završena? Granične mogućnosti liberalizma i demokratije (socijalizma)", Zbornik radova sa skupa o J. Rawlsu: *John Rawls i perspektive liberalne demokratije u Bosni i Hercegovini*. FNS, Sarajevo 2003, p. 9-18.

<sup>7</sup> The critique of naturalistic expansion in spiritual sciences as of recently has been initiated by Habermas in his book *Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion*, Suhrkamp Verlag, 2005. English translation: *Between Naturalism and Religion*, Polity Press, 2008.

requirements of liberal-democratic socialism are completely unnatural to the nature of nerve cells and their practice in the brain – it is not too far at all. It has been a long time since Marx's criticism of social relations as *natural* relations received a more accurate praise.<sup>8</sup>

1. *The end of communism or “...really existing socialism“?* Theses on pre-suppositions of theoretical-historical new foundation of liberal-democratic socialism.

The road which leads to overcoming the principled crisis of every critical theory today, and especially of the ruling ethno-centrism of the so-called “...post-socialist“ countries should, first of all, suggest, providing sound arguments, the need for a research into the importance and consequences of 1989 by attempting, without delay to answer the question about the accuracy or falsely of the interpretation of 1989 as the end or the beginning of an end of the so-called communism, under the pre-supposition that something like that has ever existed. If not, and probably it has not, except for the form of “...primitive communism“ in the sense which Marx attached to this syntagma more than 160 years ago in *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* (of 1844), then we should talk about the beginning of an end of the so-called *really existing socialism* which indeed “...came down“ in Europe in 1989. It is interesting how ideological blindness anticipates that *even this* type of socialism was not completely overthrown, as it survived in China (and elsewhere) in a specific symbiosis with some elements of capitalist economy. Present-day philosophical, political, social, cultural and economic theory is infected with a myriad unclear ideological “...post-isms“. Quite rare are the works that reliably operate with such terms as “...post-modern“, “...post-communism“, “...post-socialism“, “...post-Marxism“, “...post-humanism“, “...post-history“ etc.

The book by J. Habermas *Die nachholende Revolution*<sup>9</sup>, which was written and published at the very beginning of those events and which consists of his both published and unpublished works, was by the end of 1980s the most delicate interpretation of the year 1989, shaped at the very beginning of great changes. Habermas makes his position clear already in a brief introduction:

The events are changing on a daily basis both the international and internal German scenes. However, the catching-up revolution (die nachholende Revolution) does not shed any new light on our *old* problems. These, as Adorno could say, negative constants amid an accelerated history, could justify the views I have maintained over the last several years.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup> I encountered this phenomenon in the early 1970s. G. Sekulić, *Filozofija i proletarijat u djelu Karla Marksa*, Radnički univerzitet, Subotica, 1980, and also in other texts, e.g.: G.S., *Aktualnost Marksovog Kapitala*, Zagreb, RU 1982, p. 111-129.

<sup>9</sup> Jürgen Habermas, *Die nachholende Revolution*, Suhrkamp Verlag, F a/M, 1990.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

His fear and scepticism as opposed to his own and general enthusiasm in the beginning, Habermas develops exhaustively and analytically best in the article (published for the first time in that book) under the title “...Catching-up revolution and the left need for review. What does socialism mean today?”<sup>11</sup> The then media story speaks of “de-magicalization of socialism“, of “...the failure of one idea“ with a dominating refrain: “... that utopias and philosophies of history have to end up in subjugation“. Habermas moves on the critical-scientific level and asks:

How should the historical meaning of revolutionary changes in East and Central Europe be evaluated? What does the bankruptcy of state socialism mean for political movements and ideas which are deep-rooted in the 19th century, and what does it mean for the theoretical legacy of the West European Left?<sup>12</sup>

The fundamental historical presupposition for a change is the historical fact of radical changes in the USSR, that is in Russia<sup>13</sup>, i.e. the historical fact of the failure of the project of *state socialism*, which is true for both the ex camp countries and the GDR:

The changes in Poland were the result of “...permanent resistance by the Solidarnost movement supported by the Catholic Church, in Hungary they resulted from the struggle for power among the political elites; in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, it was the upheaval resulting from peaceful massive demonstrations, in Rumunia, it was the bloody revolution, and in Bulgaria, in a resilient way. Despite the multitude of the manifested forms, the revolution in those countries is proven by *events*: revolution generates its dates. It can be understood in a certain way... as a revolution which frees the way for *catching up on* missed developments.<sup>14</sup>

“...Negative constants“ and “catching up on missed development opportunities“ are the two facts that Habermas starts from in his understanding of the importance of 1989. In a myriad of important parts of this analysis, I shall focus on the explication of his classification of post-socialist countries in regard to socialism as the project *after the fall of state socialism* (a) while leaving aside his discussion on the attitudes towards Marx’s theory after 1989 (b).

(a) Habermas divides six different answers to the question of the future destiny of socialism after 1989 into two groups: three “...affirmative“ and three “critical“ historical answers. Catching up revolutions enables

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 179.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 179.

<sup>13</sup> On the Russian capitalist revolution which allegedly was successful in introducing market economy to the detriment of democracy, see among the latest studies in particular: Anders Åslund, *Russia’s Capitalist Revolution. Why Market Reform Succeeded and Democracy Failed*, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington DC, October 2007.

<sup>14</sup> Jürgen Habermas, *Die nachholende Revolution*, Suhrkamp Verlag, F a/M, 1990: 180.

the “...return to the democratic rule of law and accession to the capitalist developed West“ but also the rejection of the model of revolutions which start from 1917, which could explain the “...complete lack of innovative ideas, the ideas which point to the future“.<sup>15</sup> Although these revolutionary changes had very much different and mutually exclusive interpretations, Habermas summed up the six models of interpretation of 1989 in regard to socialism. “...Both groups can be lined up in a symmetrical order as Stalinist, Leninist and reform communism interpretation on the one hand, and as postmodernist, anti-communist and liberal, on the other.“<sup>16</sup>

*Stalinist* interpretation denies the revolutionary character of the changes and perceives them as “counter-revolutionary“. *Leninist* interpretation considers changes as a “conservative revolution“ (J. Kuszynski) within a historical long revolutionary process in which a revolution is “purged“ from within. Already next process shows that it is not about a “sheer self-correction of the state socialism“. The third, affirmative model of interpretation, *the reform-communist model*, especially in Prague with Dubček, and in the GDR, as a *third road* between social-state capitalism and state socialism, tries to revitalize the idea of democratic socialism, which Habermas considers to be unrealistic as the masses, having experienced the Soviet-type totalitarianism, were resolved in their decision not to resort to that option.

Even on the side of the three models of interpretation of events which are *critical towards socialism*, an extreme position was not developed in a convincing way. “...*Postmodernist criticism of mind*“ is fascinated by a non-violent overthrow of the state socialism, so that this revolution is allegedly the end of the eras of revolutions. “...*Catching-up revolution*“ in the East came closer to the spirit of the West, not only to its technical civilization but also to its democratic tradition. Habermas is very much sceptical about the postmodernist criticism of mind, which stylizes the historical scheme by the inspiration in Nietzsche and Heidegger. *Anti-communist* model of interpretation of 1989 celebrates changes as a “...triumphant end of the world’s civil war which the Bolsheviks proclaimed in 1917; again a revolution turned against its own source.“ Habermas’s interpretation of *anticommunist* model of interpretation of 1989 interprets translation of the former “...international class struggle“ to the term “...the world’s civil war“ and under Carl Schmitt’s influence, translates the first expression from the language of the theory of society to the language of one “...Hobbes’s theory of power“. The story about the “...world’s civil war“ was created in the period of a conflict between East and West. Historian Ernst Nolte was its main advocate. In his intention to negate Leninism, his anti-communism (his well-known thesis is that fascism is a

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<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 181.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 181.

historical response to communism) is just his adverse side. *Liberal* interpretation of 1989 is the most important. Liberal triumphalism was expressed in *Zeit*<sup>17</sup> quite accurately by Daniel Bell and Ralf Dahrendorf. Habermas says:

What remains is *liberal* interpretation which, first of all, only registers that with the state socialism the very last forms of totalitarian power in Europe began to fall apart. The epoch which began with fascism is moving towards its end. In parallel to the democratic rule of law, the market economy and social pluralism, the ideas of liberal order are also established. In this way, the tempting ideologies about the end of ideologies are finally coming true. ... Liberal interpretation is not bad. However, it fails to notice the log that is in its own eye.<sup>18</sup>

Does Habermas exaggerate with this log in the eye of the *liberal model of interpretation of the meaning and consequences of 1989*?

According to his opinion, the triumphant liberal interpretations resemble Marx's "...hymnic" description of the revolutionary role of the bourgeoisie (citizenry) in the first chapter of *The Manifesto of the Communist Party*, which necessarily subjugates all the areas of the world to its logic and interests. But here Marx talks about the "so-called civilization" of capitalism, which liberals keep forgetting. This is how Habermas understands Marx's substantial limitation of his accurate, nearly advertising (Marx as the PR of capitalism!) description of the civilization role of the bourgeoisie or the citizenry as the new transformations, the so-called "...personification of capital", are ideologically mystified today.

Marx thought that every civilization which subjugates itself to self-reproduction of capital carries inside itself a seed of devastation as in this way it pretends to be blind to all the relevancies which cannot be expressed in prices.<sup>19</sup>

Today, the circumstances from Marx's description are significantly different. The pillar of the capitalist expansion is no longer that bourgeoisie, but one

Economic system which got separated from sensually identifying class structures, which became anonymous and which operates on the global level. And our societies, which climbed in this system to the "...economic top" no longer resemble the Manchester England the misery of which Engels described a long time ago in a drastic manner. Those societies in the meantime found, in a social-state compromise, a response to the strong words from the *Communist Manifesto* and tenacious struggle by the European labour

<sup>17</sup> *Die Zeit*, 29. Dezember 1989.

<sup>18</sup> Jürgen Habermas, *Die nachholende Revolution*, Suhrkamp Verlag, F a/M, 1990. 186.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 187.



movement. *Allein, der ironische Umstand, dass Marx für eine Situation, wo das anlagensuchene Kapital auf die staatssozialistisch ausgelagten Märkte drängt, immer noch die besten Zitate liefert, stimmt ebenso nachdenklich wie die Tatsache, dass Marxens Zweifel gleichsam in die Strukturen der fortgeschrittensten kapitalistischen Gesellschaften selbst inkorporiert worden ist*<sup>20</sup>

The irony is that as Marx offers still the best quotes which help understand the situation and tendencies in the “...state socialist” societies penetrated by capital in illegal ways, his doubt which is incorporated in the structures of the most developed capitalist societies is equally appropriate. Through Marx, East and West meet here after 1989. In this regard Habermas is reserved towards liberal rejection of socialism with a seeming legacy in the social-democratic era<sup>21</sup> (188). This is why he puts his question in a radical way about whether all theoretical and spiritual sources from which “...West European Left draws its theoretical stimuli and normative orientation failed with the liquidation of Eastern state socialism“. His response is complex and in any case it is not negative.<sup>22</sup> In any case, Habermas’s research recommendation of these phenomena is finalized in the position that all so-called “post-socialist societies“ would have the following historical task: “Today, the social-state compromise, which took root in social structures, represents the foundation from which every politics in our environment has to *start*.”<sup>23</sup>

Has it happened *anywhere* in the proper way? How many of those, at this time, seven new states in the territory of former Yugoslavia started their journey to “democracy“ from that historical position? Could something similar be a starting point for a serious inter-disciplinary research into a twenty-year long tragic, albeit unequally distributed history of “our“ areas under the principle of military, political and international power? Eventually, it is from this position and *this* level of historical change that one could argue about the blindness of the American and European Democracy Commissioners in relation to the drama in Bosnia and Herzegovina: these days, the entry of Serbia and Montenegro into the Schengen happy brothers group is being planned while the same right for the living social individuals and fictitious citizens – BIH nationals – without any legal or moral explanation – is being postponed to one of the years to come! Ontological and anthological scandal of Euro-mandarins!

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 187. I intentionally leave this section of the quote in German because of its significance (note by the author)

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 188.

<sup>22</sup> Habermas’s analysis starts from the thesis that the Left cannot operate as if nothing had happened in 1989 although there is no reason for it to act as if everything had gone to ashes. In the second part of this study, in item 6, Habermas develops an inspiring polemic with Marx for the purpose of providing arguments for his relevance today, with a series of arguments that nobody in literature has yet answered to – which necessarily remains outside the function of this paper.

<sup>23</sup> Jürgen Habermas, *Die nachholende Revolution*, Suhrkamp Verlag, F a/M, 1990., 197.



2. *It is necessary to research systematically the difference and similarity between the yu real existing socialism and the Real Existing Socialism as such*

Twenty years of upheaval – 1989 – 2009 – would deserve a debate on historical, political, cultural, economic and ethic nature of the *RES*. As this roundtable is taking place in Sarajevo (BiH but also former Yugoslavia), the *differentia specifica* of the ex-yu socialism or the Yu Real-Existing Socialism could be researched in particular. The main historical and scientific reason for this line is based, among other things, on the need for a more accurate academic understanding of a strange historical paradox between the widespread thesis about some kind of excellence and relative uniqueness of the yu socialism in relation to paradigmatically Stalinized Soviet group of countries, which, under the pressure of the infernal propulsion of *the right of the people to self-determination* as well as of the failed economic prosperity, mainly, at least in the first phase, manages to avoid the warlike form of violence with a minimum of democratic procedure, while the region of what is today referred to as the West Balkans is surrendered, from within and outside, to the most diverse violence. Aggressions, civil wars, war crimes, massive war crimes ranging to the crime of genocide, hatred, fear, xenophobia, ethnic distance etc.... Why is that so? Because comrade Gorbachev was wiser than a huge mass of Tito's powerful successors? Because liberal democratic left of ex-Yugoslavia failed to find a response overnight to the superior protagonists of ethno-nationalist pre-democratic and devastating elements creating seven new ethnically clean mini-states through civil wars and aggressions with religiously and ethnically, sad to say, successful phantasms? There is an immense literature on this issue, although a more accurate response is yet to be found. A whole series of undone and unbeginning criticisms of ideologies and practices is ahead of us. On the soil of what used to be a joint country all sorts of ideological and political civil wars continue without an end in sight. Besides, the Big Brother from Europe and the U.S.A. has not yet explored the proportions of the tragedy of Yugoslavia and its former citizens, and of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Humanistic, social and political sciences, depending on the new city villages in the territory of ex-Yugoslavia are hardly getting rid of, if at all, ethnic worm's-eye views. Completely neglected in the state budgets, in the end they will be left without a scientific successor generation, exposed to a big competition in the West – if ever it reaches as far as the West.

3. *Eastern and Western democracy in the same boat facing the 21st century challenges*

The year 1989 was the beginning of a more radical democratic transformation of the large group of the so-called – colloquially and unscientifically said – “...*post-socialist countries*“. Transformation of rigid to-

talitarian and bureaucraticized systems and the world of life is taking place at different paces, with different intensity and along different political paths. There is immense literature written about this. I have to restrict myself to only a few important authors.

Agnes Heller in her “...Ten Years Later“<sup>24</sup> observes that today, in 2009, we cannot be triumphantly joyous after so many years following the change. In Hungary, new democrats are making the “...golden calf“:

Over these twenty years, Hungary has become a member state of the European Union, and in so doing it has almost got others to forget completely (as we ourselves have forgotten) that we fought on the wrong side in both world wars. I might even say that this time, for once, the country has joined the winning side. What is missing is a democratic spirit, a zest for enterprise, bravery and patriotism – scarce commodities.<sup>25</sup>

Extremely interesting is an interview with Agnes Heller in Australia’s magazine *Thesis Eleven*, in which she reminds, in my view, in reaction to idealistic exaggerations of non-violent revolutions in 1989 (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia), of the internal logic of a revolution and violence, where the act of revolution itself does not excessively follow violence (October 1917). It comes later.<sup>26</sup>

Adam Michnik<sup>27</sup> believes that the year 1989 was, after all, *annus mirabilis*:

The year 1989 brought a revolution without revolution. The struggle against Communism revealed a belief in the importance of human freedom. But this freedom brought with it paradoxes. The workers who went on strike in Poland to win their freedom were the first victims of the transformation. The Solidarność strongholds went bankrupt. But throughout this great expanse, save for the Balkans and Russia, there have never been a better 20 years than the past two decades. Present-day Europe is in any case being put to the test of its own credibility. Cynicism, which undermines every value system, and authoritarian temptations are threatening freedom. The defence of the Republic is at stake.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Agnes Heller, “Ten years later“, Eurozine ([www.eurozine.com](http://www.eurozine.com)) First published in *The Hungarian Quarterly*, 193/2009.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>26</sup> *An Interview with Agnes Heller, Thesis Eleven*, Number 97, May 2009, 99-105.

<sup>27</sup> Adam Michnik, *Verteidigung der Freiheit. Reflexionen über 1989*. Magazine *Osteuropa*, 2-3/2009. Taken from: [www.eurozine.com](http://www.eurozine.com)

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

#### 4. *The Left facing the challenges of the latest world's crisis of capitalist economy*

There is a substantial historical link between the crisis of the real-existing socialism 20 years ago, during the time of an unrestrained triumph of neo-liberalism and financial speculation capitalism and its *comprehensive crisis of today* in which, in the first phase, it returns to the *state capitalism project*. Here comes a period, where the question of a historical relationship between the crisis and the fall of the *state socialism project* and the crisis of the currently dominant *casino-state capitalism* should be suggested.

Thus German theoretician Friedhelm Hengsbach<sup>29</sup> thinks that a chance lies in a big change: in place of the financial market, which "...should be de-globalized", a chance should be given to "...economic democracy". Here we should add that at least in Germany, there is a growing interest in the "...democracy of advice".

#### 5. *Boundaries of the historic survival of capitalism from the viewpoint of new chances of democracy*

Just as so long awaited and desirable historical defeat of the *RES* did not exhaust important possibilities of the "...liberal-democratic project of socialism", the capitalistic manner of life production has allegedly not yet lost its inherent ability of an indefinite revolutionization of production and global way of life.<sup>30</sup>

#### 6. *The most difficult task: research into nonconcurrency and structural closeness of the two major crises: 1989 and 2008-2009.*

Today, we should think about this nonconcurrency of the two major crises and their encounter today. Which is ominous or life-saving? For now we might know, in the basic outlines, where a solution to the first crisis leads, or do we really know it? We could have a better knowledge about it if a solution to present-day crisis of the capitalist *way of life* is done without violence, with at least minimum of violence, and with the minimum of national, regional and global democratic procedures.

<sup>29</sup> Friedhelm Hengsbach, *Nach der Krise ist von der Krise. Für eine Wirtschaftsdemokratie ohne Finanzkapitalismus*, Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 5/2009, S. 53-61.

<sup>30</sup> Today, it would be very desirable to discuss enthusiasm of political economists of predatory capitalism manifested in the special issue of the magazine *Mercur* (653/654) under the heading "...Kapitalismus oder Barbarei" and compare that ideological Hayekian galimatias to the texts of the present great authors of liberal orientation who write – nevertheless – about bankruptcy of at least financial capitalism and return to the state (=statist) capitalism.

## 7. *Is the liberal-democratic socialist left still possible?*

Global and any other possible *teachers of mankind*<sup>31</sup> has for the time being disappeared. Nobody can any longer be alone. The worlds of life of post-socialism meet, perhaps, with the contours of either barbarianism of post-capitalism in its predatory form or important alternatives to capitalism, among which is certainly that of liberal-democratic socialism, facing a major work on spiritual legacy and the new foundation of liberal-democratic socialism. Modern social democracy in Europe, faced with a choice between a third way social democracy as a disaster and real, new possibilities of democracy of the founding liberal-democratic socialism.<sup>32</sup>

Post-socialism learned something from more complex democratic societies of the West. Can it open new civilization vistas with a new energy of democracy? Here, we should be precise: instead of agreeing to an ever stronger and falser ideological speech about "...post-communism" even about "post-socialism" as still academic self-explanatory prop-phrases of especially former dogmatic Marxists and in particular of the newly fledged ethno-nationalist revolutionaries as triumphalist adherents of liberalism without borders, it is necessary to develop systematically a spiritual resistance to a destructive spiritual Right in both the region and "...our" entities and beyond. The like-minded people are yet to be recognized despite electronic speed of formal communication, and perhaps, they are just emerging.

## II

### Europe and "We" After 1968 and 1989<sup>33</sup>

#### 1. *The spirit of '68. (a) and its important consequences for Europe today (b):*

a) Despite the moments of a more radical violence, social-cultural and political protest of students and workers in West Europe and the rest of the developed world was least to say the last global *in principle non-violent* attempt to humanize or neutralize rough hegemonic forms of reproduction and spread of Capital against Labour but also an indication of an important alternative to capitalism. The student movement in the East went against the authoritarian real-existing socialism, far from

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<sup>31</sup> "Teacher of mankind" is Hegel's highest compliment to the thinkers in *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. For him those are certainly Plato, Aristotle and a few more exceptions.

<sup>32</sup> See: Albrecht von Lucke, *Europa und die Krise der Linken*, Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 7/2009, S.5-8.

<sup>33</sup> Due to limited space of the publication, II and III parts of this study remain only as *indications*. (note by the author).

radical forms of the revolutionary action through violence like, for example, in the Hungarian rebellion/revolution in 1956.<sup>34</sup>

b) Of course, it did not have success on any line of its pretensions anywhere in the world in principle, except for making a contribution to some mild and symbolic corrections in the East. The West has since been losing its own emancipatory potentials in both the economy and culture and democracy. The main message: the principle of uncompromisingness after '68 was seriously called into question. My question is as follows: is Oskar Negt right today when he calls for rejection of "...an illusion of principled uncompromisingness" ("Kompromisslosigkeit").<sup>35</sup> Luther's "...Here I stand. I can do no other" is typical of only strong identity coercion in churches and sects, Negt thinks, in this text a recommendation as a lesson from the events in 1968. Is this not too early? In any case, I do accept the principle of non-violence as a regulatory idea of every future radical change of modern capitalist society from Tokyo, via Moscow to Berlin, Belgrade, Zagreb and Sarajevo. However, the foundation of this principle requires also a systematic reconstruction of the past and the appropriate forms of knowledge and self-confidence.

## 2. The '89 spirit. (a) and its consequences (b)

(a) I consider the year 1989 as a symbolic announcement of a long-term liberation from structural layers of authoritarianism and capitalism of the West without an alternative, as well as of totalitarianism of the East through democratization and abolition of its non-democratic regimes. This liberation is uncertain, superficial and diabolic because in nearly all countries a democratic discourse had a statist rather than republican form. In fact, the so-called liberal nationalism (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia) prevails. One of the causes lies in the fact of the principled and long impasse of *social* democracy in complex societies (from the US to the FRG).

(b) An important negative consequence of '89 is an undesirable reduction of democracy to the sheer legitimization and legalization of (ethnic) nationalism at *both* the level of national states *for the purpose of* radical legitimization of the project of *pure national states* (both old and new) *and* at the level of what have for the time being and so far been formal supranational political communities (EU as *another US-*

<sup>34</sup> Huge controversies were triggered in Germany and beyond by Götz Aly's book, *Unser Kampf. 1968*, S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 2008. The book investigates the parallels between "...68-ists" and "...33-ists" in a rather easy-going, unconvincing and at the same time tempting and certainly provocative way, unlike an euphoric "revolutionary" self-feeling of today's somewhat older 68's. He says, "We should be thankful to God that their children (i.e. children of the 33-ists) did not succeed" in 1968. G. Aly is far from a serious research of the historical meaning and consequences of the 1968 Movement, in which there were certainly different options. All of them share one thing in common – defeat.

<sup>35</sup> Oskar Negt, *Achtundsechzig. Politische Intellektuelle und die Macht*, Steidl Verlag, Göttingen 1995, S. 401-402.

*America*). The main message of '89: it is more necessary than ever before to provide arguments in support of the line of action and opinion on the line of radical non-violence or non-violent radicalism. In other words: EITHER – OR / ENTWEDER – ODER as a principle which historically legitimized the right to violence for the purpose of some higher goals may be accepted or rejected only on the basis of universal validity or non-validity of the principle of non-violence (*Gewaltlosigkeit*).<sup>36</sup>

### III

#### **Some sceptical recommendations for the so-called scientists, intellectuals, liberals and former Marxists**

It is only on tendentiously and normatively similarly meant basis that it is possible to speak of the civilized radically non-violent overcoming of the global non-violent power of the so-called neo-liberalism, which is an ideological euphemism for an almost absolute real and formal subsumption of the Labour under “...transcendental power“ of Capital. No reliable knowledge about this is possible without a new reading of Marx’s files within his *Critique of Political Economy*. When the great thinker of the tragedy of existence of both thinker and social individual, Richard Rorty, advised students, in connection with the *Manifesto* anniversary, that they should read *The New Testament* and *The Manifesto of Communist Party* as still inspiring texts, along with Rorty’s melancholy and skepticism, and perhaps even irony, because of their intentions towards *brotherhood and social justice*, he must presumed deep inside his soul that the thick huge book in three volumes – never completed for publication. *Capital*, which does not glorify just the capitalist “...so-called“ civilization – is perhaps a natural continuation of the radically alternative line in the *Manifesto*. This, of course, does not give privilege to Marx’s open critical theory but only takes it into consideration within inter-disciplinary discussion with other and different theories.

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<sup>36</sup> Here are neglected such thinkers as Johann Galtung and Diether Senghas, as modern founders of *critical theory of peace* and the principle of *non-violence* which cannot be raised as a question without argumentation by J. Habermas in his *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* (1981) in two volumes and later works.

# THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGES: HOW DIFFERENT ARE THE TRANSFORMATION RESULTS IN POST-YUGOSLAV COUNTRIES

Nenad ZAKOŠEK

One of the most interesting and also greatly neglected political science issues is how much political regimes are different in the post-Yugoslav states and if the differences are huge, how they can be explained. This question is particularly interesting since those regimes have one and the same origin – they all stem from the Yugoslav communist regime. There are general and seemingly broadly accepted conceptions about the quality of democracy and stability of orders in those states today, under which Slovenia is the most advanced democracy, while BiH is the least developed and the most unstable (if we disregard Kosovo which has just started its path to building a state and democracy). Since the new states and their political regimes arose from the legacy they all share, can those differences be explained with some other historical differences, for example, by a different degree of economic development or some specific cultural features of the post-Yugoslav countries? Such explanations do exist in academic debates, most notably in 1990s, trying to explain the success or failure of democratic transitions, state building or the type of nationalism in the post-Yugoslav countries with the heavy, longstanding burden of the past.<sup>1</sup> However, to assume such an important influence of structural factors would mean to accept an extremely high degree and a long-lasting effect of structural determinism, which is not plausible from the viewpoint of social sciences focused on the impact of individual and collective players. Causes of different results of transition in the region of former Yugoslavia should thus be sought elsewhere.

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<sup>1</sup> See: Nenad Zakošek, 2007: The Heavy Burden of History: Political Uses of the Past in the Yugoslav Successor States, *Politička misao*, year 44, No. 5, 29-43, Nenad Zakošek and Goran Čular, Croatia, Chapter 13, in: Sten Berglund, Joakim Ekman and Frank H. Aarebrot (ur.), *The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2004, 451-492 Nenad Zakošek, Democratization, State-building and War: The Cases of Serbia and Croatia, *Democratization*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2008: 588-610.



## International indices of democratization

If we are interested in the assessment of democratic quality and stability of political regimes, which is based on differentiated and methodologically clearly based criteria, we can rely on some of the well-known international indices measuring them. There is, for instance, Freedom House (FH) Political Rights and Civil Liberties Index (FH PR&CLI) which has been used to measure those categories ever since the post-Yugoslav countries became independent, or somewhat more complex Freedom House Nations in Transit Index (FH NIT), presented since the late 1990s in annual reports. Finally, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) has been available since 2003.<sup>2</sup> On the face of it, these indices confirm the general judgment on the level of democracy in post-Yugoslav areas, under which democracy is most developed in Slovenia, and least developed in BiH. However, a more in-depth comparison of those indices shows some important differences in ranking individual post-Yugoslav regimes. The simplest index, FH PR&CLI, offers a dichotomic picture of the group of six post-Yugoslav countries. Three states have fully free regimes: Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia, while three states belong to the group of partly free regimes: Macedonia, Montenegro and BiH. Slovenia receives the highest numeric rating, i.e. it is equated with the most advanced democracies; Croatia and Serbia receive somewhat lower rating; Macedonia and Montenegro receive the same rating, while BiH is unequivocally rated lowest. The more refined Freedom House index, FH NIT, offers a rather different picture: only Slovenia is rated as a consolidated democracy, as more successful than even the best East European states like the Czech Republic and Estonia. Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia are all rated as semiconsolidated democracies on a comparably equal level. Only BiH is rated as a hybrid regime, i.e. the regime which combines democratic and authoritarian elements. Eventually, the BIT, as the most complex index in methodological terms, offers a completely different categorization of the post-Yugoslav regimes. Slovenia and Croatia are assessed as the states which are “highly advanced“ in political and economic transformation towards liberal democracy and market economy (Slovenia is given on a scale of 1 to 10 one solid score higher than Croatia). Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia are assessed as the states which have achieved advanced transformation, where Macedonia is rated somewhat higher than Serbia and Montenegro. Only BiH is in the group of the states with limited transformation.

The comparison of international methods of measuring the quality of democracy thus shows that there is no consensus on the ratings of the post-Yugoslav regimes. Of course, the character of those indices of democracy depends on the measurement methodology as well as on impartiality

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<sup>2</sup> See the Attachment.



and knowledgeability of experts who evaluate the regimes. However, it is precisely the lack of consensus that indicates some serious weaknesses of such a procedure of indexing the regimes. Let me point out some of the most important weaknesses which are, in my view, inherent to the method of comparing the regimes:

- *Path dependency*: status of a country, or its regime, depends largely on initial – either positive or negative – assessments. The evaluators in later stages will hardly ever explain some major deviations from the previous ratings. This can be illustrated by comparing the most underdeveloped East European regimes, such as Romanian and Bulgarian, to the post-Yugoslav (except for Slovenia) in the FH indices: the former, as a rule, are rated higher than the latter thanks to the initial bonus, although that assessment is often unconvincing.
- *Static quality*: despite the diachronic character (as a rule, evaluation is done in intervals of one or more years), the index method may not cover the real dynamics of political regimes. Instead, we get a series of diagnoses of the current situations, which the evaluators assess as “improved“ or “deteriorated“ systems in regard to the set benchmark. This perspective fits the logic of international “pedagogy“ of external conditionality set for democratization or Europeization of the regimes, and not the logic of social sciences which are trying to explain and interpret social and political processes.
- *Teleological perspective*: changes are assessed in regard to a level of completed process of consolidating democracy, i.e. the deviation of the real features of the regime from a benchmark model. However, this does not help understand the causes of bigger or smaller “deviations“ from an ideal model.
- *Abstractness and insufficient adaptability of measuring tools to the specific features of the societies under survey*: in principle, those are universal criteria which sometimes fail to cover the specific constellations of players and problems.

There is no doubt that the results of political changes in post-Yugoslav states are different. The above-mentioned international indices may serve as a starting point for specifying those differences although the explanation of those differences, their specific “logic“ has to be sought elsewhere, for example, in political science theories of transition. As a response, let me offer my own analysis of the genesis of transition regimes in the post-Yugoslav states. In doing so, I shall focus specifically on the dynamics of changes in which the results of changes arise from constellations of players and the time sequence of events.

## Players and political agendas

Political science theory of transition, i.e. the movement from one type of regime to another, focuses primarily on the players and their mutual relations. Different typologies of players – for example, those developed by Adam Przeworski, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, or Jon Elster and Claus Offe<sup>3</sup> - resulted from the analysis of empirical constellations from the viewpoint of the theory of rational choice. The key political players of the regime transition are the political elites and organized collective players. Along the lines of this tradition, it is possible to propose also a typology of players who set the dynamics of changes in post-Yugoslav states.

Under the conditions of the fall of the communist mono-party regime, the old and new political elites organized themselves into political parties as privileged players who compete for power at elections. This is why the development of parties and party systems in post-Yugoslav states is the key to understanding of the dynamics of changes. Success or failures of the parties, and also of the post-communist institutions (government, parliament) which they establish and vie to get the upper hand over them, depend also on a vast array of collective players who affect them but do not aspire to directly take over power: those are the civil society groups such as religious organizations, trade unions, war-related associations (associations of veterans, refugees, victims etc.), associations of ethnic minorities, new social movements etc. Finally, foreign players, i.e. the governments of influential states and international organizations (primarily those of the European Union) have had a strong influence on the developments in all post-Yugoslav states. In view of extremely different roles played by those foreign players, we can make a difference between veto players, conditional players and mediators (mediating players). It should be said that the latter typology is analytical, i.e. those same players could play different veto, conditional or mediating player roles at the same time or in different periods.

The lines of polarization and their mutual relations which were crucial to the dynamics of transformation and a chance for democratic consolidation are key to the development of parties and party systems. Here, I want to make an analytical difference between the lines of polarization and the classic political science notion of cleavages: the lines of polarization are the conflicts over the key issues of ideological-political interface among the parties (=political elites) and in this sense they can also be conjunctural (short-term) phenomena which polarize the political space on the level of elites, while cleavages are the lines of polarization

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<sup>3</sup> Cf.: Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and Market*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991; Juan J. Linz. and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996; Jon Elster, Claus Offe and Ulrich K. Preuss, *Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996; Claus Offe, *Varieties of Transition*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998.

which are congruous with the long-lasting divisions in the society, such as ethnic, confessional and social divisions, and which create rather durable ideological and political blocs in the electorate. I propose the following typology of the lines of polarization (which is in principle applicable to all political regimes in Europe) for the analysis of the key political players of transformation in post-Yugoslav states:

1. Centre-periphery: the conflict over the fundamental concept of forming a state and nation; in post-Yugoslav societies, it also includes the relation towards the past and the crimes committed by the warring political camps in the World War Two.
2. Regime polarization of democracies – authoritarianism: the conflict over the fundamental rules of political regime, prompted by the monopolistic position of one player (party, coalition).
3. For and against European integration: in post-Yugoslav states, as a rule, it is not about radical Euro-scepticism (although it does exist on the right and partly on the left edges of the political spectrum – particularly in Serbia), rather it is about the dynamics of the fulfilment of political and economic requirements within the European integration process.
4. Clientelist polarization: conflict over the access to the budget for the purpose of satisfying appetites of clientelist groups.
5. Programme polarization: conflict of socio-economic concepts of development, including the reforms of the large social systems (health, pensions, education).
6. New ideological polarization: value conflicts over the issues arising from new view-of-life, e.g. regulation of sexuality (homosexuality, reproductive rights, artificial involution etc.), roles of religious communities etc.

My basic hypothesis is the following: success or failure of democratization and stabilization of state institutions depends on the ability of political elites (i.e. the leaderships of the most important political parties) to achieve a consensus over the first two types of the lines of polarization, i.e. polarization of centre-peripheries (over the formation of a nation and a state) and the regime polarization (for the benefit of democratization, naturally), and to move political interface to other lines of polarization. The conflicts in favour of and against the European integration, and clientelist conflicts, make the establishment of a stable liberal democracy difficult; but they are not specific only for transition regimes but also for numerous advanced liberal democracies. Eventually, the ability of political elites to organize the competition among political parties around programme polarizations and to solicit votes on those issues makes the largest contribution to the quality of democracy. It should be emphasized that this type of interface is not always present

in developed democracies either, in which the race among political parties is affected also by ideological and clientelist polarizations.

Let us take a closer look at the dynamics of transformation against proposed criteria in some of the post-Yugoslav states.

The foundation of the success of Slovenian transition was precisely its early broad-based political consensus over the lines of centre-periphery polarization and democracy-authoritarianism: all the relevant political parties supported Slovenia's independence and acceptance of the liberal democracy rules. Of course, this does not mean that nationalism did not manifest itself in Slovenia also in its more radical forms, for example, in relation to granting citizenship to a fairly large group of citizens of Slovenia who are not ethnic Slovenians or in the forms of radical cultural particularism and xenophobia. Still, those topics and the players who promoted them remained outside the focus of democratic political life. The expressions of consensual nature of political competition in Slovenia were frequent big coalitions in 1990s and the domination of centralist Liberal Democracy of Slovenia, which tied together the right-wing and the left-wing coalition partners. Accordingly, they reached a consensus over Slovenia's European integration early. In 2002, Slovenian politics came to polarize over issues related to clientelist, programme and new ideological polarizations (and partly over opening the centre-periphery polarization which, in Slovenia, concerns the attitude towards the crimes committed by partisans in the World War Two). Foreign players had a small influence on Slovenian transformation, except for Slovenia's withdrawal from the Yugoslav state and the EU integration.

The deficit of the Croatian transformation in 1990s is related to the absence of consensus in the first two dimensions of polarization: Serb political elites in Croatia refused both the state's independence and pluralist democracy, and reformed post-communists (today's SDP) advocated, since the very beginning, the Yugoslav federation, without giving support to Croatian independence. It was not before the Croatian-Serb conflict became radicalized that post-communists joined the national consensus over forming an independent state. At the same time, however, it was already around 1992 that the conflict over the centre-periphery polarization line over the integrity of the BIH state became deeper. Also the regime democracy-authoritarianism polarization became deeper over authoritarian inclinations of the ruling HDZ. The consensus over the state of Croatia and democracy after 2000 resulted from a series of events: military defeat of the Serb radical nationalism, failure of Croatian expansionist national programme as a result of the intervention by international veto players and the election defeat of HDZ and its post-election transformation towards moderate nationalism and firm commitment to democracy. The consensus over the accession to the EU prompted a fundamental political consensus. International players continue, up until this date, to have an important conditioning influence on Croatia. The party competition is

marked mainly by interface over clientelist polarization line and new ideological polarizations, along with incessant resumption of centre-periphery polarization in relation to historical awareness (relation towards the Independent State of Croatia and the crimes committed by partisans). Programme competition did not develop.

The remaining four post-Yugoslav states have not fully solved the conflict over the centre-periphery polarization, which is the main cause of weak democracy. Still, each of those states has a specific internal dynamics of consensus and conflict. In Serbia, inability of political elites to solve the issue of Kosovo status keeps centre-periphery polarization constantly open, thereby enabling also the continuing presence of a strong radical nationalist player (SRS). The regime consensus in favour of democracy has largely been established, but the SRS challenges it from time to time.<sup>4</sup> The main polarization line concerns the fulfilment of requirements set by international players and the issue of the EU accession. In Montenegro, the centre-periphery polarization was solved – through international brokering – by an independence referendum and the establishment of independent state of Montenegro. Still, the newly formed segment of Serb ethnic identity is a potential source of renewed conflicts over that issue. A bigger problem is the regime polarization line in view of the factually dominant position of post-communists and the impossibility to change government. In Macedonia, the political life lies in the shadow of unsolved statehood-related problems which concern both the relations with Greece and the status of the Albanian minority.<sup>5</sup> Finally, in BiH, the conflict over unsolved issues of the centre-periphery polarization blocks democratization although the groups of political elites are present, competing also over other polarization lines, and the clientelist in particular.

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<sup>4</sup> Cf. Vladimir Goati: *Izbori u SRJ od 1990. do 1998.*, Belgrade: Centar za slobodne izbore i demokratiju, 1999, Zoran Lutovac (ed.): *Političke stranke i birači u državama bivše Jugoslavije*, Belgrade: Institut društvenih nauka and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2006; Dušan Pavlović and Slobodan Antić: *Konsolidacija demokratskih ustanova u Srbiji*, Beograd: Official Gazette, 2007.

<sup>5</sup> See: Svetomir Škarić: *Democratic Elections in Macedonia, 1990-2002*, Berlin: edition Sigma, 2005.

## Attachment

### 1. Freedom House: Nations in Transit Index (FH NIT)<sup>6</sup>

| Rating | Country    | 1999   | 2002   | 2005 | 2008 |
|--------|------------|--------|--------|------|------|
| 1      | Slovenia   | 1.88   | 1.83   | 1.68 | 1.86 |
| 2      | Croatia    | 4.46   | 3.54   | 3.75 | 3.64 |
| 3-4    | Montenegro | (5.67) | (4.00) | 3.79 | 3.79 |
| 3-4    | Serbia     | (5.67) | (4.0)  | 3.75 | 3.79 |
| 5      | Macedonia  | 3.83   | 4.46   | 3.89 | 3.86 |
| 6      | BiH        | 5.42   | 4.83   | 4.18 | 4.11 |

Democracy score: 1-2.99 consolidated democracy; 3-3.99 semiconsolidated democracy; 4-4.99 transitional or hybrid regime; 5-5.99 semiconsolidated authoritarian regime; 6-7 consolidated authoritarian regime

### 2. Freedom House: Political Rights and Civil Liberties Index (FH PR&CLI)<sup>7</sup>

| Rating | Country    | 2002             |                 | 2005             |                 | 2008             |                 |
|--------|------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|
|        |            | Political rights | Civil liberties | Political rights | Civil liberties | Political rights | Civil liberties |
| 1      | Slovenia   | 1                | 2               | 1                | 1               | 1                | 1               |
| 2      | Croatia    | 2                | 2               | 2                | 2               | 2                | 2               |
| 3      | Serbia     | (3)              | (3)             | (3)              | (2)             | 3                | 2               |
| 4-5    | Macedonia  | 4                | 4               | 3                | 3               | 3                | 3               |
| 4-5    | Montenegro | (3)              | (3)             | (3)              | (2)             | 3                | 3               |
| 6      | BiH        | 5                | 4               | 3                | 3               | 4                | 4               |

Scale: 1-7: 1 = the highest degree of freedom, 7 = full absence of freedom; rating: 1-2.5 free, 3-5.5 = partly free, 5.5-7 = not free

### 3. Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI)<sup>8</sup>

| Rating | Country    | 2003   | 2006                     |                         |        | 2008                     |                         |        |
|--------|------------|--------|--------------------------|-------------------------|--------|--------------------------|-------------------------|--------|
|        |            | Status | Political transformation | Economic transformation | Status | Political transformation | Economic transformation | Status |
| 1      | Slovenia   | 9.6    | 9.55                     | 9.36                    | 9.45   | 9.70                     | 9.29                    | 9.49   |
| 2      | Croatia    | 8.2    | 9.10                     | 8.32                    | 8.71   | 8.85                     | 8.29                    | 8.57   |
| 3      | Macedonia  | 6.4    | 7.55                     | 6.61                    | 7.08   | 7.75                     | 7.29                    | 7.52   |
| 4      | Montenegro | (6.5)  | (7.40)                   | (6.50)                  | (6.95) | 7.81                     | 6.71                    | 7.28   |
| 5      | Serbia     | (6.5)  | (7.40)                   | (6.50)                  | (6.95) | 7.75                     | 6.64                    | 7.20   |
| 6      | BiH        | 5.5    | 6.80                     | 6.43                    | 6.61   | 6.70                     | 6.32                    | 6.51   |

Scale: 8.5-10 = highly advanced transformation, 7-8.5 = advanced transformation, 5.5-7 = limited transformation, 4-5.5 = very limited transformation, 0-4 = failed or blocked transformation

<sup>6</sup> Freedom House: *Nations in Transit* and *Political Rights and Civil Liberties Index*, available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org>

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> Bertelsmann Foundation: *Bertelsmann Transformation Index*, 2003-2008: available at: <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/11.0.html>

# WESTERN BALKAN TROUBLES WITH TRANSITION: BETWEEN CONFORMISM AND COLLECTIVISM

Bodo WEBER

Europe is devoting the whole year 2009 to celebrating the 20th anniversary of 1989, the year of “peaceful revolutions”, the overthrow of the real-socialist systems and the fall of the Berlin Wall; the year which marked the end of a bipolar division of the world and thereby of the short twentieth century (Eric Hobsbawm). This historical date is being celebrated throughout Europe and especially in Central and Eastern European countries which, according to Adam Michnik - one of the key actors of the then developments - “have never had in their recent history so good 20 years.”<sup>1</sup> It is about the two decades of an accelerated transformation of the mono-party political systems and command economy into parliamentary democracies, the rule of law and market economies. And also about the process of political and economic integration of the European continent under the European Union’s institutional umbrella.

In the countries of former Yugoslavia, the same level of fervour is more or less missing. Except for Slovenia, the Western Balkan countries can hardly present a success story which would be similar to that of Poland, the Czech Republic or other Central European countries. On the contrary - paraphrasing Michnik - one could say that in the last two decades they have seen the highest level of regression in the recent past, while transformation processes remain fragile and ambivalent until present day, with an outcome still uncertain.

This frame gives a partial explanation of the difficulties facing not only external analysts of the developments on the European continent over the last two decades, but also today’s political elites and the populations in the south-eastern part of the continent in identifying the fate of their respective societies over the past two decades with the year ’89 and determining a place for Yugoslavia and post-Yugoslav societies in that global context.

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<sup>1</sup> Adam Michnik, “...Verteidigung der Freiheit. Reflexionen über 1989“, in: Osteuropa No. 2-3 (2009), Berlin, S. 15



## How the year 1989 passed Yugoslavia by, and why it nevertheless happened

Indeed, where could Yugoslavia be placed within the frame of upheaval in '89 and the transformation of the former real-socialist societies? Looking from the manifestational level of the stakeholders and developments, Yugoslavia does seem to be an exception outside the mainstream. In Yugoslavia, there was no “peaceful revolution” in either 1989 or the years after. There were no massive protests to overthrow the regime. The people did not constitute themselves as “demos” nor was a democratic opposition ever formed outside the communist nomenclature that would have taken over a political initiative from the paralyzed regime.

In Yugoslavia, amid the conflict among the parts of the state-party apparatus, fragmented along the lines of the federal units, the regime simply disappeared and with it also the state institutions at the central level. The regimes which were the main actors of that confrontation (Serbia and Slovenia), as well as their satellites, were avoiding the fall through ethnic transformation, while other regimes, unable to handle the conflict (Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina) lost power. But this happened at the moment when fear and obsession with “collective identities” largely dominated all democratic and socio-economic social issues, which in turn determined the substantially different character and direction of the *regime change* from that in other eastern countries. Massive demonstrations in an importantly different environment could not turn into a form of constituting a new “demos”; rather, everywhere they acted like a populist institution of transforming the then “working people” into “ethnos” (Ivan Čolović).

But when we turn eyes from individual actors and events to deeper social and political causes, it becomes clear that nonetheless the dissolution of the socialist Yugoslavia does not belong to anywhere else but the '89 global context and the implosion of the social systems of the Soviet socialism. Just as the social systems of the Soviet type of socialism, the crisis in Yugoslavia during 1980s was not an interim problem. Rather, the crisis laid bare a long-time structural disease of the real-socialist order.

The economic crisis in the eastern part of Europe came at the end of a long development in which, unlike mid-1960s when the West still believed in the possibility for command economies to outdo capitalist economies, it became clear to everybody that socialist economies were unable to compete with market economies.

It was already in the early 1970s that the nomenclature in Yugoslavia gave up a serious attempt to build a system based on the principle of self-management. Instead, it cemented the existing power relations, concentrating on obfuscating the basic contradictions in the economic system and making up some pragmatic, basically non-socialist instruments (labour migration to Western Europe, opening the country for tourism, western



loans) with which it was possible to compensate economic irrationalities over a certain period of time but not to prevent a final collapse.

Continual spread of informal and semi-formal social relations over more than two decades within and outside official institutions for the purpose of maintaining a dysfunctional system and meeting also in Yugoslavia only partially legitimate individual needs not only in economy but also in all other spheres of the official system eroded by the end of 1980s the state and all other social institutions almost entirely. The official ideology had the same fate. The ideology of self-management socialism was derogated from a belief system, which defined not only ethos but also the life style of the communist party members into an instrumental means of an outward demonstration of commitment to the system and personal promotion, for the vast majority of the members of the state-party apparatus.

It is a common characteristics of both Yugoslavia and all other Eastern European countries that the socialist sistem had already been by far dissociated from within at the time when the “actors of change” appeared at the scene. Not only does it explain the character of revolutions which were not that, i.e. why authoritarian closed regimes surrendered without a single shot and why nobody in the West had anticipated the fall of regimes in Eastern Europe, but actually the specific dynamic of a great upheaval, a historical moment in which the “time exploded”. It is about a specific relation between the main social and political actors and the social dynamics of change which, on the one hand, opened until-then inconceivable areas for individual actions, new actors, and on the other, set rather strict limits on their influence on the social development. Amid this explosion of time, in which “what was inconceivable yesterday is overcome today”, the social dynamics drags all actors along with it.

That socialist Yugoslavia in living through its bloody disolution has been the object of this dominant role of the social dynamics is mainly overlooked in the post-Yugoslav societies until today. This refers to the general social perception as much as to academic literature. Instead, a personalized understanding of socio-political developments dominates that centers around the assumed key role of main political actors, its intents and “plans”.

It seems that one of the keys to understanding the problems still tormenting the Western Balkan countries lies in the fact that this dynamics of accelerated time has not been stopped in the larger part of the region.

## **Ethnisation as negative transformation instead of transition**

While the dynamics of change took the countries of former Eastern bloc to a journey into transition towards the Western systems and Western prosperity, it took the Yugoslav society into a forced ethnisation and dissolution, war and comprehensive destruction of the society. The appearance of aggressive ethnic nationalism in the Balkans confused the world which was expecting “the end of history” (Francis Fukuyama), the global emergence of the “system which has no alternative”.

The shock caused by the return of the war and massive crimes on the European soil toward the end of the 20th century made an attractive perception of a specifically “Balkan” problem, a unique case – an exception, despite the fact that the “nation” became a dominant matrix of the break-up of the real-socialist social systems. The great upheaval in 1989 in Central European countries, a peaceful separation of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia as well as a largely peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union took place in the name of “national liberation” from the Soviet imperialism or the re-establishment of “national sovereignty” from the pre-communist era. The unification of East Germany with the Federal Republic of Germany took place under the still generally accepted slogan “Wiedervereinigung” (reunification), despite the fact that those were significantly different societies with a weak feeling of the declared joint affiliation and completely unprepared political elite in West Germany. It appeared as if the 19th century had come back; political actors, movements and parties were continually identifying themselves with the pre-communist times, while the world’s public and social sciences talked considerably about the return of the era of nationalism, the era of forming nation-states.

Their common denominator is repression of the basic fact that by the end of the 20th and in the early 21st century, completely new social relations emerged. But they are interpreted only in old categories by the help of constructing national and cultural continuities and traditions. The use of this old categories takes on the character of arbitrariness because modernization processes and the processes of deep de-traditionalization in the second half of the 20th century undermined the material base of the idea about the identity of nation, territory and culture (which was fragile already at the end of the 19th century) and the base of traditional social (religious, cultural) relations. But it also makes them greatly attractive, for it thereby increases the possibility of their global use. It is this arbitrariness that enables a social mechanism of collective self-understanding of “identity”, “tradition”, “culture”, “religion”, etc. Their unexpected power after ‘89 lies in their conformist social function. Discourses about collective identity are “social discourses of avoidance”, discourses the sense of which obviously lies less in its concrete (“ideological”) contents than in their social function, i.e. in the possibility of avoiding

thinking about a concrete society. At the same time, they are offering a vague feeling of affiliation and sense. It is offered as a medium for expression of disapproval of the present society without an obligation to offer an alternative. In the case of real-socialist societies, the interpretation of the social reality in the old categories helped avoid facing an uncertain future amid the general crisis and the break-up of the existing system. The division of the world into the blocs, which systematized the social reality – from international political system to everyday life – had disappeared.

While it appears that the modern attractiveness of the discourse of collective self-understanding is general, their social and political effects are different in every individual society. It is beyond dispute that the “return to national” had an emancipatory effect in both East Germany and other countries of the Warsaw Pact, it enabled some great processes of political and economic transformation. But how much the use of these categories is ambivalent is seen, for example, in the cases of xenophobic attacks on foreigners in Germany in 1990s or the present political development in Hungary, one of the role-models of post-socialist transformation. Post-Yugoslav societies found themselves in a completely different “transformation“, in the dynamics of forced ethnisation of all social spheres, in the process of collective social entanglement in authoritarian rule, violence and massive crimes. The reasons for that specific path should be far less sought in the pre-communist history of Southeastern Europe than in territorialization of group competitions as a consequence of a process of authoritarian decentralization and in the semi-formal character of the institutionalization of ethnicity, which made the Yugoslav socialism different from Soviet socialism.

In the area of disintegrating Yugoslav state, social and political changes in 1990s thus assumed a contradictory character of parallel processes of establishing the basic normative and institutional elements of Western democracy and forced ethnisation. The social sciences were trying hard to cope with that specific development through some notional innovations such as “democrature“ but it cannot be understood without a critical analytical approach to the career of the categories of collective identity in the given historical context of ‘89.

The results of those social and political changes in 1990s are negative beyond doubt. Ethnisation of the society enabled a continuation of political tradition of the authoritarian rule under formally pluralist conditions through further spread of semi-formal and informal relations and networks, i.e. the networking of political and economic elites, which, in the long run, led to a continued erosion of all state institutions and social authorities as a whole. Ethnic ideological homogenisation and a broad social legitimization of violence and mass crimes did not lead to some kind of natural unity of the new ethnic communities but, on the contrary, to the deep de-solidarisation beneath the surface of the new

societies. The practice of parliamentary democracy, the rule of law and market economy under such conditions led to devaluation of democratic values and the damage caused to all actors involved, those from the regime and the opposition. This is why there is point in talking about a negative transformation which makes the Southeast of Europe different from other parts of Eastern Europe.

### **Peaceful revolutions in '99 and prospects of "subsequent transition"**

Precisely one decade following 1989, i.e. over the course of 1999 and 2000, regime change took place also in the Balkans, first in Croatia and then in Serbia. Both events were dubbed "peaceful revolutions" in both national and the world's public. Was it indeed the delayed '89 developments, which marked the real upheaval, the beginning of the real transition? If there is one parallel, then it lies in the inappropriate term: "peaceful revolution". That the regimes, responsible for tens and hundreds of thousands of the dead and millions of refugees handed over power without a single shot proves that they, just as the regimes of the real-socialist type before them, imploded from within much more than they were subverted by the opposition which suffered throughout 1990s from a chronic weakness. Thus, it would be much more appropriate to talk about "implosion after implosion" than about a peaceful revolution.

Beyond a banal truth that history does not repeat itself, here similarities end and substantial differences begin. While the opposition's criticism toward the end of 1990s focused on the authoritarian rule and corrupt political practice of the ruling regimes, their ideological basis, i.e. ethnic nationalism, did not lose legitimacy nor has it lost legitimacy until present. Another important factor is the different role of social conformism: while conformism played an incontestably important role in the transformation of real-socialist systems in the Central and Eastern European countries, conformism in the Balkans played the role of the key psycho-social basis for an authoritarian and regressive social dynamics.

Thus, it is no surprise that despite the optimism from "revolutionary" days, the transformation processes in this decade remain ambivalent, they are too far from that linear development suggested by the perception of transition.

What are the prospects of completion of the delayed transformation of the Western Balkan region and its European integration? The biggest hope is being offered by the development in the Republic of Croatia where national (nationalist) consensus blended into European sometime in the middle of this decade and became a base for an integrating and accompanying reform process steaming far ahead of the neighbouring countries. But already in the Croatian case, the question about the relationship between reform façade and substance has to be raised. How far can democratic reforms go if they are based on a social consensus

which, until a few years ago, stood behind collective entanglement in anti-democratic transformation and mass crimes? All the more so as the Western Balkan countries are facing a far more difficult task of overcoming double legacy – socialist and post-socialist, i.e. ethnic nationalist? How far can transformations go under the umbrella of the European integration in other Southeastern European societies (Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina), where such blending of national into European is possible only partly.



**EUROPEAN INTEGRATION:  
BETWEEN TRANSITION AND IDENTITY**





# THE WESTERN BALKANS IS IN THE SOUTH: DISCOURSES ON THE WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES' EU ACCESSION

Tanja PETROVIĆ

In June 2007, just before Portugal assumed the EU Presidency, the Portuguese Permanent Representative to the European Union, Álvaro de Mendonça e Moura, stated, when listing the priority tasks of Portugal's Presidency, that because of its colonial history *Portugal's focus in foreign policy will be cooperation with Africa, and human rights will be in the foreground* (24ur.com, June 11, 2007).

Several months later, at the time when Slovenia was in the midst of preparations for taking over the EU Presidency from Portugal, *The Financial Times* quoted Janez Janša, Slovenian PM at the time, saying that *in the region* [the Western Balkans] *Slovenia has interests that are similar to Portugal's interests in Africa* (*Mladina* 31, 4 August 2007, 11).

However bizarre and absurd this may sound, it would be a mistake to understand it as yet another eccentric statement of the former Slovenian PM. It is a part of much serious phenomenon and wider and prevalent discursive practice in which the part of Europe which is today called the Western Balkans is increasingly pushed for ideological reasons by the shapers of "European" discourses towards the south, outside the borders of Europe and equated with, or rather relocated, to "the third world" in the symbolic geography of contemporary Europe. Discursive patterns directly or indirectly referring to colonialism have a prominent role in this process of ideological relocation motivated by a need to construe "European identity".

## The Western Balkans and European identity

The contemporary history of Europe has been marked by incessant search for identity. It became particularly intense after the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the clear-cut boundary between "Europe" as perceived by the Western part of the continent, and the former Eastern block or "Other Europe." In the next step, in which the countries of both Europes were united within the political framework of the EU, the questions of the nature and content of European identity, European

values, Europeans' beliefs and Europe's border, became the inevitable components of political rhetoric and academic debates<sup>1</sup>. Representation of the Balkans as the 'European third world zone' certainly helped create the impression of so urgently needed collective identity and the sense of the European Union.<sup>2</sup>

The Balkans were traditionally perceived of as being on the periphery that must be controlled by European centers of power and guided "to avoid slipping into the mistakes from the past."<sup>3</sup> The point that the Balkans need some kind of colonial supremacy in order to save it from chaos — and to protect Europe from the dangers that chaos would bring — is frequently made in the Western journalistic and pseudoacademic writings on the Balkans.<sup>4</sup> Such view was emphatically revived during the EU enlargement to the east and southeast of the European continent. In political discourse, the accession process in the *Western Balkan* countries is usually represented as a journey towards the goal of becoming a full EU member. Moreover, candidate countries are to be profoundly transformed along this journey from *non-European* to *European* countries. To implement this transformation, they need *assistance* and *guidance* along the road. Such attitude is exemplified in the following statement of the Slovenian politician and member of the European Parliament Jelko Kacin, who emphasized that *the EU should use all of its accumulated knowledge, expertise and financial support to steer the Balkans on its determined journey towards Brussels* (EP, December 30, 2006).

### The zone of expertise / interest and employment of colonial relations

The accession discourse, in which candidate countries are ensured the European course and the European perspective, is marked by the "the paradox of postmodern ambiguity:"<sup>5</sup> in this discourse, "the set of preconditions for entering the EU is volatile when it comes to EU newcomers, juxtaposed with Europeanization and transition construed as 'a passage from a well-defined point of departure to a unitary and well-defined destination.'"<sup>6</sup> Every *step* on this *passage* earns praise from European politicians, inevitably followed by a statement that the *target*

<sup>1</sup> Hammond, Andrew: Balkanism in Political Context: From the Ottoman Empire to the EU. *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture* 3(3), 2006, p. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Erjavec, Karmen and Zala Volčič: 'War on terrorism' as a discursive battleground: Serbian recontextualization of G.W. Bush's discourse. *Discourse & Society* 18(2), 2007, pp. 123-137.; cf. also: Mastnak, Tomaž: *Evropa: med evolucijo in evtanazijo*. Ljubljana: Apes – Studia humanitatis, 1998.

<sup>3</sup> Andrew Hammond, *ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>4</sup> Andrew Hammond (*ibid.*, p. 20) provides some illustrative examples of this discourse.

<sup>5</sup> Busch, Brigita and Micha Krzy anowski 2007: Inside/Outside the European Union: Enlargement, migration policy and the search for Europe's identity'. *Geopolitics of the European Union Enlargement: Expansion, Exclusion and Integration in the European Union*, J. Anderson, A. Warwick (ed.). London: Routledge, pp. 107-124.

<sup>6</sup> Fairclough, Norman.: 'Transition' in Central and Eastern Europe. *British and American Studies* 11, Timisoara, 2005, p. 4. See also: Majstorović, Danijela.: Construction of Europeanization in the High Representative's Discourse in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Discourse & Society* 18, 2007, pp. 627-651.

*destination is still far away*, albeit not accompanied with a clear explanation of why this is so; a good illustration of such discourse are the statements of the German Foreign Minister Steinmeier on Serbia: *The Government of Serbia clearly chose the course leading to Europe (...). We can all see your great effort to enact reform in your country. Undoubtedly, there is a lot more to be done, not only in Serbia but in the entire region. When I speak to Serbian politicians I can sense in every sentence their determination to bring Serbia closer to Europe. Undoubtedly many more obstacles have to be overcome, and the government in Belgrade knows this as well as I do* (b92.net, January 27, 2009). Such an ambivalence and lack of clarity leave ample room for political imagination in which the Balkan Other, in addition to its traditional image of a semi-wild and semi-civilized European periphery, also acquires the traits of the colonial Other.

This colonial image is strengthened by political discourses from the EU members which share historical legacies with the Western Balkans countries, in particular Austria and Slovenia. One may observe a kind of “contest” between the two countries competing for the title of *expert on the Western Balkans*. Both countries cited the *Western Balkans* as one of their priorities during the EU Presidency (Austria held the EU Presidency during the first half of 2006, and Slovenia during the first half of 2008). The common historical legacy shared by Austria and Slovenia with the countries of the *Western Balkans* is the basis for invoking a special knowledge of the region and appropriating a special role as an expert on the *Western Balkans* within the EU.<sup>7</sup>

Claiming the possession of special knowledge and the role of an expert on the Western Balkans is intrinsically connected with economic context that necessarily comes after (or before?) these kinds of discourse. While Austria is the largest foreign investor in Slovenia and one of the most important investors in the *Western Balkans*, the largest part of Slovenia’s foreign investment goes to Serbia; in 2007, the SE European region accounted for one-sixth of all Slovenian exports.<sup>8</sup> As Slovenian anthropologist Bojan Baskar argued in 2003,

“the Slovenians have developed a habit of considering the rest of Yugoslavia as ‘their markets’. The Slovenian comeback to Bosnian, Croatian and now also Serbian markets has been fast and very ambitious, thereby inviting some criticism in these countries regarding Slovenia’s ‘economic imperialism.’”<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup> However, the origin of this knowledge is differently treated in Austrian and Slovenian discourses: while Austrian politicians and journalists explicitly mention the shared experience arising from Austria’s expansion to the southeast, the producers of public discourse in Slovenia rather conceal the source of their knowledge about the *Western Balkans*. In other words, the Yugoslav and socialist legacies are not mentioned in this discourse.

<sup>8</sup> EU i države JV Evrope [The EU and the Countries of Southeastern Europe]. *Dnevnik*, January 17, 2009, p. 6.

<sup>9</sup> Baskar, Bojan: Within or Without? Changing Attitudes towards the Balkans in Slovenia. *Ethnologia Balkanica* 7 (2003), p. 199.

Mitja Velikonja (2005, 52) quotes Slovenian politicians' statements that support such view, one by the chairman of the Slovenian pan-European movement: *For us, this [the Balkans] is the area in which we can pursue our interests, and in this respect we have a great advantage over others*, and another by a representative of the party Slovenija je naša [Slovenia is Ours]: *Within the EU framework, Slovenia must assume the leading role in South Eastern Europe and organize its diplomatic network in such a way that it will function as a service to the Slovenian economy and its science.*<sup>10</sup>

The role of the expert on the *Western Balkans* is inseparable from the economic influence in this region and economic interests of individual EU member states. The discursive patterns and power relations behind them are mutually supportive and they legitimize and create a logical, albeit frequently historically unfounded, link: Slovenian politicians treat WB in colonial way despite the lack of any colonial past. It shows that political representatives of states with no colonial legacies can also shape colonialist discourses. This is made possible by the context in which EU membership functions as a basis for inclusion and exclusion and creates the shared "repository" of discursive patterns available to the EU member states to produce the discourse of Otherness when referring to those who are not part of a united Europe.

Within this new context, the colonial representations and relations within this region acquired still another, rather ugly face. The living conditions of temporary workers in Slovenia, most of whom come from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and other parts of former Yugoslavia and mainly work under contracts for Slovenian construction companies, are incredibly poor. They work more hours per day than prescribed by law and the valid visa regime and work permission policy make them completely dependent on their employers. The brutality of their situation is strongly reminiscent of the exploitation mechanisms used during the colonial era in Western Europe. The use of such mechanisms would not be possible unless Slovenia were an EU member unlike the countries from which these temporary workers come. Slovenia's EU membership also plays a central role in openly racist discourses, as it is a message by the construction company *Végrad* addressed to the workers from Bosnia-Herzegovina, posted in March 2008 on the containers in which they live in the Ljubljana district of Bežigrad. It warned the Bosnian workers against trying to practice their *culture and behavior, which in some cases is extremely inappropriate. You should be aware that you currently live in Ljubljana, the capital of the Republic of Slovenia, an EU member state. Here we observe the laws and rules that are of a higher level.* In the words of Boris Dežulović, this example of discourse involves a "typical

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<sup>10</sup> Velikonja, Mitja: *Eurosis – A Critique of the New Eurocentrism*. Ljubljana: Mirovni inštitut, 2005, p. 25.

Central European cliché: an ordered ‘urbanized environment’ is by definition a ‘social environment of a higher cultural level,’ inhabited by ‘highly situated people,’ meaning highly cultured citizens with high wages who will ‘not much longer approve’ of any kind of newcomers and guest workers, dirty southerners, Africans, Arabs, Turks, Roma, Croats, Serbs, or Bosnians in this example, disturbing their urban idyll. In these ‘social environments on a higher cultural level’ different rules of behavior are observed, and the newcomers’ only task is to commit their cheap labor to building these ‘urban environments.’<sup>11</sup> In this case, “dirty southerners” are people from the “third world” – without any political power or basic rights; these are no longer *southerners* (*južnjaki / južnjaci*) from other republics of former Yugoslavia, whose position was much better despite their ghettoization and widespread stereotypes. Similarly, this group does not comprise other seasonal workers from Slovakia or other East European EU countries — the legal treatment of these workers is different, and moreover, the low wages and poor living and working conditions in Slovenia attract only few workers from these countries (their number is much lower than was expected after Slovenia joined the EU).

### **Dangerously close**

Apart from economic interests, another reason why in today’s political imagination the *Western Balkans* are largely categorized as the south, the “third world,” is the security aspect: the countries that border contemporary Europe to the east, south-east and the east form an area that in *Europe’s* eyes is *dangerously close*, and where lurk all sorts of dangers – organized crime supported by corrupted political elites, drug smuggling, illegal immigrants, terrorism (because the Muslim population is “autochthonous” both in the Balkans and in North Africa, this area can be associated with Al Qaeda and ‘global terrorism’) etc.

The countries of the *Western Balkans* cannot be denied their geographical placement in Europe even within the new political reality, if only because on today’s political map of Europe they appear as a “black hole” surrounded by the EU territories. If for that reason they should be “allowed into Europe,” it is justified by the need for security: before France assumed the Presidency of the EU, President Nicolas Sarkozy stated that Paris supported the accession of the Balkan countries to the EU, *as this is the way to bring peace to the region where one world war started and where tensions still run high* (b92.net, July 1, 2008); or, as it was written in the Program of Slovenian Presidency of the EU, *[t]he stability of the Western Balkans – a region encircled by Member States – is of major importance for the security and prosperity of the entire Union*.<sup>12</sup> In this example, new patterns of exclusion again tally well with

<sup>11</sup> Dežulović, Boris: Vegradovo okolje na višjem kulturno nivoju. *Dnevnik, Objektiv*, 22. november 2008.

<sup>12</sup> [http://www.eu2008.si/includes/Downloads/misc/program/Programme\\_en.pdf](http://www.eu2008.si/includes/Downloads/misc/program/Programme_en.pdf), accessed on March 8, 2009.

the old ones — the discourse on the “problematic nature” of the Balkan countries and their responsibility for violence and wars in Europe is now carried forward through the representation of the Balkan countries as the “seedbed of terrorism,” while the images of barbarism, primitivism and rudeness are in the contemporary variant conveyed through discourses on crime, corruption, terrorism and illegal immigration. The necessity of supervision is therefore a constant trait in both old and new discourses – the *Western Balkan* countries have to be admitted into the EU so that they can be supervised and prevented from causing new troubles to Europe.

### Living in different time

The attitude towards history, memory, the past and the future is still another area in which in contemporary political discourses a clear dividing line is drawn between “Europe” and “non-Europe,” whereas the Balkans is equated with the “third world.” In political and media discourses the *Western Balkan* countries’ accession to the EU is portrayed as their *opting for the future* (and the *final break with the reactionary past*); this type of discourse is supported by the spatial metaphor of *progress along the road to Europe*. EU officials and politicians continually repeat that the *Western Balkan countries should be offered the European perspective or the European future*, and talk about these countries *taking the European course, choosing the European course* and the like. The accession to the EU is here presented as the only option for *the Western Balkan countries to rid themselves of the burden of the past and destructive nationalisms, and turn to the future*. The notions linked with the EU in this discourse are *the future, progress, stability, and health*, and conversely, non-inclusion in the EU is related to the *past, instability, chaos, nationalism, disease*, meaning the traits that are traditionally associated with the countries of the Balkan peninsula.<sup>13</sup> The EU is therefore both a precondition for normality and the prescriber of normative requirements for qualifying as normal. On January 28, 2008, on the day when the Council of the European Union was discussing future cooperation with Serbia, the *Guardian* published an article by Olli Rehn entitled *Balkans on the Mend*.<sup>14</sup> Among other things, it says that *(p)eople in the Balkans face a stark choice this year: their region could either finally resolve its outstanding problems from the wars of the 1990s or fall back into instability and extremes of nationalism. The first option would take them forward towards stability, prosperity and European integration. But many commentators believe the second is inevitable*.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Todorova, Maria: *Imagining the Balkans*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

<sup>14</sup> The same metaphor of cure/mending was used by Dejan Steinbuch, a columnist for the Slovenian free newspaper *Žurnal*, in an article entitled *How To Cure the Serbs From Nationalism*. Among other things, he wrote: *Therefore I think that it is high time we cured our Serbian friends from nationalism and helped them on their way to the future* (*Žurnal*, February 23, 2008, p. 18).

<sup>15</sup> Rehn, Olli: *Balkans on the Mend*. *Guardian*, January 28, 2008.



The Balkans can therefore *mend themselves, become normalized and escape growing nationalism* only by becoming part of the EU, only by *becoming Europe*. What is kept concealed when painting such a polarized picture of the two worlds is the contemporary reality of the EU, with many of its members confronting growing nationalism, racism, xenophobia, strengthening of extreme right political forces and similar “horrors” — in short, the phenomena that are attributed exclusively to those countries that have a lot of work ahead of them before they can be called *European* and before they can join the *big European family*.

This type of discourse proposes the following “time map” of Europe: the EU’s present is the *Western Balkans’* future, with the latter now living not in the present but in the past governed by nationalistic myths. The image in which the reality of the *Western Balkans* is not the reality of the present but of the past makes the transformation of these countries indispensable and the difference between Europe (the EU) and the *Western Balkans* explicit, preventing us from perceiving the similarities between the two parts of the continent.

The Balkans is traditionally perceived as an area inhabited by peoples obsessed with history who build their identity on myths and are not capable of “facing the present” and “turning to the future.” *Europe* attributes the same characteristics to the “third world” countries: *The tragedy of Africa is that the African has not satisfactorily entered history. ... In this imaginary world where everything starts over and over again there is no place for human adventure or for the idea of progress. The man never looks towards the future. Never breaks the repetition cycle... That is the problem of Africa*, said President Sarkozy addressing young Africans in Dakar (Tatlić 2007/2008).

On the other hand, in Europe’s perception of itself, the idea of progress is inherent to Europe; it is a space characterized by a linear flow of time, as contrasted with the non-European, cyclic perception of time and endless repetition. In addition, Europe sees itself as a community of nations joined together precisely by their ability to face their traumatic past, overcome it and build a better and more ethical society through such catharsis.<sup>16</sup> By contrast, the Balkans lives in the past, is obsessed with the past and on top of that is unable or does not want to face that past. Since as such, it seriously threaten Europe’s self-image, it is suitable to place the Balkans beyond the European borders.

<sup>16</sup> In his study of the 20<sup>th</sup> century history of Europe, Mark Mazower convincingly deconstructs this European narrative about the cathartic confrontation with the past and points out that Nazism was “a nightmarish revelation of the destructive potential of European civilization – turning imperialism on its head and treating Europeans as Africans” (Mazower, Mark: *Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century*. London et al.: Penguin books, 1998, p. xiii).

## Is Europe possible?

In 1999, French political philosopher Etienne Balibar pointed out in his lecture given in Thessaloniki, that “the fate of European identity as a whole is being played out in Yugoslavia and more generally in the Balkans (even if this is not the only site of its trial)” and that Europe has two options: “Either Europe will recognize in the Balkan situation not a monstrosity grafted to its breast, a pathological ‘aftereffect’ of underdevelopment or of communism, but rather an image of effect of its own history, and will undertake to confront it and resolve it and thus to put itself into question and transform itself. Only then will Europe probably begin to become *possible* again. Or else it will refuse to come to face-to-face with itself and will continue to treat the problem as an exterior obstacle to be overcome through exterior means, including colonization.”<sup>17</sup>

A deeper look into the European discourses on the *Western Balkans* shows that today Europe is no more *possible* than it was ten years ago, when Balibar made the statement quoted above. One could even argue to the contrary. The means used to constitute the *Western Balkans* as an area outside Europe have become even more explicit; the use of well known mechanisms of supervision and colonization is characterized by an even greater lack of reflection, and these means have become accessible to all those inside the EU. The main economic beneficiaries from this symbolic and discursive colonization of the Balkans are precisely those countries that most frequently make use of these mechanisms, i.e. EU members located at the EU’s southeastern border. As to Europe as a whole, this colonization enables it to continue with construction and maintenance of a self-satisfied image while shunning, or ascribing to those *outside*, everything that might possibly challenge such an image. In this kind of Europe there is no room for “peaceful, managed and nurtured diversity,”<sup>18</sup> and this kind of Europe is not capable of self-reflection. In this kind of Europe, the media bring on the daily basis politicians’ statements echoing the well known patterns that marked the darkest periods of European history. Because of this, it is difficult to get rid of an unpleasant feeling of repetition — despite the deep-rooted opinion that repetition is a *problem of the African man* and of the Balkan peoples, and by no means of Europeans.

<sup>17</sup> Balibar, Etienne: *We, the People of Europe?* Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004, p. 6

<sup>18</sup> Garton Ash, Timothy: Europe’s True Stories. *Prospect Magazine* 131, February 2007.



# A THIRD EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN UNION METAPHYSICS

Nerzuk ĆURAK

Is the European Union an incontestable fact of the future? The public sphere is dominated by the opinion that it is. For us, *Europhiles*, the constitution of the European Union, as a supranational trajectory, is an irreversible process. But the task of the science is to challenge dominating discourses and the mainstream opinion in order to prove or disprove the sense of a historical process. And the EU is, undoubtedly, a permanent fact of history. Still, Agnes Heller in his famous “...Europe-An Epilogue?” says: “...Outside the technology domain...there is no longer a social project centred on the future, nor is Europe yet a place where grandiose ideas concerning a better future in political, social or another sphere are elaborated”.<sup>1</sup>

We have to challenge this pessimistic argumentation which, not deliberately, evokes with nostalgia the European social imagination, because the political philosophy and political science demand an analysis (radically critical and anti-apologetic) of the European political and economic institutionalism as a possible paternalistic source of European trans-border social universalism which may give rise also to “a new European culture...as layman culture within which local and national cultures may prosper”.<sup>2</sup> That “authentic new European culture does not contain the necessary ‘promise of happiness’”<sup>3</sup>, which is good news. Without a utopian discourse Europe’s future is present indeed in our Now for *we, the people of Europe*<sup>4</sup>, *we who share the European dream are unable to envisage an epilogue*.<sup>5</sup> This means that it is possible that our “dream becomes a reality”<sup>6</sup> for when you find traces in theoretical tenets (such as Heller’s) which are suspicious about the possibility for European culture or – on the political level – for the European federation, even the European republic – to develop, which prove that it is nevertheless possible with a new political and cultural mythology (supranational European legal framework, the

<sup>1</sup> Agnes Heller: “Europe an Epilogue?”, in Feher Ferenc, Agnes Heller: *The Postmodern Political Condition*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1988., p. 146-159.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> Etienne Balibar: *Mi, građani Evrope?*, Beogradski krug, Belgrade, 2003.

<sup>5</sup> Heller, *ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> Heller, *ibid.*

European Union as a political entity and European culture as “giving prominence to civic virtue, taste, the education of the senses, civility and civil society, urbanity, joy, nobility of mind, forms of life permeated with dignity and sensibility for nature“<sup>7)</sup> then it is worth working and believing in Morin’s *European unity of destiny*. That unity

does not arise from our past which contradicts it. It hardly arises from our present, for it is our future that imposes it. Thus, there has never been the awareness or a feeling of shared future created on the basis of the future, of what has not yet happened. So we are facing a paradoxical Gordian knot of the European identity. Divisions and conflicts are the causes of cultural diversity which has become constituent for the European identity. Generally, our European identity and unity arise from the division and conflicts. This means that we drew the blessing from our original damnation and also preserved that damnation, the nation-state, no longer in a paranoid form which stirs up wars but in an unconditional sovereign form which rejects every higher instance which would make it subordinate.<sup>8</sup>

The idea of a united Europe as a “higher instance“ which wants to justify its appearance in the world is faced with a geopolitical problem of the highest rank: the West Balkan region, constructed as a political category which is announcing its inability to be in the Now, with a connection to the future, without the mediation by the bad past. Is it really so difficult to demystify the causality?! Bad causality!

The acceptance of substantially living the bloodstained past Now, *nolens-volens*, means that we are not in the Now. This in turn is a typical manifestation of the heroic spirit as a pathetic form of the parochial spirit of the countries of the region, the geopolitics of which I am researching in order to offer it as the form of peace, rather than war. This is extremely difficult, for it is most comfortable to consider geopolitics as “the science about territorial conflicts and contradictory positions“.<sup>9</sup> Europe confirms with its historical existence that the war takes a central place in its history<sup>10</sup> - this makes the challenge to conceptualize and theoretically (re)constitute geopolitics of peace even bigger and more important. This is the reason why in this research Theoria as a respectable form of cognition, will be most important. The West is the birthplace of violence indeed, but also the birthplace of Theoria:

<sup>7</sup> Mužijević Pero: Evropa: prolog – epilog. In *Republika*, year XV, No. 322-323, Belgrade. See at: <http://www.republika.co.yu/arhiva/2003/#4>, retrieved on 29 June, 2009.

<sup>8</sup> Edgar Morin: *Kako misliti Evropu*, Svjetlost, Sarajevo, 1989, p. 132.

<sup>9</sup> Michel Foucher: *Evropska republika*, Stubovi kulture, Belgrade, 2000, p.15.

<sup>10</sup> “Porijeklo Evrope iskovanano je u ognju rata”. See in R.A. Brown: *The Origins of Modern Europe*, London 1972., p. 93. For the understanding of the war as a building block of the European history, inspiring is also the study by Michael Howard, *Rat u evropskoj istoriji*, Studentski kulturni centar, Belgrade, 1999.

Only 'Europe', the argument would appear to be, is theoretically (that is, at the level of the fundamental categories that shape historical thinking) knowable; all other histories are matters of empirical research that fleshes out a theoretical skeleton that is substantially 'European'. There is one version of this argument in Edmund Husserl's Vienna lecture of 1935, where he proposed that the fundamental difference between 'oriental philosophies'.... and 'Greek-European science' or as he added 'universally speaking: philosophy' was the capacity of the latter to produce 'absolute theoretical insights', that is, 'theoria' (universal science), whereas the former retained a 'practical-universal' and hence 'mythical-religious', character.<sup>11</sup>

The register of *absolute theoretical insight* under which the *world presents itself as thematic*<sup>12</sup> may also include the conviction of theoreticians of science that Theoria, along with all restrictions of information technology, technokinetic and mega-virtual civilization – which moves Abstraction from the library Logos to techne as a sufficient abstract finality – cannot be crossed out unless It puts up its own disempowerment by non-respecting changed social circumstances which demand that science take a real stand instead of fleeing to the comfort of academic walls avoiding discussion with other discourses, which are no less important or relevant than the scientific one. Unfortunately, scientists whose theorising is based on “the presupposition that it is the science that is being implemented today, the ethno-science”<sup>13</sup> can hardly accept dethroning Theoria as a paradigm of all paradigms. But it is this demission that saves Theoria from metaphysical presuppositions and deconstructs its European, that is, colonial foundation. The happy news is that such a deconstructing thought, attempting to return also *non-Western science* into history, is being developed, under considerable resistance by ethno-right wing, precisely in the West.

On the other hand, it is not the good news that in South Eastern Europe, as a third Europe.<sup>14</sup> Theoria is still being developed on the founding paradigm – whereas the world, as we have said above, is being thematically laid bare in the present section of history as a universalizing co-existence of particularities rather than as an *entelechy of universal reason*<sup>15</sup> - which is moreover localized, ethnicized and in-depthly historiographic, hence collectively subjectivized. Such a *spirit of anti-time*

<sup>11</sup> Dipesh Chakrabarty: "...Postkolonijalnost i majstorija istorije: ko govori u ime "indijskih" prošlosti". In *Razlika/Difference*, Art Theory and Criticism Journal, year II, No. 3-4 Tuzla, 2003. p.142.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> Ziauddin Sardar: *Thomas Kuhn i ratovi znanosti*, Naklada Jesenski and Turk, Zagreb, 2001, p. 72.

<sup>14</sup> In a hegemonic gradation of the structure of the European order, which corresponds to the requirements of classic geopolitics born in the Mittel-European belt, First Europe means Continental Atlantic Europe, understood as a space of Catholic-Protestant civilization; Second Europe defines the area of East Europe as a shifted limes of the First Europe, while a Third Europe is Southeast Europe as a geopolitical sub-continent continually requiring some form of imperial governance.

<sup>15</sup> Chakrabarty, *ibid.*, p.141.

hinders the development of a stable regional community, South Eastern Europe as a europeized Balkan agenda which will not be in collision with its sovereign localities – national and quasi-national states. Thanks to the scientific discourse which serves the purpose of mainly ethnic policies and in fact equated itself with the political discourse in all South East European countries, the region as a *community of citizens*<sup>16</sup> which the First Europe is wishing for as a liminal constituent if its pan-continental geopolitics is still being awaited. The reason is that the whole (region) and parts (states) do not constitute the possibly non-imposed unity. South Eastern Europe and the states of South Eastern Europe are divided by, as Husserl said, “a gaping abyss of sense”.<sup>17</sup> Without a theoretical articulation which will offer the bridge over the abyss, constructed of the solid material of scientific neutrality, the post-modern idea of region<sup>18</sup> - while postmodern is nothing but the deconstructing talk with the dead – will not get revived. In that variant the end of the Balkan history is looming: ethnic feudalism in democratic disguise. Continuation of the *rule of men, and not the rule of law*.<sup>19</sup> This danger is underestimated in our debates. If a thought is a stake in the future, then I am guided in this research by the thought that the time has come when future needs to be demystified, to employ Weber’s word, meaning, to free it from utopian shackles and work on it and for it as if it were our own matter, as if it were Now. The opinion about the Future as the opinion for the Future has no future unless it has a rebellious and disrupting presence in the ontology of Present. So let us try and be a disrupting factor.

There is a confusing play going on on the European scene: a new creation of the Old World as a civilization totality of geophilosophy and geopolitics, along with an institutional standardization of that totality and its legalization through a de-territorialized European legal and political order. (It is a de-territorialized order as the EU does not have its privileged territory; rather, it rents it from the immanent states). But can Brussels, as a symbolic and metaphorical place of summing up of those

<sup>16</sup> Dominique Schnapper: *Community of Citizens. On the Modern Idea of Nationality*, Izdavačka knjižarnica Zorana Stojanovića, Sremski Karlovci, Novi Sad, 1996.

<sup>17</sup> See in Emanuel Levinas: *Drukčije od bivstva ili s onu stranu bivstvovanja*, Jasen, Nikšić, 1999, p. 54.

<sup>18</sup> Observation of the region as a post-modern geopolitical expression corresponds to Cooper’s position about the post-modern world which the international community has partly stepped into already, the evident proof of which is the EU’s growing power as the order which has developed “the system of mutual interference with someone else’s home affairs, going as far as the issues of beer and sausages”. But the problem with Southeast Europe is extremely difficult: how the elements of the pre-modern world, which got infiltrated into the modern world and prevent a fairer regional life, can be transformed into political and cultural order of the post-modern world, the world which counts on the states the elites of which have a most sincere wish for “the borders to be less and less important every day”. See in Robert Cooper: *Slom država. Poredak i kaos u 21. stoljeću*, Profil, Zagreb, 2009, p. 41, 45.

<sup>19</sup> Brilliant works on those “...two notions of the rule“ with his wholehearted advocacy of the rule of law were written by the doyen of the European left thought, Italian political philosopher and political scientist Norberto Bobbio in his essay *The Rule of Men or The Rule of Law*. The essay is available also in the local languages in two Bobbio’s books: *Budućnost demokratije*, published by Filip Višnjić, Belgrade, 1990 and in *Liberalizam i demokracija*, published by Novi Libero, Zagreb, 1992.

European development paradigms, sub-totalize both the Athens (geophilosophy) and Rome (geopolitics)? Geophilosophy and geopolitics are the junctional verticals of the European irenologic-polemologic identity. Both are relativized, although not made senseless by immersing Europe into the national constitution of history. This particular agenda, of course, is not moving towards its end as a nation is established as a *trans-historical standard*,<sup>20</sup> still, the good news is that in the European present, national is finally not, to a large extent, opposing the universal. During nationalized European history it was not so, although “universal, as a possibility, exists in every opinion and in every culture. But none has ever set it as a driving force of its special culture. Precisely because that universal is contradictory to all egoisms and egocentrisms of an individual, nation and culture, it has continually been twisted, it has distorted sense and betrayed in that European culture from which it emerged.”<sup>21</sup>

If the universal has its origins in the European culture – we shall agree with Morin that it has – the European opinion is by its own history predestined to understand globalization, which does not exclude also criticism of globalization as an Americanized development paradigm of the world, and of Europe in particular. But is our *dark continent*<sup>22</sup> capable of overcoming the gloomy twentieth and building a happy, post-national twenty first century? Can geophilosophy, geopolitics and globalization help build the European political and cultural identity?

They can if we problematize them, in accordance with the epoch of crumbled, virtual time, *time without time*,<sup>23</sup> which means that we *reject finality, believe in limitless, ignore the principle of reality precisely at the moment when it imposes itself*.<sup>24</sup> Or, as Richard Falk said, “...directing our eyes above the horizons of what is reachable is the only ‘realistic’ way to escape geopolitical hopelessness”.<sup>25</sup> What is geophilosophy in this context? It is political philosophy of space immersed in time. Institutional political dominates space and time. The task of geophilosophy and political philosophy is to think dominant, to think *that political*. To think political, that political which resists naming (as it is allegedly already named as institutional) and eludes scientific categories, is a demanding intellectual task. Although, as Derrida notices, for philosophy, science is “absolutely unavoidable”<sup>26</sup> as it requires discipline, geophilosophy has to think also “what can not be disciplined”<sup>27</sup> which is, inter alia, precisely the space of political, the European space of political, European political, charged with plurality as hardly any destination of *collective life*.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Anthony Smith: *Nacionalizam i modernizam*, Faculty of Political Science, Zagreb, 2003.

<sup>21</sup> Edgar Morin: *Kako misliti Evropu*, Svjetlost, Sarajevo, 1989, p. 102.

<sup>22</sup> Mark Mazover: *Mračni kontinent. Evropsko dvadeseto stoljeće*, Prometej, Zagreb, 2004.

<sup>23</sup> Vladimir Tasić: *Matematika i koreni postmodernog mišljenja*. Svetovi. Novi Sad, p. 27, 2002.

<sup>24</sup> Morin, *ibid.*, 103.

<sup>25</sup> Richard Falk: *Veliki teroristički rat*, Belgrade, Filip Višnjić, 2003. p. 283.

<sup>26</sup> Wolfgang Welsch: *Naša postmoderna moderna*, Izdavačka knjižarnica Zorana Stojanovića, Sremski Karlovci, Novi Sad, 2000, p. 341.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 342.

Geophilosophy and political philosophy are directed to think plurality of politics and plurality of space, plurality of de-territorialized political space, for in an unrooted world without a “founding function”<sup>29</sup> the plurality of everyday forms (*ibid.*) reveals itself, without any announcement, as the “basic idea (which) today determines ever more our opinion and feeling”.<sup>30</sup> Domination of the particular, as the basic content of the plural<sup>31</sup>, requires from geophilosophers, geopolitical scientists and political factors wisdom of non-accepting a holistic answer because the “horizon of incomprehensible”<sup>32</sup>, which prevents an occurrence of totalitarian mind, has to be preserved.

History of Europe – philosophy as polemologic geophilosophy lent sense to its warring (geopolitical) spirit – is full of attempts to give sense to the incomprehensible in the concrete worlds of human suffering, so, eschaton walked from incomprehensible otherworld into this world, giving it sense and enveloping it with totalities which had to end in crime as their mental love for the whole world, in all its totality, prevented them from seeing the world of individual people. Inquisition, fascism, communism... Riding different Waves of Totality is one of the primordial causes of the recent political philosophy of the continental Europe, or geophilosophy as political philosophy, coming down mainly to an attempt to justify the era of European Supranational Institutionalism, that new pseudo-spatial Totality as the political expression of the *spirit of the times*. So geophilosophy, in the transfer from metaphysics into utilitarian metaphysics of an enlarged European Union, in fact, without a critical discourse, in contrast to the agora tradition, becomes a servant to the Great Bureaucratic Norm which puts down its Behemoth-Leviathan mantle across all the parts of the Old Lady’s body, like a fantasized political space<sup>33</sup> from Brussels to Vilnius, from Berlin to Kiev, as if the European supranational bureaucratic citadel was The World’s Spirit revealed anew. Even if so, although it is not possible that it is so in the world of an overwhelming rule by Particularities and Individualities, every new idea in Europe which possesses the allurements of a final solution (and the same allurements exist also in the EU as a significant number of important Europeans believe that the EU is the solution finally found for

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>31</sup> “It will not be sufficient to perceive the differences, ‘break them down’, it is also necessary to ask how separation happened and which logos produced it. Only if the man is capable for the logos of fission he will be able to say that he understood it and by understanding it he will be able to reduce it to harmony.” See in: Massimo Cacciari: *Geo-filozofija Evrope*, Ceres, Zagreb, 1996, p. 8.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 341.

<sup>33</sup> “If the real ‘unity’ of one ‘political space’ (the EU political space, *note by N.Č.*) decides to impose its identity, then the imposed ‘total’ force of its truth would compellingly become violent against the presence of what is not reflected in such identity, thereby resorting to the already known forms of ghettoization, or if it allows its own multiplicity of differences to master the identity of the ‘common space’, denying its strictly “political” dimension, such a unity would actually disappear and would leave the space to the simple coordination of specific freedoms to which individual differences always pretend”. See in Riccardo Panattoni: *Bratska zajednica kao ljubav prema slobodi pojedinca*. In *Zbornik radova Sloboda u jedinstvu razlika*, Međunarodni forum Bosna, Sarajevo, 1998, p. 54.



the continent the origins of which were forged on the anvil of war) should be subjected to demystification precisely by the plural European Union itself in order to prevent the neo-conservative European right wing from carrying out that demystification. Unfortunately, the European Union is against geophilosophy which calls it into question. The European Union is against any criticism of its Purpose, which is why only entrepreneurial science, business science, sectoral science, institutionally legitimate science, non-social science, project science, focused science, the non-thinking science is being *pushed* on a large scale even through scientific research projects, whereby a message is being sent to philosophy, and especially geophilosophy which is trying to think out an expanded shared European space that it is unable to contemplate individual worlds, that it is unable to reside in Particularity and to scoop it up for its own research. Hence, that is it redundant. That is not serious.

Filing geophilosophy away into the tray of metaphysical redundancy leaves the European geopolitical space spiritless and it loses its philosophical nature, identity and becomes redundant in the institutional projection of the European Union. On the other hand, marginalization of a spatial component of the political tilts the space-time balance and leads to tyranny of (capitalist) time<sup>34</sup>, forgetting that “the space was empirically described and practically effective even before theory turned it into notion”.<sup>35</sup> As such, manifested before it was given a notion, space cannot stand reduction to de-territorialized time. It demands that it should be understood not only in legal-political, sociological, economic and anthropologic and cultural terms, but also in geophysical sense. And this sense requires interpretation of space as *mythos*<sup>36</sup>, as distinctiveness outside logos since logos can also stand for “deceitful and forgetful talk by the multitude”.<sup>37</sup> Through *mythos*, understood as it is interpreted by Cacciari, space confirms its existence in the epoch of time and brings the lost geopolitical sense back in the de-territorialized time of post-modernism. A striking example of such power, although consciously ignored by the Brussels bureaucracy is the European Union, which confirms itself as a geopolitical order, and also as a geopolitical discourse.

This is the fundamental distinction developed by Agnew and Corbridge. According to them, *geopolitical order refers to political economy of spatial practice, or hierarchical organization of space, and geopolitical*

<sup>34</sup> “Omnipresence, imminence and settlement of time are being replaced by settlement of space. Permanent governance of the continents withdrew before the general intemperance of transfers and transmissions... There is no longer struggle for space. Now the time is being conquered.” Paul Virilio: *Kritički prostor*, Umetničko društvo Gradac, Čačak, 1997, p. 86.

<sup>35</sup> Henri Lefebvre's thought. See in Pušić Ljubinko: *Grad, društvo, prostor*, Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, Belgrade, 1997. p. 45.

<sup>36</sup> I refer to Massimo Cacciari, who in *Geo-Philosophy of Europe* trying to surpass many “...empty idle talk about antique understanding of time and space” evokes Hecataeus of Miletus and his term *mythos*, with which this Greek historian, geographer and logographer, marks “...one's own true speech..... *Mythos* is for him still a sound, vox of the thing itself, the thing which confirms itself.” See in: Massimo Cacciari: *Geo-filozofija Evrope*, Ceres, Zagreb, 1996, p. 9.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*

*discourse refers to geopolitical idea about hierarchical organization of space with interpretation of that space in its centre, but which does not necessarily have to materialize fully, or which does not have to be correct in substance.*<sup>38</sup>

The above analysis shows clearly that the geopolitical order of the European Union belongs to globalization, and that geopolitical discourse radiates various conceptual and morphological meanings among which geophilosophical dominates, taking the European space as an emerging homeland, as an emerging Europe:

In temptations of creating one public space, long-winded works, it is necessary to re-do the basis (common values, human rights, nation), it would also be necessary to discuss differences and divisions, not only in the interest of promoting common visions, uniform and artificial ones, but to create *unitas multiplex* which may found a new European pluralist and self-critical identity, aware of ambivalence and open to the world's plurality. The old identity, if we trust Edgar Morin, was 'democratic and imperialistic and re-gained a double identity of a charming curtain of its cultural spirituality; it is based on certainty that it possesses reason and civilization.'<sup>39</sup>

That certainty was ending through the long (national) European history, what an irony, with the military invasion of the Space of Another. With genocide. With the Holocaust. Never again – that is our big hope. For:

Europe does not want its own end, which means: it does not want itself – it does not want to believe in what its own to be *occulus suggests*.<sup>40</sup> It has fears of it, perceives it as a simple, imminent destiny, sees it as the product of external forces, instead of longing for being the one which is now waning. Still, it is a unique, authentic decision, thrust upon it by the epoch. The wane does not mean to wrench itself free from itself but to turn to its own bottom and listen – yield oneself to the Last, under whose standard all different ones, if they are perfectly different, admit the necessity of their own enquiries as conjecture. And this would be impossible for Europe? What has never been perceived as possible? Well, that impossible is its sole future.

It is that impossible, which is being delayed, that one should search for. Lope ahead, regardless of the fact that the "European particularity is a highly set, very risky identity: it is shaped by the composition of the opposites, by overcoming the opposites in a synthesis; by plurality fitted into a motley unity; by tensions which resulted in harmony,

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<sup>38</sup> Agnew John & Corbridge Stuart: *Mastering space: Hegemony, territory and international political economy*, Routledge, London and New York, 1995.

<sup>39</sup> Michel Foucher: *Evropska republika*, Stubovi kulture, Belgrade, 2000, p.160.

<sup>40</sup> Massimo Cacciari: *Geo-filozofija Evrope*, Ceres, Zagreb, 1996, p.156-157.



fruitful contrasts“.<sup>41</sup> But can that relatively risky identity project for the future begin at present? Can Europe overcome the previous negative anticipations which I have constructed, speculated or picked up from the river swollen with European nihilism? Said within the frame of geopolitical codification – can Europe overcome geopolitics as a tyrannical construct of the mind and work on the geopolitics of peace as a practical political application of geophilosophy of Europe in an *organized European space*?<sup>42</sup>

That space has its ideology. That is, as Lefebvre calls it, the space of “capitalist society“.<sup>43</sup> That space has its boundaries. They follow a non-fixed geography of the European Union, which, without a Third Europe, remains an incomplete story. Since incompleteness is a historical property of Europe, is our sole certainty not that the West Balkans remains the real name for that incompleteness, *permanent instable situation with a natural tendency towards degeneration*?<sup>44</sup> For this reason and also by reason of the historical powder chamber, I ask: will the Balkans remain indefinitely a “vital geopolitical issue“<sup>45</sup>, the region the unsolvable history of which is becoming a desired obstacle to the European completeness?

Wolfgang Schmale in *History of European Ideas* observes: “Not only political but also cultural integration of Europe independently from the EU stretching contains only partly the questions for history; partly, it depends on the wish, on the decisions directed to the future which may have a political and possibly moral foundation, but not historical.“<sup>46</sup> It would be perfect if it were so. Unfortunately, all questions emerge from history so that the political and moral universe of the (new) European civilization is being built on immersion into history. This is not strange since, as Karl Jaspers observes wisely, “Europe brought the world the idea of History”<sup>47</sup> which is why a solution to a problem can always be blocked by searching for a historical sense.

Does the accession of the West Balkan countries to the European Union have a historical sense? For the new European right wing, which has started the long march to Brussels, there is none. For us, the citizens of some of the countries of Southeast Europe, being part of the European Union means translating dreams into reality. The prime condition for that to happen is that the European continent leaves history behind. But, the following question is legitimate: what shall we get if we

<sup>41</sup> Wolfgang Kraus: *Budućnost Evrope. Na putu ujedinjenja*. PanLiber, Osijek - Zagreb - Split, 2000, p. 15.

<sup>42</sup> Christer Jonsson, Sven Tagil, Gunnar Tornqvist: *Organizing European Space*, Sage Publications, London Thousand Oaks - New Delhi, 2002.

<sup>43</sup> See in Pušić Ljubinko: *Grad, društvo, prostor*, Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, Belgrade, 1997, p. 48.

<sup>44</sup> Alain Minc: *Novi srednji vijek*, Alfa, Zagreb, 2008, p. 233.

<sup>45</sup> Philippe Moreau Defarges: *Geopolitički rječnik*, Centar za geopolitološka istraživanja, Zagreb, 2006, p. 25.

<sup>46</sup> Wolfgang Schmale: *Istorija evropske ideje*, Clio, Belgrade, 2003, p. 314.

<sup>47</sup> Edgar Morin: *Kako misliti Evropu*, Svjetlost, Sarajevo, 1989, p. 88.

finally leave history? We shall get some form of a *post-territorial political community*<sup>48</sup>, an unclear “huge, heterogeneous territory which has (only) a common political frame“<sup>49</sup> but also the potential to get transformed by the will of the people who surpassed the shackles of sovereignty, into a common European space with post-historical institutions of the universal European time growing like a new *essential form*<sup>50</sup> on its post-imperial political body. *Semantic distinction*<sup>51</sup> between the old imperial geopolitical orders and the new European order, which will, or will not, be established, is as obvious as the difference between national and *cosmopolitic*<sup>52</sup> sovereignty. With the triumph of the latter, without tinges of imperial hierarchy, the European Union becomes and remains an undeniable fact of the continental future.

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<sup>48</sup> David Chandler: Critiquing Liberal Cosmopolitanism? The Limits of the Biopolitical Approach. In *International Political Sociology*, Volume 3, Issue 1, March, 2009. p. 54, 55, 56.

<sup>49</sup> Eric Hobsbawm: *Globalizacija, demokratija i terorizam*, Arhipelag, Belgrade, 2008, p. 111-112.

<sup>50</sup> Kessler Oliver: Toward a Sociology of the International? International Relations between Anarchy and World Society. In *International Political Sociology*, Volume 3, Issue 1, March, 2009, p.104.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 105.

<sup>52</sup> Chandler, *ibid.*, 58, 59, 60, 67, 68.

# Bosnia's Phony Transition: The Mirage of Bosnian Democracy and False Assumptions of the EU

Kurt BASSUENER

1989 is probably the wrong frame of reference for discussing Bosnia, and probably all of the countries of the former SFRJ, probably save Slovenia. In every federal unit (and I use the term on purpose) south of there, liberal democracy as expected and understood in the EU at the time followed independence only later, following violent conflict. In none of these former republics is the transition complete, in my view. One can argue that in Bosnia and Herzegovina there never *was* a democratic transition.

Many academics – David Chandler in particular<sup>1</sup> – have argued that the international community's role has impeded normal democratic function. The European Stability Initiative (ESI) in its 2003 *Journal of Democracy* article "Travails of the European Raj<sup>2</sup>," made the point that if the international community, especially the Office of the High Representative, simply got out of the way, Bosnia could find its own democratic political equilibrium and move forward under its own steam toward EU and NATO membership.

I disagree with both arguments. The international community has been an actor in BiH politics since 1995, and especially since 1998 when the High Representative's Bonn Powers began to be employed. Yet to attribute Bosnia's dysfunction to the OHR or international factors in general is a deep misreading of Bosnian politics. So is the sense that BiH politics would find an equilibrium that would allow for consensus on the structures, functionality, and reforms needed to enter clubs like the EU and NATO. These parties have found consensus, albeit fraught, since the war, but certainly not in the public interest. That is to effectively divide the country, its public offices and resources into party-controlled fiefdoms.

<sup>1</sup> See [http://www.davidchandler.org/books/books\\_bosnia.html](http://www.davidchandler.org/books/books_bosnia.html) for a synopsis of his 1999 book *Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton*.

<sup>2</sup> See the article in PDF format at <http://www.britishcouncil.org/brussels-democraticpapers-travails-of-the-european-raj.pdf>

The past three years, under the previous two High Representatives – Christian Schwarz-Schilling and Miroslav Lajčák, have essentially been a period in which Bosnian politicians could act unimpeded by meddling international interference to find their own political solutions. While the Bonn Powers have been used, the threat of being removed from office for anti-Dayton behavior is perceived as moribund. The political atmosphere has become more, not less, rancorous with diminution of international credibility in the eyes of Bosnian politicians. It's been playtime for Bosnian politicians.

Of course, it is hardly normal that in a functioning democratic political system that external forces act as the most effective (and until recently only real) deterrent to official malfeasance, or as an administrative quasi-legal failsafe. But that is precisely the point I mean to make: that as presently constituted, Dayton BiH is not a functioning liberal democracy, even one in its infancy. It rather functions – and I argue *was designed to function* – as a *de facto* oligarchy, with nationalist parties representing “their” constituent people (Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks).

It has of course undergone development of sorts since the signature of the Dayton Accords in 1995 and the first postwar elections, which were termed as an “ethnic referendum” by many observers, to a stage where one might call it a “competitive oligarchy.” Among each constituent people, there are a number of parties which vie to assume the role of what I've taken to calling the “classic nationalist parties” of the early to mid-1990s: the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), and Croatian Democratic Union of BiH (HDZ BiH).

Yet the fundamental name of the game has *not* changed. Under the Dayton system, politicians are not compelled to seek a broad constituency, but only within a given constituent people. There is no political center – there are effectively three separate political spectrums. And since each party is competing to present itself the most credible “protector,” fear remains a very effective political tool to homogenize and mobilize. Each of the three ethnic political spectrums has a built-in gravitational pull to the right.

This compulsion to scare the hell out of or anger voters in each electoral cycle (which have been following in two-year intervals since Dayton, one municipal, one general) has manifest itself repeatedly. While parties do have platforms and manifestoes that address social issues, these rarely are prominent in electoral communication or political discourse during campaigns. There is also a distinct benefit for BiH politicians from this structurally driven focus on fear: almost complete lack of accountability. This is reflected in the remarkable stability of Bosnia's political elites. There are new faces since 1995 – Republika Srpska Premier Milorad Dodik and SDA leader Sulejman Tihić are the most visible evidence of some churning. But they are exceptions that prove a rule. The only ways out of the top echelons of political power and influence

in BiH since Dayton have been death, imprisonment, being a fugitive from prosecution, or forming an unsuccessful splinter party.

While non-ethnic parties try to compete, most notably the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and as of 2008 Naša Stranka (“Our Party”), these parties compete at a disadvantage as a result of the dynamics included in the constitutional and electoral system. The SDP is a statewide party with representation at high levels, though it is in opposition at all levels of government beyond the municipal, where it is well-represented.

The rise of Milorad Dodik since his assuming the RS Premiership for the second time, in 2006, proves another unfortunate fact. The Dayton Accords, with their integral Annex 4 constitution, were designed to preserve strong roles for all the signatories and their parties. This is hardly surprising. But Dodik’s veering in a strongly nationalist direction in the 2006 general election campaign proves that the Dayton constitution generates new nationalists by making fear and ethnic divisiveness politically profitable.

In Dodik’s case, after the failure of the “April package” of proposed constitutional reforms in 2006, which would have made the state-level prime minister office more attractive (he was reportedly flirting with the idea of the role), he made a logical deduction. The RS Premiership is the most powerful office in the state, since it has a strong vertical of power within the RS, and the RS can stop anything from moving forward at the state level. And this has indeed been the case. Ever since assuming the reins, Dodik has been the most powerful man in Bosnia – and he knows it.

So to sum up, unlike Central and Eastern European new members of the EU, and even its immediate neighbors Croatia and Serbia (the latter more problematic), Bosnia never underwent a democratic transition. Yet nor is it an authoritarian state as such. Rather, it is a competitive oligarchy with a political-business-criminal nexus which relies on clientelism, patronage and fear, despite the machinery of an electoral democracy.

The recent spectacle of the SDA’s May 26<sup>th</sup> party congress is an illustration of another facet of BiH’s political culture. The reason it was so remarkable was the fact that the outcome of the leadership contest was not known in advance. Most party congresses in Bosnia end in coronations. No other party of similar weight, including the SDP, has had any such uncertainty.

### **Misdiagnosis Leads to Dangerous Prescriptions**

The international community’s role in Bosnia is currently in limbo, with the closure of Dayton’s peace enforcement mission, and the agreement’s final arbiter, the High Representative, subject to five objectives and two conditions set by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) in February

2008. It is unlikely there will be substantial progress toward meeting the remaining two objectives – state property and defense property – at the late June meeting of the PIC. And the overall political climate, in which the RS Assembly has challenged the legitimacy of the Office of the High Representative and transfers of constitutional competence from the entity to the state-level, is hardly likely to convince all members of the PIC Steering Board that the situation is sufficiently stable to warrant OHR's closure – the flexible essence of the second condition.

There are insistent voices calling for the long-mooted “transition” away from OHR to a “reinforced” EU Special Representative mission, including the incoming Swedish EU presidency. But as of the time of writing, the question of what that mission's composition, mandate and powers will be remains opaque. As of now, it appears a joint EUSR and European Commission Delegation approach would focus on the so-called “European path” of preparing BiH for European integration, and not involve itself in the deeper constitutional reasons for state dysfunction.

The EU – by which I mean its institutions and most of its member states – seems wedded to an approach, while somewhat different from the accession model of other recent applicants and members, still relies on a set of assumptions that do not apply in Bosnia. First, the EU expects to negotiate with representative democratic politicians. Brussels also assumes that these politicians have a political and social consensus behind them to do the heavy-lifting required to meet the EU's criteria. Finally, the EU assumes its interlocutors at the state-level are the real powerbrokers, and can deliver. None of these apply in Bosnia.

The so-called “Prud process” which a desperate international community grasped as evidence of progress proves the power brokers are party-leaders, not office-holders (though in Dodik's case, he is both). The “process” was clearly designed for international consumption, and served its purpose. It has delivered little thus far, though apparently hope springs eternal in the international community. Prud's formulation – one stop-shopping with three men arrogating unto themselves the presumption they can speak for “their” peoples – shows the EU's assumptions to be false. And yet there seems an almost theological resistance to recognizing, much less acknowledging, that contradiction.

In the same vein, the experience of new EU member states has been touted as giving guideposts for BiH in its efforts to enter the EU. I believe this has been overplayed, including by some Central Europeans themselves, like the previous High Representative, Miroslav Lajčák. There are some similarities and experiences that can be instructive, to be sure. But the differences are at least as important. There has been much post-accession grumbling that Romania and Bulgaria had not fulfilled all the reforms that were asked of them. But the contrast with Bosnia is stark. Viewed even through the most jaundiced lens, Romania and Bulgaria's political elites were able to forge a consensus to at least fake meeting the

EU criteria. In Bosnia, politicians don't even feel compelled to do *that* prior to talking about tendering a formal application for candidacy.

There is manifest hope among many EU members that Serbia's forward movement toward the EU, itself heavily a result of a wide desire to declare progress in the hope reality will follow in its wake, will compel Bosnia's politicians to accelerate their own efforts. This seems to draw on the Central European experience of Slovakia, which indeed did feel the pressure from below to rejoin the Central European mainstream – it had gone from being spoken of in the same breath with its neighbors the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to Milošević's Yugoslavia and Lukashenko's Belarus in a matter of less than five years. But the analogy is flawed. However increasingly corrupt, authoritarian and nationalist the Vladimir Mečiar's government became, citizens had a singular target on which to focus their ire for being stuck. The country had an administrative structure that worked. And despite the brief period from 1989, civil society struck the deep roots that allowed strategic activism to ultimately force a political correction. Bosnia's reasons for falling behind are structural and political, not simply the latter. Furthermore, and dangerously, the incentives for political players differ in the case of Serbia's "fast track," as some, including the incoming Swedish EU presidency, advocate. The RS and Serbia have concluded numerous agreements in their special relations, in theory allowed by Dayton, but never exercised until the somnolent Schwarz-Schilling period of international disengagement. Should, for example, Serbia get visa liberalization before BiH, Bosnian Serbs will logically increasingly decide to avail themselves of Serbian passports, further weakening the state. The idea that Serbian progress will spur progress in Bosnia is deluded – the reality is likely to be the opposite.

The EU has only itself to blame for the perception among Bosnian politicians that it is an easy mark. While not primarily responsible for the Dayton constitutional construct, the EU has sent Bosnian politicians clear signals that its conditionality is malleable. The initialing of a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU immediately on the heels of an ignominious defeat of High Representative Lajčák at the hands of RS Premier Dodik, despite the failure to achieve police reform, which was among the EC's declared criteria, reinforced that message. So the dismal delivery on EU criteria since the signature of the SAA in 2008 shouldn't come as a surprise. Bosnia's politicians have been conditioned to believe the EU will accept them anyway.

Worse yet, the same impulse to adhere to what has become over time a sort of standard EU enlargement playbook has led to pressure from EU institutions and many members to dismantle the remaining peace enforcement guardrails in Bosnia, most crucially the legal failsafe of a High Representative to act as final arbiter of the Dayton Accords and a military deterrent force, since 2004 under the EU flag as EUFOR. The



rationale is thus: since the EU signed an SAA with Bosnia, it must not need these institutions, by definition.

This dogmatic inflexibility not only shows a lack of imagination as well as a misunderstanding of the dynamics at play, but is outright dangerous – not only for Bosnia, but for the EU itself. For without maintaining the guardrails that prevented the re-emergence of violent conflict for the past 13 years, the international community will divest itself of the Chapter 7 legal ability to intervene in a crisis without a direct invitation or a UN Security Council Resolution. It is not difficult to imagine the complications of either securing an invitation from a divided, dysfunctional government, or getting a resolution through the Security Council with Russia able to cast a veto.

Some argue that the risks are remote, and that conflict serves no political interest at the moment. But there are numerous variables at play, many (such as private security firms) unstudied by those who have the responsibility to address them, such as EUFOR. Nor is 1992 the right yardstick with which to measure the potential threat. The correlation of forces is very different. But given the proliferation of small arms, the amplified political tensions which have bred increased fear, and the divergence of unfulfilled agendas, there are manifold risks that fall short of full scale war that could push BiH beyond the point of no return. Deterrence should always be based on the capabilities at hand, not perceived or likely intent. Given the limited cost of maintaining legal capacity and sufficient military capability, is it worth the risk to unilaterally disarm?

### **If there is to be no OHR, then there must be a post-Dayton BiH**

The problem in Bosnia is structural, so the international approach here must address that frontally, as I wrote in a recent US Institute of Peace briefing<sup>3</sup>.

To the extent BiH has worked since Dayton, it has done so because of the role of an empowered High Representative. The fact that it didn't work at all for the first two years after Dayton necessitated the Bonn Powers. For the past three years, it has been possible to see what happens when the international community and its representatives lack an overall strategy and the will to employ those tools effectively behind it. The logical transition point from the High Representative's peace enforcement mandate to the EU's accession approach would be once Bosnia is structurally capable of responding to the EU's incentives to conduct reforms for membership.

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<sup>3</sup> "Unfinished Business in Bosnia and Herzegovina: What is to be Done?" Kurt Bassuener and James Lyon, USIPeace Briefing, May 2009. Available in PDF format at [http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace\\_briefings/2009/0519\\_bosnia\\_herzegovina.html](http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2009/0519_bosnia_herzegovina.html)



To acquire the functionality to work effectively (and accountably) for its citizens, much less meet EU standards, Bosnia needs serious structural reform, including constitutional reform and amendment of the election law.

To achieve this, the EU and US must work jointly toward this goal. The EU has the potential leverage to demand and facilitate such deep reform, should it only develop the political will to employ it. And this is where the US role comes into play. For while the EU holds the preponderance of the leverage, it lacks the requisite urgency, unity and will to apply it to this logical end – and end that would serve its own interests, I hasten to add. The US seems to have grasped the ugly reality in Bosnia better than Brussels, judging from Vice President Joe Biden’s speech to the BiH Parliament last month. So if a coherent strategy is ever to emerge, the US has to act as a catalyst to bring it about, working with individual member states to assemble critical mass within the EU. As of now, the members that view the Bosnian situation with similar concern appear to be relatively few: Britain, the Netherlands, and perhaps Germany. The group that wants to close OHR as quickly as possible is much larger, and is led by Sweden, the incoming presidency of the EU, and includes France, Italy, Spain, and most Central European members of the Union. Many member states don’t even pretend to have a Bosnia policy, and will go with the flow. So this is a question of initiative. Should no initiative be taken to build the policy among the EU member states, then the policy will be what emerges from the Brussels lowest common denominator sausage machine, and it will fail.

Building that critical mass will be very labor intensive, and in my view require the appointment of a Presidential Special Envoy to do the necessary work in capitals of EU and other PIC members, with the Brussels machinery, and in the Western Balkans region. This effort would aim to build a working consensus on a number of crucial elements. Accepting that the situation has become dangerous and will require executive authority to prevent conflict is the essential starting point. Defining the strategic goal as substantial functional reforms in Bosnia, including changing the political incentives in the constitutional and electoral system, is the endpoint of the continuum. The tools and mandate of the “reinforced EUSR,” as well as the roles of the US and other allies, need to be configured around what is necessary to be able to achieve the strategic objective. The Biden visit showed increased attention from Washington, but how that will durably manifest itself in terms of policy is far from clear.

### **“Ownership” Ought to Begin with a Popularly Legitimate Constitution**

For over a decade now, the term “ownership” has been employed by members of the international community who wish to see Bosnians take responsibility for their own governance and problem-solving. Under the

Dayton Annex 4 constitution, which allows politicians a splendid lack of accountability, this has been little more than a cop-out. But there must be no doubt that Bosnia's citizens – Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks, and those who do not want to fit into those boxes and are “others” – have to own any post-Dayton constitutional order. Finding a model that a majority of each self-identified group can accept will be no easy task. But it is the *sine qua non* of Bosnia and Herzegovina's survival, much less be able to enter the EU.

The EU and US cannot create that consensus. But they can – and must – create a context in which such a consensus can be forged, free of the fear of renewed conflict, and act as a catalyst to bring it about. Doing so will require a level of coordination and collaboration that the EU and the US have never shown before. But it is well within the realm of the possible. Given the stakes, there is no time to lose.

## **1989-2009: FROM EXCLUSION TO INTEGRATION (case of Serbia)**

Vladimir PAVIĆEVIĆ

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 marked in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe the beginning of transformation of their economic, legal and political systems into modern communities based on market-oriented economy, the rule of law and political pluralism. Orientation to new values was clearly determined and inspired by the idea of membership in the European Community (EC), meant to ensure the ultimate unification of the two parts of the European continent which had been divided by an impenetrable wall over half a century.

Out of all communist states in Europe, in 1989, the European prospects were the brightest for the then Yugoslavia (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), which consisted of the six federal units (Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Slovenia and Montenegro) and two autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina). The two autonomous provinces were within Serbia, in administrative terms, but were represented in the federal institutions and decision-making processes. Unlike other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which set the EU accession after the fall of communism as their priority albeit quite a distant goal, in former Yugoslavia mounting ethnic tensions resulted in armed conflicts and dissolution of the country, while the European future of what used to be a joint country was relegated to the bottom of the agenda. It did not become a political priority of its successors until after the wars ended.

Out of all countries created in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, only Slovenia became the full member of the European Union, in 2004, while other countries are standing in the vestibule, the waiting room for Europe. Croatia has a candidate status; that country has opened negotiations on its full EU membership and their completion is expected in the course of 2010. Macedonia, despite its problems, was granted EU candidate status in 2005 and is getting prepared for the commencement of accession negotiations. Montenegro presented its official application for EU membership in December 2008 and expects to get candidate status in the course of 2010. Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina signed Stabilization and Association Agreements and are now waiting for an opportunity to present an official application for EU membership and get a candidate status as the next step.

Following a change in 2000, which began with ousting Slobodan Milošević from power, the status of Serbia's European integration continues to be uncertain. Serbia signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement, although there has been no implementation of the SAA provisions yet over insufficient level of Serbia's cooperation with the Tribunal in The Hague. This was how Serbia, amid the European integration process, came down to the bottom of the list of the West Balkan states, ranking behind Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The European integration process in Serbia was slowed down even more after the Assembly of Kosovo decided on 17 February, 2008, to declare Kosovo's independence. Serbian reaction to Kosovo's declaration of independence was put before the discussion about Serbia's European prospects, which consequently called Serbia's integration into the European Union into question.

Serbia's bad position in the formal process of association with and accession to the European Union confronts us with two key political obstacles which slow down Serbia's meaningful inclusion in the European integration processes:

- (1) unsuccessful definition of Serbia's state borders, and
- (2) Serbia's insufficient cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

The need on the part of the present-day elites in Serbia to prolong the crisis caused by the dissolution of Yugoslavia and to keep the state border issue open gets right to the core of the first obstacle. This position, maintained by the elites in power, is manifested in the politics pursued towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, and previously in the attitude towards Kosovo. The assessment of insufficient cooperation with the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia refers primarily to the failure to locate and apprehend Ratko Mladić, and also to the absence of the will to come face-to-face with the crimes committed in the past.

The picture of an isolated country, excluded from most of international forums portrayed Serbia from 1990s. But Serbia moved into the new century with the idea of turning from the main disturber in the West Balkans to a reliable partner. As soon as the new politics got a chance, Serbia experienced the greatest shock in the first decade of the 21st century: in the early March 2003, the first democratically elected Prime Minister of Serbia, Zoran Djindjic, was assassinated. Zoran Djindjic was assassinated by a member of the Interior Ministry of Serbia who also belonged to a criminal group formed during Milosevic's rule, which maintained some important footholds in the state authorities after a democratic change. It turned out soon that the Djindjic assassination blocked Serbia's attempt to turn from the disturbing factor to a country fully integrated into the European mainstream.

Return of Serbia to the vision of the late Prime Minister Djindjic implies a change in politics in several respects.

One of the most important changes concerns a shift in Serbia's policy towards its neighbors. In 1990s, Serbia's policy towards its neighbors was mainly irrational, which left an impact on the relations with some of its neighbors in the form of disputes which are being addressed or will be addressed bilaterally or at the international level. The Stabilization and Association Agreement envisages Serbia's contractual obligation to foster good neighborly relations in the region, while the European Commission and the European Parliament have always emphasized in their reports that the regional cooperation is one of the key indicators of Serbia's pro-European orientation. This is why all pending issues between Serbia and its neighbors should be solved and their cooperation should be intensive in politics and economy.

After Croatia, Montenegro and Macedonia recognized Kosovo's independence, when an extremely bad atmosphere was created in diplomatic relations between Serbia and its three neighbors.

Belgrade's unreasonably harsh and emotional reaction forced the ambassadors of Montenegro and Macedonia to leave Belgrade, which triggered a backlash against Serbia, drastically worsening diplomatic relations with the two countries. This also stirred concern in the European institutions. Normalization of relations with Macedonia and Montenegro is absolutely necessary if Serbia is to integrate fully into Europe. This is why it is extremely important that the Serbian Government extends hand of cooperation to its neighbors who have gone further down the EU path than Serbia by organizing official visits to Skopje and Podgorica and withdrawing its decision declaring the ambassadors of those countries undesirable on Serbian soil.

Croatia could be Serbia's main partner on the path to the European Union, despite Serbia's toughened rhetoric on Croatia following Kosovo's independence. Zagreb should be Belgrade's main partner in the EU and NATO accession and also in refugee returns to Croatia and addressing other still pending issues from the armed conflicts in 1990s. The charges filed by both countries should be left to the International Court of Justice unless bilateral settlement of the dispute is not possible, in which case Serbia will have to respect the Court's judgment. At the same time, the Danube border dispute between Serbia and Croatia should be settled as soon as possible through bilateral negotiations with the Croatian government in order to prevent this issue from becoming an insurmountable obstacle at the moment of Serbia's EU accession.

Regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, as a guarantor of the Dayton Agreement, should support all the efforts the international community is making to redefine and make BiH more efficient through the constitutional reform. Without a constitutional reform in BiH, there will

be no internal stability or the stability in the region – which is necessary for the fast European integration of all West Balkan states.

Another important point of Serbia's new politics refers to the successful completion of cooperation with the Tribunal in the Hague. The Stabilization and Association Agreement and the Interim Trade Agreement with the European Union were ratified in the Serbian Parliament on 9 September, 2008. Ratification of these agreements has not yet begun in the EU because of the Dutch Government's opposition over Serbia's failure to establish full cooperation with the Tribunal in the Hague. Serbia should ensure the apprehension of Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic or otherwise to provide substantive evidence that it is unable to do that, thereby proving its full cooperation with the Tribunal in the Hague. Thereby, Serbia would demonstrate its ability to fulfill its international obligations, primarily those established in the judgment of the International Court of Justice in connection with Bosnia-Herzegovina's charges against Serbia, and also its genuine orientation to the basic values of united Europe – respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy and the rule of law.

The third item concerns the necessity for the constitutional reform in Serbia. On its path towards the European Union, Serbia will have to change some sections of its Constitution just as other countries of the region did, among them Slovenia, the country which changed its Constitution as many as two times before it acceded to the Union. There are two major obstacles in the Serbian 2006 Constitution which impede Serbia's EU path:

- a) provisions on Kosovo, and
- b) provisions on Serbia's scope of responsibility and the (lack of) primacy of international law over national law.

Kosovo is defined in the Preamble to the Serbian Constitution and the texts of the oaths taken by the highest power-holders as an autonomous province of Serbia. The rigid insistence on having this provision in the most fundamental law narrowed the leeway in negotiations with Kosovars on all pending Kosovo issues. Since the status of Kosovo was defined by international documents, the reasonable behavior of the political elite in power in Serbia would be their advocacy of changes in the relevant provisions of the Serbian Constitution in order to prevent any possible manipulation with the Serbian European integration in the future over the so-called Kosovo issue.

The Serbian Constitution, on the other hand, does not define the primacy of international law over national law. Thus it is envisaged in a completely amateur way that every international treaty has to be harmonized with the Constitution. Although Serbia and Kosovo are going separate EU paths, while the Stabilization and Association Agreement does not refer to Kosovo, this constitutional provision could be used as

a formal obstacle to Serbia's accession to the EU and as such must be changed urgently. At the same time, Chapter IV of the Constitution does not envisage transfer of sovereign powers to the supranational organization, i.e. the European Union, which can also be a very serious formal obstacle to Serbian accession to that organization.

Finally, a special point of acceleration on Serbia's EU path is Serbian attitude towards Kosovo issue. The policy-level road map for both Serbia and Kosovo envisages a number of steps. First of all, Serbia, focusing on rational and objective analysis of the situation in the world, should send a clear signal to the European Union that an agreement is possible under which Serbia, provided that an agreement is reached on future steps, will accept the Kosovo reality. As Serbia is unable to prevent the European Union member-states from recognizing Kosovo's independence, Serbia should open, rather than close, the chapter of its European prospects, which would be a rational thing to do.

Serbia should initiate an agreement with the European Union and the representatives of Kosovars which would regulate the status of Kosovo Serbs, implementation of their human and civil rights, citizenship, free access to cultural monuments and freedom of movement between Kosovo and Serbia. At the same time, Serbia should request from the European Union a clear guarantee that it will be granted a candidate status and a date of commencement of pre-accession negotiations. Within regional cooperation, after it gets a candidate status, Serbia should establish diplomatic relations with Kosovo, which would be a requirement for its accession to the European Union.

The above-proposed Kosovo policy and acceleration of Serbia's European integration would, after twenty years of conflicts and wars, help define new relations among the states in the region. In the long run, it would bring Serbia the greatest benefits, and would create for the West Balkan countries the preconditions necessary for enhancing stability and mutual trust and confidence.





# CONCLUSIONS

Asim MUJKIĆ

1. The year 1989 marked the beginning of inclusive processes in the former socialist countries of East, Central and Southeast Europe. Still, it can be concluded that those were not unequivocal processes. Inclusion implies, as the twenty-year-long transition has shown, also the micro-strategies of exclusion (Vlaisavljević and Mujkić), of which the most conspicuous are the anti-migration policy and the approach to the West Balkans. This complexity of the inclusive-exclusive processes may be considered as a reflection of Europe's search for its own political and cultural identity, resulting in the new walls built with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Of them, the most impressive is the Schengen wall; in other words, with the annulment of Division, another process was launched, that of creating new divisions the multiplication of which has no end in sight (Mujagić). This is why a kind of dialectics between inclusion and exclusion, the continuity which is based on discontinuity (Klotz), is awaiting its solution in the narration which Europeans will have to produce on their identity.
2. Joining the ranks of "successful democracies" implied, within the process initiated in 1989, the process – as understood in the old terms – of consolidating national states and their free markets on the basis of the concept of the right of the people to self-determination. At the same time, that area sparked the old ethnic myths, animosities and conflicts the accommodation of which depended primarily on the action by political elites – different directions of action by those elites are most visible in the example of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – and especially on the will of the Serb political elite, in the case of former Yugoslavia, so that the source of crisis and deviation of the democratization process in the West Balkans may be understood from the context of a failure to define the state borders of Serbia (Pavićević). It is in this context that a different course of "transition processes" in Southeast Europe should be interpreted. This is the reason why it is extremely important to analyze action and value orientations of the political elites (Zakošek).
3. Accepting Etienne Balibar's statement that the fate of the European identity is being solved in the Balkans, the upheavals in the articulation of the European identity are closely related to the absence of

a connecting narration of the social hope which was a motivating power of the 1989 Revolution. There are no narrations of hope (Demeš) or narrations of social justice which we link to Rawls's teaching (Sekulić) without an emancipatory discourse, which has been in crisis ever since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Hope is closely linked to freedom, while freedoms appear today, in a neo-liberalist context, assuming the shape of an ideological system, in the form of consumer freedoms and the freedom of movement of capital. Today in particular, there is a need for a 'disruptive thought' (Ćurak) which could oppose the dominant, largely Orientalist discourses of the European Union towards this part of the world (Petrović), opposite to such a disciplining opinion which is imposed, for example, through the Bologna higher education reform. If, as Bogdan Denitch concludes, "genuine democracy requires at least the minimum of commitment to social justice", room has to be found for that discourse in the entire area of the former communist bloc, and in the West Balkans in particular.

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
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**Fondacija Heinrich Böll** je njemačka politička fondacija koja je po svojoj orijentaciji bliska stranci Savez 90 / Zeleni. Njen osnovni zadatak jeste političko obrazovanje građana/građanki u zemljama u kojima djeluje s ciljem unapređenja demokratskih potencijala, društveno-političkog angažmana građana i građanki i razumijevanja među narodima. U svom radu orijentiše se prema osnovnim političkim vrijednostima, kao što su zaštita okoliša i održivi razvoj, demokratija, solidarnost i nenasilje. Ohrabrujuće riječi Heinricha Bölla: „Umiješati se, jeste jedini način da se ostane realističan.“, moto su djelovanja Fondacije.

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