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Security as a Commodity

Mega Events and Public Security in Brazil

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Organizing an international mega event implies beginning or reinforcement of a series of circulation and exchange flows: of people, merchandise, capital, technology, expertise, promises or risks. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, certain patterns of flows have been established (or reinforced) in the security field, with a big increase of investments (Giulianotti & Klauser, 2009). A distinct emphasis lies on the acquisition of information and communication technologies, aimed at establishing command and control infrastructures, which are also used for vigilance and monitoring (Samatas, 2011), as well as in so-called non-lethal weapons such as rubber bullets, taser, tear or irritant gas, water cannon or the often used stun grenade. The growing availability of so-called non-lethal weapons – supposedly less likely to kill, used in order to prohibit combat or limit escalation – however already proofed to be lethal – have , in Brazil's case, already had a significant impact on the way the police acts in certain scenarios.

In Brazil, the most frequent questions regarding the expenditure that accompany mega events had as their target the expenses for the building or renovation of sporting equipment, for which big building companies have been procured: companies that are among the largest corporations in the country. Meanwhile, many other contracts involving huge amounts of money have been signed. This sometimes means way more than the transfer of funds via exchange between the State and the private segment: Building and operationalizing large security technology systems insert these companies in the government's own architecture, with a role that goes beyond the simple provision of services or equipment.

This way, private sector players start not only cooperating with the State, but also cooperating, through some of their main action and organization tools in the field of security. In Brazil's case, the investments grant centrality to the building of the Integrated Command and Control System (SICC), responsible for the coordinated integration of different public bodies of defense, public security or disaster relief (at national, state and municipal levels), in an institutional architecture that adopts to the different situations and scenarios it faces. In the official discourse, this system is often presented as the main security-related «legacy» of mega events, and as the final objective of a significant part of the expenses.

Alongside SICC, technology companies started having an increasingly decisive role in the operationalization, organization and options that are offered to public security authorities. Their approach is not to interfere directly with public policies, but rather to build action channels «designed» by these companies via equipment and software that privilege (although they do not determine) certain mission patterns from the security forces. Changes introduced are not negligible and follow, in a non-strict way, a pattern of changes in the protocols and action strategies that have been repeated in various international contexts. They can be associated with a model of «militarized urbanism,» well-adapted to social, economic and public-space changes that have always followed, or rather have been planned to follow the preparations to hold mega events. As highlighted by Giulianotti & Klauser (2009), the relation between the security and warfare industries as well as the «militarization» model of security forces cannot be ignored. The effects of such alterations became very evident during the large protests of June 2013, and in Rio de Janeiro's case, with the police-like occupation, by the Armed Forces, of territories for the implementation of

Pacifying Police Units (In Portuguese: Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora, UPPs). With the occupation and presence of the police, the state government aimed at gaining control over the slums that were dominated by drug traffickers or, in rare cases, by the militia.

In spite of the visibility the use of so-called non-lethal weapons brought, which grew proportionally to the considerable increase in expenses with this kind of equipment (see chart 1), the main element responsible for this change is the Integrated Command and Control System (SICC), created to operate in FIFA's 2014 World Cup. The SICC consists of 12 Command and Control Integrated Centers (CICC), one in each host city, with a 13th in Brasília (the federal capital, which has then two CICCs), from which the coordination and supervision of all the other centers were made, all of them integrated and coordinated through a complex communication system that ensured a high degree of operational centralization, supplied by a few large technology companies, hired by the Extraordinary Secretary for Security During Large Events (SESGE). After the World Cup, the federal government has opened CICCs in all of the country's capitals and integrating them to SICC. Besides the buildings, the staff and the technological infrastructure, the SICC also has trucks equipped with cameras in high platforms and a small command-and-control room, helicopters with aerial imagers, buses that work as mobile precincts and other equipment.

Chart 1: Government expenses to Condor S/A, main supplier of the federal government of so-called non-lethal weapons (in million Brazilian Reais)



Source: Portal da Transparência

The «Legacy» of Mega Events Security

Contrary to what happens in other areas, in which the permanence of some «legacy» from mega events is controversial, in the field of security it is quite evident. This is a short overview that will be commented below:

- Technological infrastructure (software, networks and physical equipment)
- Building infrastructure (the CICCs, for instance)
- Operational protocols (created and maintained by software and computer systems that integrate all the different players, mediate their relations and register – or sometimes command – operations)
- Institutional architecture (SICC strengthens, both nationally and locally, a model that requires the participation of multiple agencies, among public bodies, such as the police and the fire departments, including companies that supply the systems and the «integration solutions» that make this multiple participation possible)
- The «militarized-managing» model (the command and control principles, which guide and structure the SICC, combine elements of corporate managing with action and space-occupying strategies of the military kind)
- (Re)Equipping the defense and security forces (lethal and so-called non-lethal weapons, cars, radio transmitters, special attire etc.)

The expressed goal for creating SICC and reequipping the security forces is the implementation of a new operational paradigm, based on management principles created in the corporate world, prepared again and adapted by the Armed Forces as a military doctrine of operations (apud Cardoso, 2013). The sought goal is to maximize the security and defense actions through information sharing, joint actions and decision-making supported by situational analysis and strategic goals. Once it is launched, this system creates action protocols that tend to be repeated in similar situations, which start to be managed theoretically by a pattern based on the efficiency of operations. This also leads to critique, due to actions by security forces perceived as excessive force or being disproportionate to the threats or resistance in a confrontation. This is a consequence of the implementation of the «military urbanism» (or of a «new military urbanism» (Graham, 2011)), characterized by the following criteria: the dissemination of definitions and a militarized organization of the urban spaces (Giulianotti & Klauser, 2009), by the trivialization or naturalization of military action, thinking and public policies paradigms (Graham, 2011; 60), by the growing use of command and control technologies, and by a larger volume of gathered information.

Therefore, the effects associated with this security legacy, seen by public managers as positive, part of the society perceives as very negative, since it establishes a militarized model of action for the security forces, and as contradiction to an ideal security policy, based on the respect for individual liberties, such as association freedom, and for human rights. The dispute about the effects of this model's adoption, and of the discourses originated from it

is taking place, very publicly, started to be discussed openly with the protests of June 2013. However, critique was present before that, for example with the removals in Aldeia Maracanã – a building occupied by indigenous people in Rio de Janeiro – in March of that same year. Though many groups and players took part in the debate, the role of the 2014 World Cups and Olympics Popular Committee of Rio de Janeiro in the publicizing of the discussions and in the counter-arguments to the State's and sponsors' discourse was especially important.

Security Expenses

Figuring out the total expenses for public security during the Games is quiet a hard job. The 2016 Olympic Games have their continuity with previous mega events: Confederations Cup in June 2013, World Youth Day in 2013 and the FIFA World Cup in 2014. Investments and preparations can hardly be traced to only one of these events. The expenses of the Extraordinary Secretary for Security During Large Events (SESGE), for instance, were higher in 2013 and 2014, with a remarkable plunge in 2015 (table 1). Security investments are being made in a diluted manner distributed among different bodies which, in one way or another, have had increases in their annual budget due to their participation in the mega event security. Therefore, many expenses overlap, causing the total agreed volume to be more or less accurate.

Concerning the events, the most precise data are those related to the 2014 World Cup, disseminated by the website Portal da Transparência. The total sum of public contracts for security and defense might be approximately R$ 1.858 billion Brazilian Reais (ca. 465 million Euro: This value, as well as all the following values in Euro are based on the exchange rate of 3.98 of 28th April 2016), most of it going to security and defense technologies. The data about the Olympic Games security spending have not yet been publicized in an organized or official way. Sources from the press talk about a budget of R$ 930 million Brazilian Reais (ca. 233 million Euro), with R$ 350 million Brazilian Reais for the Ministry of Justice (ca. 87 million Euro) and R$ 580 million Brazilian Reais for the Ministry of Defense (ca. 146 million Euro). That would mean approximately R$ 2.8 billion Brazilian Reais (700 million Euro) spent directly on the security of the two-mega events. The coordination between the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces, on the one hand, and the Ministry of Justice and state security offices (in the states that hosted World Cup games), on the other hand, it is the central element of this entire security plan, and that is the reason why the budgets are divided and cause some conflict.

Extraordinary Secretary for Security During Large Events (SESGE)

The coordination of all the agencies involved in the security plan for the mega events and, consequently, for building and beginning operations of SICC, is responsibility of SESGE, the Extraordinary Secretary for Security During Mega Events, created especially for this task. It was allocated in the administrative structure of the Ministry of Justice, and in its majority composed by Federal Police agents. SESGE plays the most important role in creating the necessary institutional architecture and had at its disposal a budget of R$ 957,506,106.28 Brazilian Reais between 2012 and 2015 (ca. 240 million Euro). As shown in table 1, more than 91% of these expenditures referred to «permanent materials and equipment» (57.74%), «buildings and facilities» (16.77%) and «other third-party services – legal entities» (16.64%). A close look at the list, and at 19 companies that received most of the funds, it makes it clear how significant were the investments made in information and communication technologies (table 2): Aceco TI S.A., Agora Soluções, Comtex Telecomunicações, Medidata Informática S.A., Modulo Security Solutions S.A. und Unisys Brasi Ltda. received 45.68% of the funds.

The participation of these companies in the operationalization of public security, the large sums paid to them and the possibility of closing big deals with the State – which, because of their visibility, may lead to other contracts, both domestically and internationally – make way for very frequent claims of corruption. In 2015, in an episode shown in Brazilian and international news, an internal investigation of the German company Bilfinger Mauell raised suspicions of payoffs made to Brazilian public agents during the bids to equip the CICCs with video walls. In total Bilfinger Mauell received orders by SESGE of about 22.59 million Reais (see chart 2; ca. 5.6 million Euro). This reminds us of the case during the Athens Olympics with Siemens, another German company (Samatas, 2011).

The expenditures made by SESGE are quite representative for the kind of relationships between the State and private companies described in the beginning of this article. As table 3 shows, the ten companies receiving the highest sums by SESGE have concentrated 70.46% of the body's investments over 4 years. Three companies with the largest sums, together, were paid a total of R$ 347.58 million Brazilian Reais (ca 87 million Euro): Aceco (Integrated Command and Control Centers, data centers, safe-rooms and «end-to-end solutions), Aeromot (video and image project and air monitoring with helicopters) and Agora (integrative and communication platforms).

Table 1: Spending of SESGE by category, in Brazilian Reais (2012–2015)

Year/Category	2012	2013	2014	2015	TOTAL	% of Total
14 – Civil Daily Rates	1,315,351.50	2,136,887.66	10,785,545.56	2,084,929.06	16,322,713.78	1.70
15 – Military Daily Rates	0.00	5,395.05	0.00	0.00	5,395.05	0.00
30 – Consumables	64,694.04	14,914,142.09	15,856,515.76	5,809,578.08	36,644,929.97	3.83
33 – Tickets and expenses with Transportation	921,092.31	2,541,560.35	2,996,344.83	1,098,746.46	7,557,743.95	0.79
35 – Consulting Services	7,008,535.27	2,935,464.72	0.00	74.04	9,944,074.03	1.04
36 – Other Third Party Services – Individuals	2,603,592.00	7,895,779.45	1,167,475.85	0.00	11,666,847.30	1.22
39 – Other Third Party Services – Corporate (Other Expenses)	0.71	1,909,514.40	38,110,365.94	24,171,096.70	64,283,437.75	6.71
39 – Other Third Party Services - Corporate (Investment)	0.00	13,189,152.66	76,791,194.72	5,048,369.49	95,028,716.87	9.92
47 – Tax Liabilities and Contributory	5,260.35	8,983.69	21,772.41	15,136.00	51,152.45	0.01
51 – Works and Facilities	0.00	115,592,452.51	39,063,004.26	5,948,397.22	160,603,853.99	16.77
52 – Equipment and Permanent Material	2,040,634.66	198,321,932.29	316,603,100.20	35,870,551.67	552,836,218.82	57.74
92 – Exercise Expenses Previous	0.00	5,956.20	19,366.12	2,523,774.48	2,549,096.80	0.27
93 – Compensation and Restitution	7,617.42	892.17	2,093.25	1,322.57	11,925.41	0.00
TOTAL	**14,059,238.26**	**359,458,113.24**	**501,416,778.90**	**82,571,975.77**	**957,506,106.17**	**100.00**

Source: Portal da Transparência

Table 2: Companies that received more than 1% of SESGE operating expenses, amounts in Brazilian Reais

Company	Equipment and Permanent Material	Works and Facilities	Third Party Services – Corporate	Total Operating Expenses	% Total Operating Expenses SESGE
Aceco ti s.A	0.00	160,512,345.90	832,463.38	161,344,809.28	16.85
Aeromot – aeronaves e motores s.A. [Aeromot]	79,870,784.09	0.00	20,471,819.99	100,342,604.08	10.48
Agora – soluções em telecomunicações ltda.	81,088,043.32	0.00	4,811,137.33	85,899,180.65	8.97
Altave indústria, comércio e exportação de aeronaves ltda [altave]	20,601,608.00	0.00	2,480,000.00	23,081,608.00	2.41
Banco do brasil sa [direção geral]	13,562,638.73	0.00	4,413,484.95	17,976,123.68	1.88
Bilfinger mauell serviços e engenharia ltda [bilfinger mauell]	9,291,064.98	0.00	13,300,738.45	22,591,803.43	2.36

Claro s.A. [Claro]	0.00	0.00	12,766,647.85	10,605,412.34	1.33
Comil onibus s.A. [Comil]	10,605,412.34	0.00	0.00	10,605,412.34	1.11
Comtex telecomunicações	28,307,993.00	0.00	16,861,164.85	45,169,157.85	4.72
Condor s/a indústria química [condor]	43,587,174.27	0.00	0,00	43,587,174.27	4.55v
Empresa brasileira de teleco-municações S.A. Embratel	0.00	0.00	9,639,216.05	9,639,216.05	1.01
Inbraterrestre indústria e comércio de materiais de segurança ltda. [Inbraland]	15,191,145.50	0.00	0.00	15,191,145.50	1.59
Medidata informática s/a	41,127,499.71	0.00	657,642.68	41,785,142.39	4.36
Módulo security solutions s/a	0.00	0.00	48,128,587.11	48,128,587.11	5.03
Rontan eletro metalúrgica ltda	50,352,655.11	0.00	435,342.23	50,787,997.34	5.30
Steel truck indústria, comér-cio e serviços ltda [steel truck]	15,409,734.07	0.00	318,699.00	15,728,433.07	1.64
Truckvan indústria e comércio ltda	42,542,996.56	0.00	0.00	42,542,996.56	4.44
Unisys brasil ltda [unisys]	42,625,682.07	0.00	12,452,469.84	55,078,151.91	5.75
Welser itage participações e comércio s/a [welser itage]	16,684,348.05	0.00	0.00	16,684,348.05	1.74
Total expenses SESGE				**957,506,106.28**	**85.52**

Source: Portal da Transparência

Table 3: 10 companies receiving the highest sums by SESGE (2012–2015), in Brazilian Reais

Company	Equipment and Permanent Material	Works and Facilities	Third Party Ser-vices – Corporate	Total Operating Expenses	% Total Operating Expenses SESGE
Aceco ti s.A.	0.00	160,512,345.90	832,463.38	161,344,809.28	16.85
Aeromot – aeronaves e motores s.A. [Aeromot]	79,870,784.09	0.00	20,471,819.99	100,342,604.08	10.48
Agora – soluções em telecomuni-cações ltda.	81,088,043.32	0.00	4,811,137.33	85,899,180.65	8.97
Unisys brasil ltda [unisys]	42,625,682.07	0.00	12,452,469.84	55,078,151.91	5.75
Rontan eletro metalúrgica ltda	50,352,655.11	0.00	435,342.23	50,787,997.34	5.30
Módulo security solutions s/a	0.00	0.00	48,128,587.11	48,128,587.11	5.03
Comtex telecomunicações	28,307,993.00	0.00	16,861,164.85	45,169,157.85	4.72
Condor s/a indústria química [condor]	43,587,174.27	0.00	0.00	43,587,174.27	4.55
Truckvan indústria e comércio ltda	42,542,996.56	0.00	0.00	42,542,996.56	4.44
Medidata informática s/a	41,127,499.71	0.00	657,642.68	41,785,142.39	4.36
Total of volume of orders for the 10 companies with highest participation				**674,665,801.44**	**70.46**
Total expenses SESGE				**957,506,106.28**	**100.00**

Source: Portal da Transparência

Conclusion

The large investment made in so-called non-lethal weaponry must certainly be highlighted. These are commercialized by the chemical industry Condor, which sold R$ 43.59 million Brazilian Reais (ca. 10.9 million Euro) to SESGE and ranks the eighth position. The multiplication of situations and occasions when such weapons are used against the population – whether during the violent removal of city areas, the repression of protests or even in the contention of carnival reveler-crowds – has a direct relation to the massive purchase of these products and the implementation of a «militarized» acting logics, that is becoming more and more frequent.

However, the most remarkable fact is that eight out of those ten companies have been directly contracted for the creation of SICC. Besides Condor, only Rontan, a supplier of vehicles, a company that ranked sixth place, was not directly related to SICC. Thus, it is established as a national model of security by creating, once it is in place, a permanent demand for update, repairs, adaptation, equipment, personnel, and further resources. These budget demands also tend to reinforce the centrality of the integrated system. And even more than a model, SICC is an important governmental technology that tends to be more and more employed, including situations that most of the times, have very little to do with scenarios that would call for the intervention of security forces: elections, festive dates, sporting events, landslides, floods, accidents, traffic jams etc. Through this governmental technology, increasingly used, the «legacy» of mega events' security is a «corporate/militarized» managing and acting model for public spaces that, alongside other factors, contributes to the current transformation of Brazilian State and its operating instruments.

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