

Missing in Transition?

Why a focus on military hand-over alone misses the point in Loya Paktia

Summary

Despite notable capacity improvements, the Afghan National Security Forces are a politically and socially fragmented force. The existing transition strategy focuses too much on military capacity building but neglects internal political divisions. A successful transition in Loya Paktia will require a strategy to address these divisions.

Afghan National Security Forces have demonstrated the ability to contribute to holding territory where they are already supported, but they have shown considerable weakness in gaining support in insurgent strongholds. Transition of security responsibility will empower networks already entrenched in the Afghan government and is more likely to lead to a direct stalemate rather than an expansion of the government's reach.

This logic extends to initiatives such as the Afghan Local Police which is mainly successful in areas where the local balance of power is already in favour of the Afghan government.

1 Introduction

In July 2011, ISAF officially handed over seven areas to Afghan National Security Forces,¹ beginning a process to gradually transition all security responsibility from international to Afghan leadership.² Twenty areas have now been formally transitioned to the Afghan National Security Force, which is, “part of the unfolding plan for all NATO combat troops to leave Afghanistan by the end of 2014.”³

Drawing on The Liaison Office's experience in the Loya Paktia (the region comprising Khost, Paktia, and Paktika provinces),⁴ this paper examines the shortcomings of a transition strategy that focuses almost exclusively on security, while ignoring important social and political factors that could undermine the strategy.

After providing an overview of the status of the different Afghan National Security Forces in Loya Paktia, the paper argues that while these forces can successfully maintain security in areas where the insurgency is already weakened, they are unable to establish, maintain, and expand the government's control over areas where insurgents are deeply entrenched.

It goes on to argue that simply increasing the number of Afghan National Security Forces and boosting capacity through the provision of equipment and training will not produce security forces capable of providing stability. Successful transition instead requires a broader focus that equally recognizes and seeks to address the serious political divides that currently plague the Afghan National Security Forces.

These imbalances are evident in Loya Paktia where local Pashtun residents consider the Afghan National Security Forces to be dominated by political networks. Residents feel excluded from security forces whose leadership is disproportionately comprised of former ruling communist party members (the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan), former Northern Alliance/United Front⁵ members, and a handful of pro-government tribes. The absence of local Pashtun leadership contributes to the general under-representation of local Pashtuns in the security forces. A greater focus on addressing these shortcomings is fundamental to ensuring that Afghan National Security Forces are able to provide stability throughout Afghanistan.

2 Changing of the Guard

ISAF has emphasized that transition demands a level of security that would allow "the population to pursue routine daily activities."⁶ However, few expect that the insurgency will be defeated by 2014 and that Afghan National Security Forces

will be able to hold the territory and stop the expansion of the insurgency without continued ISAF support, particularly in light of the continued strength of the insurgency.⁷ Indeed, the year 2011 was the most violent in Afghanistan since 2001, with a 39% increase in violent incidents in the first eight months of 2011 over the same period in 2010.⁸ Despite the increase in violent incidents, an accelerated drawdown of international forces was announced in June 2011.

As a result, Afghan National Security Forces will now need to expand their range of operations to include the "Clear" phase (i.e. recapturing territory from the insurgency) while simultaneously improving their ability to execute the "Hold" phase (i.e. ensuring territory stays under government control).

In order to support Afghan National Security Forces in this goal, General Petraeus, former ISAF Commander in Afghanistan, refocused the international military strategy, noting:

"The campaign will not be as intensive a fight for every village... but will rest largely on the buildup of Afghan Army and police forces to guard the border, block infiltration routes, and strengthen communities and local government."⁹

To realize this strategy an overall increase in the number of soldiers (171,600) and police (134,000) was approved.¹⁰ Further, an increased focus has been placed on training and assisting Afghan National Security Forces.

This transition strategy, however, neglects the significant divisions within the Afghan government and its security forces as well as the schism between the government and many communities in Loya Paktia. This requires a re-examination of the current strategy to better reflect the strengths and weaknesses of the Afghan National Security Forces and to address potential pitfalls that could undermine the prospect of achieving peace and security.

3 Afghan National Security Forces

This paper focuses on the largest and most visible Afghan National Security Forces on the ground, the Afghan National Army, the Afghan National Police, and also touches upon the National Directorate of Security. After a short overview of these security providers, it discusses the limitations of the current transition strategy to improve the capacity of Afghan National Security Forces.¹¹

3.1 Afghan National Army

The international community has often cited the Afghan National Army as a success story. It is generally better equipped and trained than the Afghan National Police. Still, the army has problems in achieving an approximate representation of the general demographic composition of the county due to the absence of large number of recruits from the south and southeast of Afghanistan where the insurgency is stronger. In those areas, families who send their sons to the

Afghan National Army face threats and social pressure. As a result, the army does not reflect the general population but mirrors the larger political divisions of the country (see Section 4).

The Afghan National Army has nevertheless been credited with contributing to improvements in security throughout the country. Furthermore, the participation of Afghan National Army soldiers in night raid operations helped improve the accuracy and conduct of such raids, although these operations are still strongly resented by local populations.¹²

The 203rd Corps of the Afghan National Army is one of six individual Afghan Army Corps operating in Loya Paktia.¹³ Of the 203rd's 28 divisions, 10 were assessed as "effective with [international] advisors"; 14 as "effective with [international] partners"; and four as "developing with [international] partners." While these assessments indicate that the force is generally competent, it still leaves room for improvement.¹⁴

In Loya Paktia both Khost and Paktia have Regional Military Training Centres with a capacity to house 600 and 350 trainees respectively. A training facility with a capacity of 1,750 trainees is planned for Gardez (in Paktia).¹⁵

3.2 Afghan National Police

The Afghan National Police is a central pillar of the Afghan National Security Forces. It consists of several branches, each with their own distinct roles.¹⁶ The

main force is the **Afghan Uniformed Police**.

As of August 2011 the Afghan Uniformed Police made up 56% (80,275 men) of Afghanistan's 144,431 police officers.¹⁷ Its responsibilities include general policing, maintaining public safety and the rule of law, the prevention, detection, and investigation of minor crimes; road safety and traffic policing, and gathering intelligence to support counter-insurgency operations.¹⁸

The 2009 approved force total for Loya Paktia was 4,556, with about 4,088 known to exist (approximately at 90% force strength). The breakdown per province of Loya Paktia is: Paktia 1,401 approved force strength/1,226 in actuality; Paktika 1,765/1,650 and Khost 1,390/1,212.¹⁹

Attrition rates in the Afghan Uniformed Police are high and are one of the principal obstacles to Afghan National Security Forces expansion. It also diminishes the continuity of the force and makes it difficult to establish a strong police-community rapport.

In 2010 approximately 2,000 Afghan National Police officers from the southeast left their positions and went *absent without official leave*, of which nearly one-fourth (464) were from Paktia.²⁰ While these positions have reportedly already been filled, there does not appear to be any measures in place to address the underlying problem of police officers leaving their positions.

According to a United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan survey, the main reasons cited for Afghan National Police officers going *absent without official leave* in Paktika were the high level of intimidation and insecurity, the inability to return home due to the unavailability of safe means of transportation such as flights, and the fact that the bodies of those killed in the line of duty often take three to four days to reach their family, a strong source of outrage for devout Muslim families that expect burial within 24 hours.²¹

The **Afghan National Civil Order Police** is another branch of the Afghan National Police. Established in 2006, it is mandated to maintain civil order in and around urban centres, while providing timely support to police in emergencies, including security provision in areas where the Afghan Uniformed Police are unable to operate. At times they also fill in for Afghan Uniformed Police until that force is fully stood up. They also rotate frequently and are rarely a permanently based in one location.

As of August 2011 there were 13,678 police officers in this force country-wide.²² In the whole of the southeast region there are three Afghan National Civil Order Police units which do not count more than a couple of hundred men. One is stationed in Sharana in Paktika Centre comprising 30 police officers, although they will soon be moved to Khost.²³ The second is in Gardez district of Paktia and consists of 70 police officers. The third unit is assigned to Zurmat district in Paktia, but is currently on

duty in Paghman in Kabul province. Similar to their regular police counterparts, they also have a very high attrition rate in the southeast, according to some sources about 70% attrition.²⁴

A third police force active in the southeast is the **Afghan Border Police**. It is tasked with securing border check-posts and crossings into Pakistan, including surveillance and prevention of smuggling, drug trafficking, and movement of insurgents across the border. In August 2011 5,000 (22%) of Afghanistan's 23,086 border police were assigned to the southeast.²⁵

In order to partially compensate for the withdrawal of international military forces, an additional police force—the **Afghan Local Police**, the most recent attempt at establishing pro-government village defence initiatives²⁶—was established in late 2010. The Afghan Local Police is considered a sub-pillar of the Afghan National Police that is nominally under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior, while in reality it is frequently run, supported and funded by US Special Forces. Considered a temporary and part-time force it is given a salary of 60% that of regular police recruits. In Paktia, there are 225 Afghan Local Police in both Chamkani and Dandi Patan districts, with plans to recruit another 250 for Zazi Aryub.

Finally, several other local pro-government security actors are present in the southeast, but operate outside the Afghan National Security Forces framework. These

include the Khost Protection Force (300 troops) and the Afghan Security Guards (400 troops). Both are created and, “paid by US Special Forces for guard duties but also accompany them during counter-insurgency operations or do patrols on their own.”²⁷ Reportedly the Afghan Security Guards also gather intelligence²⁸ and have accompanied US Special Forces in house searches and other operations.

The Khost Protection Force is mostly deployed for border security, though they also occasionally take part in search operations and raids, sometimes with US Special Forces.²⁹

3.2.1 The Militarization of the Police

With ISAF forces drawing down there will be an increased reliance on all Afghan National Security Forces to actively combat the insurgency. This has led to an ever-increasing militarization of the Afghan National Police. For example, there has been increased military training to Afghan Uniformed Police officers to prepare them for their frequent deployment to high-risk areas where they man checkpoints and often engage the insurgency.

The focus on military, rather than community-based policing skills, led the US military to create the Focused District Development programme to enhance police capabilities through an eight-week training to police officers in selected districts, with seven out of the eight weeks relating to military skills such as improvised explosive device awareness and weapons

training. Currently, only one week of instruction focus on basic policing skills.³⁰

After completing the training, the police officers return to the district with international police mentor teams that provide oversight and use field experience to build on the training.³¹ Many of these mentoring teams, however, are made up of current and former soldiers, which only reinforce a militarization of the police.³²

The Focused District Development programme has been implemented in a number of southeastern districts,³³ but progress has been slow and as of March 2011, only 491 Afghan National Police had been trained in Khost.

The increasing militarization of the police force, however, distracts the police from their mandated civilian policing duties. It also sometimes leads to conflicts over responsibility with the army. Converging the roles of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police also risks that the police may simply morph into a more poorly equipped and less professional version of the Afghan National Army.

While a paramilitary police might be necessary in the short term for transition, the current training focus is short-sighted as it leaves Afghanistan without a civilian-oriented police force. This bears the risk of leaving a crucial gap that can focus on crime-prevention while also opening avenues of the development of paramilitary groups and armed gangs.

4 A Force Divided

The transition strategy seems to ignore existing ground realities of a virulent and resistant insurgency, increasing insecurity, and the population's low confidence in the Afghan government, including Afghan National Security Forces. While training can contribute to improving the capacity of Afghan National Security Forces, it in no way addresses problematic structural issues rooted in Afghanistan's history and politics.

Residents of Loya Paktia indicated that, despite the improvement of the Afghan Uniformed Police's military skills they are still no match for the better-equipped and highly motivated insurgent fighters. "According to NATO data cited by the Brookings Institution, 830 police officers were killed in the first half of last year [2011], more than double the number of either Afghan soldiers or coalition troops."³⁴

The inability to rely solely on existing Afghan National Security Forces prompted the US to push for the creation of the Afghan Local Police, which will add to the overall number of troops that will be expected to take on the insurgency. The creation of this force, however, seems to ignore the fact that traditional *Arbakai* have failed struggled to function as anything more than a community-policing force.³⁵ The *Arbakai* prevalence in Ghazni and Paktika has dwindled in recent years with increasing insurgency pressure, as

they are simply not able to do the job of an army.

Fear and intimidation limits the Afghan National Police's willingness to fight the insurgency, and it appears as if some units collaborate or at least tolerate insurgent attacks. For example, due to security threats, Afghan National Civil Order Police forces in the southeast rarely leave their barracks.³⁶

In Musa Khail district of Khost province, the District Centre was destroyed twice in the past two years, yet no police officers were hurt in either attack. There have been similar reports from Paktika, where locally recruited Afghan Uniformed Police often emerge from attacks unscathed, suggesting that agreements are being struck to turn a blind eye to each other's presence. Given the strength of the insurgency, these links should be seen as a rational way for individual units to stay alive.

This, of course, adds to the distrust that Loya Paktia communities already harbour about the Afghan government and its security forces. As will be discussed in detail below, for one they see both dominated by those forces they used to fight in the past—former members of the communist government and Northern Alliance/United Front, which for many southeastern Pashtun used to be a rivalling *mujahideen* faction. On the other hand, they question the ability of Afghan National Security Forces to efficiently

engage the insurgency and protect communities.

In short, many feel that fighting the insurgency is not only tantamount to a suicide mission but also that Afghan National Security Forces and Afghan government officials are as much an enemy as the insurgency. Consequently, an assessment of Afghan National Army recruitment patterns suggested that Pashtun recruitment “remains relatively minuscule, reflecting a deep and lingering fear of the insurgents or sympathy for them, as well as doubts about the stability and integrity of the central government in Kabul, the capital.”³⁷

The resilient insurgency, insecurity, and the population's perception that Afghan National Security Forces are divided internally as well as a reflection of larger national political divisions need to be addressed in order to diminish the ability of the insurgency to garner support from alienated communities that feel they have little to lose.

4.1 Divisions within the Afghan National Security Forces

The Afghan National Security Forces, just like other branches of the Afghan government, are affected by the influence of patronage networks along factional, tribal, and ethnic lines. Patronage networks are particularly strong within the Afghan Border Police because it essentially controls custom revenues and smuggling routes from which corrupt officials and criminal groups extract large profits.

In Loya Paktia, the Afghan Border Police is believed to cooperate with criminal gangs in the smuggling of chromite, weapons, and explosives. Customs officials have reportedly complained that they have not been allowed to operate at Afghan Border Police border posts, hinting that this was because the border police did not want them interfering in their lucrative and corrupt sanctioning of illegal cross-border traffic.

There was also a strong perception among focus group participants from the southeast—including members of the Provincial Peace Councils—that the Afghan National Security Forces were plagued by personal rivalries and dominated by individuals from the mostly non-Pashtun Northern Alliance/United Front or who were affiliated with the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

Some of the division between the different Afghan National Security Forces can be partially explained by the fact that many positions—especially the army—are recruited at the Kabul level and later deployed without consideration of whether recruits are from the area or not. In contrast, the Afghan National Police, especially the Afghan Local Police, tends to be almost exclusively locally recruited. This often creates an ethnic and tribal imbalance between the two main pillars of the Afghan National Security Forces that often leads to competition and tension.

In Paktia province, for example, 90% of all Afghan Uniformed Police recruits are

Pashtuns, close to the ethnic ratio of the province itself. This is generally not the case with the Afghan National Army.

While US sources tend to boast that about 41% of the Afghan National Army is indeed Pashtun, “hence roughly in line with the broad demographics of the country,”³⁸ a recent independent assessment points out that, “the vast majority of recruits come from provinces in the North and Northeast, where the insurgency is weaker.”³⁹

Yet the problem is not purely about ethnic make-up of the Afghan National Army, but also the domination of certain regions over others, which leads to the next point.

4.2 Divisions between Afghan National Security Forces and parts of the local population

In Loya Paktia there has been a historical legacy of tension between Tajiks linked to the Northern Alliance and rural Pashtuns. For example, one elder from Khost province stated that most key government officials in their area are people who Pashtuns from his area used to fight against in the past, i.e. People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan or Northern Alliance/United Front. Elders from Ghazni, Paktika, and Paktia frequently argued that by supporting Afghan National Security Forces controlled by the Northern Alliance/United Front, even out of gratitude for their assistance in defeating the Taliban in 2001, the US was in essence supporting an “opposition” to the Afghan government that enriches itself with current contracts.⁴⁰

Indeed, according to an analyst of the US Congressional Research Service, “at the time the United States first began establishing the Afghan National Army [ANA], Northern Alliance figures who were then in key security positions weighted recruitment for the national army toward its Tajik ethnic base. Many Pashtuns, in reaction, refused recruitment or left the ANA programme.”⁴¹

Furthermore, according to an army recruitment study, over one third of all Pashtuns in the Afghan National Army are from Nangarhar Province in Afghanistan’s East.⁴² In contrast, southeastern and southern Pashtun only make up about 1.5 percent of all soldiers that were recruited since 2009.⁴³ The Nangarhar Pashtun legacy in the Afghan National Army goes back to their historic support of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, highlighting the power of politics and historic allegiances to the communist party.

Similarly, the Tani tribe of Khost province in Loya Paktia, which is also generally considered as close to the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, is seen as dominating the Afghan National Security Forces of the province. In contrast, the Zadran tribe—initially linked to the *Hizb-e Islami* of Mawlawi Kholes, while now leaning toward the Haqqani-led insurgency—is firmly in the anti-government camp.

These historic animosities and political ties perpetuate and deepen divisions between

the Afghan government and local tribes and communities.

They are also reproduced in the implementation of the new Afghan Local Police programme in Loya Paktia. Recruitment is successful in areas where the government already has more support and does not work in areas where the insurgency is strong. For example, during the initial establishment of the Afghan Local Police in Chamkani district in January 2011, residents of the Nozi, Lawari, Mangiar, and Sarangoor areas in Chamkani, where the insurgency is strong, did not join the Afghan Local Police, limiting the effect these units could have in these insecure areas. Similarly, in the Muqbil area of Dandi Patan district of Paktia, people refuse to nominate recruits to the Afghan Local Police for similar reasons.⁴⁴

Finally, the use of militias that are seen as supporting certain tribes over others, such as the Khost Protection Force and Afghan Security Guards follows a similar problematic pattern. Most of the members of both groups in Khost reportedly hail exclusively from the Zazi tribe of Zazi Maidan district, the home of Afghan Security Guard Commander Sakhi Rehman and General Khalibaz, the initial Commander of the Khost Protection Force.⁴⁵

In the Barmal district of Paktika, the local Afghan Security Guard Commander Azizullah, a Tajik from Urgun district, has also exasperates tensions between Tajiks

and Pashtuns by allegedly killing innocent Pashtuns he falsely accuses of being Taliban.⁴⁶ His criminal behaviour is in so far relevant here as his association with the former Northern Alliance/United Front and backing by international military adds to the local perception of the Afghan National Security Forces as reflecting the larger national divisions.

5 Conclusion

The 2014 deadline for the Afghan National Security Forces to take over in the southeast is ambitious given the challenges security organs currently face, both in terms of capacity but also reputation and trust by local communities.

There have been improvements in the military capacity, but as long as the Afghan National Security Forces remain a politically fragmented force distrusted by many Pashtuns in Loya Paktia, its ability to extend control into areas where the insurgency is strong will be limited.

Unless some of the actual and perceived imbalances in the composition of Afghan National Security Forces are addressed, transition of security responsibility to the Afghan government will only empower networks, such as the Northern Alliance/United Front and former communists that are already entrenched in the Afghan National Security Forces. Consequently, transition is like “preaching to the converted” and will not necessarily produce an expansion of the government’s reach.

While government outreach efforts have been relatively well-received in areas where the government is present, these efforts have been met with distrust in areas where the insurgency is still strong. This logic extends to initiatives such as the Afghan Local Police that tend to be successful in areas where the local balance of power is already in favour of the Afghan government and fragmentation is minimal.

The transition strategy needs to put a stronger emphasis on addressing the current imbalances in Afghan National Security Forces. Measures to recruit a more representative force are particularly needed. Furthermore, the Afghan government should pay more attention to the take the alienation of many southeastern and also southern Pashtuns. This could include ensuring that a political settlement also deals with past grievances with former members of the communist government and Northern Alliance/United Front. Without a broader political reconciliation, the insurgency will ultimately win out, both locally and regionally.

6 Recommendations

- On the national level, find ways to make the Afghan National Army more inclusive and representative. This means looking beyond the number of recruits to ethnic, tribal and geographic representation. Programmes need to be developed to attract Pashtuns from the underrepresented South and Southeast.

- Locally, improve balanced recruitment in Afghan National Security Forces through engagement with respected neutral leaders from under-represented groups.
- On the provincial and district level, explore local political settlements to address existing fragmentations and divisions before transition. In Loya Paktia, this means reaching out to those tribes that feel excluded and marginalized from the Afghan government.
- Make the level of representativeness of Afghan National Security Forces and good community relations and rapport a precondition for transition.

Endnotes:

¹ These were Bamiyan and Panjshir provinces, Mehterlam district in Laghman, all areas of Kabul district except Sarubi district and the cities of Herat, Lashkargah, and Mazar-e Sharif.

² NATO Public Diplomacy Division, (2011) "Transition to Afghan Lead: Inteqal." 5 October 2011. Accessed from <http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_10/20111006_111006-backgrounder_Inteqal_en.pdf>

³ Bowley, G. (2012) "Optimism as U.S. Transfers Security Control to Afghans in Jalalabad." New York Times, 27 January 2012. Accessed from <www.nytimes.com/2012/01/28/world/asia/us-transfers-security-to-afghans-in-jalalabad.html>

⁴ Southeast refers to the provinces of Paktia, Khost and Paktika, except when indicated otherwise.

⁵ The United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (or Jabha-yi Muttahid-i Islami-yi Milli bara-yi Nijat-i Afghanistan), often called the Northern Alliance in short, was loosely formed military-political umbrella of several mujahideen parties that emerged in opposition to the Taliban regime in 1996 and was lead by the late Ahmad Shah Massoud. While it united all ethnic groups of Afghanistan, it was often seen as primarily made-up of non-Pashtuns, especially at the leadership level: including Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmen and others. While United Front is the official name, most local elders interviewed referred to the Northern Alliance.

⁶ NATO Public Diplomacy Division, (2011) "Transition to Afghan Lead: Inteqal." 5 October 2011. Available from

<http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_10/20111006_111006-backgrounder_Inteqal_en.pdf>

⁷ http://www1.rollingstone.com/extras/RS_REPORT.pdf

⁸ BBC News (2011) "Afghan conflict; UN says 39% jump in violence in 2011." 28 September 2011. Accessed from <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-15098939>>

⁹ Gall, C. (2011) "Petraeus Confident as He Leaves Afghanistan." Kabul: New York Times, 10 July 2011; <<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/11/world/asia/11petraeus.html?pagewanted=1&r=2&hp>>

¹⁰ Having previously surpassed its October 2011 target of 171,600 soldiers and 134,000 police, ANSF forces are expected to increase to a combined force of 352,000 by October 2012, including 195,000 Afghan National Army members and 157,000 Afghan National Police. These figures do not include the Afghan Local Police.

¹¹ The ANSF also consists of the Afghan National Air Corps.

¹² Open Society Foundation and The Liaison Office and (2011) "The Cost of Kill/Capture: Impact of the Night Raid Surge on Afghan Civilians." Kabul: 19 September 2011.

¹³ Along with the three provinces of Loya Paktia, this unit battalion also operates in Ghazni and parts of Logar.

¹⁴ Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (2011) "Quarterly Report to the United States Congress." 30 October 2011.

¹⁵ Numbers on government employees are not always reliable. There is a tendency in some cases to inflate numbers or there is a gap between the central level in Kabul and the province.

¹⁶ Not discussed here due to their specialized nature are the Afghan Anti-Crime Police, the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) and the Afghan Public Protection Force.

¹⁷ SIGAR October 2011; Tashkeel (or Tashkil) is the approved number of sanctioned posts at each grade level, here the approved size of the ANP.

¹⁸ Ministry of Interior (2010) "Afghan National Police Strategy." Kabul: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, January 2011, p. 23.

¹⁹ Chilton, S., Eckart Schieweck, E., Bremmers, T. (2009) "Evaluation of the Appropriate Size of the Afghan National Police Force Manning List (Tashkil)." Kabul: 15 July 2009; p.113

²⁰ Source: UNAMA ANSF survey February 2011

²¹ Ibid

²² SIGAR October 2011

²³ Source: UNAMA Southeast region

²⁴ Friesendorf, C. (2011) "Paramilitarization and Security Sector Reform: The Afghan National Police." *International Peacekeeping*, 18(1): 79-95

²⁵ SIGAR October 2011

²⁶ Others including the Afghan National Auxiliary Police, the Local Defence Initiative, the Community Defence Initiative, and the Afghan Public Protection Police (AP3).

²⁷ Ruttig, T. (2009) "Loya Paktia's Insurgency: The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity." Pp.57-89 in

Giustozzi A. (ed.) *Decoding the New Taliban: Insight from the Afghan Field* (London: Hurst Publishers), p.87

²⁸ Cavendish, J. (2011) "Why One of Afghanistan's Most Feared Men is a U.S. Ally." *Kabul: Time Magazine*, 04 October, 2011.
<<http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2096079,00.html>>

²⁹ Ibid

³⁰ European training programmes, although arguably containing a more civilian focus, are limited in their geographical scope; see Chilton *et al.* (2009)

³¹ United States Department of Defense (2011)

³² Friesendorf (2011)

³³ **Paktia:** Shwak, Wazi Zadran, Gerda Serai, Zurmat, Jani Khail and Dandi Patan districts. **Paktika:** Mata Khan, Urgan and Sar Hawza, and parts of Sharana with plans to extend it to Gayan, Jani Khail, Yusuf Khail, Gomal, and Sharana Centre of Paktika.

³⁴ Nordland, R. (2012) "R. Afghan Officer Sought in Killing of 9 Colleagues," *The New York Times*, 8 March 2012, <www.nytimes.com/2012/03/09/world/asia/in-afghanistan-officer-sought-in-killing-of-9-colleagues.html>

³⁵ Arbakai in the Southeast, particularly in Khost and Paktia, are a temporary form of "community-based policing with limited reach and mandates." They are invoked by a *jirga* and generally to enforce and implement the decisions of a *jirga/shura*, to 'maintain law and order' (general policing), and 'to protect borders and boundaries of the tribe or community'. See Schmeidl; S and Karokhail, M. (2009), "The Role of Non-State Actors in 'Community-Based Policing' - An Exploration of the Arbakai (Tribal Police) in South-Eastern Afghanistan," *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol.30(2):318-342; p. 332.

³⁶ Friesendorf, C. (2011) "Paramilitarization and Security Sector Reform: The Afghan National Police." *International Peacekeeping*, 18(1): 79-95

³⁷ Rivera, R. (2011) "Afghan Army Attracts Few Where Fear Reigns." *The New York Times*, 6 September 2011; http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/07/world/asia/07afghanistan.html?_r=2&nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha2

³⁸ Katzman, K. (2012) "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, 6 February 2012; <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf>; pp.33-34

³⁹ Rivera 2011

⁴⁰ An elder from the Mangal tribe added that as a consequence internationally-led night raids often target the wrong people because local government officials intentionally provide ISAF with incorrect information in order to target an enemy or someone they are in a dispute with.

⁴¹ Katzman 2012; see also See International Crisis Group (2010) "A Force in Fragments: Reconstituting the Afghan National Army" Kabul: May 2010.

⁴² Rivera 2011

⁴³ Ibid

⁴⁴ Information provided by UNAMA Southeast region

⁴⁵ The Zazi of Khost are also seen as close to the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

⁴⁶ In the summer of 2010, he allegedly conducted an anti-Taliban operation in Sarobi district of Paktika after which eyewitnesses reported that he killed nine alleged Taliban by dragging them behind his vehicle.

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The Liaison Office (www.tloafghanistan.org)

TLO is an independent Afghan NGO seeking to improve local governance, stability and security through systematic and institutionalized engagement with customary structures, local communities, and civil society groups. Its main areas of activities are research/analysis, dialogue facilitation and participatory peacebuilding, including access to justice. In addition to the Kabul headquarter, TLO has three regional offices (Paktia-Southeast, Kandahar-South, Nangarhar-East) and over 130 staff across Afghanistan.

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