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# Protest and Opportunities

The Political Outcomes of Social Movements

Foreword by Sidney Tarrow

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# 1. Introduction

What do the abolition of slavery, the emergence of the modern welfare state, and the introduction of women's franchise have in common? All of these landmark political events have been the consequence of sustained mobilization by social movements. However, despite these and many more victories, social movements are far from always successful. The failure to obtain ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), the deadlock in taking effective measures to stop global warming, and the inability to prevent the invasion of Iraq are only three prominent examples among a long list of failed aspirations. When and why are social movements successful in their struggle for social and political change? When and why do they fail? These probing questions not only occupy the minds of activists, but also became an important topic in social movement research when Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward (1977) asked why movements succeed, and how they fail. This book attempts to find additional answers to this bold question, and more importantly, endeavors to develop a theoretical framework for reasoning about the causal dynamic between social movements and political change.

»Everyone who has worked on social movements knows how important it is to try to understand their outcomes. Almost everyone admits the extreme difficulty of doing so« (Tarrow 1999: vii). Why is it so difficult to explain the political impact of social movements? I am convinced that causal complexity is an important part of the answer (cf. Earl 2000; Giugni 1999). In the context of movement outcomes, causal complexity refers to the fact that not only social movements but also interest groups, public opinion, mass media, political parties and many other factors are likely to exert causal influence on the process of social and political change. In order to sort out the various influences, we first need clear theories of the causal processes by which social movements produce their effects (Tilly 1999). It is a key premise of this book that such causal theories are still

underdeveloped in the social movement literature – despite the existence of much empirical work on the outcomes of social movements. Therefore, I attempt to help fill this gap by proposing and developing a partial theory of social movements and political change. This theory is meant to apply only to western industrialized democracies because it explicitly takes western social movements as reference points, avoiding the problems associated with transferring western theory to southern protest (Boudreau 1996).

### Causal Mechanisms and Social Science Theory

To develop a theory of social movements and political change is a bold goal, and it requires elaborating on a seemingly simple question: What is theory? Although the term is frequently used in the literature on social movements, studies (almost) never address what properties define a theory, or what if anything sets a theory apart from related concepts such as models, perspectives, or paradigms (cf. McAdam et al. 1996; Morris and Mueller 1992; Snow et al. 2004). I argue that most research on the political outcomes of social movements – and in particular the more quantitative work – is based on the same (or at least a close variant of the same) conception of theory. According to this view, theories have two different components (Dickmann 1995: 122–123):

1. A small number of core assumptions, which concern central hypotheses positing causal relationships and the definition of fundamental terms. It is assumed that these core assumptions are difficult to prove or to disprove in empirical research.
2. A series of concrete hypotheses, which are deduced from the core assumption, and rules to define how the variables should be measured.

Causality is simply established by identifying non-spurious correlations between independent and dependent variables. In most cases the core assumptions of the theory will not be altered when a deduced hypothesis is falsified in empirical research. Thus, such theories only make predictions about the correspondence between explanatory and dependent variables, not »about the character of the process that links the latter to the former« (Hall 2000: 23). It is, at the very least, unsatisfying when correlations are presented to prove that certain variables related to movement activities

caused the observed outcomes, but no reasoning is provided to explain these links (e.g. Landman 2000; Skocpol et al. 1993). Referring to this weakness in the social movement literature, David Meyer (2005) recently argued that »social movement scholars treat the policy process as a black box within the state, which movements may occasionally shake and upset into action« (Ibid., 3).

It is simply not enough to state that a social movement caused or at least contributed to a certain political outcome independent of non-movement factors; rather, a causal argument must be spelled out showing how certain movement activities resulted in political changes (Andrews 2001). Therefore, I argue that any substantial theory of social movements and political change has to explain through which processes social movement activities can result in political change. Following a recent approach in social science, I call these explanations *causal mechanisms* (cf. Hedström and Swedberg 1998a; Little 1991; Mahoney 2001; Mayntz 2004; Opp 2005; Steel 2004).<sup>1</sup> My motivation to invoke this concept is the conviction

»that the advancement of social theory calls for an analytical approach that systematically seeks to explicate the social mechanisms that generate and explain observed associations between events« (Hedström and Swedberg 1998b: 1).

This specification of causal explanations of movement-generated political change is particularly urgent because, as with other macro *explananda*, the political outcomes of social movements are obtained through multiple pathways rather than through one surefire pathway (Cress and Snow 2000; Mayntz 2004). The three major paradigms of social movement research – resource mobilization, framing, and political process theory – are not of much help in identifying these pathways because they were all developed to explain the emergence and development of social movements rather than its outcomes (cf. McAdam et al. 1996). Therefore, in developing the causal mechanisms of political change, I will follow the recent call for an integration of social movement theory with the theories of public policy making (cf. Burstein 1999; Meyer 2005).

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<sup>1</sup> The idea of overcoming the limitations of »black-box« theories – also prevalent in other areas of social movement studies – by using the concept of causal mechanism was recently introduced in social movement studies by Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly (2001) in their landmark book *Dynamics of Contention*.

## The Political Outcomes of Social Movements

When we talk about the outcomes or consequences of social movements, we should keep in mind that we refer to a great variety of possible events and developments, not to a single phenomenon. Shifts in the federal budget, increasing public support for the principle of equal opportunity, media coverage of sexual harassment cases, or the hiring of additional police officials can all be the consequences of a social movement. Many scholars have tried to contain this diversity by developing taxonomies of movement outcomes (e.g. Earl 2000; Kitschelt 1986; Rucht 1992; Schumaker 1975). One basic distinction suggested by many authors is internal versus external, or in similar terms, intra-movement versus extra-movement (Earl 2000; Kriesi et al. 1995; Rucht 1992). Because the scope of this book is limited to the impact of social movements on political change, not all forms of internal movement outcomes are relevant. Thus, no attempt will be made to explain, for example, the consequences of protest mobilization for the resources of the involved social movement organizations (e.g. Cress and Snow 2000; Whittier 2004) or the impact of social movements on the lives and attitudes of the participating activists and organizers (e.g. Fendrich and Lovoy 1988; Giugni 2004a; McAdam 1999; Sherkat and Blocker 1997; van Dyke et al. 2000).

Furthermore, while the political impact of social movements belongs to the category of external outcomes, not all types of extra-movement outcomes will be systematically studied in this book. For example, I will not focus on the influence of social movements in shaping cultural norms, practices, and ideas (e.g. D'Anjou 1996; Earl 2004; Gamson 1998; Rochon 1998); the consequences of movement activity on societal institutions such as the university, the church, or the military (e.g. Astin et al. 1975; Katzenstein 1998; Moore 1999); or the outcome of strikes or consumer boycotts directed against corporations or other non-state actors (e.g. Luders 2006; Shorter and Tilly 1974; Wapner 1995).

In this book, all efforts are focused on developing a theory to explain the (domestic) political outcomes of social movements. Therefore, only types of outcomes that are related to the state and changes in its policies, politics, and polity, as well as the consequences of these changes for the society at large, will be considered as dependent variables (cf. Amenta and Caren 2004). This focus justifies using the term *political outcomes of social movements*. As will become apparent later in the book, the subject of politi-

cal outcomes is itself comprehensive and complex. The study of movement outcomes is further complicated by a twist of reality: Social movements often have unintended outcomes that may in some cases even contradict its goals (Rucht 1992). With a few exceptions, unintended movement outcomes have not been the subject of systematic research (Deng 1997; Linders 2005; Paul et al. 1997). Although additional research is urgently needed, it would be beyond the scope of this study to systematically research that topic.

In the previous paragraph, I used the term *domestic political outcomes* to indicate that my theory does not claim to explain the political impact of social movements on the international level. In recent years, a rich body of literature about so-called transnational social movement movements has emerged (cf. Bandy and Smith 2005; della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Smith and Johnston 2002; Tarrow 2005). One of the topics has been the impact of transnational activism on international organizations – such as the European Union, the United Nations or the World Trade Organization – as well as on international treaty negotiations (Clark 1995; Helfferich and Kolb 2001; Metzges 2006; Price 1998; Rutherford 2000; Warleigh 2000).

The decision to restrict myself to the political impact of social movement merits a short explanation. In my view, two separate factors made the decision to start with political outcomes most plausible. First and most important, any attempt to develop a general theory of movement outcomes would be doomed to failure: the complexity of the social world does not allow for all types of outcomes to be explained by a single theory (Giugni 1999). Most of the research on the outcomes and consequences of social movements has concentrated on their impact on public policies, ignoring other forms of social movement consequences (della Porta and Diani 1999; Earl 2000; Giugni 1999). While this bias is regrettable, it means that the area of political outcomes is most suited for an attempt to develop a theoretical framework of movement outcomes by synthesizing and integrating the existing literature. In addition, for most social movements, their political outcomes are most relevant to assessing their success or failure. Many, such as the civil rights, women's, environmental, and peace movements, have mainly – although not exclusively – pursued political goals; they have therefore targeted the state because they considered it either directly responsible for their grievances, or as the institution best suited to address them. In addition, »other challengers often require some state ac-

tion in order to further their cultural or other goals that are not mainly state related» (Amenta and Caren 2004: 461).<sup>2</sup>

### A Literature That Grows but Does Not Accumulate

The idea that it is important to study the political outcomes of social movements is neither new nor original. On the contrary, the belief in the power of social movements »has provided an indispensable justification for the studies of social movements conducted since the field was revitalized in the 1970s« (Burstein et al. 1995: 275). Despite this widely held belief – or maybe because of it – very little attention was devoted to the study of movement outcomes in the 1970s and 80s (Marx and Wood 1975; McAdam et al. 1988). Reviews of the subject frequently conclude with complaints that we still know little about the impact of social movements on social and political change, or that the study of movement consequences is one of the most neglected topics in the literature (Burstein et al. 1995; Giugni 1999; Gurr 1980). However, as Marco Giugni (1998) stated and Amenta and Caren (2004) more recently confirmed, social scientists have published much more on the outcomes and consequences of social movements than some scholars would have us believe. In recent years, interest in the outcomes of social movements has further intensified (cf. Giugni et al. 1999; Meyer et al. 2005).

Unfortunately, the mere number of studies cannot be considered as an indicator for the increase in our systematic knowledge about the political outcomes of social movements. For example, since Herbert Kitschelt (1986) published his article *Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest*, we do know in principle that the political environment of a social movement exerts a strong impact on its political outcomes. Two decades later, despite dozens of studies assessing the influence of political opportunity, we only know for sure that some political opportunities matter sometimes. At the same time, we still do not know why certain political opportunities matter and others do not – and, equally important, why they only matter sometimes (cf. Meyer and Minkoff 2004). Thus, although the literature on

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<sup>2</sup>For example, movements such as the labor or the anti-liquor movements considered influencing cultural or economic processes as their primary goal. However, these movements pursued those goals partly via political change (cf. Szymanski 2003).

social movement outcomes has grown quickly in recent years, it has not contributed to the same extent to the accumulation of a core consensus about the factors shaping the political outcomes. It is striking that in this respect, the situation is not much different from the study of interest groups, where great progress has been made in explaining the determinants and dynamics of »demand aggregation,« but much less has been learned about »group impact« (Baumgartner and Leech 1998: 7). I am convinced that theoretical incoherence, lack of comparability across studies and the limited scope of the research also explain why the literature about policy outcomes could grow without accumulating (cf. Baumgartner and Leech 1998).

### Theoretical Incoherence

We still lack a comprehensive and widely accepted theory of social movements and political change. As a result, there also exists no consensus about which explanatory variables need to be, or at least should be, included in empirical research. Therefore, it often seems quite arbitrary why some independent variables are included in a specific study but are left out in a study with an almost identical research question. For example, political opportunity structure is seen to be the key variable explaining the political outcomes of anti-nuclear energy movements across countries (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995), whereas it is not even mentioned in cross-national research about the policy outcomes of the labor movement (Boreham et al. 1996; Korpi 1989; Väisänen 1992). Whereas studies of the gay and lesbian movement are generally sensitive to the influence of public opinion (Haider-Markel 1999; Kane 2003), many studies on the women's movement simply ignore it as a potential explanatory factor (Outshoorn 2004; Weldon 2002). The problem with such omissions is that all determinants of policy change must be included in a research design, since it is pointless »to try to understand the impact on the legislature of any potential determinant of policy change without considering other potential determinants as well« (Burstein 1998: xvii).

In addition, our knowledge of the processes through which political or social change can be caused by social movements is quite limited (Andrews 2001; Burstein et al. 1995; Earl 2000). Most studies have ignored, or at least underspecified, the causal links between external, non-movement factors

and movement characteristics such as strength and strategies on the one hand, and political change on the other (for exceptions see Andrews 2001; Knopf 1998; McAdam and Su 2002). The prevailing correlational analysis provides a weak foundation for integrating the diverse findings into the single coherent framework that is required for knowledge accumulation (Mahoney 2001: 577): Social movement scholars have discovered that a heterogeneous group of variables are associated with movement outcomes, but their theories offer no basis for understanding why such diverse factors are important. The result is a lack of theoretical integration, which is responsible for the fragmentation of our knowledge about movement outcomes.

#### Lack of Comparability across Studies

The existing empirical studies are so different in terms of the ways outcomes are defined and in their considered explanatory variables that it is difficult to synthesize and integrate their findings. One reason for this problem is that the empirical literatures on the political outcomes of specific social movements are generally unconnected to each other and to the theoretical literature on the political outcomes of social movements. In particular, there are relatively independent bodies of research about the political outcomes of the women's (e.g. Stetson 2001a; Tyyska 1995; Weldon 2002), labor (e.g. Boreham and Compston 1992; Goldfield 1989; Jenkins and Brents 1989; Radcliff and Saiz 1998), and gay and lesbian movements (e.g. Bernstein 2003; Haider-Markel 1999; Kane 2003; Wald et al. 1996). Most of this research is carried out not by social movement scholars, but by researchers with a particular interest in a specific movement. Whereas these specialists tend to be aware of some of the work on social movement outcomes, their research has so far largely been overlooked in the social movement literature (cf. Amenta and Caren 2004; Giugni 1998).

The comparison of empirical research is also complicated by the fact that the conceptualization of political outcomes is not standardized across studies. Although the political outcomes of social movements are most often equated with their policy outcomes – defined as movement influence on the adoption of legislation – some studies use the impact on agenda setting, implementation, or political institutions as the dependent variable

(e.g. Andrews 2001; Balbach et al. 2000; Baumgartner and Mahoney 2005; Kriesi and Wisler 1999). However, even the majority of studies that refer to policy outcomes use quite different indicators to measure success. For example, the number of adopted laws or roll-call votes of members of Congress (Burstein 1979c; Haider-Markel 1999; Landman 2000; McAdam and Su 2002; Soule et al. 1999) or the amount of public spending (e.g. Giugni 2004b; Meyer and Minkoff 2004) may be used to assess the policy impact of social movements. The use of such diverse measures makes it difficult to compare results, even among studies of the same movement. For example, Burstein (1985) and Santoro (2002) both explore the impact of the civil rights movement on the adoption of equal employment opportunity (EEO) policy, but they reach different conclusions about the effectiveness of public protest. Whereas Burstein did not find an influence of protest, Santoro reported a strong and significant impact. However, any comparison of their findings will be largely inconclusive because they used quite different dependent variables. Whereas Burstein used the number of sponsors of EEO bills as his dependent variable, Santoro used an index of the bills' comprehensiveness.

#### Limited Scope of Research

The empirical scope of much of the research is so limited that its findings can hardly be generalized beyond the cases studied, or must even be considered as inconclusive. The term »empirical scope of the study« can refer to quite different dimensions in this context. In particular, some quantitative studies have conceptualized and measured the political outcomes of a specific social movement so narrowly and one-dimensionally that they are likely to have missed important aspects (e.g. Costain 1994; Giugni 2004b; Landman 2000; Soule et al. 1999). Therefore, it is highly doubtful whether such studies can tell us anything about the determinants of movement outcomes. For example, Meyer and Minkoff (2004) exclusively defined the policy outcomes of the civil rights movement in terms of annual outlays for the Commission on Civil Rights between 1955 and 1985. They found only two of their twelve indicators of political opportunities to be significantly correlated with the outcomes of the civil rights movement. It is almost ironic that these researchers did not even discuss the possibility that their results might say nothing about the importance of their various indi-

cators, but much about the inadequate validity of their outcome indicator. Thus, the findings of studies that do not conceptualize political outcomes properly and broadly enough are likely to be inconclusive, because an important dimension could be missing in the analysis.

The scope of social movement research is also limited in the sense that particularly strong and/or political successful movements catch the attention of scholars, and thus are selected for empirical study. For example, countries such as France, Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, and the United States, where the mobilization of the anti-nuclear energy movement was very strong, are much more frequently included in comparative studies about political outcomes than are countries such as Belgium, Canada, Luxembourg or Japan, which only experienced a weak mobilization (cf. Flam 1994c; Jasper 1990; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995; Rucht 1990). Due to this selection bias, it becomes almost impossible to test the influence of movement strength on the impact of anti-nuclear mobilization on nuclear programs (cf. Collier and Mahoney 1996; Geddes 1990). In a similar vein, successful social movements and protest campaigns are often analyzed by various authors in extensive case studies, whereas in-depth studies on failed social movements or protest campaigns are very rare. The amount of attention devoted to the analysis of the Brent Spar campaign (e.g. Bennie 1998; Jordan 1998; Klein and Koopmans 1995; O'Riordan 1995; Vowe 1997) or to the transnational protests against the *Millennium Round* during the WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle (e.g. Cockburn et al. 2000; Hoad and Hill 2000; Levi and Olson 2000; Lichbach and Almeida 2001; O'Connor 2000; Scholte 2000a; Thomas 2000) are two cases in point. Jane J. Mansbridge's (1986) study *Why We Lost the ERA* is one of the few remarkable exceptions.

In particular, many cross-national studies are restricted in their empirical scope because they are only based on one or less than a handful of empirical cases, leading to the problem of »small N's – big conclusions« (Liebersohn 1995). The fact that their findings can hardly be generalized beyond the cases studied is not their biggest problem. On the one hand, such small-N studies are in danger of employing indeterminate research designs (e.g. Breyman 2001; Carter 1997; Kriesi and Wisler 1999; Linders 2005; Nathanson 1999; Tyyska 1995). The authors of such studies make more causal inferences than there are observations, but in such a case it is impossible to decide which of the causal hypotheses is true because »each observation can help us make one inference at most« (King et al. 1994: 119). On

the other hand, in an attempt to avoid indeterminate research designs, studies might omit plausible explanatory variables, thus biasing their findings. For example, many studies do not control for the potential impact of public opinion (e.g. Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995; Piven and Cloward 1979b).<sup>3</sup>

To significantly improve our ability to systematically explain the political outcomes of social movements, we must work on all three fronts. We have to develop clear causal theories of social movements and political change. Based on such a theory, we must conduct research that can be fruitfully compared with other research. As much as possible, the existing literature should be more systematically used for synthesis. Finally, empirical research should be broad in scope in terms of included cases, definitions of outcomes, and considered explanatory variables. Thus, it is the plan of this book to utilize the wealth of existing research to develop a theory of social movements and political change (Part I), refining this theory by applying it to the U.S. civil rights movement and to the anti-nuclear energy movement in a cross-national study (Parts II and III).

## The Structure of the Book

### A Partial Theory of Social Movements and Political Change – Part I

It is the primary aim of this book to develop a partial theory of social movements and political change. Based on an intensive literature review, I will develop this theory in Part I of the book. The focus of the review is on the general literature on outcomes, as well as the political outcomes of the women's, environmental, peace, gay/lesbian, and labor movements. Literature on the anti-nuclear energy and civil rights movements is only included in Part I if it contains theoretical aspects not covered in the rest of the literature. I choose this procedure in order to avoid redundancy and to allow

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<sup>3</sup>These problems of small-N research can be partly overcome by increasing the number of observations. One strategy is to explain changes in the political outcomes of a social movement across different years rather than explaining its overall political outcome (e.g. Costain and Majstorovic 1994; Giugni 2004b; Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Soule et al. 1999). Whereas this procedure helps to avoid indeterminate research designs or the omission of variables, it does not change the highly problematic nature of generalizing such findings to other movements.

for testing and redefining the theory with empirical material not used in its development.

In chapter two I will begin the review with the literature about the classifications of political outcomes in order to develop a typology of political change. Thus, I start the actual theory developing process by specifying the *explanandum* of my theory. In the first step it will be necessary to clarify concepts, because terms like outcomes, impact, consequences, and success are sometimes used as synonyms and as opposing concepts in other approaches. Following a classical formulation, I will then distinguish between substantial and procedural political outcomes of social movements (Gamson 1975). In the remainder of the chapter, typologies for both general forms of political outcomes will be developed.

In the next step of my theory development, I will spell out the factors usually accounted for as the independent or explanatory variables in the literature. It is possible to identify two different theoretical approaches – one focusing on factors internal to movements and the other on external factors – which were initially seen as competing (Giugni 1998). However, a broad consensus has emerged that both internal and external factors and their interactions must be considered in explaining movement outcomes. The first approach assumes that the strength and strategies of a social movement determine the scope and the nature of the political change it can achieve (e.g. Brill 1971; Gamson 1975; Lipsky and Levi 1972). I will discuss in chapter three how movement strength and strategy are shaping the political outcomes of social movements. The other approach held the opposite perspective, arguing that the political impact was overwhelmingly contingent on the cultural, political, and economic environment (e.g. Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995; Piven and Cloward 1979b). I will identify the cultural, economic, and particularly the political factors most influential in determining the political outcomes of movements in chapter four.

In the final step of theory development, I will turn to the concept of causal mechanisms. Causal mechanisms link the two clusters of independent variables on the one side, and the dependent variable on the other. It is the basic premise of the theory that the political outcomes of social movements will be generated by one or a combination of various causal mechanisms of political change. In recent years three authors explicitly referring to the mechanisms approach have suggested a relatively small and partly overlapping number of mechanisms linking movements and political

change (Andrews 2001; Knopf 1998; McAdam and Su 2002). In addition, during the last four decades, a number of qualitative studies have developed causal arguments linking the activities of social movements to the process of political change (e.g. Lipsky 1968; Piven and Cloward 1977; Rochon and Mazmanian 1993; Rosenberg 1991; Wilson 1961). I will use both literatures as the starting point to elaborate five basic causal mechanisms of political change in chapter five; these are the disruption, public preference, political access, judicial, and international politics mechanisms. In elaborating these mechanisms I will also use insights from the literature on public policy making. In addition, I will try to identify which of the previously identified explanatory variables have to be present in order for the mechanisms to be activated by social movement mobilization.

### The Civil Rights Movement – Part II

After laying out the theory of social movements and political change, I will begin demonstrating that such a mechanism-based theoretical framework is indeed capable of improving our understanding of the determinants and dynamics of movement outcomes. The U.S. civil rights movement was selected as the case for this demonstration, because its political outcomes have been more intensively studied than those of any other social movement (cf. Andrews 2004; Browning et al. 1984; Burstein 1998; Button 1978; Fording 2001; Garrow 1978; Haines 1989; Lee 2002; Piven and Cloward 1979b; Rosenberg 1991; Santoro 1995). This literature will be used to conduct a comprehensive case study, which is defined as an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of similar units (Gerring 2004: 342). But although the civil rights movement has received greater attention than other movements, our understanding of its political impact and in particular the causal dynamic that led to its outcomes is neither perfect nor complete (Giugni 1999). Therefore, in empirical terms, it is my goal to systematically explain and analyze the political outcomes of the American civil rights movement.<sup>4</sup> I will mainly focus on political outcomes at the national level, and on the time span from after the

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<sup>4</sup> I will not provide a detailed history of the civil rights struggle, because several excellent comprehensive accounts on the emergence and trajectory of the movement are already available (e.g. Chong 1991; McAdam 1982; Morris 1984).

Second World War to the early 1970s – considered the height of the civil rights movement.

The major theoretical goal of Part II is to demonstrate that the political outcomes of the civil rights movement were indeed caused by the five causal mechanisms of political change that were introduced in chapter five. This challenge was two sided. On the one hand, I must show that specific political outcomes can be linked to a certain causal mechanism. On the other hand, I have to verify whether the political opportunities identified in chapter five are the conditions under which the mechanisms could be activated by civil rights mobilization. The case study method that will be employed has been singled out as well-suited »to peer into the box of causality« (Gerring 2004: 348). Each of the five mechanisms will be addressed in a separate chapter, each with an identical overall structure. In the first step, I establish that the civil rights movement did try to activate the particular mechanism. In the second step, I show when and under which conditions the mechanism was activated. And in the final step, I identify the resulting political outcomes.

In chapter six, I will start my discussion by evaluating the judicial mechanism, because litigation was the dominant tactic in the early phase of the civil rights movement and was used to fight almost every aspect of racial discrimination. In chapter seven, I will continue my analysis with an assessment of the political disruption mechanism. After 1955, protest tactics such as the bus boycott or the sit-in gained increasing importance and began to transform the civil rights struggle into a real mass movement. In chapter eight, I will analyze the public preference mechanism. In the early 1960s, the civil rights movement leadership finally acknowledged that it lacked the power to break the stubborn Southern resistance to desegregation. Therefore, it increased its efforts to mobilize public support in the North in the hope of gaining support from the federal government. In chapter nine, I will evaluate the effects of the political access mechanism. The realization of voting rights for African Americans and the possibility of political participation in general were seen as important pre-conditions for racial progress in other issue areas. This chapter will try to judge if this democratic promise held true. In chapter ten, I will close the evaluation of the five mechanisms with the international politics mechanism, focusing on an often ignored aspect of the civil rights struggle, namely its Cold War context.

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### The Anti-Nuclear Energy Movement – Part III

After having employed the theory of social movements and political change to explain the impact of the U.S. civil rights movement, the framework will be applied to the anti-nuclear energy movement in Part III. Rather than focusing only on the U.S. movement, I will try to explain its political impact by comparing changes in nuclear programs in eighteen OECD countries. The focus of Part II was on the role of the causal mechanism – in other words, on the »How« of political outcomes. The focus in Part III will be on the influence of movement strength and particularly on the role of political opportunities – in other words, on the »Why« of outcomes. However, in explaining how the various mechanisms caused the political impact of the civil rights movement, I also had to refer to the »Why« by identifying the opportunities necessary for the activation of a mechanism. In Part III, I will use variations in political opportunities to answer the question of why the anti-nuclear movement succeeded in some countries while it failed in others. However, in order to show how anti-nuclear protest succeeded, I will also show that political opportunities shaped which mechanism could be activated.

To ensure that the findings of this study can be generalized, I designed it as broadly as possible in terms of its empirical scope. The huge majority of previously conducted comparative studies on anti-nuclear outcomes are based on four or even fewer cases (e.g. Giugni 2001; Jasper 1990; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995; Rucht 1994b). In addition, almost all of these comparisons have included all or some of the same four countries – France, Germany, Sweden, and the United States. Anti-nuclear protest in countries such as Belgium, Canada, Great Britain, and Japan has never or at least rarely been analyzed in comparative research. It is particularly striking that with the exception of Norway (cf. Andersen and Midttun 1994), comparative studies have neglected countries such as Denmark, Ireland, and Luxembourg in which the anti-nuclear energy movement prevented the construction of nuclear power plants in the first place. This selection bias is highly problematic; it is well known in comparative politics that the cases you choose affect the answers you get (Geddes 1990). In contrast, my study includes anti-nuclear energy movements from eighteen OECD countries. These countries are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.

Thus, my research includes a diverse set of countries, representing strong and weak as well as successful and unsuccessful anti-nuclear movements (cf. Rüdiger 1990).<sup>5</sup>

Although the anti-nuclear energy movement has attracted many efforts to explain its political outcomes, there is still the need for an additional study.<sup>6</sup> On the one hand, because previous studies paid insufficient attention to the causal dynamics of political change, some scholars have questioned whether the observed reductions in nuclear programs were indeed caused by anti-nuclear mobilization (Jasper 1990; Nichols 1987). In addition, public opinion had been omitted as an explanatory variable in most studies, although it is believed to be very important in nuclear policy making. On the other hand, with a few exceptions, the existing comparative work on the impact of the anti-nuclear movement is rather dated, and thus neglects in particular the outcomes of anti-nuclear mobilization after the Chernobyl catastrophe (e.g. Flam 1994c; Giugni 2004b; Yamasaki 2003). The part of my research that deals with the impact of the Chernobyl accident is only based on fourteen countries. Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg and Norway had to be dropped from the sample because they had already abandoned nuclear energy before the year 1986 (cf. International Energy Agency 2001).

Part III is structured into three chapters. In chapter eleven I will prepare the ground for the analysis in the subsequent chapters. I will detail how I operationalized and measured the dependent variables. For the period before Chernobyl I used the deviations between the intended and realized capacities of the nuclear programs to compute a variable that displays the percentage of a country's nuclear program that was not realized. To capture the impact of Chernobyl accident, I coded a variable based on the degree of change in a country's nuclear program in the years immediately after the accident. In addition, based on chapters three and four I will

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<sup>5</sup> Unfortunately, secondary literature on nuclear policy making and sufficient data on anti-nuclear mobilization were not available for Australia, Greece, Iceland, South Korea, New Zealand, Turkey, Mexico, and Portugal.

<sup>6</sup> The first wave of overwhelmingly descriptive studies, sparked by the massive emergence of the movement in the 1970s, was published around 1980 (Conrad and Krebsbach-Gnath 1981; Falk 1982; Kitschelt 1980; Mez 1981; Nelkin and Pollak 1977, 1981; Thom 1979). The second wave of research, in general more theoretically sophisticated, was published in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Andersen and Midttun 1994; Campbell 1988; Flam 1994c; Jasper 1990; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995; Rucht 1994b; Sahr 1985).

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present ten explanatory hypotheses that explain anti-nuclear outcomes. I will detail and document how I operationalized and coded the according independent variables. In chapter twelve, I will explain the political impact of the anti-nuclear energy movement in the period before Chernobyl as well as the immediate impact of the Chernobyl accident, with the main emphasis on the earlier period. I will begin the analysis with bivariate correlation analysis. Due to the small number of cases, I resorted to qualitative comparative analysis in order to perform a multivariate analysis (Ragin 1987). In chapter thirteen I will complement the estimation of causal effects with case studies specifying and tracing how the disruption, public preference, and judicial mechanisms link anti-nuclear mobilization and nuclear program development.

#### Summary and Conclusions

I will close the book with a chapter that attempts to summarize its most important empirical and theoretical findings. In addition, I will sketch out where I think the framework needs more elaboration.

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