VOLUME 28

Sudan after Separation

New Approaches to a New Region

Contributions by Francis M. Deng, Edward Thomas, Magdi el-Gizouli, Aly Verjee, Jok Madut Jok, Paula Cristina Roque, Wolfram Lacher, Laura James, Kathrin Maria Scherr, Harry Verhoeven

Edited by the Heinrich Böll Foundation and Toni Weis

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

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PUBLICATION SERIES ON DEMOCRACY

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Notes to the photos

All pictures inside this volume are stills from *Change of a Nation*, a film in the making: four filmmakers, four protagonists, all born in Sudan, all from different cultural and social backgrounds. Four storylines intertwine into a visually and emotionally capturing testimony of the birth of two new states and the effects this dramatic event has on the people in North and South Sudan. The documentary film is going to be produced by Perfect Shot Films in Berlin and was supported by the Heinrich Böll Foundation in its initial phase.

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New Approaches to a New Region
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PREFACE

Hardly a year has passed since Sudan split in two. For much of this time, the dominant question has not so much been whether the two countries will eventually return to war, but whether or not they have already done so. As early as 3 February 2012, Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir declared his country to be «closer to war than to peace» with South Sudan.[1] Since then, both sides have continuously been embroiled in conflict along their border as well as further inland; in some places this means direct military confrontation, in others old allies and new proxies confront one another. Bashir's call to «liberate the south» has done little to defuse the tensions, nor has the south's new-found military audacity. Clearly, the Republic of Sudan and its new neighbour to the south – these «two states born out of the fatigue of constructing one»[2] – have been off to a rough start.

Many observers are quick to point out that the years of relative peace represented an anomaly in Sudan's recent history and that the country's original fault lines are still in place. There is an element of truth in this: Sudan's old periphery has been replaced by a new but no less contested one, and those in power have remained the same. Yet the independence of South Sudan has fundamentally altered the political landscape. It has left the economy of the north, and the government that depends upon it, considerably poorer; it has uprooted hundreds of thousands of people whose lives straddled both sides of the new border; and it has turned the leaders of north and south, erstwhile accomplices (if not partners) in the previous Government of National Unity, once again into enemies.

The end of unity in Sudan also meant the end of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). For political leaders on both sides, the agreement had stipulated clear goals; for the international community, it had structured political debate and engagement on the ground. As Aly Verjee states in his contribution, the CPA, «for all its deficiencies, provided numerous milestones, that if nothing else could be checked off as being missed.» With the CPA a thing of the past, the governments of north and south lack a clearly defined framework within which to discuss the many outstanding issues, and the international actors, too, who remain active in the Sudans are trying to identify new points of engagement.

More than ever, good analysis is needed, and is essential to make sense of the never-ending stream of breaking news flowing from the region in recent months. Building on its 2010 publication, *Sudan – No Easy Ways Ahead*, the Heinrich Böll

1 AFP, «Sudan closer to war than peace with south: Bashir», 3 February 2012.

2 Magdi el-Gizouli, «The Sudanese divorce: one wine, two broken bottles», blog post on 14 September 2011, http://stillsudan.blogspot.co.uk/2011/09/sudanese-divorce-one-wine-two-broken.html

Foundation has therefore brought together a new group of authors to reflect on the challenges of the post-separation era. Their contributions lay out ‹new approaches to a new region,› providing guidance to understand the complex political realities of the two Sudans, and pointing out areas where constructive international engagement is possible.

The book opens with a panoramic view of the two Sudans one year after the split. Francis Deng, one of the most seasoned and compassionate observers of Sudan's troubled history, shares his personal reflections on what he calls the «paradox of Southern independence.» Recalling the «bitter-sweet response» he felt during the independence celebrations in Juba, he pleads with the governments of both north and south not to take separation as an excuse for continued acrimony, but to accept the shared history of the two Sudans as the basis for peaceful coexistence. Eddie Thomas then goes on to develop a convincing analogy for Sudan's post-separation predicament: that of a «strange duopoly» that has given way to two unstable monopolies. Outlining the various «modes of opposition» faced by the NCP in Khartoum and the SPLM in Juba, he traces the fault lines of the new polities and looks at the difficult times ahead.

The next two chapters look at the ways in which the south's independence has transformed the north. Aly Verjee highlights both changes at the centre, where military hardliners face the dilemma of controlling a more urban population with substantially fewer means, and in the peripheries, where old and new military contenders are joining forces against the government in Khartoum. Magdi el-Gizouli then addresses the question of how the NCP managed not only to dodge the regional turmoil of the Arab Spring, but even to portray its own rise to power as a «Sudanese foretaste» of the latter. He points to the Islamic movement's increasingly populist rhetoric, which has mobilised its constituency in the wake of the south's separation, and to the disconnection between Khartoum's «generation facebook» and impoverished populations in the peripheries.

The contributions by Jok Madut Jok and Paula Roque, on the other hand, focus on some of the challenges facing the new Government of South Sudan. Jok, an undersecretary in the Ministry of Culture, makes the case for an inclusive nation-building project that can unite South Sudan's diverse population even in the absence of a common enemy. Roque, drawing on recent interviews with the South Sudanese leadership, traces the SPLM's transformation from rebel movement to ruling party. She argues that, while the SPLM has shown its ability to adapt to radically altered circumstances, it is reluctant to trade in its liberation credentials for a more democratic kind of legitimacy.

The book concludes with concrete advice on ways in which the international community, and the German government in particular, can play a positive role in this tense political climate. Wolfram Lacher presents an overview of the main points of contention among international actors: Which side is to blame in the post-separation conflicts; who among the foreign powers should get involved; and the question whether a confrontational stance makes sense or not. Contrasting Germany's considerable financial investment in the Sudanese peace processes with its limited leverage

on the ground, he stresses that the best approach would not be to inflate bilateral aid, but to push for greater co-ordination and commitment within the EU and the UN. The convoluted nature of post-CPA politics in the two Sudans calls for clear security guarantees and unequivocal sanctions, not for an even greater cacophony of donors jostling for influence.

No Easy Ways Ahead was the title we chose for our previous report on Sudan, and there is little in the above to suggest that the road ahead will be any smoother. Nevertheless, there is a world of difference between a messy divorce and a no-holds-barred return to the battlefield. The many injustices and contradictions the Sudanese state(s) and societies have incurred over the centuries cannot simply be erased by a new war. Sudan's political arena may often be marked by violence, but experience shows that difficult compromises and strategic détente are also a possibility. We hope that this book will point to such opportunities – and that it will convey the urgency to seize them now.

Berlin, May 2012

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FRANCIS M. DENG

The Paradox of Southern Independence – Some Personal Reflections

I was honoured to be included in the delegation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the celebrations of South Sudan's independence on 9 July 2011. As I experienced that momentous event, with virtually the whole of Juba's residents and more people from other areas of South Sudan jubilantly parading or watching in the blazing heat, and leaders from around the world in attendance, I felt a bittersweet response. On the one hand, the independence of the south was the realisation of a dream for which the people had fought intermittently for half a century and sacrificed a great deal; it was a clear victory of right over wrong. On the other hand, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) had also inspired many areas of the north to rise up against injustice and to fight for a New Sudan – a country of equality and non-discrimination on the bases of race, ethnicity, religion, culture, and gender; this objective was not achieved and their struggle would undoubtedly continue.

The people of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, who had fought alongside their comrades in the south, had been granted a process of «popular consultation» under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The objective of the consultation was to probe their views on the system of governance provided under the CPA. It was, however, a vague and nebulous provision that nobody fully understood, but which everybody knew did not match the sacrifices they had made. Darfur and Eastern Sudan were still suffering the devastations of war. And the anomalous situation in the border area of Abyei remained unresolved. Add to this the many post-CPA issues between Sudan and South Sudan that still remain unaddressed. I felt therefore that the euphoria of the southerners over their independence had to be tempered by a degree of apprehension about the future, given the interconnected conflicts across the borders.

The ambivalent path to southern independence

The remarkable attendance at the festivities for southern independence by leaders not only from Africa but from around the world was a positive response to the peaceful, transparent, and unexpectedly successful conduct of the referendum on self-determination that resulted in a near-unanimous vote for independence. However, having closely observed the process, it was obvious to me that the international support for

southern independence marked a significant shift away from earlier concerns about the potential dangers of partition.

Initially, while peace was precariously maintained during the interim period, the implementation of the various provisions of the CPA proved to be very contentious, reflecting a deep mistrust between the parties. For the south, the challenge was to prevent a collapse of the CPA that would have deprived the people of the south of their most precious achievement – the exercise of the right of self-determination. The north appeared ambivalently poised between resisting and undermining those elements of the agreement that supported southern independence while avoiding a return to war. Most observers seemed convinced that the NCP, despite statements to the contrary by its leadership, would not honour the right of self-determination for the south. Others,

In the south: celebrating independance

however, suspected that the NCP in fact favoured southern secession to rid itself of the non-Arab and non-Muslim factor that put a constraint on its Arab-Islamic agenda and monopoly on power. After all, in Sudan's history, the south had always been a decisive factor in the overthrow of central governments.

As the interim period was nearing its end, the African region and the international community began to take more seriously the possible implications of southern independence. The more it became evident that unity had not been made attractive, and that secession seemed the most likely outcome, the greater the apprehensions about the possible consequences.

Prominent regional and international personalities began to question the wisdom of allowing the south to secede, as they feared this might entail potential disaster not

only for Sudan, but also for East Africa, if not Africa as a whole. Such alarm bells were very much in tune with what the north had argued all along – that the south could not be a viable independent state and that intertribal warfare would tear the new country apart. Some well-intentioned African leaders even criticised South Sudan's looming independence as a bad example for Africa, as it might encourage numerous other secessionist movements.

With the January 2011 referendum fast approaching, the debate over the prospects of unity intensified. In November 2009, the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, UNMIS, organised a symposium on unity and self-determination in Khartoum with the not-so-hidden agenda to explore prospects for making unity more attractive. I was asked to give the keynote address, an honour that I initially declined but eventually accepted, and I stated the obvious: Short of a miracle, time for unity was over. I argued, however, for a form of unity beyond partition, namely one through close association between the two independent states, with the prospect of re-unification, should the north create conditions favourable to the SPLM/A's concept of a New Sudan.

After all, the political struggle of the south did not start out with independence as the goal, but with a call for federalism, which was denied, and a compromise on regional autonomy, which was subsequently dishonoured. Even during the peace talks, the SPLM/A proposed a confederal arrangement – something the Sudanese Government rejected. Thus, self-determination with the option for independence became the south's residual option. Secession was, therefore, a reaction to flagrant mistreatment by the north and its rejection of any form of genuine self-governance for the south. Given the long historical connection between north and south, and shared elements overshadowed by protracted conflict, it is conceivable that, if the country's constitution were reformed, the blatant inequities of the old system removed, and the vision of the New Sudan of justice and equality become reality, a case could be made for at least some form of association.

Surprisingly, in another volte-face, the international community shifted its position from apprehension about independence to full support for the referendum and its possible result, independence. In a High Level Panel on the Sudan convened by Ban Ki-moon during the 2010 General Assembly session, and attended by heads of state, ministers, and senior government representatives, this was the view widely held by all who spoke.

A senior colleague at the United Nations who is very familiar with Sudan called the smooth process leading to southern independence «too good to be true.» My response to his remark was that, if it were too good to be true, then this was ground to watch out for something that may still go seriously wrong. Sadly, the now divided Sudan is, once again, a country in grave crisis and, once again, the focus of international concern.

While a number of practical issues are still being negotiated, the recent crisis over Sudan's seizure of South Sudan's oil as compensation for allegedly unpaid pipeline fees, and the south's retaliation by shutting down its oil production, have raised the stakes for both countries. These developments make renewed war likely, notwithstanding that neither side would easily embrace another round of conflict.

Persistent national identity crisis

While these factors are of immediate importance, it is my firm belief that the reasons for Greater Sudan's interconnected conflicts are still rooted in the crisis of national identity, something I have analysed in numerous publications over the years, and which now cuts across state borders[1]. It is therefore necessary to go back to the history of this crisis from which the country has suffered since, and even before, independence.

There are two dimensions to Sudan's national identity crisis: The first is the distorted self-perception of a hybrid Arab-African minority that sees itself as homogenously Arab in race, language, and culture, with Islam as a conspicuous ingredient; the second is the projection of this distorted self-perception as forming the framework for an all-embracing national identity. This is what drives discrimination against non-Arabs and non-Muslims in both north and south, something that was, historically, viewed as a north-south dualism or simplistically perceived as an Arab-African dichotomy.

This dualism developed during a period when Muslims who spoke Arabic, embraced Arab culture, and could trace or concoct descent from Arab ancestry were elevated to a status of relative dignity and respectability, with little or no regard to colour of skin. If, on the other hand, you were a black African and a «heathen,» you were a legitimate target for enslavement. Over time, the north subsumed even the non-Arab groups into the Arab-Islamic mould. Since the south remained African, had indigenous belief systems, and tried to defend itself against slave raids and, after the advent of the British, increasingly converted to Christianity, southerners developed an identity based on the resistance against Arabism and Islam, both of which were viewed as tools of enslavement, domination, discrimination, and oppression.

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1 Books on this theme include: *Dynamics of Identification: A Basis for National Integration in the Sudan*, Khartoum University Press, 1974; *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan*, The Brookings Institution, 1995; *New Sudan in the Making? A Nation in Painful Search of Itself*, Africa World Press/ The Red Sea Press, 2010; *Sudan at the Brink: Self-Determination and National Unity*, Institute for Humanitarian Cooperation and Fordham University Press, 2010; and two novels, *Seed of Redemption*, Lilian Barber Press, 1986, and *Cry of the Owl*, Lilian Barber Press, 1989. A selection of articles on the theme of identity in the conflict include: «Identity Factor in the Sudanese Conflict» in Joseph V. Montville (editor), *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*, Heath and Company, 1991; «War of Visions for the Nation» in John O. Voll (editor), *Sudan, State and Society*, Indiana University Press, 1991; «Hidden Agendas in the Peace Process» in M.W. Daly and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga, *Civil War in the Sudan*, British Academic Press, 1993; «Islamic Fundamentalism in the Sudan: A Symptom of an Identity Crisis» in Hans d'Orville (editor), *Perspectives of Global Responsibility*, Inter-Action Council, 1993; «Negotiating Hidden Agendas,» in I.W. Zartman, *Elusive Peace Agreements: Negotiating An End to Civil Wars*, Brookings, 1995; «Sudan: The Challenge of Nationhood,» in Wolfgang Danspeckgraber and Arthur Watts, (editors), *A Sourcebook on Self-Determination and Self-Administration*, Lynne Riener Publishers, 1997; «Sudan's Turbulent Road to Nationhood,» in Ricardo Rene Laremont, *Borders, Nationalism and the African State*, Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2005; and «Sudan: A Case of Mismanaged Diversity,» in Francis M. Deng, (editor), *Self-Determination and National Unity: A Challenge for Africa*, Africa World Press, 2010.

The British, the dominant partner in the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, governed the country as two in one, with the central Arab riverain regions being relatively more privileged and developed, peripheral non-Arab regions in the north marginalised, and the south the most neglected and subordinated. Initially, the British left open the options of the south becoming either independent or being annexed to East Africa. Toward the end of colonial rule, however, they decided to unify the country under a centralised system of government.

In August 1955, with independence imminent, the south, apprehensive that its historical mistreatment would continue under Arab-Muslim rule, started a secessionist rebellion. Seventeen years later, this war ended with a compromise, the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, which granted the south regional autonomy within a united Sudan. The unilateral abrogation of the Addis Ababa accord, ten years later by President Jaafar Nimeiri, the very man who had made it possible in the first place, led to the outbreak of the second war in 1983, which was fought under the leadership of the SPLM/A and ended with the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Unlike the first war, the objective of the second war was not southern secession, but the liberation of the whole country from the distortions of Sudan's identity and the creation of a New Sudan that would be free from any discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion, culture, or gender. The concept of a New Sudan was generally viewed as the vision of Dr. John Garang de Mabior, the leader of the SPLM/A, and initially it was not taken seriously by either north or south, except as a screen for the south's hidden agenda. This agenda was frequently expressed when fighters in the south said, «We know what we are fighting for,» which was understood to mean «independence.» Yet, over time, the vision of a New Sudan began to inspire many, in particular in the marginalised areas of the north.

In the mid-1980s, the Nuba of Southern Kordofan and the Ingessana or Fung of Blue Nile joined the SPLM/A in its struggle for a New Sudan. Later, the Beja rose and allied themselves with the SPLM/A. The Darfurians first rebelled in 1992, also in alliance with the SPLM/A, but were crushed – only to resume the struggle in 2003. Paradoxically, even as the CPA was being negotiated and peace was about to come to the south, the war in Darfur intensified.

Implications of southern independence for the north

The US Sudan Policy Task Force, an initiative of the Center of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which I was honoured to co-chair with J. Stephan Morrison, proposed the formula «One country, two systems» to reconcile the two contrasting visions: northern aspirations for unity, and the south's quest for independence. However, this formula, which was adopted in the CPA, unwittingly entrenched the division of the country. In January 2011, the south voted overwhelmingly in favour of independence, which was formally declared on 9 July 2011.

Despite the independence of the south, there was reason to believe that the marginalised regions of the north would remain committed to the struggle for a New Sudan and would look to an independent south for support. On my visit to Southern

Kordofan and Blue Nile States, following the conclusion of the CPA, that message was conveyed to me in no uncertain terms. I felt sure, however, that support by the south would almost certainly provoke the north to encourage inter-ethnic conflicts in the south and thus destabilise the nascent country. President Salva Kiir Mayardit announced at the independence celebrations that South Sudan would not abandon its former allies in the north, but would support their cause through peaceful means and in co-operation with Sudan. Unfortunately, this noble aspiration has not materialised. Instead, the now violent conflicts in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile are spilling across the borders, and there is a strong belief in South Sudan that Khartoum has a hand in these inter-ethnic conflicts.

The situation in Abyei poses an even greater threat. The Abyei Protocol of the CPA gave the members of the nine chiefdoms of the Ngok Dinka and other residents of the area the same rights granted by the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement – but it was not implemented, that is, Abyei was not allowed to choose whether to join the south or remain under the administration of the north, to which the British had annexed the area in 1905. It also established the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC), whose demarcation of the borders was to be final and binding. The NCP's rejection of its findings led to military clashes, after which the parties decided to submit the case to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), which, to promote peace, revised the borders set by the ABC and ceded more territory to the north. Initially, both sides accepted the PCA ruling, but the NCP later changed its mind and resisted implementation.

Repeated clashes over Abyei culminated in military occupation by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) in May 2011, leading to yet another mass displacement of the Ngok Dinka. In June, the parties agreed to an Interim Security Force for Abyei (ISFA) composed of Ethiopian troops, the withdrawal of all other forces from the area, and the return of the displaced Ngok Dinka to their homes. An Abyei Joint Oversight Committee (AJOC), co-chaired by representatives of Sudan and South Sudan, was established to monitor and support the implementation. It is widely recognised that the Ethiopian troops are providing credible protection and have won the confidence of much of the population, some of which has begun returning to the area. However, so far SAF forces have not been withdrawn, and it is being reported that Missiriya nomads have entered the area in large numbers heavily armed and with their herds, a factor that deters most people from returning.

Despite the crisis in Abyei, this border region has historically been a peaceful point of contact and co-operation between north and south. While the Ngok are now identified with the south, the area can still play a bridging role between the two, now independent Sudanese states – as affirmed by the Abyei Protocol of the CPA. The protocol calls for a conceptual, institutional, and operational framework to support the return, resettlement, re-integration, and socio-economic development of the local populations, with due consideration to the needs of the nomadic Missiriya Arabs within their regular area of residence as well as in the transitional zone of their seasonal migrations in search of water and pasture in Ngok Dinka territory.

The Ngok Dinka Deputy Paramount Chief, Deng Makuei (Deng Abot), has compared Abyei to the eye, «so small, and yet it sees so much.» Today, this metaphor can be reversed in that Abyei, though small and remote, is under the watchful eye of the international community. I am of the opinion that the Ngok Dinka can now rest assured that the world is watching, and that, if need be, the international community will come to their rescue and protection.

The quest to manage diversity

To reiterate the point made at the outset, while there are immediate military, political, social, and distributional issues that need urgent attention, it is my contention that the crisis of national identity and the persistent failure, since independence, to manage diversity constructively is at the core of Sudan's interconnected conflicts. This confronts the states of Sudan and South Sudan with several challenges.

First, the north must address the genuine grievances of the marginalised regions to promote the principles embodied in the concept of a New Sudan in the northern context.

Second, South Sudan must correct the past mistakes of the north by adopting a framework for a southern national identity that promotes inclusiveness, equality, and dignity for all ethnic groups – without discrimination.

Third, the cause of the people of Abyei that, in two wars, has driven them to join the south must be effectively addressed by implementing the Abyei Protocol of the CPA and the findings of the PCA.

Fourth, the genuine needs of the Missiriya for secure access to water and pasture in Ngok Dinka territory must also be met, and reconciliation, peaceful co-existence, and co-operation between the two communities must be fostered to reinforce the stipulated role of the area as a bridge between north and south.

Fifth, both Sudan and South Sudan cannot be indifferent to the genuine grievances of disadvantaged and marginalised groups. They should help each other to address such grievances in ways that promote peace, security, stability, and equality for all and thus lead to good neighbourly relations between the two countries.

Unity and partition in John Garang's vision

It has always been my view that centuries of contact, interaction, and mutual influence between north and south in the Nile Valley has left much in common, yet this has been overshadowed so much by more recent violent confrontations that the respective peoples see hardly any common ground anymore. I have also always postulated three alternative outcomes to the conflict between north and south: unity in a fundamentally reformed national framework; co-existence in a loose form of diversified unity; and outright partition. These alternatives have much in common with three of John Garang's Five Models:

- a transformed democratic New Sudan;
- a confederal arrangement;

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- a system of Arab-Islamic domination;
- an indigenous African-dominated secular state;
- partitioning the country into two separate states2. While Garang is popularly known for his commitment to unity, I believe his position was far more complex. He saw unity in a fundamentally transformed Sudan as the ideal, accepted loose co-existence in a confederated Sudan as a possible compromise, and recognised that the separation of the south would be the unavoidable outcome should either of the two other options fail. Options 3 and 4, a predominantly Arab-Muslim or African-secular identity, were out of the question. After the signing of the CPA, Garang is reported to have said to southerners that for him the SPLM/A had delivered self-determination on a silver plate, and that it would be for them to decide whether to be free as first class citizens of an independent south or to remain second class citizens in the Old Sudan.

To Garang, self-determination leading to independence was not something to be given, but a right which, by definition, had to be exercised. On occasion I heard him say, maybe somewhat too graphically, «We will squeeze them [the north] until they vomit us out.» The complexity of his thinking is reflected in his remark that even if the interests of southerners were limited to their own region, they could best achieve and guarantee them by transforming the centre. To him, southern independence was always a fallback position; the strategic course of action was for the SPLM/A to follow him in the war until the south was liberated. At that point, those interested in liberating only the south could stop, while those fighting to liberate the whole country would continue. However, he would add: «If my soldiers stop at the northern border, how can I pursue the war in the north alone?» This indicated that the objective of liberating the whole country might be a tactical means of achieving southern independence. On the other hand, he would say, «but if we succeed in liberating the whole country towards the vision of a transformed New Sudan, why would we still want to secede?»

Garang's complex ideas indicate that no outcome can be without a degree of ambivalence, which is why I had mixed emotions at the celebrations of southern independence – rejoicing in the freedom of the south and lamenting the plight of those still oppressed in the Old Sudan of the north. It must be remembered that southern independence was the result of the failure to make unity attractive. Since the SPLM/A had inspired Sudanese all across the country, southern independence should be viewed as a partial accomplishment, an unfinished job, a work in progress. I have always said that, although John Garang was a friend and I knew him well, I could never confirm whether he was an uncompromising unionist, a separatist who used the goal of unity as a tactical ploy, or, to varying degrees, a combination of both. I would, however, venture to say that had he lived, he would have felt justified by southern independence, which he alluded to on a number of occasions, but he would also have continued to work for a transformed Sudan, something that may

2 See El Wathig Kameir, «Toward Building the New Sudan,» in Francis M. Deng, *New Sudan in the Making*, p.21.

have resulted in a framework of closer association and integration between the two independent states. This concords with the position taken by President Salva Kiir at the declaration of southern independence, when he said that South Sudan would never forget its comrades in northern liberation movements, but would support their cause through peaceful means and in co-operation with the government of Sudan. This is a challenge that I believe the leadership in both Sudan and South Sudan are called upon to address.

Conclusion

Since independence, Sudan has been intermittently at war because of its intractable crisis of national identity and the flagrant mismanagement of diversity. If the CPA is credibly implemented and sustained – not only between north and south, but also with implications for peace in both countries – it would offer the people in north and south their first opportunity to resolve the chronic crisis of national identity and establish a system of governance that constructively manages diversity within and between the two states. What is needed is a shift in the mindset, a shift from hostility and acrimony to peaceful co-existence and co-operation. After all, unity and separation are varying degrees of on-going relationships that can be strengthened or weakened, depending on the will of the people and particularly their leaders.

EDWARD THOMAS

The New Governments in Juba and Khartoum – and How to Oppose Them

The CPA: A Strange Duopoly that Turned into Two Monopolies

In 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the southern-based former rebels of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), created a novel political order that decisively shifted the unbalanced and unfair relationship between Khartoum and peripheral Sudan. The CPA brought former rebels from Sudan's most impoverished and conflict-prone periphery – the south – into the heart of government. The agreement also set up an autonomous southern government, which received half of the southern oil revenues, and which organised, in 2011, a referendum on the south's self-determination. In the six years preceding that referendum, the two parties to the CPA led a coalition government in Khartoum. In this coalition, the SPLM played junior partner to the National Congress Party (NCP), a Khartoum-based alliance of Islamists, senior security officers, finance/merchant capital, and rural traditional authorities that, in 1989, had seized power in a coup. The two parties to the CPA recognised each other's security forces, and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) controlled the south, the Sudan People's Armed Forces (SAF) the north. In the war-torn border areas of Blue Nile, South Kordofan and Abyei (to the north of the internal border established by colonial powers) the two forces were jointly deployed. In border states, the SPLM and the NCP had an almost equal shares of posts; and in Juba, the NCP was the junior member of a coalition dominated by the SPLM.

The 2010 general elections changed all of these SPLA-NCP coalitions. Nearly all the political parties and armed movements that make up Sudan's opposition boycotted the polls and the NCP and SPLM agreed not to contest the elections in each other's sphere of influence. Consequently, the NCP withdrew its candidates in the south, and the SPLM withdrew its presidential candidate, and withdrew from (or boycotted, in the phrase of the day) contests for northern parliamentary seats, governorships, and the national presidency. The elections were thus not competitive, yet voter participation was at a historic high. A more competitive presidential election would have given Sudanese people a direct choice between the SPLM's and the NCP's vision of society; instead the two parties opted to help one another to decisive victories in their respective spheres.

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Negotiations were acrimonious and finally concluded a few weeks before the elections, just in time to present Sudanese people with a new duopoly that was curiously resilient and that set the stage for southern secession the next year. On 9 July 2011, Sudan lost the southern third of its territory to the new state of South Sudan, and secession thus turned the duopoly into two monopolies, Sudan and South Sudan. The stability of these monopolies is now being tested by violence and other non-electoral means. Violence first broke out in border areas where the SPLM and the NCP shared power; in those three respective areas, the 2010 elections were suspended, delayed, or inconclusive. This essay sets out the background of opposition movements in Sudan and South Sudan and their future prospects.

Opposing the monopoly on power

For the first few years after the CPA was signed in 2005, the SPLM balanced multiple roles with some clumsiness. It was a party of transformation with a vision of a Sudan at ease with its fabulous diversity; a junior member of a national governing coalition; an opposition group representing marginal groups in northern Sudan; a military organisation on the way of becoming a political party; a guarantor of southern rights; a harbinger of southern independence. Finally, during the 2010 elections, the movement settled on the latter two roles, as it seemed easier to attain independence than to transform Sudan's conflict-ridden political order that had set Khartoum at odds with its diverse and populous peripheries that are rich in resources, yet impoverished. The decision was a disappointment for northern armed and unarmed opposition movements, groups that during the CPA period had eagerly awaited co-optation by the SPLM. Who were they? And why did they seek co-optation?

Urban, Khartoum-based opposition movements had joined the SPLM in the National Democratic Alliance, an umbrella group established in 1989 when the leaders of today's NCP first seized power. This included the traditional parties that had led most of Sudan's governments. The traditional parties had evolved from nineteenth century religious sects with extensive rural constituencies – but after 20 years of NCP rule, their rural bases had been fragmented and their ability to serve them has been much diminished. Left parties, on the other hand, once led disciplined labour and civil society organisations in urban Sudan. These organisations were abolished when Omar al-Bashir took power, their leaders only returning over a decade later as foreign-funded NGO activists; today, almost all of them are out of touch with everyday political struggles. The opposition also included Islamists who split from the NCP after 1998. The SPLM's successes in war and during peace negotiations and its presence at the heart of government attracted all of these groups. Additionally, the SPLM set up a northern branch that tried to mobilise workers in the boomtowns of central Sudan as well as people who had fled rural conflict zones and settled on the margins of those boomtowns. For all these groups the SPLM's decision to facilitate the NCP's victory in 2010 created a crisis, and this was particularly true for the SPLM's northern branch that was left out on a limb.

Armed opposition movements had also put their bets on the SPLM's transformative potential. In Eastern Sudan, armed movements had fought alongside the SPLM since the 1990s. In Darfur, decades of instability turned to outright insurgency in 2003, and the NCP's ferocious response to that insurgency was intended to forestall the emergence of another SPLM military alliance while the NCP was negotiating with the SPLM an end to the war fought in the south and its borderlands. The NCP was able to isolate the struggles in its northern peripheries from the issues at stake in the CPA, thus frustrating an alliance of peripheral dissent. Regional rebels were forced to accept peace deals that had some striking formal similarities to the CPA. Such peace deals gave some former rebels a place in the CPA's order – in 2006, one former rebel from Darfur was made Assistant to the President – but did not change that order significantly. Darfur rebels continued to borrow the SPLM's political rhetoric, but hopes of a political alliance were thwarted as the SPLM decided that to take on the problems of all of Sudan's peripheries would jeopardise the independence of the south.

Why did northern opposition forces hope the SPLM would co-opt them? In part, it was that they had no serious project to make the best of a rapidly changing country. The biggest opposition parties bore some of the responsibility for the crisis. Their policies of building purely sectarian and ethnic alliances in Sudan's northern peripheries had been accompanied by long-standing neglect. In the past three decades, their political dominance fell apart, and the SPLM and NCP, two parties with close links to the Sudanese army, had supplanted them.

In different ways, the NCP and the SPLM reshaped existing ethnic constituencies to extend their authority over Sudan's rural majority. The NCP fostered divisions among the ethnic

constituencies of northern parties, with the result that in areas like Darfur and Eastern Sudan sectarian and ethnic strife descended into endless wars, which spurred the concentration of wealth and opportunity in the centre. In the south, too, military intelligence officers from Khartoum mobilised proxy forces around ethnicity.

Peripheral wars are no bar to economic growth. The NCP was able to use these wars to

centralise labour and natural resources and for over a decade now has used the new globalised markets in labour, finance, and commodities to achieve spectacular rates of growth in its heartland. It also used the wars to deny its urban opponents the possibility of mobilising rural Sudan, and the possibility of creating a genuinely national movement. The complexity of Sudan's possibilities, oppressions, and constraints requires supple and rigorous analysis in combination with effective mobilisation, and these tasks daunt the best minds of the opposition. NCP incumbents know how to handle Sudan's wars and wealth, and the northern opposition does not know how to stop them.

Modes of opposition

Because Sudan's divisions revolve around the unequal relationship between centre and periphery, most opponents of the regime conceive of two approaches towards

change. One is an uprising (*intifada*) in Khartoum, toppling the regime from its heartland, the other attempts to mobilise the periphery – ethnic groups, religious sects, or militias – towards a takeover of the centre.

Intifada: Mobilising the centre

In October 1964 and again in April 1985, street demonstrations in Khartoum brought about the fall of military dictatorships. The Sudan Communist Party played a key role in organising the demonstrations, mobilising trade unions and other organisations and drawing in politicians from the traditional parties. However, in the parliamentary elections that followed these two intifadas, the left was unable to sustain its successes on the streets because, back then, rural Sudan was less politically fragmented than it is today, and traditional parties were able to bring out the rural vote. Nonetheless, at the time, the intifadas made Khartoum activists confident about the possibility of democratic change. After the 1989 coup that brought the present NCP leadership to power, this buoyant feeling became history. The new leadership abolished civil society by decree, and set up a security apparatus and party militias that could overpower any challenge from the streets. Constitutional rule was only re-established in 1998, and civil society became increasingly visible in 2002 as the peace process in South Sudan got under way.

Even today, the regime is still afraid of the intifadas of old – as proven when last year, during the anniversary of the 1964 revolution, it banned all celebrations. Many ordinary Sudanese believe that the regime's security apparatus still has the clout to put down any challenge from the streets, and this is what kept many Sudanese activists off the streets, even when the Arab Spring began in January 2011 – at the same time the NCP was conceding to the secession of South Sudan. Some young activists did take to the streets in early 2011. The security forces› response was at once carefully calibrated and harsh – on *YouTube* one young activist posted an account of a gang rape during detention.

Her intervention may have stopped the use of rape against female detainees in urban

areas, yet it failed to galvanise sizable street protest. The protests that did take place were marked by the absence of older activists – flummoxed perhaps by Sudan's wide-ranging and arcane structures of oppression. Instead, fortysomethings with political leanings waited, hoping that youthful impatience and indignation could take the place of the courage, strategy, and tactics that had eluded them.

Youth is a glittering weapon. However, the treacherously complex mix of economic and political oppressions young activists in Khartoum are facing can sometimes tax the analytical abilities of the politically inexperienced and make it difficult for them to come up with programmes able to mobilise the disaffected at large.

In Khartoum, people unhappy with the regime – like those in Beirut, Algiers, or Baghdad, and unlike those in Libya or Syria – may fear instability more than they hope for change. In addition, mobilisation faces some intractable constraints. In Egypt, for example, strikers in factories were able to challenge the government's control over official unions. In Khartoum, on the other hand, unions are still led by regime

insiders, and strikes are harder to organise and maintain, as many new jobs are in the informal sector. Young activists also find it difficult to win over traditional opposition parties. The NCP has split two main traditional parties, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the Umma party, into a dozen competing groups, and it has entangled their leading families in negotiations for seats or influence in national government (in December 2011, three DUP politicians accepted ministerial posts). Like the SPLM during the CPA period, these parties are trying to be part of government and opposition alike, thus paralysing any opposition. Some observers believe that the opposition could act more decisively if the traditional parties fully joined the government. The NCP believes that, on the other hand, power-sharing divides the opposition, yet, on the other, it genuinely wants the traditional parties as allies because, although it trounced them in the 2010 elections, it has doubts about its own hold on power – something not so surprising after two decades of rule, the Arab spring, and the loss of one third of the country's territory.

The Mahdi: Mobilising the periphery

Building an opposition movement at the centre faces daunting challenges. It is likely that because of that opposition forces favour the second approach – mobilising at the periphery and marching on Khartoum. The Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), an alliance formed in the course of 2011 between Darfurian rebels and the SPLM northern branch, is the latest attempt. In May 2011, South Sudan's imminent secession cut the SPLM northern branch adrift. Its election boycott (or tactical withdrawal) in 2010 left the SPLM with little representation in northern Sudan, outside the two border states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile and the contested enclave of Abyei. The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) occupied Abyei in May 2011, and then the NCP won a delayed and disputed election in South Kordofan in June – at which point the SPLM northern branch took to arms.

Under the terms of the CPA, the SPLA maintained forces in South Kordofan in joint units with the SAF. It was required to withdraw or demobilise other forces in the state, yet it failed to do so: SPLA forces in South Kordofan were of Kordofan origin, and they did not want to withdraw to the south. In the run-up to South Sudan's secession, the future of these deployments was not resolved, and some of them embarked on a military campaign against the NCP-led government. The forces of the SPLM's northern branch met an immediate and ferocious response from the SAF. Within six months, Khartoum opened three new military fronts – in Abyei, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile – and the SAF's readiness to embark on multiple military operations as South Sudan seceded was a reminder of Khartoum's confidence in its ability to manage peripheral wars, suggesting that the SPLM's northern branch may have miscalculated when it gave up on political action, opting for a military solution instead.

The SAF's confidence was borne out in December, when Khartoum's most able military adversary in the region, Khalil Ibrahim of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), was killed in a missile strike that had apparently been undertaken with the assistance of foreign governments. Formerly, Ibrahim had been an important ally. He was an Islamist who had fought for the regime across all of Sudan's peripheries, and

his defection from the NCP was part of a wider, unresolved split in Sudan's Islamist movement that exposed the NCP's inability to unify Sudan's centre and its peripheries through economic growth, ideology, or socio-cultural development. The SRF alliance of marginalised movements and regions was formed after Sudan's most marginalised and militarised periphery, South Sudan, had become independent and could no longer join the alliance. The loss of Khalil, a few months later, was another serious blow.

One of the reasons the NCP has made the cost of opposition at the centre so prohibitively high is that it prefers to fight its opponents on the periphery. The strategy of mobilising from the periphery and marching on Khartoum has been tried before, however it has only succeeded once, in 1885, when the Mahdi, Muhammad Ahmad, took Khartoum at the head of a coalition of southern slave armies, Darfurian militias, and a host of other disaffected groups. The Mahdi accepted that his army attracted to its ranks non-Muslim groups, and he responded defiantly to the colonial masters› scorn for his strategy: You say that our only followers are ignorant Baqqara and the idolaters [al-Majus, an Arabic term for Zoroastrians here applied to non-Muslim Sudanese]. Know then that the followers of the apostles before us and of our Prophet Muhammad were the weak and the ignorant and the nomads, who worshipped rocks and trees.[1]

It has been a pivotal preoccupation of Khartoum governments ever since to prevent the emergence of a similar coalition. To this effect, they have used administrative arrangements, such as closed districts; or they emphasised cultural and religious differences between peripheral peoples; or they mobilised militias from neighbouring ethnic constituencies against each other.

In 1976 and 2008 armies from the periphery tried to capture Khartoum. However, unlike the Mahdi's army, these forces had a narrow, mainly Darfurian ethnic base. Throughout the 1983–2005 war in South Sudan, the SPLM was also unable to repeat the feat. Instead, the confrontation between northern and southern cattle pastoralists – Dinka and Misseriya – has become prominent in Sudan's conflicts as governments managed to convince these neighbours of their insurmountable differences.

Islamists and the army: Striking from within

These two modes of opposition – peripheral violence or urban street politics – are the main choices available to opposition forces in Sudan today. However, there is another mode of opposition just as venerable as the two – the military coup. Many Western diplomats believe that a coup has taken place. They trace this coup to the SAF's occupation of Abyei, in May 2011, and its harsh response to events in Kordofan the following month. The hostilities in Kordofan came in spite of an agreement on a peaceful solution that had been signed by Nafie Ali Nafie, a security supremo and regime hardliner. For this the newspaper of the SAF immediately castigated him, and President Omar al-Bashir backed the army against him. In the old days, on the

1 PM Holt, The Mahdist State in the Sudan 1881-1898, a study of its origins, development and overthrow, Clarendon: Oxford, 1970, p 58

morning of a coup, the military would play bagpipe music on the radio, bracing military marches to prepare the population for things to come. This time, instead of an unambiguous musical proclamation, there has been a small alteration in the protocol for the most important foreign delegations in Khartoum – they now meet the military intelligence services before they meet the politicians. This has convinced diplomats that military hardliners have taken over the party. Nevertheless, this may be a simplification. The military may well be more powerful during the current crises, but that is because NCP politicians have not yet come up with a clear post-secession project.

The absence of strategic direction has shed some light on the workings of the NCP's sometimes-mysterious alliance of security men, Islamists, capitalists, and others. Different groupings offer different prescriptions for the country's ailments. One discussion centres on the country's Islamic orientation. Since the 1980s, Sudan's Islamists had seen southern secession as a route to Islamisation of the north – non-Muslims make up the majority in South Sudan – and over the past year, the president has made a number of speeches calling for a unified Arab-Muslim northern Sudan and a recommitment to the principles of Islamic law. But there are other views within the mainstream: In February 2011, a senior member of the security forces, Hasaballah Omer, was quoted or misquoted as saying that political parties could repeal Islamic sharia law, if they reached consensus on its repeal. The statement was retracted and Hasaballah sacked, still it was an indication that senior figures may recognise the need to include other parties in a dialogue on the country's future.

Another focus is on youth and gerontocracy. Compared to other political parties, the NCP has done more to accommodate young people's views. The NCP's senior leadership has not changed for two decades, but the DUP, Umma Party, and Communist Party have had the same leaders for three or four decades. The NCP often exploits the frustrations of young opposition politicians to engineer splits in their parties, and it has taken some steps to protect itself from such splits, appointing younger cadres to party and government office, and listening to young people's complaints about corruption.

The biggest influence on the NCP comes from the populist right, however. The Justice and Peace Forum is a group linked to Tayeb Mustafa, a relative of the president who edits Sudan's best-selling *al-Intibaha* newspaper. *Al-Intibaha* articulates or amplifies the anxieties of many in the NCP's constituencies with provocative stories about race, corruption, generational differences, and gerontocracy. The paper also represents the concerns of former members of the Popular Defence Forces, a party militia that mobilised students in urban areas with its jihad ideology and young men in peripheral areas with ethnic propaganda. These groups experienced the Islamic revolution in their own lives and they remain an important base of support. *Al-Intibaha* is hostile to migrant workers and South Sudanese alike and links Sudan's tribulations to international conspiracies against the Arab and Muslim world. Such undercurrents go to show that, so far, the NCP has been unable to forge a vision for a new, a northern Sudan.

A sufi meeting in Khartoum

Pushing the opposition to the peripheries

The constitutions of Sudan and South Sudan both embrace pluralism. The 2010 elections, however, produced a strange duopoly, and Southern secession turned this into two monopolies – effectively, two single party states. Single party systems can work if the party is agile enough to negotiate or resolve social and economic contradictions. In some periods of African history, single-party systems were seen as preferable to multi-party systems that, it was feared, would just aggravate existing contradictions. This view was echoed in a recent opinion poll, when 38 % of respondents agreed with the statement «Political parties create division and confusion; it is therefore unnecessary to have many political parties in South Sudan».[2]

Neither in Sudan nor in South Sudan, however, are these «single party systems» flexible enough to negotiate and resolve each country's many problems. The debates within the NCP indicate that many within its ranks have realised that this «single party system» is about to reach the limits of its political utility. Nevertheless, it remains invested in the current system, and it sometimes weakens and splinters potential partners out of habit rather than strategic intent. The cost of dissent is still high – which pushes it to the margins, to the impoverished, diverse peripheries, where mutinies keep on erupting. The problem is that Sudan's most populous periphery – the rain lands between the tenth and thirteenth parallels – is now situated alongside an international border. Neither Sudan nor South Sudan call the situation in that area war, still it is violent and fraught with risk.

Oil and power in Sudan

The border is also where Sudan and South Sudan's shared oil infrastructure begins. During the CPA period, when Khartoum received half of South Sudan's oil revenues, both governments› dependence on oil had helped keep the peace. The increasingly violent politics in these borderlands, however, has affected this key economic relationship.

In December 2011, South Sudan produced 260,000 barrels of oil a day and Sudan 110,000 (figures significantly down from the 2008 peak in production).[3] Oil is the main export for both countries and, in South Sudan, it accounts for over 95 % of state revenue. On secession, the deal on sharing oil revenue ended and no new agreement on shared pipeline use had been signed. Since secession South Sudan has not paid pipeline fees to the north. In the absence of an agreement, Sudan had been siphoning off a 23 % in-kind share of South Sudan's oil while South Sudan argued that internationally comparable pipeline fees are less than one percent. In late 2011, negotiations failed, and, in early 2012, South Sudan shut off its production.[4]

2 Survey of South Sudan Public Opinion, September 6-27, 2011, International Republican Institute, Washington DC, December 2011

3 International Energy Agency monthly report for December 2012, cited in Jenny Gross, «Restoring Sudan's Oil Output Could Take Months,» *Wall Street Journal*, New York, 10 Feb 2012

4 Ibid.

Sudan's violent system of peripheral governance is entangled with vital economic interests in Juba and Khartoum. Oil is the main export for both Sudan and South Sudan, and both countries are undergoing a deeply unpredictable fiscal shock. As, in recent months, Khartoum's policy of exporting crises to the periphery was executed confidently by the SAF, the fiscal shock will also be transmitted to the periphery. According to the World Bank, the bulk of budget cuts will be in the areas of development spending (26 percent) and federal transfers to state governments (20 percent).[5] Nevertheless, it will be difficult to insulate Sudan's centre, where the inflation of food prices is reaching new heights. The government is sharply reducing its own spending, and, after a decade of extraordinary growth, the economy is predicted to contract in 2012.

South Sudan: The SPLM's monopoly on power

At the beginning of the CPA period, in 2005, the SPLM did not have a monopoly on power in

South Sudan. Large territories were under the control of militias sponsored by Khartoum, and these militias had no representation in the peace talks that brought about the CPA. In January 2006, Paulino Matiep, commander of an umbrella group of militias, signed the Juba Declaration with President Salva Kiir that amnestied tens of thousands of militia members and incorporated them into the SPLA. The 2006 deal spared the south many years of war. It was, however, a costly deal, putting thousands of soldiers onto the government payroll, an investment in peace that has limited the spending on social welfare. It also put the military at the centre of the process of national reconciliation. Khartoum had used ethnicity to organise its proxies in South Sudan, and the SPLA decided to incorporate them into ethnically mixed units deployed outside their home areas, forcing former adversaries to work together.

This costly integration remains one of the SPLM's biggest political achievements, a key part of its claim to be able to lead the liberation of Southern Sudan. This «liberation dividend» paid off in a crushing victory in the 2010 elections: President Salva Kiir received 97 % of presidential votes, and his party took 94 % of seats in the southern parliament (the composition of the legislature was modified after independence). Until 2010, the parliament was filled with appointees, the SPLM having 70 % of seats, the NCP 15 percent, and the remaining 15 % went to southern opposition parties. In 2010, the NCP withdrew from the vote, and the old opposition parties were wiped out – their purpose was to fill up a quota that gave the illusion of pluralism in a system entirely dominated by a single party.

The «liberation dividend» is not without precedent in African liberation struggles; nor is it without problems. The armed struggle in South Sudan was harsh, and the SPLM's attempts to develop revolutionary consciousness in the population were

5 Sudan: Country Economic Brief, December 2011, World Bank Africa Region: Washington DC, at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSUDAN/Resources/Sudan_Economic_BriefDec_2011.pdf (accessed 17 Feb 2012)

sporadic, as it was easier to mobilise against the common northern enemy or to appeal to ethnic solidarity. When the struggle ended, some SPLM cadres began to sport a «we-liberated-you» sense of entitlement to office. This sometimes stifles criticism or stokes resentment in areas where the armed struggle divided people against each other on ethnic or other grounds.

The Juba Declaration and the 2010 elections have shaped structures of power and resistance in South Sudan. They are the starting point for understanding the SPLM's «single party system» – a formally pluralist constitutional order overwhelmingly dominated by one group. The tiny group of non-SPLM parliamentarians fall into two categories – independents and members of SPLM-Democratic Change (SPLM-DC). The latter is a party led by the capable but capricious Lam Akol, who, through a long political career of frequent defections, has retained a constituency in Upper Nile. The independents, in contrast, were mainly SPLM figures that failed to win nominations for party positions. Over 300 stood as independents, in part because the SPLM's nomination processes lacked transparency and the movement did not have the internal consultation mechanisms that might have allowed for a more attentive reading of local personalities and priorities. This lack of political agility was followed by some heavy-handed interventions in peripheral areas, abuses that were sometimes overlooked by international election monitors all too eager to support Sudan's peace process. In some areas, such flaws caused post-election mutinies – disappointed former-SPLM independents led armed revolts in the states of Jonglei and Upper Nile.

Modes of opposition in South Sudan

The main way to show opposition in South Sudan is peripheral mutiny. Unlike Sudan, South

Sudan does not have a history of intifadas in the national capital, and, because of the self-confidence engendered by the «liberation dividend» in Juba, the SPLM is less anxious than the NCP about its dominance of the centre. Post-independence euphoria has not quite worn off yet, and in this atmosphere public criticism of the leadership is relatively rare.

The main problem in understanding South Sudan's peripheral mutinies is the way that they have been encoded in ethnic politics. The wars and feuds in remote and inaccessible states such as Jonglei, Upper Nile, or Warrap are sometimes so cruel that it becomes difficult for local people to explain them, and bewildered outside analysts use ethnicity as a starting point. Their accounts of the violence in Jonglei, for example, often overlook the national political questions that partially motivated these revolts. Instead ethnicity is invoked and explanations proffered consequently sound like this: The people who live in places like Jonglei are pastoralists, they like cattle-rustling, their economies are based around nuptial exchanges of cattle rather than markets, and decades of war in the south have made rustling and marriage much more violent processes.

Such factors, important as they may be, have to be viewed in a wider political context, one not so much marked by «tribalism» as by «retribalisation.» Manipulating

traditional authorities, South Sudan is constructing peripheral governance systems that manage rural ethnic groups in ways at once comparable to and different from the NCP's peripheral governance. Like many previous Khartoum regimes, the NCP uses traditional authorities as a low-budget means to administer the peripheries. The NCP's «single party system» requires a wide range of weak allies (rather than a credible and strong opposition).

South Sudan also organises peripheral governance around ethnicity – but its reasons for doing so are not always the same as the NCP's. Like the NCP, the SPLM is motivated by cost – it does not have the resources to build a new system from scratch and is adapting an existing one instead. It is also motivated by lack of government infrastructure. Today, there are schools, clinics, barracks, police stations, and jails in most small towns in South Sudan but few outside the towns, where the majority of people live. Finally, there are ideological reasons. Although the SPLA used traditional authorities and their ethnic constituencies as a starting point to mobilise recruits and requisition provisions throughout the war, it also sought to unify the struggles of ethnic groups that had been set against each other. In the first years of its struggle, it set out an analysis, still valid today, of Sudan's problems as a conflict between the centre and the periphery that drew on the neo-Marxist dependency theories of the day. After the Cold War, however, the SPLM relinquished Marxism and turned instead to African tradition, emphasising the cultural rather than the economic difference between the centre of Sudan and the south. Some in the movement also believed that traditional leaders had preserved an authentic, consensual, and responsive leadership style through decades of intense violence that might serve as a counterpoint to the authoritarianism and inequality of the movement's military structures. For all of these reasons, the SPLM emphasised the role of the custodians of African tradition, and their vernacular, consensual political style.

The situation in Jonglei and Upper Nile

The SPLM's use of ethnicity may be more nuanced than that of the NCP, nevertheless its ethnic policy comes at a high cost – as can be seen in Jonglei. After the 2005 CPA ceasefire, Jonglei and Upper Nile were preoccupied with integrating their militias into the SPLA according to the 2006 Juba Declaration. In 2009–2010, after integration had been completed, the SPLA moved to disarm the militarised civilians of the area. This took the form of brutal and ineffective campaigns, which were a reminder that many ordinary people are not ready to trust the state with a monopoly on violence. Initially, armed civilians had been organised to defend villages and livelihoods from the intense violence of the civil war. Their need for weaponry, however, often forced them into alliances with much more powerful groups. The cultures of Jonglei and Upper Nile still display many of the best features of African customs, yet, on the other hand, they also have large numbers of militarised young people who do not always put their energies to peaceful and productive uses. Violence between Lou Nuer and Dinka Twic youths caused many deaths in 2009; in 2011, the same two groups attacked Murle people in the south of Jonglei. The elections may have contributed to the violence – politicians

seeking office in a country with more development needs than development resources often mobilise constituencies by stoking fears and resentments. In South Sudan, the ever-denser tangibility of ethnicity means that those fears and resentments are given an ethnic object.

The 2010 elections were also the immediate cause of the mutinies in Jonglei and Upper Nile.

In remote places, politicians with military backgrounds and frustrated ambitions turned to mutiny. Violence erupts in these places because peripheries are politically incoherent, economically marginalised, and their population is desperate enough to risk a costly challenge to the «single party system.» People in the capital, on the other hand, may not be able to challenge the dominance of the ruling party effectively through conventional politics, and they may not be able to afford the price of a violent challenge – and thus frustrations emerge in less governable places where the government has few resources. Officials in Jonglei State claimed that, in the last week of 2011, 3,000 people were killed in inter-communal violence, and the governor stated he lacked sufficient security forces to deploy against the highly organised local army mobilised to fight the Murle. The government of South Sudan does not possess the monopoly on violence needed to provide protection or to establish a framework for accountability and reconciliation. It thus responds to peripheral violence late and with a mix of coercion and the conciliation of mutinous elites (offering them position and pay). Neither government response addresses the structures of violence and marginalisation that allow the problem to continue and escalate.

According to NCP sources, South Sudan's decision, in January 2012, to stop oil production was «suicide.» Oil revenues make up 97% of South Sudan's state revenue. Substitutes for the lost revenue cannot be raised readily from political allies or commercial lenders. Despite many pessimistic predictions, the decision has not yet led to war – indeed, in March 2012, the two new governments signed their first post-referendum agreements – on borders and on the status of each other's nationals residing in the other state. Still, a likely consequence will be that an even greater proportion of the country's vastly diminished income will go to its security forces. To cope with its fiscal crisis, Sudan has already cut its development budget and transfers to states by 20-26%. South Sudan's finance ministry, too, has indicated that it will reduce transfers to states, and its austerity measures may be considerably harsher. This means that the political and social problems of the borderlands are unlikely to go away in the short term. Both Sudan and South Sudan can mobilise proxies in each other's borderlands, and the international border will complicate proxy warfare. The current violence in South Kordofan and Blue Nile might turn into a way for South Sudan to tie up northern forces and thereby protect the oilfields just south of the border from invasion – they were the scene of some of the bitterest conflict during the civil war.

Northern commentators derided the South's decision to cease oil production as reckless, yet South Sudan's decision has political points in its favour, as the government managed to brand it as a step towards «economic independence» – the final decisive break from Khartoum's dominance. South Sudan's government may be

hoping to re-orient the restive energies of young people in remote areas towards an external enemy. Sudan, with its much more complex infrastructure, may yet turn out to be more vulnerable to a rapid contraction in income – in the south, relatively few people have a major stake in the cash economy.

Outlook

For some observers, the «fierceness» of the Sudanese state is part and parcel of its weakness (to adapt a resonant phrase from Egyptian political scientist Nazih Ayubi). It wages harsh peripheral wars because it lacks the resources to govern such areas in a more accommodating way. This observation is only partially convincing: A major cause of the wars in Sudan is its unipolar model of development, which seeks to transform the country by concentrating its wealth. «Concentration» creates spatial as well as social hierarchies – boomtowns and ghost towns – cores and peripheries. Wealthy elites, poor workers, and reserves of underused labour are each, in turn, over-represented or underrepresented in respective favoured and disfavoured ethnic groups. Such a development model generally requires coercion, and for most of Sudan's history, this has been the preferred model of Khartoum elites.

Implied in this chapter is the question, whether the new regime in South Sudan will be able to come up with a more inclusive style of politics than that practiced by successive Khartoum regimes? The SPLM regime emerged from an armed struggle that was a response to the coercion and marginalisation caused by the Khartoum model of development. In the course of this armed struggle it has attained a monopoly on power that is even clearer than the one held by the NCP. It has also acquired an economy overwhelmingly dependent on oil, a model even more prone to concentration of wealth and social division than Khartoum's. Perhaps Juba's decision to cease oil production demonstrated good political instincts for another reason: It might allow for a new approach to economic development, one that ties the fortunes of the governing elite to that of South Sudan's people – resulting, perhaps, in a weak but flexible state. The problem with this approach is that it may lead to war with the north. Elites in both countries face an unpredictable year with more dilemmas than choices.

ALY VERJEE

New North, Old North: The Republic of Sudan after the Split

The secession of South Sudan created a new state and radically transformed another. This chapter examines the latter, the remnant Republic of Sudan, a country diminished in many ways – demographically, geographically, linguistically, culturally, ethnically, and economically. Despite all those changes, Sudan as a state remains fundamentally flawed. While, on the one hand, it is facing new economic, political, and social realities, it has, on the other, not managed to overcome old patterns and mentalities and continues to rely on violence and repression as primary means of governance.

Speaking in December 2010, President al-Bashir stated: «… if South Sudan secedes, we will change the constitution and at that time there will be no time to speak of diversity of culture and ethnicity.» Yet Sudan remains a remarkably diverse country, with many peoples, traditions, and livelihoods – as well as numerous conflicts and unresolved tensions. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) may have ended, but two other peace treaties are still in place, the all-but-forgotten Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement of 2006 and the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD), signed in July 2011. The war in Darfur, while less intense today, is far from over. And, as the targeting of Christian minorities in Khartoum, in April 2012, and recent conflicts in South Kordofan and Blue Nile show, Sudan is a country where debates over the meaning, form, and authenticity of national identity and political plurality still persist, and such questions are very much at the centre of national political dynamics. Even the looming threat of having their Sudanese citizenship revoked and being expulsed to South Sudan – a land many have never seen – has not changed the fact that hundreds of thousands of South Sudanese still identify with Sudan.

Having shed the periphery that is today's Republic of South Sudan, a new *southern* Sudan, one running from South Darfur through South Kordofan to southern White Nile and Blue Nile states, is the neglected underbelly along Sudan's longest international border, that with South Sudan. Here, one periphery has supplanted another, yet the centre – Khartoum – is still the antagonist. Regarding protests in major cities or the far north, as well as regarding discontent in the borderlands or broken promises to Darfur, Abyei, or the East, the government of the Republic of Sudan reacts as it historically has – with coercion, co-option, or with neglect.

A more urban Sudan

Amidst political turmoil, some of the implications the South's secession has for Sudan are easy to overlook. The disputed 2008 national census accounted for a total popula-

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tion of 39,154,490. On South Sudan's independence, on 9 July 2011, Sudan's population dropped by more than a fifth – the roughly 8.2 million residents of South Sudan. South Sudan, which, in 2009, rejected the results of the census, claims that the actual number of Southern Sudanese is much higher, a claim that seems to be confirmed by voter registration prior to the independence referendum. If this were the case, Sudan's population would have decreased even more dramatically.

Upon the South's secession, the population of the three states of Khartoum, Gezira, and White Nile, 10,580,189 people in 2008 accounted for a third of Sudan's total population. This underlines the demographic shift to the country's riverine centre region. Also, the departure of the largely rural South boosted Sudan's rate of urbanisation. This is more than a statistical quirk; it illustrates a greater nationwide demographic trend: Today, more Sudanese than ever before live in cities. While, admittedly, this is not a phenomenon unique to Sudan, the implications are apparent – Sudan is no longer the overwhelmingly rural country it once was. Coupled with significant displacement to the major cities of Darfur (El Fasher and Nyala) due to the last decade of conflict, and peri-urban settlement elsewhere due to substantial economic migration (outside Darfur, this includes cities such as El Obeid and Port Sudan, and the tri-city area of Omdurman, Bahri, and Khartoum), the distribution of Sudan's population has undergone rapid change.

This poses the question, whether a more urban population is more vulnerable or more resilient to political coercion. Of course, urbanisation is not the only relevant factor in answering such a question, and Sudan's political dynamics are far from monolithic. What is certain is that the Nile valley has long been Sudan's most favoured region for investment, the allocation of resources, and the provision of services. An increase of population in central and urban regions suggests that the geographic and demographic margins will remain precisely that – marginal. At the same time, the growing income gap between urban elites and recent migrants to the cities may amplify political tensions. Particularly during the oil boom of the last decade, Sudan's cities have been places of growth and opportunity. To sustain such expectations following the south's secession will prove a veritable challenge.

A smaller and poorer Sudan

At least in the short term, this more urban Sudan will be poorer. The latest figures published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) point to this current economic decline. In 2011, real GDP declined by 3.9 % – and, in 2012, is forecast to drop a dramatic 7.3 %, by far the worst showing in the IMF's Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. For 2011, in comparison to the sub-Saharan region, Sudan's real rate of GDP growth (an actual decline) only surpassed that of Côte d'Ivoire, a country recovering from its own political and economic crisis (South Sudan is not listed, as it was not a member of the IMF at the time the report was produced). The picture is little better regarding consumer price indexes. In 2011, Sudan's rate of increase was roughly double the regional average, and it ranks second to last in the MENA region (the bottom place going to Iran). Compared to sub-Saharan Africa, Sudan is tied with

Ethiopia for the bottom position. In late 2011, budget negotiations became heated, as, in an attempt to plug financial gaps, NCP parliamentarians and ministers clashed over cuts to subsidies for basic foods and fuel. In a rare move, the National Assembly vetoed some such cuts that had been proposed by the Ministry of Finance.

There is no question that the secession of South Sudan along with the loss of oil revenue drives these changes. Reduced oil revenue, however, while the cause of today's budget crisis, masks structural deficits and political quandaries. In economic terms, Sudan's security state is not a rational actor. As an NCP member of the National Assembly's Economic Affairs Committee told me in December 2011, «there are areas of the budget that can't be touched. We [parliamentarians] all know what those are [the security services, the military]. So, there's no choice but to cut other things like subsidies.» Sudan's sizable external debt is another constraint, and, while there have been lengthy discussions concerning financial concessions, to date little in the way of debt relief has been forthcoming (for a more detailed analysis of Sudan's debt see Laura James› essay in this volume).

The economic problems are not solely caused by the country's split. For years, agriculture and food processing, Sudan's largest employers, have been plagued by a lack of investment and modernisation, resulting in stagnant productivity. There is talk of reviving the cotton sector, which, despite a long period of neglect, continues to generate an important amount of foreign currency earnings. In 1989, Sudan exported 750,000 bales of cotton; by 2008 this had declined to 160,000 bales. There are many difficulties in other areas of agricultural production, too. In April 2012, there was an embarrassing setback when an investment of $1 billion in the White Nile Sugar Company that aimed to boost annual production to 450,000 tonnes of sugar and 60 million litres of ethanol, ran into difficulties as the new plant was still not operational. Officials blamed US sanctions for the delay, and President Bashir appointed a committee to investigate the affair.

Sudanese manufacturing has long struggled to be competitive, yet it accounts for significant employment. By contrast, employment in the oil sector had always been relatively low; nevertheless it directly stimulated activity in other parts of the economy, particularly in construction, the services, and in public infrastructure such as roads and electricity. Because of the financial and economic crisis, Khartoum is eager to develop new sectors of the economy. Recently, gold production has been substantially raised, with further increases expected in 2012-13. Oil exploration continues as well, and some new oil fields are due to come on stream in 2012.

However, economic necessity has also caused the government to revert to some old patterns. Earlier this year, the commandeering of South Sudanese oil at the export terminal in Port Sudan attested to this mentality. Khartoum, albeit, had not anticipated Juba's drastic response – the shutting down of all of its oil production, legal action against those who purchased crude oil sold illegally by Khartoum, and, finally, the temporary occupation of the Heglig oil fields. Without a swift resolution to the economic disputes with South Sudan and/or new sources of finance, Khartoum's current economic quandary may conceivably cause a return of the hyperinflation seen in the 1990s and a substantial devaluation of its currency. Still, despite the risks,

economic rationality is not necessarily what guides Khartoum's policy decisions. Often, there is only a thin line that separates brinkmanship from self-destructive behaviour.

Changes at the political centre

South Sudan's secession changed many of Sudan's institutions. All constitutional articles pertaining to the south were repealed and the national assembly lost almost a third of its seats. Even during the civil war, nominal representation of the south was a sometimes-moderating factor in parliament. In September 2011, the erstwhile bipartisan presidency lost its southern element and the National Congress Party's (NCP) Ali Osman Taha became first vice-president with Darfuri Al-Haj Adam Youssef, also of the NCP, serving as second vice-president. In the north the once united SPLM became the SPLM-North, an extra-parliamentary party that has returned to the battlefield. In the north, its leaders are considered traitors. Today, its political successes during the CPA period, when it fielded candidates from all parts of northern Sudan and had members from across classes, religions, and ethnicities, are distant memories.

In December 2011, President al-Bashir presented a new cabinet. This reshuffle, heralded to bring new young faces into government, actually changed very little. Most notable was the appointment of several Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) figures to a handful of second-tier government posts. Outside the cabinet, the ruling parties of old, the Umma and the DUP, have begun a transition to the next generation, and the sons of the respective party leaders, Umma's Abdul-Rahman al-Sadiq al-Mahdi and the DUP's Jaafar al-Saddiq Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani became Assistants to the President.

But if Sudan's traditional opposition parties are still in denial about their existential crises, the death, in March 2012, of Mohamed Ibrahim Nugud, the leader of the Sudanese Communist Party, was a reminder that the political leaders stemming from the 1960s and 70s will finally have to take a bow. Nugud, who had led his party for forty years, left no obvious successor, and the leadership struggle that has ensued since is threatening to destroy a party already weakened by decades of NCP repression. Al-Mahdi and al-Mirghani face similarly difficult transitions. The Popular Congress Party of Hassan al-Turabi is not immune to such difficulties either; while it may enjoy greater internal unity, its leaders are all nearing senescence.

The resurgence of militarism?

Southern independence did not provoke an immediate crisis in Khartoum. The post-secession political dynamics, however, have exacerbated rather than tempered historic conflicts. Two explanations have been proffered for subsequent events. Firstly, that the incomplete implementation of the CPA, once seen as a transformative national project, has come back to haunt Sudan. This is most obvious concerning the failure to implement the protocols for Abyei, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile. Yet the failure is a more general one. The unfulfilled promise to promote democratisation

and protect fundamental human and minority rights has had adverse effects for most Sudanese.

Secondly, the concessions made in the CPA have made Sudan – as defined by the NCP regime – weaker, and this, in turn, has boosted the power of the generals. As Julie Flint puts it, today a «new configuration» of military hardliners is in control. Flint goes on to cite a Khartoum source close to the NCP: «It is the hour of the soldiers – a vengeful, bitter attitude of defending one's interests no matter what, a punitive and emotional approach that goes beyond calculation of self-interest. The army was the first to accept that Sudan would be partitioned. But they also felt it as a humiliation, primarily because they were withdrawing from territory in which they had not been defeated. They were ready to go along with the politicians as long as the politicians were delivering – but they had come to the conclusion they weren't. Ambushes in Abyei … interminable talks in Doha keeping Darfur as an open wound … Lack of agreement on oil revenues…»

Ever since gaining its independence in the 1950s, Sudan has known far more war than peace. Judged by this standard, the CPA, like its predecessor, the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, has been an historical aberration. The Addis Ababa deal lasted for about a decade, the CPA for only six years. In the new crisis of governance old patterns have re-emerged, namely the preponderance of military action. Here, too, the Sudanese military-security apparatus has followed a path similar to that of the last civil war: It swiftly advanced through Blue Nile and on to the border with Ethiopia; however it met much greater opposition when it tried to take and hold of the Nuba Mountains.

In its own way, the Sudanese army is a microcosm of Sudan's power relations. The generals in Khartoum may wield more power than they did during the CPA period, yet it is the soldiers on the ground who fight and die. The army's commitments on five fronts – Blue Nile, the Nuba Mountains, Darfur, Abyei and, in April 2012, for at least a few days, the oil fields of Heglig and Kharasana – are overstretching its capacities. Thus, Khartoum has resorted to another old policy, the use of proxy forces and of the militia known as the Popular Defence Forces (PDF), ordered by President al-Bashir to fully mobilise in early March 2012. By the end of March, a committee for a «grand mobilisation campaign,» for the «mobilisation of Jihadists» had been appointed, chaired by the erstwhile CPA grandee, First Vice-President Taha.

Amidst a budget crisis, the military demands an ever-increasing share of the national income – and thus the vicious cycle of militarism continues: Sudan's military-security complex needs war to maintain its prestige, power, and size; and the politics of confrontation frequently make conflict the preferred option – an option that requires a sizable military capacity.

South Kordofan and Blue Nile: Not Darfur redux

The conflicts in South Kordofan and Blue Nile are cast by many, especially in the activist community, as Darfur redux. Such a narrative is helped by the career of South Kordofan's governor Ahmed Haroun, who is now mobiliser-in-chief for the Govern-

Inside a home in Khartoum

ment of Sudan and its associated armed elements in South Kordofan. Between 2003 and 2005 Haroun served as Sudan's Minister of State for the Interior and during this time also managed the Darfur Security Desk, activities for which he is now infamous (and wanted by the International Criminal Court). One of the reasons Haroun was appointed governor of South Kordofan, was to shift attention away from the high-profile roles he had played in Khartoum and Darfur.

For those with long memories the present conflict is reminiscent of the civil war between north and south and the brutality of the first jihad, in the 1990s, in the Nuba Mountains region. However, while today's conflict certainly draws on the legacy of these past wars, the insurgency that began in 2011 is neither a replay of Darfur nor of earlier civil wars. It has much more to do with the unfulfilled promises of the CPA – the failure to hold popular consultations. Elections in South Kordofan, originally to be held in 2008, were first postponed (as were the nationwide elections). Then, when national elections finally took place in 2010, elections in South Kordofan were further delayed over disputes concerning voter registration and the demarcation of constituencies. When the vote was finally held in May 2011, mere months before the end of the CPA, hardly any time was left for popular consultation. As soon after fighting broke out, the state legislature was never able to get the process under way in any meaningful form. The aim of the popular consultation had been defined as follows: «Should any of the legislatures of the two States, after reviewing the [CPA], decide to rectify, within the framework of the [CPA], any shortcomings in the constitutional, political and administrative arrangements of the [CPA], then such legislature shall engage in negotiations with the National Government, with a view to rectifying these shortcomings.»

Notwithstanding the failure to hold the popular consultation, the immediate causes for the war in South Kordofan lay elsewhere, namely in the problematic state legislative and gubernatorial elections, which Ahmed Haroun won by the smallest of margins, and in the Government of Sudan's forcible attempt to disarm the largely Nuba SPLA component of the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) in South Kordofan. The JIUs had been an attempt to create a unified national army, yet its components ended up as combatants in Sudan's new civil war.

An IKV Pax Christi report chronicles the sequence of last year's events: «On 7 April [2011], the African Union High Level Implementation Panel on Sudan (AUHIP)..., convened a meeting of Presidents Bashir and Kiir in Juba. On the agenda was a decision made by them to dissolve the JIUs sooner than anticipated – three months after the South's referendum, on 9 April...Whenever the AUHIP attempted to reopen the issue thereafter, reflecting Nuba concern, Bashir said the matter was closed: Salva Kiir himself had agreed to dissolve the JIUs.

This was the basis for the SAF Chief of Staff ordering the disarmament of the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile JIUs, and Bashir's argument for not revising this decision, says an observer at the talks. The counter argument, made by (Thabo) Mbeki, (chairperson of AUHIP), was that it would start a war.»

Problematic state elections heightened partisan animosity. South Kordofan's polls were contentious, and Haroun's margin of victory cannot be statistically assured. Ultimately the vote was endorsed by national and international observers, providing

the crucial electoral legitimacy the NCP sought, and with it a majority democratic mandate to rule the state. The conflict in South Kordofan is a setback not only to the ambitions of the CPA; it also means that an earlier deal, the Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement reached in Bürkenstock (Switzerland) in 2002, has collapsed. In conflict-riven Sudan, the Nuba Mountains had once been a model for peace – or at least the absence of war.

In Blue Nile, the popular consultation process had progressed much further than in South Kordofan, still, the prospect that the process would resolve the state's fundamental tensions had always been slim. In the early days of the consultation process, local NCP officials were often able to work with the SPLM and its elected state governor, Malik Agar, finding pragmatic ways to continue the dialogue. Ultimately, however, the local branch of the NCP began to take its marching orders from Khartoum, and party officials involved in the consultations who deviated from the party line were replaced or overruled.

The die for war was cast in Blue Nile when, in September 2011, a constitutionally questionable presidential decree dismissed elected governor Agar and imposed a statewide state of emergency. Democracy in Blue Nile had lasted for a year and a half. The 2010 elections had seen a glimmer of federalism, with state governors elected by the people for the first time rather than appointed by the president. Agar's dismissal showed that federalism would have to wait.

Darfur: A new peace deal, an old war

The South's secession from Sudan also had implications for the long-running conflict in Darfur. The South and the SPLM's emotional sympathies, limited though their influences had been at times in the national debate, were often with the opposition movements in Darfur. It was only when the JEM attacked Omdurman in 2008 that Salva Kiir pledged that the SPLA would stand with Khartoum militarily and, if necessary, defend the government. Similar to the situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, for Darfur the secession of South Sudan further diminished the possibility that a new, inclusive national political arrangement would be achieved in the near future. Still, Khartoum was unable to win an outright military victory, however its hand in Darfur was strengthened.

Three additional developments in 2011 reconfigured the conflict in Darfur. On 14 July 2011, mere days after South Sudan seceded, and after seemingly endless negotiations, the Qatari-hosted mediation process finally resulted in the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) between the Government of Sudan and the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM). Like its predecessor, the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) of Abuja, the DDPD was far from comprehensive, and it did not include all parties to the conflict.

LJM leader Tijani el-Sissi became chair of the Darfur Regional Authority, replacing the largely ineffectual Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA), originally created under the DPA. El-Sissi may be a shrewder political operator than Minni Minnawi, the DPA's erstwhile chief rebel signatory to the treaty and a former chair

of the TDRA and Senior Assistant to the President of the Republic. Minnawi is now a core member of the opposition alliance Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF, discussed in more detail below). However, whether El-Sissi will be able to mould the responses of his counterparts in Khartoum remains to be seen.

Regional politics have also continued to play a role in Darfur. Libya has long been meddling in the region. The fall of the Gaddafi regime eliminated a key supply route and safe haven for Darfur's rebels, with Libya's new government much more sympathetic to Khartoum. Combined with the continued Sudanese rapprochement with the Déby regime in Chad, this means that the movements that did not sign the DDPD are today being squeezed from both sides. The future regional implications are uncertain: For the foreseeable future, Libya's internal problems would seem to constrain the attention it pays to peripheral foreign issues. It is highly unlikely that any new regime would have the expansionist delusions of Gaddafi, who long considered Darfur to be in Libya's sphere of influence. At present, Déby and Bashir are on very good terms, a relationship that was bolstered by the January 2012 wedding in Khartoum of Déby and Amani Hilal, daughter of Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal. Nevertheless, a harmonious relationship between the two leaders can never be taken for granted. Déby's own domestic position is not unchallenged, and the course pursued by any future Chadian government will inevitably impact Darfur.

In late December, Khartoum pulled off a major coup (possibly with outside help), when Khalil Ibrahim, leader of the most robust armed opposition group, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), was killed in an air strike. The JEM however, though weakened by Khalil's death, is still a formidable force. Its fighters have linked up with the SPLA-N in South Kordofan to fight for the oil fields. The DDPD seems headed in the same direction as the DPA as it is being rejected by most rebel movements and, at least so far, only half-heartedly implemented by the Government of Sudan. Meanwhile, Darfur remains a festering wound on Sudan's body politic. The United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) emphasises that violence has decreased throughout Darfur and that the voluntary return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refuges has been on the rise; still, millions remain trapped in limbo.

A united armed opposition and the future of Sudan

In August 2011, the first official moves were made to form the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), a military opposition movement to the Government of Sudan, extending from Blue Nile to Darfur. In the Kauda Declaration the SPLM-N, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) – Abdel Wahid and the SLM –, and Minni Minnawi agreed on an agenda to achieve regime change. Malik Agar was named chair of the Front. By November, the Kauda Declaration had been reaffirmed by these three member parties, as well as by the JEM, that initially had abstained because of reservations regarding the SRF's secular agenda. The second communiqué of the SRF was unequivocal, stating at the very beginning: «We affirm our resolve to overthrow the National Congress Party

(NCP) regime using all available means, above all, the convergence of civil political action and armed struggle.»

In hindsight, 2011 may be considered the start of Sudan's fourth great war (the other three being the two civil wars between north and south and the conflict in Darfur). For the period ahead there is no roadmap; the renewed conflict between Sudan and South Sudan could potentially be transformative for either one or both sides.

Old antagonisms have gained new dimensions. Sudan's historic tensions between centre and periphery once again reign supreme. The south's secession has reconfigured Sudan's conflicts in multiple ways and, in the near future, the country faces daunting challenges. In important ways, though, the Sudanese state is the same old predatory, dysfunctional polity it has been for decades. It is no less flawed than before. The state remains organised around the tensions between centre and peripheries. Even in case the centre should be overthrown – the express goal of the SRF – this may still not suffice to overcome the seemingly essential defects of the Sudanese state's character. To achieve fundamental change in Sudan will require more than just military success.

MAGDI EL-GIZOULI

Sudan, the Arab Spring, and the Politics of Fatigue

During the course of January 2011 messages appeared on *Facebook* calling upon the Sudanese ‹youth› to stage protests on the 30th January against the government of President Bashir. The activists were trying to emulate the Tunisian uprising against President Ben Ali and the demonstrations in Cairo against Mubarak's regime. Many answered the call, and a string of protests kept Khartoum's police busy for a good part of the day. Unlike in Tunisia and Egypt, however, the apparently leaderless protests failed to gain momentum, and soon nothing was left but a stream of ‹likes› on *Facebook* and occasional peaks of *Twitter* activity. In the meantime, the Sudan that the 30th January protesters identified with ceased to exist as a single polity. Since July 2011 two states, Sudan and South Sudan, occupy its former territory. The break-up was the consequence of a referendum on unity or secession in South Sudan. Almost all who cast their ballot opted for secession, and on the 9th July 2011 South Sudan became a sovereign state.

Despite the harsh response by the security forces, calls for a ‹revolution› were hard to silence. Emerging groups of activists such as Sharara (Arabic for «spark»), Girifna (a term that translates as «we are fed up»), and Change Now carried on the revolt on the campuses of Sudan's universities in Khartoum and beyond. Over the following year student demonstrations fed the paranoia of Sudan's rulers and made the «official» opposition uneasy. Once it became clear that, in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, the Arab Spring had brought the forces of political Islam to power, Sudan's ruling National Congress Party (NCP) embraced the tumult in the region as a vindication of its Islamist agenda. In November 2011, at an NCP conference attended by representatives of Tunisia's and Libya's new rulers, President al-Bashir stated that the 1989 coup that had brought him to power was in fact Sudan's version of the Arab Spring.[1]

Nevertheless, the NCP's nomenklatura is well aware of the potency the examples in the region may still have. The Libyan model, in particular, casts a long shadow over Sudan's peripheries. However, what is missing from such a scenario is the Benghazi or Daraa moment – an element of mass protest that undermined the authority of the Arab autocrats. The rift between urban and rural is an enduring feature of Sudan's socio-economic landscape and political superstructure. The following essay seeks to chart the complex field of political action in Sudan.

1 «No ‹Arab Spring› will occur in Sudan anytime soon, Bashir says», *Sudan Tribune*, 25 November 2011 (accessed 25 November 2011), http://www.sudantribune.com/No-Arab-Spring-will-occur-in-Sudan,40818

«Try again, fail again, fail better!»

There certainly were similarities between those who protested on the 30th January and movements in other parts of the Arab world, yet the demonstrations in Sudan failed to attract mass support. Reportedly, onlookers in Khartoum's busy streets taunted dissident students and young professionals that, if they were serious about regime change, they had to withstand police brutality. The dissociation between protesters and «the streets» was striking. However, another striking feature was that the protests apparently took the ever-alert security forces by surprise as most of the preparations happened on social networking platforms. The new protesters eschewed the hierarchical structures of traditional underground activity, inherited largely from the Sudanese left, and embraced an ‹open access› format – which has the disadvantage that only those with access to technology, internet service, and mobile devices were able to join in. Times and locations of protests were discussed and announced online. The security forces, frustrated by their failure to find ringleaders, arrested virtually everybody they could snatch off the streets. To begin with, the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) agents were nonplussed by the seemingly leaderless nature of the protests and thus, resorting to familiar patterns, focused their atten-

Protests in Khartoum

tion on the sons and daughters of public figures, journalists, and opposition politicians, who happened to take part.

Once the initial wave of protests had receded, the NISS began to develop new countermeasures. The NCP and NISS launched a ‹cyber-jihad battalion›[2] manned with committed internet-savvy NCP youths. Also, the NCP significantly improved its online visibility and pro-NCP news and propaganda portals multiplied. During the inauguration of a new power plant in Um Rwaba, North Kordofan, President Bashir told the audience that the electricity generated would enable young NCP supporters to use computers and challenge opponents of his rule on Facebook.[3]

The President's remarks, made in the colloquial Arabic spoken in Sudan's rural areas, revealed one predicament of the new activists: Although they are willing to identify with the presumably universal rights and freedoms upheld by their counterparts in the Arab world, their urban bias and limited outreach is keeping them detached from the struggles of the masses they seek to mobilise. The rural areas of Sudan, the scene of Sudan's incessant conflicts where young men are mobilised by rebel movements and the government's counter-insurgency forces, are beyond their scope.[4]

It was with the backing of its student and youth wings that the National Islamic Front (NIF), the ancestor of the ruling NCP, managed to seize power in 1989. At the time, the Islamic Trend, the student organisation of the NIF, controlled virtually all student unions in the country. Khartoum's new rulers relied on their young supporters› energy and zeal to guard the Islamic regime against political challenges from the centre and the military threat posed by the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) in the peripheries. Unlike its predecessors the SPLA/M, had managed to extend its insurgency beyond the south and into neighbouring South Kordofan and Blue Nile, and it even had units in Darfur, led by Dawood Yahia Bolad, a former Islamist student activist who once headed the Khartoum University Students› Union (KUSU) and who had turned rebel. In November 1989, the regime, short of funds and doubting the allegiance of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), began to form the paramilitary Popular Defence Forces (PDF). Training of the first recruits started in 1990 in a camp close to al-Qitena, a sleepy town on the White Nile. Within a few years the PDF evolved into a formidable force, its ranks continuously replenished by a flow of young loyal students from the country's heartland and, more importantly, by battle-hardened *fursan* (horsemen) from the pastoral communities that inhabit the transitional zone between northern and southern Sudan. In the Darfur conflict that erupted in 2003, the *mujahidin* trained and armed by the PDF played a mayor role both as insurgents, *Tora Bora*, and as pro-government militias, the infamous *Janjaweed*. In

2 «Sudan's NCP says its ‹cyber-Jihadists› ready to «crush» online oppositionists», *Sudan Tribune*, 23 March 2011 (accessed 23 March 2010), http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-s-NCP-says-its-cyber,38372

3 *al-Sahafa*, 9 February 2011 (accessed 10 February 2011), http://alsahafa.sd/details.php?articleid=21985

4 For a succinct account of Sudan's wars see Douglas Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars: Peace or Truce*, rev. ed. (New York: James Currey, 2011).

fact, the late chief of the rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Khalil Ibrahim, was a prominent PDF commander with a distinguished record of combat against the SPLA/M in southern Sudan. Sudan's youth, the very people *Facebook* activists sought to mobilise, were both agents and victims of the ethnic and religious fragmentation of the country and the militarisation of its conflicts.

The long season of the Islamic Movement

To comprehend why, against all odds, President Bashir and the NCP were in a position to plagiarise the ‹Arab Spring› and dull its lure of popular dissent, one has to take a historical detour and examine the evolution of the ruling NCP and its ancestor, the Islamic Movement. In the words of an NCP cadre, the Arab Spring came out of the mosques and, in Sudan, the NCP rules from the mosques.[5]

When, on the 30th June 1989, Brigadier-General al-Bashir and his comrades in the Command Council of the National Salvation Revolution seized power from the elected government of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi the response of the Sudanese elite was one of cynical dismissal. At the time, 45-year-old Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir was a army man with little claim to authority, and unlike their predecessors, the officers who lead the 1989 coup were not part of the Sudanese ruling class. They hailed from rural families and were privileged neither by property, education, nor by senior service in the colonial or independent Sudan. Although this soon proved a mere gesture, the Command Council even included officers from Sudan's marginalised peripheries, southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains, and Darfur, the first time that ‹national minorities›, to use a term from the period, played a role in a coup.[6] Al-Bashir and his associates had two pillars of power, the SAF through the ranks of which they had risen during the 1970s and 1980s, and the Islamic Movement.

Thanks to generous US support the SAF had expanded considerably under the rule of Gaafar Nimeiry (1969-1985), and the ranks of its officer corps, traditionally an almost exclusive domain of the Khartoum elites, had been swelled with ever-greater numbers from Sudan's rural areas. This regional ‹democratisation› of the armed forces came about as a result of two factors, the government-sponsored expansion in education and the regime's ambition to drain its rivals› sources of support.

In 1977 the interests of the regime and those of the Islamic Movement converged. A few years earlier, Nimeiry had fallen out with the Sudanese Communist Party and switched allegiance from the Soviet Union to the United States and Sadat's Egypt. In July 1977, Nimeiry agreed with the opposition National Front, the Umma Party of Sadiq al-Mahdi, and the Islamic Movement led by Hassan al-Turabi on a process of national reconciliation and the two latter leaders were given token positions in the

5 al-Tayeb Mustafa, *al-Intibaha*, 13 February 2012 (accessed 14 February 2012), http://alintibaha.net/portal/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=10036:2012-02-13-03-31-40&catid=99:2011-06-22-23-00-34&Itemid=763

6 Notes on the backgrounds and affiliations of members of the National Salvation Revolution Command Council are available in Ann Mosely Lesch, *Sudan: Contested National Identities* (Oxford: James Currey, 1998), 226-227.

politburo of the ruling party, the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU). Sadiq al-Mahdi failed to adapt to the new situation and eventually resigned his post. Turabi, however, grasped the opportunity. After several years of persecution and exile, Turabi and his adherents were suddenly able to acquaint themselves with the business of government, something they would eventually utilise for their own ends. The Islamic Movement was allowed to operate almost uncontested amongst students and professionals. Soon, Islamist cadres began to dominate the state apparatus and their presence in the army and security forces grew.[7]

Then, on the 9th March 1985, Nimeiry ordered the arrest of influential cadres of the Islamic Movement. Turabi claimed that Nimeiry was under instructions from the US to check the steady rise of the Islamists. Whatever the case, Nimeiry's rule did not survive this attempt. Severe drought, the resurgence of civil war in the south, and the pauperisation of Khartoum's middle class lead to the collapse of the regime. In March/April 1985 demonstrations gripped the capital and strikes paralysed the state. Under pressure from the streets the high command of the SAF announced on the 6th April 1985 the deposition of Nimeiry who, at the time, was recuperating in the US. The Transitional Military Council (TMC), an ad-hoc body formed by the SAF, assumed power and promised elections within a year – which is what happened. However, in spite of the demand by the trade unions that had organised the strikes, the TMC refused to repeal Nimeiry's draconic sharia laws, and the TMC was reluctant to dissolve Nimeiry's security apparatus, the State Security Organ. In both instances, the Islamists sided with the generals against the predominantly secular trade unions.

To adapt to the new era, Hassan al-Turabi re-organised the Islamic Movement, and the NIF was chartered in April 1985.[8] Yet, against Turabi's expectations, the NIF did not sweep the 1986 elections.[9] He was particularly disappointed by the NIF's performance in Darfur, a region he thought he had thoroughly ‹Islamised› during his brief tenure as political commissioner for Darfur in Nimeiry's SSU. With twenty-eight seats in parliament and a vociferous extra-parliamentary political movement the NIF nevertheless had sufficient power to dictate its terms on a house that was split between Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi's Umma Party and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) led by Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani. The NIF managed to block any attempt to revoke the sharia laws and negotiate an end to the war in the south. Had the SPLA/M joined the political forces in Khartoum, this would have tipped the balance against the Islamists – as shown by the south's thirty-nine empty seats in parliament. Wary of this, the NIF supported the SAF in its offensive against the SPLA/M, and, in a propaganda war, the NIF's seven daily newspapers constantly invoked the spectre of a

7 For an account of the era from the perspective of the Islamic Movement's veteran chief see (in Arabic) Hassan al-Turabi, *The Islamic Movement in Sudan: Progress, Gains and Methods* (Rabat: al-Furgan Publishers, 1991).

8 For details see Abdelwahab El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan* (London: Grey Seal, 1991), 131-151.

9 For a comparative assessment of the NIF's performance in the 1986 elections see James L. Chiriyankandath, «1986 Elections in the Sudan: Tradition, Ideology, Ethnicity: And Class?», *Review of African Political Economy* No. 38 (1987).

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Communist, Black African, and Western Zionist crusade against Sudan's Arab Muslim heartland.[10] Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, deputy secretary general of the NIF and head of its parliamentary caucus, toured the SAF garrisons in southern Sudan to probe the political mood of the officer corps.[11] It was during such a trip that he bonded with Brigadier-General Omar al-Bashir, at the time the SAF commander in Mayom, Upper Nile.

The Arab Spring: a Sudanese foretaste

President Bashir's claim that Sudan's Arab Spring had already taken place in 1989 refers to the early rise to power of Sudan's Islamic Movement. However, rather than that, it is the events of April 1985 that corresponds to the Arab Spring of 2011. Nimeiry, the autocrat in the style of Nasser, was the equivalent of Gaddafi and Mubarak – not Bashir. Within a period of sixteen years, from 1969 to 1985, Nimeiry made the transition from Arab socialism à la Nasser to an ‹economic opening› à la Sadat, yet he did not manage to become a Mubarak. While Sadat died in 1981 at the hands of the very Islamists he had sought to instrumentalise in order to tame the masses that had threatened his rule during the Cairo bread riots of January 1977, Nimeiry was forced out of office by the SAF generals when similar unrest broke out in Khartoum in 1985 – in essence foreshadowing the fate of Mubarak in February 2011.

The Sudanese Islamic Movement profited from the cultural and social estrangement of rural migrants seeking education and salaried employment in the cities. The promise of an Islamic renaissance provided this ambitious petty bourgeoisie with the political grammar to express its discontent with the ‹revolutionary› modernisation of the 1960s and 70s as well as with the heirs of the colonial order, a closely-knit elite following in the footsteps of their former colonial masters and dependent on semi-feudal relations. For instance, in the first elections following the demise of Mubarak's regime, the Wafd Party, the heavyweight of Egyptian politics in the pre-Nasser era, won a meagre 7.6 % of seats while the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the political wing of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, secured almost half the seats in the house. Second, with 24 % of the seats, came the al-Nour Party representing an ultra-conservative streak of political Islam.[12]

Considering the NIF's poor performance in the 1986 elections it seems that either Nimeiry's revolution failed to undermine the hegemony of Sudan's old ruling class, or that the NIF did not do its homework. On this note, several dissident Islamists have recently argued that the 1989 coup was a premature adventure forced upon the rank and file by the power-hungry inner circle around Turabi. Had the NIF only waited its turn, they claim, it would have been voted in eventually and thus would

10 For an account of the 1986-1989 parliamentary period see Kamal Osman Salih, «The Sudan, 1985-9: The Fading Democracy», *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 28 (1990).

11 Ann Mosely Lesch, *Sudan: Contested National Identities*, 86.

12 David D. Kirkpatrick, «Islamists Win 70% of Seats in the Egyptian Parliament», *New York Times*, 21 January 2012 (accessed 8 February 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/world/middleeast/muslim-brotherhood-wins-47-of-egypt-assembly-seats.html?_r=1

have shown the world that peaceful and democratic Islamic governance is possible.[13] However, the actual situation back then defies such interpretations. Nimeiry failed to deny his sectarian contenders, the Umma Party and the DUP, their power bases in Sudan's hinterlands, and, in the aftermath of the 1985 uprising, the two re-emerged to dominate the elections.

In order to loosen the grip the Umma Party and the DUP had on rural areas, the NCP sought to take over the native administrations that formed the backbone of both parties› power. Initially, the NCP used force to make its clients the leaders of tribal authorities, yet slowly it learnt that appeasement is much more effective. When faced with recalcitrant elements the government promoted demographic changes, either by making vague tribal borders into permanent feature, or by favouring land-poor pastoral communities against dominant sedentary populations. In Darfur, such tribal policies lead to considerably more conflict than the government had anticipated.

On a different level, the government sought to secure the allegiance of younger generations by expanding higher education. New universities, often underfunded and understaffed, were founded in every major town. Academics who criticised the government's haste and the poor quality of the education missed the point. The NCP's universities were ideological training grounds where the rural young, in many instances the first in their families to get a higher education, learned to rebel against the ties that attached their kin to the sectarian order. Even on this terrain, however, where it thought itself safest, the dialectical boomerang caught up with the NCP. In Sudan's least developed regions young people's anger at the failure of government to deliver the promised ‹development› – and the jobs befitting an educated, self-indulgent elite – turned into rage against the system. Particularly in Darfur and Kordofan, educated but unemployed young people joined the new rebel movements and tried to fight their way out of perceived regional/ethnic marginalisation. The government responded by outsourcing its war against the Darfur rebels to loyal ‹tribal› militias, thereby entrenching ethnic fragmentation and, on a larger scale, the rift between the riverain heartland of Sudan and its peripheries.

The regional distribution of power was not only an issue for disgruntled young men in the peripheries, in 1998/1999 it became a major bone of contention between Omar al-Bashir, the head of the state, and Hassan al-Turabi, the veteran sheikh of the Islamic Movement. The result was the overthrow of Turabi and a split in the Islamist camp, with the majority led by Ali Osman Mohamed Taha who chose to side with President Bashir. Turabi rallied NCP supporters in the peripheries, particularly in Darfur and Kordofan, against President Bashir, and, in December 1999, the confrontation came to a head when Turabi, the speaker of the parliament, pushed through a set of constitutional amendments that denied the president the authority to appoint state governors. In this situation, Bashir declared a state of emergency and dissolved the National Assembly.

13 For instance (in Arabic) al-Tayeb Zain al-Abdin, «The Story of the Islamic Movement with the Salvation Regime», *al-Sahafa*, 12 February 2012 (accessed 12 February 2012), http://www.alsahafa.sd/details.php?articleid=41316&ispermanent=0

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The politics of fatigue

With this in mind it may be possible to explain why, in January 2011, a Sudanese Spring failed to gain traction – and that despite the fact that the regime lost about a third of the country and is struggling with a severe economic crisis. There are two major opposition groups to NCP rule – armed movements in Darfur, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan, and, in Khartoum, representatives of the old ruling class (to which one may add Hassan al-Turabi). Although there are points of contact between the two groups, their agendas are essentially different.

Following the example of the SPLA/M, the armed movements would like to form a broad alliance of the ‹marginalised› and capture Khartoum, thus overturning the relationship between centre and periphery. At the popular level, members of this alliance define themselves in strictly ethnic terms and the common ground with others is purely an African identity juxtaposed to the Sudanese Arabs. Collapsing ethnic and political identities in such a manner may be an effective way to recruit supporters in the war zones, yet it condemns the rebel forces to a state of permanent parochialism.[14] The rebels thus mirror the divisive ideology propagated by the very centre they seek to transform, and thereby deliver the critical mass of the population in the Sudanese heartland to the siege mentality fostered by the NCP. Even where the rebel groups maintain stable constituencies the rulers in Khartoum manage to find sufficient clients among Arabs living in peripheral areas, who, because of their ethnic identity, are being excluded from liberation struggles, and thus the NCP is able to maintain its tenuous hold on Sudan's troubled fringes.[15] Bogged down by this handicap the rebel movements have become ready material for Khartoum and other powers in the region, including the recently independent and assertive Juba, a factor that only strengthens the conspiracy theories propagated by the NCP.

The old political parties continue to pursue a rather stubborn policy – the restoration of the political order that preceded the 1989 coup. The opposition parties, once allies of the SPLA/M under the umbrella of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), have found their way back into Khartoum politics. The first to rescind was former Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi. In 1999 he signed a bilateral accord with President Bashir that eventually split his party. His second in command and cousin, Mubarak al-Fadil al-Mahdi, at the time secretary general of the NDA, chose to split from the Umma Party along with a considerable faction and join the NCP government. He later tired of the NCP's dominance, maintaining his own party for a while and eventually returning to Umma, a wasted force.

Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani, the chief of the DUP and the chairman of the NDA, chose Ali Osman Taha as a partner. In 2003, once it had become clear that the SPLA/M was unwilling to let its negotiations with the government in Khartoum be

14 For a discussion of the category ‹parochial rebels› in Africa see William Reno, *Warfare in Independent Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 206-241.

15 Paradigmatic in this context is the regime's mobilisation of the northern Rizeigat in the Darfur conflict, see M. W. Daly, *Darfur's Sorrow: The Forgotten History of a Humanitarian Disaster*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 258-268.

bogged down by demands of the northern Sudanese opposition, the two signed a framework agreement. In June 2005, following negotiations in Cairo, the NDA signed a formal political agreement with the government.[16]

The rules in Khartoum were no longer the ones the old political parties were accustomed to. They bemoaned the death of John Garang, as they had imagined he would restore Sudan back to what it was before the NCP took over; they lagged behind as the SPLM and the NCP battled through the transitional period of the CPA; they could not decide in a timely fashion whether to take part or to boycott the April 2010 elections; they eventually fielded presidential candidates – each party its own man;[17] they were dumbfounded when the SPLM withdrew its presidential candidate, Yasir Arman, in what seemed to be a last-minute deal with the NCP;[18] and they failed to react in any meaningful way when South Sudan seceded.

The calamity of partition, reasoned the leaders of the opposition, would deliver the majority of the northern Sudanese straight back into their arms. What they did not account for was the considerable success of the NCP's northern chauvinist, if not frankly racist, propaganda. This was achieved through the Just Peace Forum (JPF), a party established just before the CPA was signed, and whose main aim was to separate northern Sudan from its southern regions. Through its mouthpiece, the newspaper *al-Intibaha*, the JPF persistently argued what NCP politicians would only hint at, namely that the separation of the south was preferable to risking Sudan's Arab-Muslim profile in a unitary state,[19] in which the SPLA/M and its allies might share power with the NCP or, come the worst, take over. On these grounds the JPF attacked the power-sharing agreements of the CPA as acts of high treason and advocated a speedy referendum. Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, the man who negotiated the deal, was customarily ridiculed on the pages of *al-Intibaha*, while hawkish NCP politicians were lauded for their aggressive stance towards the SPLM.

Today, *al-Intibaha*'s stance has become mainstream. President Bashir himself, incidentally the nephew of the JPF's chairman, declared in December 2010 that, once southern Sudan seceded, the rump northern Sudan would at last be able to realise its Muslim-Arab identity.[20] Then, he declared to a cheering crowd in Gadaref, central

16 Reuters, «Sudan opposition sign deal but major issues left», *Sudan Tribune*, 18 June 2005 (accessed 12 April 2012), http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-opposition-sign-deal-but,10237

17 «Sudan electoral commission approves 10 out of 13 presidential candidates», *Sudan Tribune*, 31 January 2010 (accessed 12 April 2012), http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-electoral-commission,33961

18 «Sudan opposition stunned by Arman's withdrawal amid talk of secret NCP-SPLM deal», Sudan Tribune, 1 April 2010 (accessed 10 April 2012), http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-opposition-stunned-by-Arman,34607

19 The idea surfaced in debates within the Islamic Movement in the mid-1970s in the context of the movement's frustration with southern support for Nimeiry. See Abdelwahab El-Affendi, ««Discovering the South': Sudanese Dilemmas for Islam in Africa», *African Affairs* 89 (1990), 378-379.

20 «Sudan's Bashir endorses lashing of YouTube woman, says North will transform into Islamic state», *Sudan Tribune*, 20 December 2010 (accessed 13 April 2012), http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-s-Bashir-endorses-lashing-of,37345

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Sudan, all legislations would be based on sharia law, Arabic would become the only official language, Islam the sole religion. In the 1980s, the NIF press had already argued the same and, following the NIF's 1989 takeover, the state media had propagated similar ideas. However, the claim back then was that the SAF, backed by the *mujahidin* of the PDF, would inevitably crush the SPLA and extend *dar al-Islam* (the territory of Islam) to the heathen / Christian south.

In 2011, with the resumption of warfare between the northern branch of the SPLA/M and the SAF in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, the JPF began to bring its jihad rhetoric into overdrive, while the opposition in Khartoum listlessly watched as its momentum slipped away. The two major opposition parties, Umma and the DUP, effectively severed their links to the National Consensus Forces, the wobbly alliance which had replaced the NDA, bringing together, besides the two parties named, a medley consisting of Turabi's PCP, the SPLM-North, the Communist Party, and a number of smaller groupings. In late November 2011, frustrated by its long absence from power and the continuing loss of members to the NCP, Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani's DUP decided to join Bashir's post-secession cabinet. As usual, Sadiq al-Mahdi of the Umma Party hesitated and rejected the NCP's crude offer to merge with the DUP and the NCP to form a grand Umma Unionist Congress,[21] nevertheless he urged his oldest son and probable heir, Abd al-Rahman, to follow the example Gaafar al-Sadiq, Mirghani's younger son, and become an assistant to the president.[22]

On the side of the unbending opposition are two unlikely partners, Turabi's PCP and the Communist Party. The former holds a deep personal grudge against the current rulers and purports to have recently discovered that liberal democracy is an article of Islamic faith; the latter has its own defiant principles. The SPLM's northern branch abandoned parliamentary politics when it decided to take up arms in South Kordofan and Blue Nile – and that although, in the run-up to the April 2010 elections, it had looked as if it might become a credible political factor, an effort thwarted when the SPLM decided at the last minute to withdraw its presidential candidate – Yasir Arman, a northerner and the youngest among the contenders – in order to ensure a smooth secession process.

«Shabab la ahzab»: youth, not (political) parties

The youthful protest movement that took shape during the run-up to the April 2010 elections under the banner of Girifna, a loosely organised group of students and university graduates, emerged out of the stalemate described above. The young women and men of Girifna, and later of Sharara and Change Now, share a common experience as members of established opposition parties, foot soldiers with little say and less to decide. Once they took to the streets – at least in the few instances where

21 *al-Sahafa*, 10 March 2011 (accessed 10 March 2011), http://alsahafa.sd/details.php?articleid=23682

22 «Sons of Sudan's opposition leaders appointed as Bashir's aides», *Sudan Tribune*, 30 November 2011 (accessed 30 November 2011), http://www.sudantribune.com/Sons-of-Sudan-s-opposition-leaders,40858

they managed to overwhelm anti-riot police and plain-clothes security agents – the young demonstrators voiced their rejection of the nepotistic and corrupt NCP state as well as their disillusion with the token politics of the opposition. The slogan they used was «shabab la ahzab» – youth, not [political] parties – a cry that voices their disenchantment with the established order and their frustration over a social structure that favours age, not creativity or merit.

Within the opposition parties, younger members tried unsuccessfully to gain greater representation, and they rejected the NCP's offers of co-optation. A group of such discontented members, united by their shared experience as student activists, organised as a non-partisan coalition of young party members, thus, ironically, replicating the convergence of opposition forces for members of their generation. In all instances these overly polite opponents of the establishment could only voice a formal critique of their elders and betters. Rather short on ideas on how to address their own situation and that of the people as a whole, their complaints sounded like those of teenagers agonising about how unfairly they are being treated by adults – or so it seemed to the indifferent onlookers on the streets of Khartoum who did nothing as the police disciplined the ‹juvenile› protesters. In reaction to this unsympathetic response from the ‹masses› many young activists either withdrew to online forums such as Facebook or began to tell a more sympathetic international audience about their tribulations, both of which strategies will achieve very little.

Not spring, the breeze heralding the rainy season

Northern Sudan's climate has a dry and a rainy season, heat being the permanent feature apart from a brief period referred to as ‹the cold.› The term «spring» is thus rather inadequate to express, be it factually or allegorically, the idea of blossoming and rejuvenation, as spring is unknown to all but the select few who have experienced it elsewhere. Rather, it is the mild breezes announcing the start rainy season that signal a reawakening and growth to the *nas* (common people), the impoverished peasants and pastoral nomads in Sudan's rural areas and the unpropertied town dwellers who, caught in cycles of unemployment, can hardly make a living. The anxious rulers in Khartoum as well as their opponents permanently call upon the *nas* to fight, to kill, and to die for their own 'salvation› or ‹liberation.›

Today, the *nas* are splintered into dominant and marginalised, Arab and African, Muslim, Christian and heathen, indigenous and migrant, and into rival ethnic groups and tribes. All these supposedly immutable smithereens of identity make the concept of a Sudanese people opaque. To dispel the mystifications of this impervious tangle of allegedly organic formations and reconstitute the union of the *nas* will require a quantum leap. A Sudanese Breeze will only arise if the fractured *nas* is healed and if sectarian identity is replaced by a unity of purpose that unites the dispossessed against their oppressors.

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JOK MADUT JOK

South Sudan: Building a Diverse Nation

Introduction

When, in July 2011, South Sudan finally achieved independence after a long and bitter struggle, the country found itself confronted with two major challenges. The first was the construction of a viable state under extremely difficult conditions. The new country inherited a poor security apparatus, dilapidated infrastructure, weak state institutions, financial worries, and regional and international uncertainties. All of this will require a lengthy process of state-building, including economic development, better-trained officials, more effective security, responsible budgeting, efficient services, and an improved infrastructure. Also needed are policies to encourage the growth of civil society and of the private sector, including foreign investment.

The second challenge is the need for South Sudan to create a sense of national unity and shared identity amongst its diverse population. Independence alone is not enough if it is not accompanied by a programme of nation-building, something that must go beyond the material aspects of development. While services, better living standards, and a sense of security would undoubtedly help citizens to identify with their country, it is also true that only national unity can produce an environment in which these services can be provided effectively. So no matter what ventures the government of South Sudan embarks upon, it has to view nation and state as inseparable components of the same project. At this stage, the government and its development partners seem to be heavily focused on state-building and less on the question of how to turn the young state into a nation all South Sudanese can embrace. Therefore, the following focuses on this second challenge and offers some thoughts on the problem of nation-building.

The need for national unity

After the separation from the north, the people of South Sudan shared the euphoria of independence and memories of a long liberation struggle. Beyond this, however, they lacked a strong sense of national cohesion that could unite the country's diverse and competing ethnic groups and political persuasions. Their historical unity was one of convenience not of conviction; it was not a unity resulting from a national project aimed at imbuing the citizens with a sense of pride in their nation. So, as it stands at the moment, South Sudan is only slightly more than a mere geographical fact. This

is dangerous, as national unity is a prerequisite for the country's ability to tackle the challenges listed above and to build a stable political system.

The struggle for liberation led by the Sudan Peoples› Liberation Movement (SPLM) was one of only a few experiences that transcended ethnic boundaries. There was a unity of purpose during the war, which promoted the belief in a separate nationhood vis-à-vis the north, most notably in the period leading up to the 2011 referendum on self-determination. However, even this unity of purpose had not been unconditional. In the recent past, particularly between 1983 and 2005 during the second round of the war between north and south, there was violent discord within the Sudan Peoples› Liberation Army (SPLA). Ethnic militias were created and bitter wars were fought between South Sudanese. In the years after 1991, the SPLA experienced a near-fatal factionalisation. Such conflicts made many citizens and foreign observers fear that independence and the removal of the common enemy might plunge the young state into civil war.

In fact, there are already many indications that this is going to happen. The relative calm that had prevailed since the 2005 truce between north and south has begun to vanish. The clearest evidence are the many rebellions against the government in Juba. Such rebellions are frequently caused by rivalries between top military officers – by the perception that power in Juba is held by only a few ethnic groups – and such quarrels quickly become ethnic as the leaders have to play this card in order to attract support. For example, following the 2010 Sudan general elections, several senior SPLA officers who contested the governorships in Jonglei and Northern Bahr el-Ghazal rebelled against Juba after they lost. There were also attempts by other leaders across South Sudan who criticised the government on issues of democracy or corruption. Such high-level criticism frequently created ethnic or regional strife, causing widespread fear that South Sudan may not be a viable nation. The same thing happened during the period following independence when ethnic violence escalated between Dinka and Nuer groups in Unity, Warrap, and Lakes states, as well as between Nuer and Murle in Jonglei. At the time of writing, there is a major campaign underway to disarm civilians in these states in order to assert the state's monopoly on violence.

Given this history of political rivalry and conflict along ethnic lines, a nation-building project has to rely on cultural diversity. Failure to do so will cause an increase in ethnic conflicts over the allocation of state resources and services, which may, in the end, destroy the new republic. Rivalries have thus to be managed in the most inclusive manner possible.

The political leadership of South Sudan has acknowledged the challenges of building a nation from scratch. It has vowed to initiate development projects that build on historical connections shared by all the various ethnic groups in order to foster a sense of belonging that transcends ethnic, political, and class differences. Mere accidents of history and geography cannot result in a unified nation, nor can they instil a feeling of belonging and loyalty. Nations don't just happen – they have to be planned, forged, and crafted. Building such a nation requires a vision, a plan, and honest participatory actions. In the following I will discuss four aspects of nation-building in South Sudan – the role of shared historical experiences; the preservation

and celebration of cultural diversity; the promotion of a vibrant civil and political society; and the need for an inclusive concept of citizenship.

Remembering the shared history of oppression and liberation

Shared experiences are often invoked as important components of forging unity after independence. Looking at the claims of unity among southerners, however, it seems that these have historically been based on how different southerners were from northerners, and less on commonalities within the south.

In the old Sudan, differences between southerners and northerners encompassed culture, religion, language, and ethnicity. These differences were exacerbated by the official policies of successive governments in Khartoum that attempted to homogenise Sudan in order to create an Arab country. Many in the south have remarked that such policies wanted to do away with diversity, as diversity hindered Arabisation. For example, officials in Khartoum often stated that Arabic was the language most commonly used by various ethnic groups in the south to communicate across linguistic boundaries and therefore should become the only national language. However, while the spread of Arabic in the south is a fact, it does not necessarily follow that southerners are Arabs: «we also speak English, but we have never claimed to be English,» observed Manyang, a southern journalist, in a recent interview.

The strategy of subsequent governments in Khartoum was one of unity through coercion, using both outright violence and underhand tactics such as the propagation of Arab culture in the state media. Not only were development and basic services concentrated at the centre, Arab and Islamic culture were also actively promoted – at the expense of various other cultural practices. The result was that the south and other peripheries were increasingly excluded from wealth, services, and power. The people of the south thus united out of the need to deal collectively with the hardships imposed by Arab-dominated governments in Khartoum.

This shared experience of victimhood has deep historical roots. It can be traced back to the days of slavery, a practice that did not segregate southerners into ethnic groups but affected them indiscriminately, thus fostering a shared sense of opposition. Another historical experience that cemented unity in the south was the resistance to the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, the colonial power of the time. Southerners were brought together by various colonial policies that destroyed their communities. By the 1940s, the British were seen in the South as favouring Arabs, northerners, and Egyptians. The turbulent independence, in 1956, further added to this sense of marginalisation. After decades of preferential treatment for the north, southern leaders felt that in an independent Sudan they would end up, yet again, as a colony of the north. Southerners argued collectively that the British should either delay independence until the south had become ready to negotiate with the north on an equal footing, or they should set up two separate countries. In the end, the people of the south had to choose between second-class citizenship and the fight for a better, more equitable country. The result was a protracted and violent conflict between north and south that lasted for 17 years (1955-1972).

However, the event most closely related to the emergence of what one might describe as a South Sudanese identity was the second war between north and south. When it broke out, in 1983, there was a long list of southern grievances, prominent among them President Nimeiry's use of sharia law, the redrawing of borders between north and south in an attempt to annex some newly discovered oil-rich areas to the north, and the plan to split the then autonomous south into three regions – a clear abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement that had ended the first civil war. All of these were shared grievances uniting the south against Khartoum, and they resulted in broad popular support for the SPLM/A. The government in Khartoum responded with counter-insurgency tactics, targeting civilians in urban centres and accusing nearly all southerners of supporting the rebels. Such collective punishment made more and more people rebel and swelled the ranks of the insurgents. The brutality of the military campaigns, the inhumane treatment of internally displaced people in the north, the extra-judicial killings in government-controlled garrison towns in the south, and the idea that the country's divide between periphery and centre could be solved militarily, all cemented the resolve of the south to stand united.

A casualty of the protracted civil war was the objective to change the country as a whole. Promising as it was, the SPLA/M's concept of a New Sudan – the vision of transforming the whole of Sudan into a democratic and secular country – began to wane among ordinary fighters. The gruesome nature of the conflict, the abductions and maiming of abductees as well as the aerial bombardments pushed southerners to pursue national independence instead. Political humour in South Sudan is currently awash with jokes about John Garang's concept of a New Sudan. Many people point to his frustration with his fellow fighters – he reportedly remarked «anyone not convinced about the liberation of the whole Sudan can stop when we reach Kosti [a town just north of the current north-south border] and leave me to march to Khartoum alone, if I so choose.» Some even question his real motives, claiming that his notion of a New Sudan was nothing but a geopolitical tactic.

In South Sudan, the struggle for independence is now officially recognised as a fight against foreign occupation and domination lasting 191 years. State medals display this official historical timeline from 1821, when Muhammad Ali, the Viceroy of the Ottoman Sultan in Egypt, sent an expedition to invade Sudan in search of slaves and ivory, and 2011, the year South Sudan gained independence. Historians will continue to debate whether or not the Turkiyya (1820-1881), the Mahdiyya (1881-1898), the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1898-1956), and independent Sudan (1956-2011) all had similar policies of oppression that make for a sense of historical continuity. However, the official conclusion today is that South Sudan, united or not, was a colony of all these powers, and only now has it emerged from foreign rule.

What the above discussion of South Sudan's history demonstrates is the gradual emergence of a sense of collective national identity, shapeless as it may still be. The memory and remembrance of the struggle for liberation and independence, therefore, has to be a key element of the new nation. In this spirit, two surviving members of the 1955 Torit mutiny – the event that marked the beginning of the first war between north and south – were invited to attend the independence celebrations on the 9th

July 2011. This gesture was meant to give the new nation a chance to express its gratitude, but the presence of these men at the independence festivities was also meant to send a message to the current generation of servicemen: Their nation will always pay tribute to them. There is now an initiative to erect monuments in honour of such heroes as Samuel Gaitut, Majier Gai, Akuot Atem, Joseph Uduhu, William Nyuon Bany, Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, and General Tafeng, in front of public buildings in the south. A related initiative is the «South Sudan History and Documentation Project,« which will record the history of the struggle as witnessed by ordinary people. A war memorial at the bottom of Mount Kujur, or on the face of Mount Lado, or on the Island of Gondokoro might serve this purpose. It will celebrate the heroes and heroines of the liberation struggle, and additional memorials and statues, street names, and war museums will do the same across different states and towns of South Sudan. Through such remembrance the new country ought to recognise all the leaders of its struggle, from the Anyanya of the 1960s, to the Anyanya II, and finally to the SPLA. In this, it is important to put less emphasis on the differing contributions made by the various ethnic groups – and especially not to extol the efforts of one group and denigrate those of others in order to justify divergences regarding power and wealth.

Celebrating cultural diversity

Now that independence has been achieved the question is whether the numerous historical experiences that united the old south can endure in the new south, and whether they will transform the young country into a unified political, cultural, and social entity. So far, what has kept the south together has been a unity *ex negativo*, a unity in opposition to the north. Will the people of South Sudan be able to form one unified nation without external aggression as catalyst? And what would be the basis for such a nation?

What will unite the South Sudanese as citizens of a sovereign state is a national project to construct a collective national identity. It is the task of the political leadership, government, civil society, and private enterprise to forge such an identity by turning South Sudan's cultural diversity into a national asset. To celebrate diversity as a source of strength, as an enrichment of human endeavour establishes a discourse of hope and togetherness, rather than one of hegemony, exclusion, and assumed homogeneity. Today, the government views South Sudan's rich culture and diversity as a source of strength, not as a symbol for discord. In view of the history of the old Sudan, South Sudan's political leadership has identified certain practices that must be avoided – enforced homogenisation, exclusionary policies, nepotism, fiscal irresponsibility, and political restrictions. Such practices are the roots of South Sudan's opposition to Khartoum, and allowing them to spread within the new state would certainly destroy national unity, political stability, and the spirit of freedom that builds nations.

One aspect of this approach is to celebrate all of South Sudan's cultural diversity – languages, arts, traditional livelihoods, religious beliefs and practices, etc. The Ministry of Culture wants to chronicle, preserve, and display religious practices and rituals used by spiritual leaders against unprovoked violence. One example is the plan

to establish a «museum of prophecy» at the shrine of Ngun Deng, the 19th century prophet from what is now Jonglei State. This museum will show that Ngun Deng's ideas had much in common with those of other Nilotic prophets, such as Ariathdit in Gogrial or Lirpiu in Bor, and thus highlight that native spiritual leaders can be a moral compass for southern communities – one not inferior to Christianity or any other religion. After all, religion had been central among South Sudan's grievances against Khartoum, which is why any effort by the new state to elevate certain beliefs above others would alienate many citizens.

A second aspect is the nation's language – or languages. Today, the country does not have an indigenous national language. The lack of a common language does not imply that South Sudan cannot become a unified nation, but a failure to address the issue would certainly hamper its growth. A national language would diminish feelings

A woman on Independance Day

of exclusion or the perception that one or few ethnic groups dominate. Here, South Sudan may follow the example of other countries with similar problems. A solution could be a hybrid tongue that draws on local languages, similar to the Indonesian model, or the adoption of English as the language of government and education. Others have suggested that five languages from the three main regions should be selected. However, developing a national language or languages does not mean that the smaller languages would disappear; rather it would encourage literacy and their use at a local level. If language policy were linked to education, indigenous languages could be taught at primary school level up to, say, third grade, after which English would become the medium of instruction.

A third aspect is the creation of symbols of nationhood. Apart from the national anthem, flag, name of country, currency, and sports, institutions such as cultural centres, a national archive, and a Museum of National Heritage will also be important.

- *Cultural centres*: In the face of poverty, lacking healthcare, high child mortality, malnutrition, and other calamities one might think that culture is not a priority. However, one cause for this dire situation is that South Sudan is a nation without a deeply-rooted collective psyche. In order to really become a nation, shared history, culture, and identity are all-important – and this is something cultural centres can impart. A true nation will have to provide platforms for arts and culture, so that different groups are able to appreciate the diverse arts and cultures of their compatriots. Such centres could offer mobile exhibitions, travelling from state to state, and accompanied by lectures about the history of South Sudan, musical shows, and workshops by artists. For younger citizens such shows offer an opportunity to appreciate traditions, and they are platforms to preserve local arts from global market forces.
- *National archive*: Many people were shocked when the provincial government of Central Equatoria moved the national archive into a tent in order to use the main building for offices. It is essential to have a permanent archive that safeguards the country's collective history and functions as a centre for research and teaching about the past. To this end, on the occasion of independence, South Sudan received funds from the government of Norway to erect a modern building for South Sudan's national archive. The planning for this building is currently underway.
- *The National Museum of Heritage*: Such a national museum could showcase the diversity of South Sudan's heritage and would display everything that is central to people's everyday culture – from healing practices to religion, dwellings and architecture, language, music and dance, connubial customs, cooking utensils and types of food, bedding and headrests, war and weapons, photographs showing the faces of southern ethnicities, systems of traditional governance, clothing, trades, crafts and other functional arts.

Creating a vibrant civil and political society

A sense of citizenship that can unite all South Sudanese also requires an independent civil society and the toleration of political opposition. Fortunately, the government seems to perceive of civil society as a partner in governance. This attitude stems from the war period, when South Sudan had an active civil society that chronicled and reported atrocities committed by the Khartoum government as well as abuses by southern forces; the groups involved also campaigned for peaceful solutions to Sudan's conflicts. At the time, there were few conflicts between activists in the south and the liberation movement, especially because civil society also provided services that compensated for the absence of state institutions in war zones.

After the 2005 peace agreement, most important civil society figures in the south joined the newly established Government of South Sudan. This was both good and bad. On the one hand, it ensured that activists had allies in government – people who knew them, respected their views of civil society, and could promote laws favourable to advocacy groups. On the other hand, however, this was problematic, since what was left of civil society lacked strength and leadership. For example, it is often said that in South Sudan women are politically invisible, and that the justice system does little to protect women's rights. Nevertheless, the constitution provides for affirmative action to redress the bias against women – but for this to become a reality powerful women-led civil society groups are needed that can create pressure concerning implementation.

One problem for civil society in South Sudan today is the increasing insecurity about legal and practical limitations. An NGO law has been drafted but is proving hard to pass, as there are a number of political and constitutional conflicts between officials and activists. The absence of a legal framework makes civil society vulnerable to arbitrary government measures. At present, the political environment still enables civil society to grow, but experiences from other countries such as Eritrea show that the lack of a clear legal framework will allow governments to curtail free speech.

It is likely that the political room for manoeuvre in South Sudan will shrink in the future and that the government may try to restrict civil society. The trend that most civil society groups currently focus on services and only very few do advocacy work seems to indicate such developments. As long as local organisations do nothing but provide services to the public, it is unlikely the state will object. Advocacy, on the other hand, tends to be challenging, and the government claims that the country is still too embryonic in form to meet all its citizens› expectations, including full democratic rights; consequently it will often rebuff criticism as premature. The same goes for opposition parties. South Sudan's ruling party championed the struggle for independence, and it is now becoming evident that the SPLM is using the liberation bonus to dominate politics – a slippery slope towards single-party rule. To create a unified country, the SPLM needs to acknowledge that other political actors have contributed to liberation as well, and participation in combat should not be viewed as *carte blanche* for holding public office.

Promoting an inclusive notion of citizenship

As stated in South Sudan's 2011 Interim Constitution, the basis for political rights is citizenship, not the question of who has done what to achieve independence. Current government policy for building the nation's identity is based on an inclusive and broad-based definition of citizenship. With that in mind, economic development and other services should not be apportioned according to which ethnic group is thought to have fought harder during the war. South Sudan's political class needs to recognise that the severest danger to national cohesion, loyalty, and citizens› pride in their nation would be the suspicion that access to power, media, government aid, and services is given or denied according to ethnic categories. Exactly this was one of the most important factors that lead the south to split from Sudan, and the new authorities should avoid making the same mistake.

Where ethnic divisions are rampant, claims will abound that government policies favour one ethnic group over another. South Sudanese often say that their new nation is threatened by tribalism, nepotism, corruption, exclusion because of ethnicity, age, or gender, and the lack of a clear social compact between government and citizens. Many, it seems, realise that the ethnic make-up of the country, if not managed carefully, may become a liability. Whether political leaders share this concern, there will only become clear once national policies that address diversity and the behaviour of officials come into force.

A starting point would be for the government to state clearly that South Sudan belongs to all South Sudanese, and not exclusively to one ethnic, religious, or political group – and it needs to be seen to make good on that promise, too. However, this is not just a question of ethnicity. Since South Sudan's independence a divide has opened up between those who have physically fought in the liberation struggle, and those who have made other contributions to it. Some of the former liberation fighters now seem to feel entitled to privileges, while many civilians feel excluded. This is not surprising for a young nation that has seen protracted and destructive war; still, it must not become an established practice in a peaceful South Sudan.

As stated earlier, not only should the government be ethnically diverse, services equitable, and individual opinions reflected through multiparty democracy or civil society, South Sudan also needs to promote gender equity. Affirmative action to rectify the historical exclusion of women from public life has to be enforced by powerful public institutions. It has to be understood that gender equity is not solely a matter of equal rights and chances for women, it is for the good of the whole country to use and maximise women's contributions. For instance, women constitute over 51% of South Sudan's population, yet literacy rates among them are the lowest in the world. If their voices are suppressed, the whole country will lose out; if women are denied the opportunity to develop their skills, their loss is that of all of South Sudan.

Conclusion

Nations are made, not born. All of today's nations had to go through prolonged periods of struggle to forge their sense of communality and become unified, stable, and developed. To call for peaceful co-existence is not just a well-meaning exhortation, it is a matter of survival. In the end, no one will gain from exclusionary practices, from loyalty only to one's own cultural peers. On the other hand, it will benefit all to develop an inclusive sense of national belonging by rallying around the national symbols, by building a citizenry devoted to citizenship in the nation, and by implementing citizen-centred national policies.

Western aid workers in South Sudan as well as migrant labourers from East Africa will often say that the South Sudanese are a very generous people. In times of famine, for example, when aid workers arrived in villages, they were often puzzled by the length to which these hungry people would go to feed their guests. This positive image is one a young country cannot afford to lose. To stay true to itself, the new nation must uphold self-criticism and reflection. It has to adhere to its own standards, and it has to teach these values to younger people so that everyone is reminded of what their nation stands for. Right now, an attitude of openness still prevails; if this remains the case, the people of South Sudan will be their own best judges and critics.

PAULA CRISTINA ROQUE

The SPLM: Political Transformation or Strategic Adaptation?

Introduction

Transitions from war to peace bring with them a number of difficult transformations, and the case of South Sudan is no exception. Since its inception in 1983, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) has undergone several important changes and survived ideological contradictions and deep internal fissures. Now that «liberation» has been achieved and the SPLM forms the government of the newly independent Republic of South Sudan, it has to make its greatest transition yet – the one from guerrilla movement controlling a war-torn region, to government in charge of a sovereign, democratic state.

The SPLM used military strategies to achieve the first phase of liberation, which led to the defeat of the old Sudanese forces. It will now need to use political strategies to tackle the most difficult phase of liberation – nation-building and state-building. However, in the first year of independence the SPLM government has not formulated a clear policy or vision. This points to difficulties of operating within political structures carried over from the civil war. The «behavioural DNA» of the revolution and liberation struggle is still very much present within the SPLM. During the war, the SPLM's High Command controlled the political party, the military, administrative functions, and the judiciary; today, it still continues to dominate the institutions of government and party. The SPLM has not yet undergone a complete transformation from national liberation movement to political party. However, it has the opportunity and the potential – and it absolutely needs to complete this transformation.

If, thus far, the SPLM has failed to fully transform itself, this is due to four factors. Firstly, there is the contradiction between a revolutionary legacy of centralised authority on the one hand, and the democratic separation of powers with its checks and balances on the other. Secondly, there is the need to distinguish between state and party – that is, it has to be determining which of the two should lead (their conflation was a consequence of the civil war). Thirdly, there is a lack of institutionalisation within the party itself; some governance structures are in place, yet party organs meet only sporadically, and the interests of powerful individuals frequently eclipse the ability of internal structures to operate independently. Finally, the SPLM is still grappling with divisions among its leadership and competing visions.

Because of these four factors, it seems likely that the movement will continue to devolve further into an ethnic-based and patronage-driven organisation. The SPLM has shown that it can be pragmatic and is able to adapt its institutional framework and rhetoric when confronted with moments of internal crisis, as was the case after the 1991 split and the 2004 leadership crisis in Rumbek. The strategy adopted has usually been one of political accommodation. However, this has led to an amalgamation of different political forces and interest groups into an over-inflated structure, something that could threaten the future cohesion and ideology of the SPLM. If it wants to achieve stability in South Sudan, the party therefore urgently needs to open up to internal debate. As the ruling party of a newly independent state, the SPLM cannot afford a deep internal crisis, as this will inevitably have serious national repercussions. In the following, I will therefore discuss how the SPLM has managed change in the past, and from that will try to draw conclusions for the challenges that lie ahead.

The origins of the SPLM's political trajectory

The symbolism of liberation movements throughout Africa has been framed within the paradigm of ‹representing the oppressed, those wanting freedom and independence.› This perspective implies that a liberation movement fully embodies the nation – with the consequence that liberation movements will find it difficult to adapt to a democratic environment where their role is being contested by other political movements. Kwame Nkrumah, for example, argued that the suppression of rival organisations in Ghana was justified, as these were forces sacrificing the interests of the country and disrupting national unity.[1] In the words of R.W. Johnson, national liberation movements have a «common theology»: Regardless of the sins of the past the liberation movement is righteous, and since it not only represents the masses but embodies them it, it can never be wrong.[2] The liberation movement has thus been conceptualised as a uniquely positioned and legitimate force to represent a nation oppressed.

It was this very political outlook that made it difficult to transform South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) into a democratic party, as the ANC could not be, at the same time, the mouthpiece of the people and one of many political contenders.[3] In many respects, the SPLM's dilemma is similar, as it was the movement that negotiated peace and achieved the south's independence, something for which it needed a very broad popular base. Today however, as one party among others in an independent South Sudan, the SPLM needs to formulate policies and begin to advocate particular political strategies and programmes. As a consequence, it will become increasingly

1 Kwame Nkrumah (1963), *Africa Must Unite*, pp73, as referred to in Ottaway, Marina «Liberation Movements and Transition to Democracy: The Case of the ANC», *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol 29:1, March 1991, pp61-82

2 Johnson, 2002, «The final struggle is to stay in power», Focus, No. 25, Helen Suzman Foundation, in: Melber, Henning, The Legacy of Anti-Colonial Struggles in Southern Africa: Liberation Movements as Governments, Conference paper, April 2010, Maputo

3 As argued by Ottaway, 1991

difficult for the SPLM to represent adequately the political interests, needs, and values of all southerners.

At the outset, the SPLM was essentially a reformist movement that aimed to transform the whole of Sudan. From its inception, the SPLM/A was dominated by soldiers, and until the signing of the peace agreement it fully embraced the armed struggle.[4] The Ethiopian Derg's Marxist influence on the SPLM's ideology meant that the priority within the movement was not to engage in mass-based politics (unlike other liberation movements with a Maoist outlook), allowing politics to be militarised and excluding most of the population from the process of transforming state power.[5] However, in its 1983 manifesto the SPLM declared its intention to make the people part of its revolution: After being liberated, the people would undergo ‹politicisation, organisation, and militarisation,› with the objective of forming a united front. The manifesto highlighted the shortcomings of the Anyanya I movement, which preceded the SPLM, accusing it of implementing ‹fake governments, complete with its Western-type cabinet› comprised of a bourgeosified southern bureaucratic elite allied with different political parties in the south (the Sudan African National Union, The South Sudanese Liberation Front, and the Southern Front). The SPLM essentially learned from the failures of the Anyanya[6] movement and elevated a structured and disciplined military hierarchy above political activities. These origins make the transformation of the SPLM into a political party a more difficult task – as such a party would necessarily need to have mass appeal, understand the demands of its constituencies, and create internal structures that would allow for input from the population.

One important ideological stance that for a long time tormented the party's nationalist appeal and cause, and which resulted in factionalism, was the unionist position of a New Sudan. As stated in its 1983 Manifesto, ‹the first bullet would be fired at the separatists.› The SPLM's vision of a New Sudan aimed to restructure the centre and wanted to achieve a united Sudan with a democratic, equal, free, and just society where the «masses, and not the elites from different regions, would exercise real power for the economic and social development of their regions.»[7] Initially, the SPLM's objective was to capture power in Khartoum in order to completely transform the state and the political order – yet ultimately the SPLM's objective was self-determination. The idea, as revealed by a leading military commander, was to avoid replicating the mistakes of the Anyanya movement and the 1972 Addis Agreement that had called for self-determination – and that, in the end, had failed. Instead, the SPLM wanted to adopt a vision that would garner international and regional acceptance, and hence the SPLM's strategy was to call for a united Sudan, in order to stir divisions

4 Young, John, «Sudan: The Incomplete Transition from the SPLA to the SPLM», In de Zeeuw, Jeroen (ed), 2008, From Soldiers to Politicians: Transforming Rebel movements After Civil War, Lynne Rienner

5 As argued by Young, 2008, pp161

6 The Anyanya was a separatist movement in South Sudan that fought the First Civil war from 1955-1972 and secured the Addis Ababa peace agreement with Khartoum in 1972.

7 Garang, «Speech by John Garang», 9th April 1985 following the downfall of Nimeiri, in Mansour, Khalid, *Call for Democracy in Sudan*, 1992, Kegan Paul International, pp 43.

in the north and thus secure the ambitions of the south[8]. The ultimate goal had always been an independent south, as can be seen by the demand to keep military and government separate during the 2005-2011 transitional period of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).[9] This policy to promote a united Sudan and oppose secession would, however, later become an important cause for dissent and factionalism within the SPLM/A. This led, in 1994, to a repositioning and to the formulation of the SPLM's ‹twin objectives,› that is that the New Sudan and self-determination were compatible. When independence was declared in 2011, the SPLM managed to survive this ideological contradiction,[10] although, under the CPA, it had committed itself to work towards unity. Still, the question remains whether by maintaining this position the SPLM has missed a crucial opportunity to create a stronger nationalist following within the south. Had independence been the objective of the fight from the very start, this might have helped to overcome the present regional and ethnic divisions.

The SPLM during the civil war

During the war the SPLM gradually developed four tiers of political and military structures to ensure that the movement and its programme were viable. Initially there were the National Committee, the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, and the Executive Committee, although later additional structures were created. As chairman, John Garang controlled and directed all aspects of the movement and the Political-Military High Command (PMHC). Later, the movement would create the para-parliamentary entities of a National Liberation Council (NLC) and National Executive Council (NEC), but it was only with the signing of the CPA that the SPLM developed a more refined party structure, one that included a National Convention, a Political Bureau, and a Secretariat.

A major impetus for change within the party came in 1991 with the so-called «Nasir split.» This crisis, the greatest challenge ever posed to Garang's authority, occurred when Riek Machar and Lam Akol attempted to topple Garang because of complaints that his rule had become too authoritarian, too focussed on him, and that the High Command had failed to establish an effective democratic system. The Nasir group (later renamed SPLA-United) called for southern independence, even though it aligned itself with Khartoum for financial and military support. As a result of this split that weakened the movement and caused tribal frictions that are still palpable today, Garang called the movement's first national convention, eleven years after it had been formed. The first National Convention, in 1994, at Chukudum, became a watershed for the SPLM: The vision of a New Sudan was consolidated, and the movement's political wing asserted its primacy over the military. The convention's principal objectives were to create political, public, and economic institutions; to win a mandate for the SPLM

8 Interview with SPLM member, Juba March 2012

9 Interview with Senior SPLA commander, and former member of the Military High Command, Juba March 2012

10 The SPLM argues that there is no contradiction because the New Sudan was a philosophical idea that could be implemented in totality or in part.

SPLA soldiers at independence parade

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to negotiate on behalf of the people of the south and other areas participating in the liberation struggle; and to separate the three tiers of government, legislature, executive, and judiciary.[11] From 1994 onward the SPLM set up the Civilian Authority of New Sudan (CANS) to manage liberated areas, that is the five regions of Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria, Southern Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan, and Upper Nile.[12] This civilian authority essentially became the executive branch and had jurisdiction over a diverse, mostly rural population.

It has been argued that these reforms were partly reversed in 2000 when the SPLM leadership realised it could not afford their political or economic cost.[13] However, the testimony of CANS leaders and others involved points to the fact that, after 2002, the CANS were very much used to prepare the SPLM for rule in the south. Cadres and administrators underwent training, laws were drafted, budgets created, secretariats instituted, etc.[14] Some SPLM leaders, however, contend that the movement ultimately failed to galvanise the support of the masses.[15] One academic from South Sudan has pointed out that there is a lack of popular participation in government and that «if we are not careful with the needs of the peripheries we will make Juba a Khartoum.»[16]

After the CPA: state-building and party-building

The most significant push towards the transformation of the SPLM came with the peace negotiations and the subsequent six-year interim period of the CPA.17 During this time, the movement had to adapt the goals it was pursuing during peace talks, it had to alter the movements overly hierarchical structure, and it had to realise that, as a future ruling party, it would have to accept principles such as accountability and constitutionality. Furthermore, it became clear that the SPLM would need to build stronger mass support and tackle the growing demands of civil society. Thus the SPLM experienced both a structural and perceptual shift.

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11 Mai, James Hoth, 2008, Political reconciliation between SPLM, SPLA and Anyanya: a negotiation tool for national reconciliation and peace in post-war Sudan, thesis, University of Fort Hare

12 Chol, Timothy Tut, Civil Authority in the New Sudan: Organization, Functions and Problems, SPLM document, Presented to the Conference on Civil Society and the Organization of Civil Authority in the New Sudan, April 1996

13 Rolandsen, Oystein, «From Guerilla Movement to Political Party. The Restructuring of the SPLM,» 2007, PRIO Papers, International Peace Research Institute

14 Interview with CANS employees and leaders based in Rumbek, February 2012

15 Interview, South Sudan advisor, Juba, January 2011

16 Alfred Lukoji, speaking at an Africa Rights conference in Juba, January 2011

17 The CPA, signed by National Congress Party (NCP) and SPLM/A in 2005, ended 22 years of civil war. The agreement provided a road map for political transformation through power-sharing and wealth-sharing. In Khartoum, a Government of National Unity (GNU) was set up that gave the SPLM proportional representation and, regarding the military, joint units of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the SPLA were to lay the foundation for a national army. However, in practical terms the country was split into two separate entities, with an autonomous government for South Sudan, distinct legal and cultural frameworks, different land policies, separate banking systems, the retention of two armies, and plans for a referendum on self-determination in the south.

When the CPA was first conceived it was regarded as a tool to change Sudan as a whole. It provided proposals for a thoroughgoing reform of the state, yet this was cut back, bit by bit, to the NCP's and SPLM's default positions – survival of the regime and southern self-determination, respectively. A potentially dangerous aspect of power-sharing agreements is that they compromise democratic processes and create elite compacts that sustain a militarised environment and impede the participation of civilian political parties. Although, under the CPA, both parties made substantial concessions, they also made sure that they would be firmly in control. Thus, the CPA ceased to be a tool to transform politics and Sudan's constitutional framework.[18]

Unfortunately, the CPA contained no provision that the two parties to the treaty be transformed into democratic organisations. While, during the CPA negotiations, NCP and SPLM reigned supreme, this began to change in the interim period, when both parties had to operate in an environment where other political actors were contesting their supremacy and legitimacy. The CPA was thus less a solution to Sudan's structural problems but rather a last chance for the country's political elites to share power.[19] The residual effect of the CPA has been that today the north and the south are both being dominated by respectively one political party.

The creation of the Government of South Sudan (GOSS), in July 2005, meant that the SPLM leadership had to rapidly establish governmental, parliamentary, and judiciary structures in Juba as well as in each of the ten states of the south. It also had to create a civil service, build and rehabilitate structures of governance, draft a constitution, and deliver on peace dividends. All of this had to be achieved while balancing a delicate array of different tribal groups seeking representation and power. Building the state in the south meant forming institutions where there were none, or using existing structures such as the CANS[20] and the national government's Southern Sudan Coordination Council.[21] At the same time the GOSS was created, the SPLM began to formally establish its party structures, a process still not completed as of 2012. Because of this, it is sometimes difficult to differentiate between party and state. In February 2006, interim party apparatuses were introduced nationally (in all of Sudan), in the south, and at a state level, with formal SPLM party structures on all administrative levels (state, county, payam, and boma), and the Congress became the party's supreme organ.[22] At present the party has a chairman (Salva Kiir), a secretary general (Pagan Amum), a 27-member political bureau, an executive committee of 55 members, and a secretariat. The secretariat has however remained wholly dependent on the political

18 See Kameir, Elwathig, 2007, Self-determination is Not the Culprit: The Password to Unity is Democratic Transformation, the First Sudan Institute for Research and Policy Symposium, Franklin and Marshall College, www.sudaninstitute.org

19 De Waal, Alex, 2007, Sudan: What kind of state? What kind of crisis? Occasional Paper 2, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics

20 In the SPLM National Leadership Council, New Site Kapoeta, December 2003, it was decided that the CANS were to become the fully functioning organs of government.

21 Barltrop, Richard, Leadership, Trust and Legitimacy in Southern Sudan's transition after 2005, UNDP working paper 2010

22 Rolandsen, Oystein, From Guerilla Movement to Political Party. The Restructuring of the SPLM, 2007, Prio Papers, International Peace Research Institute

bureau, and it has been unable to take the initiative or allow for the file and rank to elect the congress or select members of the political bureau. Some elements within the SPLM are aware of the fact that the movement has many leaders and institutions but no structures that reach out to the grassroots.[23] Unless the party succeeds in becoming a more democratic organisation there is little hope for democratisation on a national level.

In May 2008, the SPLM held its second convention in Juba, reiterating its will to be a national party and its vision of a «New Sudan.» Expectations regarding this convention were high, and many members hoped that the transformation agenda and policies regarding the deployment of cadres and other basic policy guidelines would be discussed. However, the opportunity to tackle these issues was let slip. The convention decided to reorganise some of the party's organs and to revitalise the roles of its youth and women's leagues, yet the party's leadership was not ready to introduce full internal democracy, as this could have meant that some senior cadres would lose their positions. For a whole week the convention was paralysed over the question of who would be the party's new number two. This issue threatened to split the SPLM into regional and ethnic fractions,[24] probably because the party's vice-chair is widely regarded as Salva Kiir's heir apparent. This experience has marred subsequent initiatives to reform the party.

The 2010 elections: A first test for party politics

The stark contrast between the logic of liberation and democratic competition was clearly in effect during the first post-war elections. During the interim period, the elections had been postponed several times, and they were finally held in 2010. During the previous four years in government, the GOSS had ruled without the democratic legitimisation of elections, depending on its liberation credentials and its patronage networks.[25] In April 2010, over 15 million registered voters elected a president of the republic, a president of South Sudan, 25 governors, as well as representatives for the National Assembly, the South Sudan Legislative Assembly, and state assemblies. The complexities and logistical challenges added to the difficulties of guaranteeing a fair vote. In the north, voters had to cast eight ballots, in the south it was twelve – with 72 political parties and 16,000 candidates. The electoral system was quite complex as the president was elected in two rounds; for governors a simple majority sufficed; and state and national legislative assemblies were elected by plurality (60% of seats being decided by constituency, the remainder on the basis of proportional representation via state and party lists). Analysts have pointed to the dangers of prioritising geographic representation, rather than expanding proportional representation, as

23 Interview with party cadres, Juba, February 2012

24 Yoh, John Gai, «The CPA: an embodiment of the New Sudan Vision?» in Deng, Francis, (ed.), 2009, New Sudan in the Making? Red Sea Press

25 As argued by Baltrop 2010

this means that interest groups and communities with their parochial agendas tend to gain the upper hand.[26]

In retrospect, the 2010 elections were less about testing party structures and the SPLM's ability to mobilise its members at a grassroots level, rather they showed what daunting internal challenges the movement was facing. The SPLM's internal fragmentation became apparent when the party leadership was unable to prevent a significant number of party members from running against candidates approved by the political bureau. Of the 340 SPLM candidates who decided to run without party support, six contested the governor positions in Jonglei, Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Northern Bahr El Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Unity states. The mismanagement of this process within the SPLM magnified already existing schisms within the party. Two years on, the issue has still not been fully resolved, and there is a perception within the party that, in order to discourage dissent, individuals that refused to toe the party line will never be truly welcomed back into its ranks.[27] If primaries and other forms of internal democracy had been in place within the SPLM, the issue of members running as independents could have been avoided.

Internal democracy, however, may reveal how fragile an organisation the SPLM is, and how much it depends on maintaining a delicate balance between tribes, interest groups, and regions. One of the reasons, members of the party's leading organs such as the political bureau continue to be nominated and not elected is that the SPLM is trying to maintain a delicately calibrated balance between interest groups. If key figures were to be voted out, this could easily be perceived as tribal groups jockeying for influence – and the result would be serious conflict.28 This argument, of course, has been used to justify the lack of internal democracy, yet it truly points to a very serious weakness within the party – and by extension the government – that, if left unattended or mismanaged, may lead to a serious political meltdown. On the other hand, if this state of affairs persists, it will allow politicians to instrumentalise coercion, fear, and prejudice to cement their grip on power. Another weighty question with respect to future elections, expected to take place in 2014, is whether opposition parties will become national forces with alternative political outlooks – or whether they will remain, or at least continue to be perceived as, personal and tribal outfits serving nothing but parochial interests.

Post-independence strategies

In the wake of independence, the government of South Sudan reorganised its cabinet. In February 2011, a communiqué of the political bureau outlined that the president would have all the necessary discretionary powers to determine the composition of the government. South Sudan's first post-secession cabinet, as announced in August

26 Mc Hugh, Gerard, «National Elections and Political Accommodation in the Sudan», Governance and Peace building series Briefing Paper No2, June 2009, Conflict Dynamics International, Cambridge

27 Interview with several SPLM members, February 2012

28 Interview with member of National Liberation Council Juba, February 2012

2011, was composed of 29 ministries with 27 deputy ministers, the president, and the vice-president. The distribution of posts was carefully calibrated to accommodate all ethnic groups and prevent a Dinka hegemony. This was achieved by assigning key ministries previously held by Dinkas to other tribal groups: The ministry of defence went to General John King Nyuon (Nuer), finance and economics to Kosti Manibe Ngai (Equatorian), the ministry of the interior to General Alison Manani Magaya (Equatorian), national intelligence and security to General Oyay Deng Ajak (Shilluk), and the ministry of justice to John Luke Jok (Nuer). Regarding the regions, the new cabinet has ten ministers and ten deputies from the greater Bahr El Ghazal area, nine ministers and eleven deputies from greater Upper Nile, and ten ministers and six deputies from greater Equatoria.

However, the new cabinet caused heated debate in Juba and throughout the diaspora, in particular among civil society activists. Some observers argued that the government had a broad base, as four ministers and five deputies were non-SPLM, while others accused the president of promoting a Dinka Rek domination of the Warrap elites and undermining the influence of the Dinka Bor. Critics also pointed out that some new ministers were former allies of the NCP, as in the case of Alison Magaya, who defected to the SPLM in June 2011, and Agnes Lukudu, previously deputy chair of the NCP in the south, who became minister of transport. Elements within the SPLM have also criticised the nomination of General Magaya, questioning the logic of placing the internal security of the new country in the hands of an «enemy.»[29] Critics perceived this as an effort by the SPLM to co-opt the opposition rather than engage with it in a political contest of ideas. Others alleged that the president was surrounding himself with elites from his home state plus some former adversaries, thus making himself the sole arbiter and the centre of power.

In February 2012, the SPLM's political bureau announced that the party would further re-structure itself and develop new strategic goals that reflect the split with the SPLM-North and the structural changes following independence. A meeting of the National Liberation Council (NLC), the first since 2008, was held between 26-29 March with the aim to transform the party's structure and vision and formulate a future national programme. This was preceded by a meeting of the political bureau on the 24 March during which the party was unable to reconcile opposing positions, and discussions during the NLC session proved similarly inconclusive. The meeting was described as a disappointment, as only key leaders and ministers were allowed to voice their positions while controversial issues were «bulldozed» in order to safeguard the status quo.[30] In the weeks before the NLC meeting, privately voiced grievances indicated that emerging tensions between government and party would have to be resolved. It is unclear whether this was accomplished.

29 Interview in Juba, February 2012

30 Interview with NLC observer and SPLM cadre, Juba, April 2012

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Conclusion: the challenges ahead

At the end of the civil war, the SPLM found itself with the mandate to rule the south using political structures created through a power-sharing agreement. It thus inherited institutions that remain underdeveloped, ineffective, and lacking in capacity – and it has struggled to define its own centre of power in a way that resonates both with the party and the population. Partly because of this, the party has been unable to transform the state and instead has tried to become the state. The governing structures under the wartime CANS (and subsequent strategies to prepare the SPLM to rule through existing and other structures of government) were significantly altered by the CPA. To a certain extent, these structures, designed through international negotiations, made it more difficult for the SPLM to adapt and effect a political transformation. To create a functioning government, the SPLM must therefore first ensure that its own party structures function properly. This may seem an odd sequence of events, but in a country that has only fragmentary and tenuous experience with formal government, the SPLM is the most authoritative and stable force of governance.

Another seemingly counter-intuitive step the SPLM will need to take is to end political accommodation. The pragmatic accommodation of divergent social and political forces not necessarily held together by a political programme has bloated the structures of government. While accommodation is an important strategy in stabilising a new country, state-building by consensus can also be a recipe for disaster. If the SPLM leadership keeps adding all the rivals it seeks to appease to the party's patronage system, the resulting motley coalition may obstruct any real transformation of the SPLM – which, in turn, will impede its ideological profile, political legitimacy, and, finally, the government's ability to function. If too many different individuals and groupings compete within a hodgepodge organisation that lacks clear structures, rules, and accountability, then such an organisation will, in the end, either become dominated by one authoritarian faction, or it will splinter into competing groups. To avert this, the SPLM will have to rapidly define its vision of an independent south – and, instead of just reacting or muddling through, it will have to rule. Failing to do this will inevitably strengthen other forces and risks that the SPLM will lose all the social, symbolic, and political capital it has gained during the process to achieve independence.

The international community can play an important role in assisting such a transition – as long as it clearly understands the context it is operating in. It is not an easy task to create a culture of democracy in post-war countries and promote dialogue and build confidence between political parties and civil society. When it comes to developing party platforms and party financing, a helping hand can help significantly to bring about an open political environment. Such measures, however, have to go hand-in-hand with domestic initiatives for greater democracy. South Sudan's partners in the international community will have to understand that the SPLM cannot be transformed from the outside, and that donors may only help to implement strategies for reform that have been developed domestically. Transitional democracy needs room, and the significant progress already made by the SPLM and SPLA has to be recog-

nised. Once the SPLM feels more at home in its new role as the governing party of an independent south, it will find it easier to make necessary changes within party and government. If the international community supports this through rewards for good practices and criticism regarding undemocratic tendencies, it will be able to stimulate the emergence of a functioning system of government and of a robust political party prepared to go to the polls and face internal criticism.

If the SPLM fails to rethink its own attitude towards a very diverse nation with divided constituencies, it will likely become, once again, a centralised entity with a military mindset, one that will try to co-opt all opposition, thus creating a byzantine mega-structure without shape, accountability, or the ability to formulate national policies. Fortunately, the SPLM has the leadership, the visionaries, and the thinkers necessary to make such a transformation happen. The level of internal debate within the SPLM is extraordinarily high, and unlike other former Marxist liberation movements that have become divorced from their current national realities, the SPLM is an acutely conscious organisation that realises that change is inevitable. The leadership of the SPLM has a deep sense that it cannot afford to replicate the mistakes of the political system it fought against. Already today, the SPLM has grasped that, after independence, the practices and structures it inherited from the liberation struggle are becoming dysfunctional legacies – and this will impel it to transform itself.

WOLFRAM LACHER

International Policies Towards the Two Sudans: What Role for Germany?

Germany is not a widely visible player in the Sudans; it rarely figures in debates about international policy towards the two countries. This presents something of a puzzle. While Germany has not been among the leading bilateral donors, it nevertheless has been making major contributions to international efforts in the two countries through peacekeeping missions as well as the European Union. Moreover, since the outbreak of conflict in Darfur in 2003 and the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, no other country in sub-Saharan Africa has been so much the focus of Berlin's attention as Sudan. Parliamentarians, think tanks, and NGOs have lobbied the German government to take a more active role in Sudan. This article provides an assessment of Germany's role in, and policies towards the Sudans during the final phase of the CPA and the period since southern independence. It outlines key debates on international policies towards the two Sudans and highlights German positions. By comparing Germany's role to its interests in issues related to Sudan, it identifies shortcomings in German policies and proposes options for a more effective engagement.

Germany and international debates on Sudan

What role should Germany play in the Sudans as part of the international efforts in the two countries? To approach this question, it is worth outlining international policy issues and how they apply to discussions within Germany.

Who is to blame? Policy-makers and the wider public concerned with Sudan – particularly the media and NGOs – have long been divided over the situation in the Sudans. US-based lobby groups such as the Enough Project or the Save Darfur Coalition have, over the past years, promoted an analysis that has consistently laid the blame for protracted conflicts and the lack of conflict resolution at the doorstep of the government in Khartoum. This simplistic pattern has been highly influential in the international news media and among policy-makers and has had a powerful impact on policies towards the Sudans. In the US, this view has had strong supporters within Congress and successive administrations (the former US Special Envoy to Sudan, Andrew Natsios, is a prominent example). Activists have harshly criticised policy-makers who take a more nuanced approach, such as Natsios› successors Scott Gration and Princeton Lyman, for being too accommodating. With southern independence

achieved, Sudan policy hawks such as John Prendergast (2011) of the Enough Project have argued that the root cause for all remaining problems is «the divisive, autocratic regime in Khartoum,» and they have advocated that the US should push for regime change. Such activists have also downplayed the responsibility of the South Sudanese government for tensions between north and south, as well as the outbreak and persistence of conflicts in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Whereas the Sudanese government is seen as deliberately provoking conflict and perpetrating genocide, activists argue that conflicts and human rights abuses in South Sudan are due to a lack of the government's and the security forces› capacities, and that the new state needs greater assistance. In Germany, the debate has been more balanced. German NGOs working

Playing the president

on Sudan and German offshoots of international NGOs have, by and large, refused to adopt the analytical framework promoted by US-based pressure groups. Most influential among the NGOs lobbying the German government on Sudan have been church organisations and humanitarian NGOs. In this, the Berlin office of Crisis Action has played a key role. As a result, policy debates in Berlin have generally been based on a shared recognition that the realities in the two Sudans are complex. This applies to the lack of progress made in Darfur, the eruption of conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile in mid-2011, and the brinkmanship both sides show in their negotiations.

Sticks or carrots? The debate concerning adequate policy instruments is based on the perceived factors behind Sudan's crises, and here the opposite camps are by and large the same. At issue is the question whether progress can be achieved in Sudan by providing incentives to co-operate to the government in Khartoum, or whether greater political, economic, or military pressure is needed. During the final phase of the CPA, this rift went right through the US administration. The US Ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, has been one of the leading hawks on Sudan, while Gration drew the ire of both Sudan activists and the Sudanese government for suggesting that the US should be «thinking about giving out cookies» to Khartoum (*Washington Post* 2009; Rogin 2010). The US has by far the greatest political clout as it could remove Sudan from its list of 'state sponsors of terrorism' and ease sanctions. In addition, it plays an important role in negotiations over debt relief for Sudan. From late 2010 onwards, the US has hinted that it would be willing to make concessions on all three issues, and, in early 2011, after the successful referendum on independence, the US began steps on the 'state sponsor of terrorism' status and on debt relief.[1]

However, since the eruption of conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, these cautious steps to improve bilateral relations have been put on hold, and advocates of more aggressive policies have, once again, gained the upper hand. Lobby groups have demanded that debt relief and the lifting of sanctions be conditional on a comprehensive agreement between the Sudanese government and all insurgent and opposition forces (Enough project 2011b). Since, for reasons other than just Sudanese government policies, it is highly unlikely that this will happen in the foreseeable future, this would effectively render void the incentives the US may proffer. Hawks such as Congressman Frank Wolf have argued that «dangling carrots before an indicted war criminal, Bashir, will never yield the desired results» (U.S. Congress, House of Representatives 2011, 37). With the Sudanese government reeling under the combined impact of a worsening economy and insurgencies in the periphery, activists have argued that the time is right to promote regime change. Influential lobby groups and figures such as former Special Representative on Sudan Roger Winter have begun to push for military action against Sudan and want to provide sophisticated weaponry to South Sudan to counter Sudan's military (US Congress 2011; Enough 2011a). There has also been increasing debate on opening humanitarian access to the Nuba Mountains by force (Kristof 2012; Enough 2012). In contrast, many US-based Sudan activists have been much less vocal on human rights abuses and corruption in South Sudan – despite the fact that the new country is a major recipient of US assistance. Independence has not substantially changed this lenient approach towards South Sudan.

For its part, the Sudanese government has interpreted this shift in stance as proof that the offers by the US are disingenuous. After the signing of the CPA in 2005, Khartoum had already been snubbed when, due to the war in Darfur, the US failed to honour its promise to reconsider Sudan's pariah status. Indeed, the influence of its

1 For an argument for increased US engagement with Sudan, see Verhoeven and Patey 2011.

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Sudan lobby means that the US is unlikely to deliver on its promises to lift sanctions, no matter what the scenario, as long as Bashir remains in power.

Like the US, the EU has also been divided between proponents of increased engagement with Sudan such as the UK, France, and Germany, and supporters of a principled stance that rules out any rapprochement in the absence of Sudanese co-operation with the International Criminal Court (ICC) – the latter group being led by the Netherlands and the Nordic countries. A similar rift has opened up between the German Foreign Office and the Ministry for Development Co-operation, with the latter consistently rejecting the former's demands to increase development aid to Sudan. It is worth noting that this divide characterised Germany's Sudan policy both before and after the new German government came in towards the end of 2009, that is, it survived a change from Social Democrats to Free Democrats in both ministries. Both at the German and the EU level, such rifts have hampered more effective policies towards the two Sudans. Germany and other EU member have considerable influence in the Paris Club and international financial institutions and therefore carry weight in negotiations on debt relief – although China is by far Sudan's most important creditor and, since late 2011, the US appears to have been the main obstacle on debt relief.

The prospect of greater EU and German development assistance could be another incentive for policy change in Sudan. However, as long as Sudan refuses to ratify the revised Cotonou agreement, the EU faces limits to what it can offer (European Commission 2012) – and this means at least as long as Omar al-Bashir remains in power, since the agreement contains a clause that requires Sudan to ratify the Rome statute and comply with the ICC.

At the same time, isolated as Sudan already is, the EU and its member states can wield few credible threats. Further EU sanctions are unlikely to be effective since, over the past decade and as a result of successful US-based divestment campaigns, economic relations with Sudan have seen a steady decline. Consequently, key players in the Sudanese government have concluded that «there is not much to gain from relations with Europe or the US» (Atabani 2012), and instead they are trying to strengthen their relations with Asian states, the Gulf monarchies and, most recently, Libya.

In contrast, neither Germany nor the EU have shown much interest in applying pressure on South Sudan where, as major donors, their leverage is likely to be greater. In recent years, EU assistance to South Sudan has been on the increase – despite growing doubts over the South Sudanese government's willingness to tackle corruption and prosecute human rights abuses committed by its security forces, or help end the conflicts in South Kordofan and Blue Nile by cutting off support to the SPLM-North.

Who should get involved? In view of the protracted nature of Sudanese conflicts and the apparent impotence of the US and EU, there has been much debate about what actors may achieve progress in Sudan. During the CPA period, the so-called troika of US, UK, and Norway – together with the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a leading player in the CPA negotiations – was joined by numerous

other actors wanting to play a role in Sudan.[2] In 2008 Djibril Bassolé, a joint AU-UN Chief Mediator for Darfur, was appointed. The Darfur negotiations led by Bassolé were hosted by Qatar, after Libyan and Egyptian attempts to impose themselves as mediators had failed in 2009. The same year saw the establishment of the AU High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD), headed by former South African President Thabo Mbeki – who over the following two years entered into competition with Bassolé and made no secret of his disdain for the latter's efforts. Kuwait briefly sought to emulate Qatar's role by hosting a donor conference on East Sudan in 2010, at which major pledges for development aid were made – pledges that subsequently came to nothing.

Special envoys to Sudan proliferated from 2009 onwards, leading to regular meetings of the ‹E6› (the Sudan envoys of the five permanent UN Security Council members and the EU) and conferences such as the Sudan Consultative Forum or Retreats of the Joint Special Representative of UNAMID. In early 2011, countries and organisations that had named special envoys to Sudan included – in addition to the E6 and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General – the Arab League, Canada, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, and Japan (UNAMID 2011), a list that may not be comprehensive. This meant that several EU member states dispatched special envoys to Sudan despite the fact that the EU has its own special representative. During 2010/11 even Austria hosted informal talks between Sudanese officials with the aim to improve north-south relations.

Mbeki's panel – which in the meantime had become the AU High Implementation Panel (AUHIP) – was later charged with mediating between the governments in Khartoum and Juba, a task it shared with the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG). Ethiopia's President Meles Zenawi has also played an important role in negotiations over Abyei, as well as in those between the Sudanese government and the SPLM-North in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. In late 2011, China became increasingly involved in talks over a new oil export agreement. As the largest investor in the Sudanese oil sector, China is the outside actor with the most tangible interests in such an agreement; it is also a key ally of Sudan and therefore has a unique ability to exercise influence. Whereas between 2004 and 2008, Sudan activists in the West had fiercely attacked China for its alliance with Sudan, they subsequently recognised China as a key player in the negotiations. By mid-2011, questions were growing over the Mbeki panel's apparent lack of leverage, with the International Crisis Group (ICG) demanding that key external actors should once again become more involved, including «the AU, IGAD, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and the following countries: Egypt, Qatar, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Turkey, China, India, Malaysia, India, Brazil, South Africa, Ethiopia, as well as the EU, UN and members of the troika (US, UK and Norway)».[3] However, no such initiative emerged

2 In addition to the troika and IGAD, witnesses to the CPA included the UN, the EU, the African Union, the Arab League, Egypt, Italy, and the Netherlands.

3 Similarly, in early 2012, John Prendergast of the Enough Project recommended that «a new core group (including China, Ethiopia, Turkey, the U.S., and a few other influential states) should be formed to provide high-level support to the current African Union/United Nations peace initiative» (Prendergast 2012).

and the drive for international conferences on Sudan fizzled out. A December 2011 donor conference on South Sudan held in Washington, was dominated by the US and South Sudan's traditional European donors; an initiative by Norway, the UK, and Turkey for a conference on debt relief and economic growth in Sudan failed in March 2012 after the US pulled out (*Sudan Tribune* 2012).

What should be Germany's role in this crowded political arena? The fact that the ICG does not mention Germany in its very long list of ‹key countries› is striking. During the final phase of the CPA, NGOs were urging Germany to become more active in international forums on Sudan, such as the Sudan Consultative Forum held in May 2010 in Addis Ababa, where Germany was not been represented – apparently due to the above-mentioned rift between the German foreign and development ministries. Germany subsequently became a member of the forum, despite the AU's reluctance to broaden the range of participants. However, there are doubts as to whether Germany should really play a more prominent bilateral role. During 2010/11, the flurry of big international conferences has done little to address Sudan's problems. Similarly, the involvement of countless external actors in mediation efforts for Darfur and negotiations between north and south has not always been helpful, and in some cases it has clearly posed an obstacle. The need for over a dozen bilateral special envoys to Sudan is at best questionable. Finally, Germany has no distinctive leverage on the two Sudans. Thus, as argued below, Germany should focus on supporting multilateral efforts.

Assessing Germany's role in the two Sudans

While Germany is not a prominent bilateral player in the Sudans, it contributes substantially to multilateral efforts. The bulk of German support comes in the form of contributions to the UN and EU budgets. Out of a total €739m in official German funding for the Sudans during 2009-11, 73% were assessed contributions for UNMIS, UNAMID, and UNMISS; a further 7% went into EU and World Food Program (WFP) humanitarian assistance. (This does not include EU development assistance, where Germany is the single largest contributor).[4] Moreover, Germany has been among the leading Western sending states of senior personnel to UNMIS(S), and, among Western countries, it has provided by far the largest number of senior officers to UNAMID, since the US, UK, and France have faced persistent obstacles to obtaining visas for their personnel in Darfur.

Germany's funding for bilateral initiatives in Sudan has primarily gone into humanitarian and emergency assistance (€43m in 2009-11). Of the remainder, the largest bilateral projects are support for decentralisation in South Sudan (€6m); equipping the South Sudanese Police service with radio communications systems (€3.7m); providing equipment to a Senegalese UNAMID unit (€3.5m); supporting

4 In July 2010, the EU dedicated €150m in development assistance to Sudan for the years 2011-13, 60% of which were earmarked for the south. In May 2011, the EU allocated another €200m for development aid to South Sudan for the period 2011-13 (EU Commission 2011).

the development of water infrastructure in South Sudan (€3m); and supporting the South Sudanese Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) Programme (€2.3m) (Auswärtiges Amt 2011). With official German development assistance to Sudan suspended since 1989 due to human rights concerns, most bilateral development assistance goes to South Sudan while, in the north, assistance is limited to humanitarian aid and small-scale support for civil society initiatives. In sum, Germany's role as a donor has been limited, low profile, and not focused on strategic sectors. This clearly contrasts with the approach taken by the US – by far the largest donor in the Sudans – the former colonial power UK, and troika member Norway. These three donors have been highly visible and have provided major assistance in key areas such as military and security sector reform, fiscal management, or oil. However, even compared to smaller donors such as the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, and Canada, Germany's bilateral efforts in the Sudans have been modest. In the assessment of the UK House of Lords› EU Committee (2012: 39), «Apart from the UK and Norway…the other active European States are France, which has commercial oil interests with Total in the state of Jonglei; the Netherlands and Italy, which have played a political and humanitarian role, in particular as witnesses to the CPA.»

Indeed, Germany's low profile as a bilateral donor has been mirrored by its limited political role. Throughout the CPA period, the official German presence in South Sudan had been largely limited to junior diplomats shuttling back and forth between Khartoum and Juba. Only with southern independence did Germany open a permanent diplomatic mission in Juba, which operates with very limited staff. As a result, Germany was much slower than some other EU members to establish relations with senior officials in the south, and, during much of the CPA period, the foreign office's analyses of developments in Sudan were biased in favour of Khartoum. As late as September 2010, when it had become abundantly clear that southern independence was inevitable, officials at the Foreign Office believed that the two states could be encouraged to form a confederacy (Bundesregierung, Auswärtiges Amt, 2011).

Moreover, in stride with other external actors, the German government's attention to Sudan has been volatile. Until 2009, its focus was largely on Darfur, and only then attention turned back to north-south issues. From early 2010 onwards, Sudan received growing public attention in Germany, and consequently the issue began to rise on the government's agenda. A key driving factor was a March 2010 parliamentary petition supported by the four main parties, which called on the government to accord 'special weight› to Sudan in Germany's foreign policy, outlining dozens of detailed recommendations (Deutscher Bundestag 2010). Following the petition, Sudan became a focus country of the government's interministerial group and council on civil conflict prevention. In mid-2010, the government drafted a Sudan concept paper, designed to form the basis for a coherent approach by different ministries (Bundesregierung, Auswärtiges Amt, 2011). Around the same time, a series of parliamentarians and senior officials began to visit Sudan, culminating in Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle's trip in June 2011. Since then, however, Sudan has again dropped off the list of German policy-makers› priorities. One reason has been that parliamentarians and officials have been preoccupied with the Arab Spring, and particularly the conflicts in

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Libya and Syria.5 Nevertheless, it was also obvious that policy-makers saw little gain in focusing on Sudan once media attention had declined, following brief spikes in January 2011 (independence referendum) and July 2011 (southern independence). Other countries have seen similar trends. German political engagement in the Sudans declined along with that of other actors while, on the ground, the situation became increasingly critical. Thus far, neither the conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, nor the rising tensions between north and south over oil exports and other issues have rekindled the attention.

This sharp decline in interest for Sudan also raises the question whether the government's 2010 concept paper was not aimed primarily at the public and the media – and never meant to outline a coherent Sudan policy. Indeed, by and large, it summarised existing German actions under three headers: a credible referendum on independence; state building in South Sudan; and humanitarian assistance and support for the peace process in Darfur. In addition, a fourth header concerned post-referendum arrangements and mentioned Germany's ambitions for membership in the Sudan Consultative Forum and increased diplomatic visits. The only aspect of the paper that suggested a convergence of positions between the Foreign Office and the Ministry for Development Co-operation was a vague pledge to, «in the long term, consider intensifying political co-operation with North Sudan» (Bundesregierung, Auswärtiges Amt, 2011). In practice, however, the two ministries still differ on development co-operation with Sudan.

Limited interests, limited leverage

Despite the fact that the government deemed Sudan important enough to dedicate a concept paper to the country6, Germany has been neither an important political actor nor a major bilateral donor in the Sudans. The question is whether Germany's limited role adequately reflects its interests and influence in the Sudans – or whether Germany is both willing and able to deepen its engagement and has the instruments to exert influence in ways other actors cannot.

Germany shares other external actors› interest to manage conflict in the Sudans to prevent massive humanitarian consequences and a renewed destabilisation of neighbouring countries. Clearly, however, Germany does not have the same strategic interests in the Sudans and the wider region as the US, nor does it have a special relationship with north or south, as is the case with the former colonial power Britain, or Norway with its longstanding commitment. Germany's development agencies have not yet been able to establish major operations in South Sudan. By comparison, even during the CPA period, Canada, the Netherlands, and the Nordic countries had a much stronger commitment to the emerging southern state, which led to considerable institutional interest to expand development assistance there. Finally, Germany

5 Germany was a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2011-12.

6 Similar joint concept papers by several ministries only exist for Africa, Latin America, and Afghanistan.

has virtually no economic interest in the Sudans. In sum, there is little reason for Germany to expand its bilateral development assistance to South Sudan beyond its substantial contributions to multilateral efforts – particularly as there are serious doubts regarding the viability of the new state (Lacher 2012).

On its own, Germany does not have the ability to exert influence in the Sudans. A case in point was the appeal by the German parliament for the government to ‹demand› co-operation from the governments in North and South Sudan regarding fair elections, an inclusive peace process, and transparent fiscal management in South Sudan (Deutscher Bundestag 2010). Since, as a bilateral actor, Germany can do little to back up such demands, it is at best questionable whether making them will have any influence on developments. Also, Germany should not seek to take on a more explicitly political role. As shown above, the Sudans› political scene is already crowded with external actors, both multilateral and bilateral. Due to their commitments, interests, and permanent seats on the UN Security Council, the US, UK, and China are the dominant players. The capacity and willingness of states such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, or Kuwait to offer financial aid or investment as incentives to the governments in north and south, or to rebel movements, by far exceeds Germany's possibilities. Sudan's neighbours also have tangible interests and the ability to exert direct influence, for example by choosing or failing to co-operate on security issues. Regional and international organisations as well as several smaller European states also play a role. Against this background, few benefits would arise from an increased German engagement.

Germany's interests and influence in the Sudans converge in multilateral forums and instruments. Germany wants to promote UN peacekeeping missions and supports the development of AU capacities in peacekeeping and conflict management in Africa. Its support to UNMIS(S), UNAMID, and the AUHIP reflects these interests. At the same time, as the third-largest contributor to the regular UN budget, Germany has a major interest in ensuring that the scope and mandate of peacekeeping missions remains limited to areas in which such missions can fulfil their purpose effectively. This implies that Germany should push a review of UNAMID's mandate – as this is the largest UN peacekeeping mission ever, and it is deployed in a situation with no peace to keep. Similarly, it would be in Germany's interest to prevent UNMISS from getting too involved in state building.

While there is little potential to increase pressure on Sudan through multilateral organisations and instruments, Germany is able to influence how the international community uses incentives to Sudan. The most significant of these incentives is debt relief. As an important player in the IMF, the World Bank, and the Paris Club, Germany is in a position to advocate debt relief or delay such a process. For Germany to play a more active role in this regard, it would need to intensify its diplomatic efforts with the two leading countries in this area, the US and China; the US in particular has prevented the effective use of debt relief as an incentive to Sudan. Another possible incentive is EU development assistance to Sudan. The EU has raised funds for development aid to war-affected populations in Sudan even after it had become impossible to use funds it had originally earmarked for the country because of Sudan's refusal to

ratify the Cotonou agreement. Sudan has been urging the EU to drop its preconditions on regular development aid (*Sudan Tribune* 2011). Yet, this is very unlikely to happen, since abandoning the condition that Sudan sign the Cotonou agreement would mean to drop the demand that Sudan comply with the ICC. German and European interest in promoting the ICC clearly supersedes any concerns that the EU's insistence on compliance with the ICC will negate its ability to exert influence in Sudan. Still, short of dropping the demand for Sudan to sign the Cotonou agreement, the EU would be able to raise further development funds and use them as an incentive for co-operation in key policy areas.

Options for more effective German policies towards the Sudans

If Germany wants to use its weight in multilateral institutions to push for more coherent international efforts in Sudan, there is potential for improvement in several key areas.

- *UN Missions:* Germany can become more active in supporting the work of UN-mandated peacekeeping missions in Sudan (UNMISS, UNISFA, UNAMID). One way of doing so would be to step up efforts to ensure these missions do not face restrictions on access for monitoring and verification. In the past, such restrictions have impeded the work of peacekeeping missions across Sudan and South Sudan, and there is little evidence that UN member states have lent strong support to the missions. Germany could mobilise the EU's support to press this issue more vigorously in talks with Sudan and South Sudan. Conversely, Germany should also demand that the UN-mandated missions fully play their role as watchdogs on security and human rights developments. Both UNMISS and UNAMID have displayed a tendency to cosy up to their host governments, for example by providing overly favourable assessments of their track record on security and human rights.
- *EU political action and development assistance:* Germany could support a more overtly political role for the EU that would help realise the leverage associated with the EU's development assistance. With the appointment of successive Special Representatives (SR) to Sudan since 2005, the EU has shown an ambition to play an explicitly political role. However, resistance from member states and EU institutions has prevented the SRs from bringing the EU's political weight to bear (Ferhatovic 2010). The current SR, former UK Ambassador to Sudan Rosalind Marsden, has been helping member states to come to a joint assessment of developments but has been unable to exert an influence adequate to the size of the EU's major share in development assistance. One reason is that the SR does not control any budgets, and that the activities of the SR run parallel to those of the EU Delegations in Khartoum and Juba. Another reason is that the EU's SR continues to act alongside special envoys from member states (Van der Zwan 2011). While the EU has taken important steps to co-ordinate EU development aid and that of its member states in South Sudan, it is still unable to fully convert its financial contributions into political influence. An additional obstacle to a stronger

EU role is the aversion of some member states – including Germany – to grant the SR a more far-reaching mandate. In spite of this wider debate on EU foreign policy structures, Germany should try to develop ways to boost the EU's capacity to exert political influence in Sudan and South Sudan. Possible approaches are to strengthen the SR's role by merging the position with that of head of the EU delegation, or by abolishing the post of SR and widening the remit of the heads of delegation.

- *Using available leverage:* A more active German approach to Sudan in multilateral institutions should ultimately increase these institutions› ability to provide incentives and exert pressure on key actors in the two Sudans. The main incentives are debt relief and EU development assistance. Germany should work with international partners towards an approach that offers immediate benefits and a roadmap for continued rapprochement in exchange for Sudanese co-operation on key issues such as progress in peace negotiations and humanitarian access to South Kordofan and Blue Nile. This would also require a more active engagement with the US.

The international community's ability to put more pressure on Sudan is limited, while, to date, donors have failed to use their leverage over South Sudan. Western donors› bias towards South Sudan, and the South Sudanese government's ability to mobilise Western support to put pressure on the north, have increasingly marred progress in north-south relations. For example, the South Sudanese government's decision to suspend oil production to increase pressure on Khartoum has likely been based on the assumption that donors would step up support in order to cushion the humanitarian and economic impact of a slump in government revenue. As a major contributor to EU and UN efforts in Sudan, Germany should make sure that multilateral assistance does not encourage further irresponsible negotiating tactics by the South Sudanese government. Instead, multilateral support should focus on promoting a sustainable settlement between the two states, for example by linking debt relief for Sudan to an agreement between north and south.

In the conflicts in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, the South Sudanese government has at best failed to bring its former allies, the SPLM-North, back to the negotiating table, at worst it has fuelled the conflict by providing them with arms and logistical support. As a major donor, the EU could encourage South Sudan to adopt a more co-operative approach towards the north. The EU could also exert greater pressure on the South Sudanese government over its reluctance to tackle high-level corruption and human rights abuses by its security forces.

Following southern independence public interest in Sudan has dropped sharply, and the pressure on German foreign policy makers to be seen as ‹doing something on Sudan› has waned accordingly. This does not have to be a bad thing. Germany's potential strength regarding Sudan is its ability to promote more effective multilateral action. Such efforts may be less visible, but the likelihood that they will solve at least some of Sudan's pressing problems are greater than with policies based on short-lived bilateral activism.

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LAURA JAMES

Sovereign Debt and Debt Relief

Sudan's total external debt burden at the end of 2010 was $36.8bn – around 60% of GDP. Of this, around $30bn was in arrears; the remainder was still being serviced. Most of the debt comes from loans made in the 1970s and 1980s. Half of the arrears (and 40% of the total debt) come from penalty interest. Moreover, by end of 2011 the debt burden (now estimated at over $40bn) was the equivalent of a substantially larger percentage of GDP, owing to the departure of the south with around a fifth of the country's total output in July. This, combined with spiralling economic problems as a result of the secession, has increased the urgency of the government's demands for debt relief.

Debt profile

Sudan's debt profile is unusual in that almost half its debt is owed either to bilateral creditors outside the Paris Club (and therefore less accustomed to engaging in debt forgiveness) or to private creditors. Moreover, this proportion is growing, since Sudan's status as a debt defaulter means that it has no access to concessional finance from multilateral institutions or most Paris Club members.

Sudan's Public External Debt (end of 2009)			
(US$bn)	**Principal**	**Total outstanding including arrears**	**% of Total Debt**
Multilateral Creditors	3.8	5.3	15
Paris Club Creditors	2.5	11.2	31
Non-Paris Club Creditors	5.3	13.3	37
Foreign Commercial Banks	2.1	4.5	13
Commercial Suppliers	1.4	1.4	4
TOTAL	15.4	35.7	100
			Source: Central Bank of Sudan

Of the more than 70 entities owed money by Sudan, the largest individual creditor is Kuwait, which at the end of 2009 held $5.6bn, or 16% of total debt – although $4.4bn of that was penalty interest. Other significant bilateral creditors include Saudi Arabia

($2.6bn), the US and Austria (with $2.1bn each), as well as China ($1.9bn, mostly not in arrears). At the end of 2009, the IMF and World Bank were owed $1.6bn and $1.5bn, respectively, amounts less significant for their size than for the limitations they place on Sudan's ability to receive further international assistance.

Future trajectory

In recent years, Sudan's external debt has been increasing rapidly, and in the absence of debt relief, this trend is set to continue, driven largely by the ongoing accrual of arrears. There will also continue to be some new borrowing. It is unusual for heavily indebted countries to be able to access such loans, but in recent years Sudan has been able to access some project-based bilateral funding on the back of political alliances. In the hope of debt relief, the government has accepted limits on non-concessional borrowing agreed with the IMF – the limit in 2010 was $700m, although in fact the country only took on $269m. Most of these loans were for infrastructure projects, such as dams, electricity transmission and sanitation, and many were provided by Arab countries.

However, there are question marks over how much new borrowing Sudan will be able to access following the secession of South Sudan. On the one hand, the loss of southern oil is putting pressure on the government budget and having a sharply negative impact on the balance of payments. With revenue losses of at least 25% and an unwillingness to risk social stability by cutting spending, the government is facing a significant fiscal gap. At the same time, the country has lost almost all of its oil exports, which represented up to 75% of its incoming foreign exchange. The result is an increased need for external borrowing to balance the books. On the other hand, a worsening debt/GDP ratio and national economic crisis could cause even the Arab and Asian countries (particularly China) that are Sudan's most reliable sources of external financing to think twice about their prospects of repayment.

Debt and South Sudan

One uncertainty for Sudan in the run-up to southern secession was the question of how assets and liabilities would be divided. In the negotiations the two sides moved towards a «zero-option,» suggesting that Sudan, as the successor state, would retain everything except territorial assets located in South Sudan. One advantage was that this would be relatively simple to administer, avoiding a long disclosure and accounting process. However, owing to differences on other issues, no actual agreement was signed prior to secession. In the negotiations, it was suggested that the zero-option would last only for two years, while both sides sought debt relief for Sudan; after that, a division would be considered. Nevertheless, in the absence of an alternative agreement, Sudan, as the official borrower and continuing legal entity, remains liable for the external debt. Indeed, a number of new claims made by South Sudan for monies owed from the CPA and immediate post-secession period may eventually end up increasing the liability of the north even further.

Prospects for debt relief

At the same time, Sudan's prospects for debt relief are unclear, at least in the short term. The country was accepted as a candidate for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative in 2004. That presents a path to debt relief, but requires political will on the part of creditor countries, as well as actions by the government itself. When it signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, the Sudanese regime strongly believed that it was promised debt relief, in particular by the US. However, that prospect soon receded in light of the emerging crisis in Darfur, which prevented the US Congress from lifting legislation requiring it to vote against Sudan in international fora.

If a political prospect of multilateral debt relief were to re-emerge, then the route to any economic impact would still be long (at least three to four years) and tortuous. Initially, it could also be expensive, as the country starts having to service at least part of its older debts. Sudan has to show a track record of macroeconomic reform, which has been maintained at some cost through IMF programmes in recent years, but may be difficult to keep up in the challenging economic environment after the South's secession. It also has to prepare at least an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP), with broad-based civil society involvement. Sudan finally completed a draft in 2011 – but wide civil-societal participation will not happen unless there is a PRSP proper. Finally, in order to reach HIPC Decision Point, it needs to agree a process and funding for clearing arrears to all international financial institutions. So far, this is the tricky bit, as it requires international pledges.

Finally, even if Decision Point were to be reached, hurdles would remain. Creditors accounting for at least 70% of eligible debt need to participate, and the Paris Club requires comparable treatment from all non-Paris Club creditors – which could raise problems given Sudan's debt profile. And debt relief would not become irrevocable («Completion Point») until it is agreed that Sudan has completed the necessary reforms aiding the poor as well as steps to return to macroeconomic stability – something that will require some fundamental policy changes closely monitored by the international community. Even then, Sudan would not be entirely debt-free, especially if some countries refused to participate.

The World Food Programme in Juba


#6

KATHRIN MARIA SCHERR

Legal Implications of Sudan's Separation: the Question of Citizenship

In a referendum held in January 2011, the people of South Sudan rejected the idea of a united Sudan and voted by an overwhelming majority for the creation of their own independent state. After five decades of struggle for autonomy and two civil wars, the Republic of South Sudan declared its independence on 9 July 2011 and became Africa's newest state and the 193rd member of the United Nations. Yet, identifying whether an individual becomes a citizen of this new country or remains a citizen of the Republic of Sudan is both a complex political question as well as an intricate legal issue.

The issue of state succession

According to public international law state succession refers to ‹the replacement of one State by another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory› (see e.g. Art. 2 (1) (b) Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties). Thereby, state succession involves the change or transfer of sovereignty over a territory from one state to another (newly created) state. As a result, one of the two entities to the separation is usually identified as the continuing state, which resumes the duties and obligations of the predecessor state. In the case of South Sudan's secession, the Republic of Sudan was considered to be the continuing state, whereas South Sudan was identified as the successor state.

In cases of state succession, the change of territorial sovereignty from the predecessor to the successor state entails numerous legal consequences for both sides of the break-up. For the newly born Republic of South Sudan the time of independence has been accompanied by a long list of post-referendum issues that need to be addressed. Apart from South Sudan's quest for international recognition and the obtainment of membership in international organisations, the two Sudans – South Sudan and the Republic of Sudan – also have to find common ground on defining the borders of their respective territories, dividing Sudanese state debts and assets, as well as defence and military assets, and continuing treaty obligations. Moreover, important questions related to wealth sharing, security, transboundary populations, cross-border movements, and economic relations have to be negotiated between the two states. In addition to the challenge of establishing a revised and workable consti-

tutional and legal framework in both entities to the separation, one of the most pertinent legal issues in this context is the question of citizenship.

Who should be included in the citizenry of the new Republic of South Sudan? And who, on the other hand, will remain a citizen of the Republic of Sudan? Even though negotiations on the question of citizenship between the north and the south should have resumed after the secession of the south, both sides have in the meantime separately passed laws to regulate the lingering nationality questions.

Laws on citizenship in South Sudan

In South Sudan the Nationality Act of 2011 provides a legal framework governing the acquisition and loss of South Sudanese nationality. According to Section 8 of the 2011 Nationality Act South Sudanese nationality by birth can be established through five different grounds:

- Where any parents, grandparents, or great-grandparents, on the male or female line, were born in South Sudan.
- Where the person belongs to one of the indigenous ethnic communities of South Sudan.
- Where the person (or any of his or her parents or grandparents), at the time the Nationality Act came into force, had been domiciled in South Sudan since 1 January 1956.
- Where the person, born after the commencement of the Nationality Act, at the time of birth had a father or mother of South Sudanese nationality (by birth or naturalization).
- Where the person is a deserted infant of unknown parents who is (or was) first found in South Sudan (unless or until the contrary is proved).
- Thereby, the South Sudan Nationality Act contains a very broad and inclusive definition of South Sudanese citizenship, which is based on residency qualifications as well as descent-based criteria. Moreover, it is assumed that South Sudanese citizenry can be awarded automatically to those eligible even if they live outside of South Sudan.

Laws on citizenship in the Republic of Sudan

In July 2011 the Sudanese National Assembly also introduced amendments to the current laws on citizenship, namely the 1994 Sudan Nationality Act. Contrary to the inclusive provisions contained in the South Sudan Nationality Act, the amended Sudan Nationality Act stipulates that any person is to lose his or her Sudanese nationality automatically if he or she has obtained, *de iure* or *de facto*, the nationality of South Sudan. In other words, any residents of Sudan who qualify for Southern Sudanese nationality will automatically be stripped of their Sudanese citizenship. Moreover, the law deprives people of any possibility to appeal such a decision or to renounce their right to South Sudanese nationality in order to remain a citizen of the Sudan. In

Man praying at a graveyard in Khartoum

addition to that, southerners living in the north were only given a nine-month interim period, until 9 April 2012, to clarify and «regularise» their status in Sudan.

What stands at the forefront of international concerns in this respect is the question of the future status of people with ties to both the north and the south. According to estimates by the UNHCR, there are currently still more than one million southerners living in the north and an estimated 80,000 northerners who are believed to reside in the south. The future rights of southerners, who lose their Sudanese nationality in the north, and the status of a significant number of people of mixed origin, i.e. individuals with a parent from the north and a parent from the south, remain unclear. However, the north has explicitly ruled out the possibility of dual nationality for southerners living in the north.

At the same time the question of citizenship is of crucial importance to those approximately five million people living at the north-south border, the nomadic trans-border communities, and to internally displaced persons who fled conflict and are now scattered all over the country. The situation is often further complicated by the absence of identity documentation, such as birth certificates, which render it difficult for individuals to confirm their entitlement to a certain nationality. Sudanese who originate in other parts of the country and now find themselves on the opposite side of the new border are therefore at a high risk of being disadvantaged and deprived of their basic rights as citizens of any country. The issue of citizenship still leaves many questions unanswered. The nationality laws in both Sudans evince a number of loopholes and lack clear guidelines for more complex cases, such as persons of mixed origin. As such, the separate adoption of legislation in both the north and the south, and a lack of mutual cooperation and willingness on both sides to address and settle these issues, have additionally contributed to the convoluted situation.

So far, an estimated 350,000 South Sudanese have left their possessions in the north in order to take up the long journey to return to their homeland of South Sudan, a place some of them left decades ago or, for those who were born in the north, might never have even seen before. While mass migration of returnees to South Sudan is an immediate expression of people's fears about their future status post secession, the long-term effects of the separation will largely depend on how each side deals with the practical implementation of their respective citizenship laws.

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HARRY VERHOEVEN

Hydropolitics of the Nile

The Nile has always played a major role in the geopolitics of North-East Africa, and the 20th century was no exception. Water, both as hydropower and through irrigation, was an obvious resource bureaucrats and politicians sought to harness after independence – not only because of its importance for agriculture in an otherwise arid region, but also because big dams were a symbol of modernity, allowing Third World countries to join the ranks of more ‹advanced› nations.

The 1959 hydropolitical architecture

Under British colonial supervision, the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement had allocated 48bn m^3 to Cairo whilst giving 4bn m^3 to the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium of Sudan. The revised Nile treaty of 1959 increased Egypt's share to 55.5bn m^3 and Sudan's to 18.5bn m^3, thus clearing all hurdles for the construction of the Aswan High Dam, the largest man-made water reservoir on earth. While Aswan ended Egypt's dependence on the erratic Nile flood, it infuriated upstream countries, not least Ethiopia, whose interests were ignored by Cairo and Khartoum. Thus, rather than definitively resolving Egypt's existential angst about its inordinate dependency on the river (97% of renewable water resources), Aswan and the 1959 agreement created a permanent tension between upstream and downstream riparians that destabilises the river basin to this day.

Proxy conflicts

For decades, the region was thus locked in proxy conflicts, with the Nile waters as one of the factors shaping alliances and hostilities. Egypt's support for successive regimes in Khartoum, and its opposition to granting self-determination to Southern Sudan were a direct result of its concern for the «hydropolitical status quo.» Had the SPLA/M captured Khartoum, this might have shifted Sudan's allegiance to the upstream bloc, while an independent south could have triggered calls to renegotiate the Nile Waters Agreement. For successive regimes in Khartoum, this partnership with Egypt yielded major foreign policy advantages and substantial support regarding the conflict in the south. The topography and geopolitical layout of the Nile basin consolidated a domestic hydropolitical economy based around irrigated agriculture; this, in turn, locked in the dominance of a riverain elite and it became well-integrated in the global economic system.

Growing ambitions of upstream countries

Over the past 20 years, the hydropolitical status quo has slowly but surely been eroded and has given way to a more complex strategic situation. In 1990, the Islamist Al-Ingaz (Salvation) Revolution ended the close partnership between Sudan and Egypt. It was only after the 1999-2000 power struggle and the fall of Hassan Al-Turabi, that President Omar Al-Bashir and Vice-President Ali Osman Taha reached out to Cairo once more, re-establishing diplomatic relations and confirming Sudan's support for the 1959 agreement. In exchange, Egypt gave the go-ahead for a Sudanese dam building programme. This has led to the construction of the Merowe Dam in Nubia, opened in 2009, with six more major projects to come, the first major new hydro-infrastructures in the region since Aswan.

Egyptian support was key for Sudan's dam building programme, but so was the export of Sudanese oil from 1999 onwards and the rise of economic partnerships between Sudan, China, and Gulf Arab states like Kuwait, the Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. Petrodollars and growing interest in Sudan's agricultural potential stimulated by rising global food prices had given Bashir and Taha the cash and diplomatic leeway to launch the most ambitious investment programme yet in Sudanese history. The multibillion dollar dam projects are meant to generate enough electricity to power rapid economic growth and store enough water for irrigation to make possible an «agricultural revival» that is supposed to recalibrate Sudan's political economy, something of particular importance after the loss of the south and most of the oil reserves.

Egypt did not foresee that Sudan's dam programme would also embolden other riparians, particularly after Bashir and Taha negotiated (and Cairo silently accepted) the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CAP) and South Sudan's right of self-determination. In May 2010, five upstream countries – Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania – signed the Cooperative Framework Agreement; Burundi joined the group in 2011. In open opposition to Egypt and Sudan, they insisted on the «equitable utilisation of waters» rather than the historical user rights so important to Cairo and Khartoum. Moreover, while the Egyptian Revolution distracted the country's military establishment, Ethiopian prime minister Meles Zenawi announced in early 2011 his country would press ahead with five megadams on the Blue Nile, starting with the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam; Uganda and Rwanda too have plans for additional hydro-infrastructure.

Chinese hydro-diplomacy

Today, three factors are further complicating the situation. The first is the rise of China in the Horn of Africa region and the weighty role the People's Republic plays in altering the hydropolitical status quo. Recently, there has been much interest in China's imports of oil and mineral resources from Africa; another, concurrent trend that has been less noted is Beijing's involvement in the construction of dozens of hydroelectric dams abroad, including in the Nile basin. China is the main partner in

Sudan's dam programme and is increasingly involved in Ethiopia's hydro-infrastructure. Sinohydro, the world's largest dam builder and a state owned company led by a Chinese Communist Party loyalist, is actively encouraging the construction of further dams on the Sudanese and Ethiopian Nile. With contracts often surpassing the US$ 1 billion mark, this is a highly lucrative business. China's growing influence, not least through dam building, has reduced Western leverage over both Khartoum and Addis.

Independence of South Sudan

The second factor is newly independent South Sudan. The country, which currently depends on oil revenues for 98% of its state budget, has great potential for agricultural production. As neither mass industrialisation nor the growth of a services economy seem imminent, South Sudan's natural comparative advantage lies in livestock and the cultivation of food crops. Contrary to the north, the south has ample water resources and plenty of rainfall, and investors are eagerly eyeing large tracts of fertile land in Unity State, Upper Nile, and Equatoria. However, the Nile is South Sudan's most unpredictable variant: Building hydro-infrastructure could help generate valuable megawatts of power and divert water for irrigation in riverain zones of agricultural production, yet it this will be very expensive and risks triggering greater tensions with Cairo and Khartoum. While dams and irrigation schemes could attract foreign investors and donors, they may also, in the short-term, require tremendous political energy and financial capital from a young and fragile nation.

Environmental stress

Finally, the allocation of Nile water and the building of hydro-infrastructure are also central to the region's long-term economic, ecological, and demographic development. If population growth continues at current rates, in 30 years time, North-East Africa will need to feed an additional 150m people. At the same time, climate change has a dramatic impact on livestock and agricultural production across the region, putting further strain on already limited resources. The 2011 drought ravaging Somalia and parts of Ethiopia underlines how severe problems may become when natural disasters strike regions already plagued by rural poverty and structurally weak economies. North-East Africa is already water scarce; climate change is likely to exacerbate this, forcing, in the near future, national governments and local communities alike to make some tough choices.

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Source: Chatham House report, Black Gold for Blue Gold? Sudan's Oil, Ethiopia's Water and Regional Integration, Harry Verhoeven, 2011.

TIMELINE

From Early Nilotic States to Sultanates	
ca. 58,000 BC	Archaeological findings indicate the presence of herdsmen, hunters, and fishers in the area known as Nubia, covering the south of present-day Egypt and the north of present-day Sudan.
8th century BC	The powerful Kingdom of Kush emerges from a previous succession of kingdoms; its rulers temporarily conquer Upper Egypt and hold control over Thebes.
ca. 590 BC	The Kushite Dynasty withdraws to the South where it re-establishes its power around the town of Meroe.
6th century AD	Byzantine missionaries spread Christianity among the Nubian aristocracy.
7th to 15th century	A series of peace treaties with Arab commanders of Egypt and contact with Arab traders, as well as intermarriage, make Islam the dominant religion in the north.
ca. 1630-1874	The Fur sultanate controls present-day Western Sudan.

Sudan under Foreign Rule	
1821	Egypt, under its Ottoman-Albanian ruler, Muhammad Ali Pasha, conquers Northern Sudan; his sons go on to annex most of present-day Sudan.
1881-1899	Muhammad Ahmad declares himself Mahdi and leads a revolt against Ottoman-Egyptian domination; his followers control substantial parts of the country until defeated by British troops.
1899-1956	Sudan is ruled as an Anglo-Egyptian Condominium; de facto British officials occupy all notable positions in the administration. The divide between a predominantly Arab and Islamic north and a black south dominated by Christianity and indigenous religions is further accentuated as the regions are placed under separate administrations (until 1946) and Christian missionaries intensify their work in the south.

Independence and Civil Wars	
1956	A united Sudan gains independence.
1955-1972	First Sudanese Civil War between the Anyanya guerrilla movement in the south and northern forces.
1958	General Ibrahim Abboud stages a coup against the newly elected government of Prime Minister Abd Allah Khalil.
1964	Starting from protests around the University of Khartoum and a general strike, the October Revolution forces Abboud's military regime to step down; the following years see a succession of civilian coalition governments.
1969	Colonel Gafaar Nimeiry leads a successful military coup.

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1972	The Addis Ababa Agreement officially ends the First Sudanese Civil War, granting autonomy to the south.
1983	The Second Sudanese Civil War erupts; the SPLM/A under John Garang takes on government forces after Nimeiry reneges on southern autonomy and introduces Sharia law in the whole country.
1985	In another coup, Nimeiry is removed from power by a group of military officers, led by General Dhahab.
1986	Elections bring about a civilian coalition government under Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi.
1989	The National Salvation Revolution, led by Colonel Omar al-Bashir, takes on power in a military coup.
1993	Al-Bashir appoints himself president; in the following years, he increasingly turns Sudan into a totalitarian state, the National Congress Party (NCP) being the only party with members in parliament and government.
1999	Sudan starts exporting oil.
2002	As a result of a round of peace talks under the auspices of IGAD, SPLM and the Government of Sudan sign the Machakos Protocol.
2003	First rebel attacks in Darfur, followed by a violent counter-offensive of the Janjaweed militias, allegedly with support from the Government of Sudan.
2004	Massive military operation by government forces in Darfur followed by a large-scale humanitarian catastrophe and widespread displacement of Darfuris.
2005	January: the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA, also known as the Naivasha Agreement) between SPLM and the government in Khartoum officially ends the Second Sudanese Civil War.

The CPA Years	
2005	March: The Security Council mandates the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to support the implementation of the CPA. June: The Constitution for Southern Sudan is signed; John Garang assumes the office of vice president of Sudan. July: Garang dies in a plane crash; Salva Kiir is sworn in as his successor. September: A Government of National Unity in Khartoum, and a new Government of Southern Sudan in Juba are appointed.
2006	May: The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) is signed between SLM-Minnawi and the Government in Khartoum; violence continues as other rebel groups reject the peace deal. November: New clashes between northern and southern forces kill hundreds around the southern town of Malakal.
2007	July: The Security Council formally authorises UNAMID, the first UN-AU peacekeeping operation. October-December: The SPLM temporarily pulls out of the power-sharing government, blaming Khartoum for not adhering to the terms of the CPA.

2008	April: Counting starts in a landmark national census; the results are later challenged by the SPLM. June: Al-Bashir and Kiir endorse international arbitration after repeated violent encounters between SPLM and northern forces in Abyei (Abyei Roadmap Agreement).
2009	March: The ICC issues an arrest warrant for al-Bashir on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. July: The ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration on the Abyei border is endorsed by north and south. December: Political leaders from NCP and SPLM agree on the terms for a referendum on the independence of South Sudan.
2010	April: Controversial elections, the first in 25 years, confirm Omar al-Bashir as President of Sudan. Salva Kiir is elected President of Southern Sudan with 93 % of the vote. July: The ICC issues a second arrest warrant for al-Bashir on charges of genocide. August: Kenya, an ICC signatory, decides to ignore the ICC arrest warrants when al-Bashir visits the country.

A Difficult Divorce	
2011	January: In a landmark referendum, 98 % of southerners vote in favour of full independence from the north. March: Independence talks between political leaders from north and south temporarily break down. May: SAF troops take the town of Abyei on the disputed north-south border. July: South Sudan becomes an independent state and the 193rd member of the United Nations. September: A state of emergency is declared in Blue Nile after clashes between government forces and the SPLM-North. Fighting is also reported from South Kordofan and Abyei. December: Khalil Ibrahim, leader of the Darfuri rebel group JEM, is killed by government forces.
2012	January: The GOSS suspends oil production after disputes with the north over export fees. February: The governments of Sudan and South Sudan sign a non-aggression pact, yet tensions remain. April: After repeated clashes, Southern forces temporarily occupy the border town of Heglig and adjacent oil fields; the threat of an all-out war looms.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ABC	Abyei Boundaries Commission
AJOC	Abyei Joint Oversight Committee
ANC	African National Congress
AUHIP	African Union High Level Implementation Panel on Sudan
CANS	Civilian Authority of New Sudan
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDPD	Doha Document for Peace in Darfur
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party
E6	Special Envoys to Sudan of the five permanent UN Security Council members and of the European Union
EU	European Union
FJP	Freedom and Justice Party
GOSS	Government of South Sudan
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Country
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IMF	International Monetary Fund
I-PRSP	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
ISFA	Interim Security Force for Abyei
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
JIU	Joint Integrated Unit
JPF	Just Peace Forum
KUSU	Khartoum University Student Union
LJM	Liberation and Justice Movement
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NCP	National Congress Party
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NEC	National Executive Committee (of the SPLM)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NISS	National Intelligence and Security Service

NLC	National Liberation Council (of the SPLM/A)
PCA	Permanent Court of Arbitration
PDF	Popular Defense Forces
PMHC	Political-Military High Command (of the SPLM/A)
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SANU	Sudan African National Union
SDF	Sudan Revolutionary Front
SLM	Sudan Liberation Movement
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPLM-DC	Sudan People's Liberation Movement – Democratic Change
SR	Special Representative
SSLF	South Sudan Liberation Front
SSU	Sudan Socialist Union
TDRA	Transitional Darfur Regional Authority
TMC	Transitional Military Council
UNAMID	United Nations / African Union Mission in Darfur
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNISFA	United Nations Interim Security Force in Abyei
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan (2005-2011)
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan (since 2011)

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Hardly a year has passed since Sudan split in two. For much of the time, both sides have been embroiled in conflict. The independence of South Sudan has fundamentally altered the political landscape. And the governments of north and south lack a defined framework within which to discuss the many outstanding issues. Yet, the international actors still try to identify new points of engagement.

Building on its 2010 publication, Sudan – *No Easy Ways Ahead*, the Heinrich Böll Foundation has therefore brought together a new group of authors to reflect on the challenges of the post-separation era. Their contributions lay out new approaches to a new region, providing guidance to understand the complex political realities of the two Sudans, and pointing out areas where constructive international engagement is possible.

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