Table of contents

Money against Migration

By Inken Bartels

Table of contents

Summary

1. Introduction

2. Migration policy context

2.1 Continuities and new priorities on the European Agenda on Migration

2.2 Joint solutions? – The Valletta migration summit

3. A new European funding instrument: the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa

3.1 Taking stock of the implementation of the EUTF: initial evaluations and development policy criticism

4. Where does the funding under the EUEmergency Trust Fund for Africa end up?

4.1 An overview of objectives, actors and regions

4.2 North Africa: International organisations offer protection and assistance to people in flight

4.3 Sahel and Lake Chad: European states take «Addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement» in hand

4.4 Horn of Africa: A lot of money for state actorsin Somalia and Ethiopia

5. Conclusion and outlook

Abbreviations

The Author

Imprint

■ Table of contents – □ Summary – □ 1. Introduction – □ 2. Migration policy context – □ 3. A new European funding instrument: the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa – □ 4. Where does the funding under the EUEmergency Trust Fund for Africa end up? – □ 5. Conclusion and outlook – □ Abbreviations – □ The Author – □ Imprint

Summary

Summary

In summer 2015, movements of refugees and migrants heading for Europe became a priority of European politics and public life, not least because of the rising death toll among people trying to reach European soil. It was against this backdrop that the European Council convened an EU-Africa migration summit in Valletta in November 2015. In the shape of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), this meeting gave birth to a new European funding instrument to help implement the objectives laid down at the summit over the next five years, quickly and flexibly. The agreed objectives reflect a compromise reached between European and African states ahead of the meeting and thus comprise so wide a range of priorities as «addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement», «preventing and fighting migrant smuggling, eradicating trafficking in human beings», «strengthening international protection and stepping up assistance for people in flight», «improving cooperation on return and sustainable reintegration» of migrants from Europe and «advancing legal migration and mobility possibilities». Halfway through the implementation period, this study aims to take a detailed look at the allocation mechanism and distribution of funds under the EUTF, to examine which objectives, countries and actors have actually been supported and which ones are no longer a focus of the attention of development and migration policy. Although there are considerable differences between regions, three general trends emerge from the results:

Firstly, the objectives agreed upon in Valletta have in practice not been supported equally. Whilst more than half of the funding has been allocated to projects aiming to «address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement», with a further tenth having been made available for «improving cooperation on return and sustainable reintegration» of migrants from Europe – the two objectives pursued by many European states – just 1% has actually been spent on «advancing legal migration and mobility possibilities» – which is very much in the interests of the African countries, due to the scale of remittances from Europe.

Secondly, the results show a tendency to use funding originally earmarked for DC projects to work towards migration policy objectives. As this study shows, funding under the EUTF has been spent chiefly in countries that are particularly affected by migration. This means that the regions and people most in need do not necessarily benefit.

Thirdly, actors from the African partner countries themselves are receiving funds from the EUTF only in a very few cases. In North Africa, it is mainly major international organisations already active on the ground that are benefiting from a faster and more extensive distribution of these. In the Sahel and Lake Chad regions, EU member states› development aid organisations are getting the lion's share of the money. In the Horn of Africa region, a constellation of various actors is benefiting from the resource allocation.

With this in mind, this study comes to the conclusion that the implementation of migration policy projects supported by EUTF funding primarily benefits the (wealthier) member states of the EU. Firstly, the EUTF opens up new opportunities for them to implement projects focusing on their migration policy interests in African countries without allowing these countries any kind of say in them. Secondly, it also bolsters their position vis-à-vis the EU. As they (have the option to) commission their own implementation organisations with both designing and implementing projects under the EUTF, they are able to create new, quick and flexible, but increasingly complex and opaque opportunities to influence the practical implementation of the fight against migration (and its root causes) on the African continent. This fight is characterised by an emergencyapproach to reacting to and governing migration flows, which does not really develop any long-term strategies that take proper account of the interests of the African partner countries in improved legal migration opportunities.

□ Table of contents – ■ Summary – □ 1. Introduction – □ 2. Migration policy context – □ 3. A new European funding instrument: the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa – □ 4. Where does the funding under the EUEmergency Trust Fund for Africa end up? – □ 5. Conclusion and outlook – □ Abbreviations – □ The Author – □ Imprint

1. Introduction

1.Introduction

Whilst the institutions and member states of the European Union (EU) struggled to agree on measures under a common refugee and migration policy in autumn 2015 – beyond the need to secure their own borders – the channelling of funding into «the fight against irregular migration»[1] outside Europe seemed relatively easy to implement.[2] For instance, in the wake of the so-called refugee crisis of summer 2015, not only were various new strategies, initiatives and agreements concluded at European level to allow for better controls on migration in the future as well as early preventative work, new European support instruments were also created to implement these whilst at the same time, existing funds were expanded, redirected and/or made more flexible.[3] The greatest significance and largest budgetary envelope of these was achieved by the «EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa» (EUTF), which was instituted at the migration summit of Valletta in 2015. Framed by the new discourse of «addressing the root causes of migration», this fund aims to «strike at the roots […] of the scourge of unregulated migratory movements».[4] What this actually means in practice, who implements it, where and with what interests in mind and how this new paradigm influences the implementation of European refugee and migration policy will be examined in this study.

The political negotiation and practical implementation of European refugee and migration policy achieved great public and political attention in autumn 2015. Accordingly, the migration policy summit of Valletta in November 2015 became a major media event and its final declaration was eagerly awaited across the globe. How the objectives, strategies and initiatives agreed upon in Valletta would be financed and thus actually put into place, on the other hand,has rarely been examined until today.[5] In order to identify the actual use of project funds, this study will look in detail at the allocation mechanisms and the distribution of European funding in the name of the so-called fight against the root causes of migration. Given the prevalent political discourse of a «comprehensive» and «global» system of migration management, this study shows which objectives have been provided with financial support and have thus also been (able to be) pursued in practice. In this way, it becomes clear which objectives, countries and actors are being supported under the new paradigm of fighting the root causes of migration and which have fallen under the radar of development and migration policy.

This study takes the EUTF, which was set in place for five years at the migration summit of Valletta in 2015, as its starting point to carry out an interim review[6] on these questions. The next section will set out the backdrop against which the EUTF came into being and provide greater detail on the strategies and objectives jointly agreed by European and African heads of state in Valletta. The corresponding action plan[7] is the result of tough negotiations between the participating European and African heads of state, both before and during the summit. It sets out the fight against the «root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement» as one of the five areas of future cooperation, all of equal value. This cooperation would also include measures on «preventing and fighting migrant smuggling, eradicating trafficking in human beings» and «cooperation on return and sustainable reintegration» as well as «strengthening international protection and stepping up assistance for people in flight» and «advancing legal migration and mobility possibilities».[8]

The EUTF was set up in the wake of the Valletta summit to make this range of different objectives a reality. The third section of this study deals with the content and operation of this new European funding instrument. Existing studies in the field of development cooperation (DC) have already found that resources actually provided in the framework of the European Development Fund (EDF) for development projects such as fighting poverty were then channelled towards migration policy objectives. As the funds under the EUTF would now be benefiting people and regions particularly affected by migration, they would not be available to the neediest. Driven by narratives of crisis and emergency, European governments would aim for fast, unrealistic results in «reducing irregular migration» instead of focusing on long-term developments or taking account of the interests of African governments and populations, such as improving legal migration possibilities. The hypothesis shared by many studies of the misappropriation of DC funds for the rapid and opaque implementation of the interests of migration and domestic policy is tested in the main section of this study.

On the basis of a quantitative analysis of the more than 150 projects so far financed by the EUTF, the fourth part of the study considers which objectives EUTF funding has actually been used to pursue in the first half of its life and which countries and actors have benefited from it and under what conditions. A detailed look at the three different regions in which EUTF projects have been implemented shows that there is no single answer to these questions. Whilst in the transit region of North Africa, more than half of the money has been channelled to international organisations (IOs) aiming to «strengthen international protection and step up assistance for people in flight», «addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement» has taken around 60% of the funds in the Sahel, Lake Chad and the Horn of Africa. There are also significant regional differences between implementation partners: in the Sahel and the Lake Chad regions, for instance, it is not IOs but EU member states› implementation organisations, particularly French and German players in the field of DC, that are mopping up most of the EUTF funding. Around the Horn of Africa, the money has been distributed more diversely: one fifth of the money goes directly to institutions of the African partner countries. Somalia and Ethiopia have received more than €150 million between them. Taken as a whole, this confirms the impression observed in other studies that EUTF funds have been spent primarily on projects in countries located along the current main migration routes to Europe.

Against this backdrop, this study argues that the implementation of migration policy projects using EUTF funding has particularly benefited the wealthiest member states of the EU. Firstly, the EUTF opens up new opportunities for them to develop projects in African countries and implement them there, without these countries being given a say in them. Secondly, it also bolsters their position vis-à-vis the EU itself. As they (have the option to) commission their own implementation organisations with both designing and implementing projects under the EUTF, they are able to create new, quick and flexible, but increasingly complex and opaque opportunities to influence the practical implementation of the fight against migration (and its root causes) on the African continent. This fight focuses not so much on the long-term strategies and interests of the African partner countries as on the short-term reaction to and management of what is perceived from a European point of view to be a series of refugee and migration crises.

□ Table of contents – □ Summary – ■ 1. Introduction – □ 2. Migration policy context – □ 3. A new European funding instrument: the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa – □ 4. Where does the funding under the EUEmergency Trust Fund for Africa end up? – □ 5. Conclusion and outlook – □ Abbreviations – □ The Author – □ Imprint

2. Migration policy context

2.Migration policy context

2.1 Continuities and new priorities on the European Agenda on Migration

2.1Continuities and new priorities on the European Agenda on Migration

Against the backdrop of a rising death toll in the Mediterranean and the ensuing public attention, the European Commission signed off its European Agenda on Migration in May 2015.[9] This document is primarily about «immediate measures to tackle the migration crisis in the Mediterranean».[10] Although it also referred to longer-term, comprehensive perspectives, the focus of the concrete measures is unquestionably on the short-term reduction of «irregular migration». In terms of its programmatic approach, therefore, the Commission's European Agenda on Migration is both a continuation of the Global Approach to Migration (GAM) and of the Global Approach to Mobility and Migration (GAMM) and indicative of a new crisis mode in the governance of migration from 2015 onwards. Under the GAM and, later, the GAMM, the Commission had promoted a «comprehensive migration concept» since the mid-2000s and urged the European states to pursue a corresponding migration management policy to the benefit of all concerned.[11] Unlike the current migration agenda, the comprehensive and global approach of the 2000s also sought to promote the positive aspects of migration, for instance by creating and developing legal migration channels to Europe.[12]

With the European Agenda on Migration of 2015, on the other hand, a notorious security perspective, which sees migration principally as a problem for Europe, came to the fore.[13] It repeated the call of the early 2000s to upgrade Europe's external borders, to tackle the «problem of irregular migration» and put an end to the «refugee crisis». The agenda also, however, once again stressed the significance of the «external dimension» of European migration policy, in other words cooperation with the countries of origin and transit in border and migration control work. As early as the 1990s, European states and the EU had pursued a policy of externalisation, which aimed, and still aims, to outsource practical migration policy measures to countries outside Europe, with the involvement of a broad range of state and non-state actors.[14] Since then, the EU has created a complex landscape of inter- and trans-national instruments, cooperation formats and funding possibilities pursuing such a broad range of objectives as border security, tackling trafficking in human beings, humanitarian assistance, development and legal migration.[15]

At the same time, a new discourse has crept into European migration policy. Termed «addressing the root causes of migration», increasing amounts of hope have been placed in development policy measures that aim to tackle the causes not just of flight, but also of (internal) forced displacement and «irregular migration» in the countries of origin. By means of development projects, people should in practice be prevented from migrating (further) and/or their return to and reintegration in their countries of origin be facilitated. For the countries of origin and transit outside the EU, the distribution of DC funding should also create financial incentives to work together in other migration policy areas, most notably taking back their citizens from Europe. In this way, financial incentives should replace years of almost completely unsuccessful attempts to encourage third states to cooperate on returns by means of migration policy sweeteners such as visa facilitation. The European Agenda on Migration also provides for European support in other policy areas, such as trade, energy, security or digitalisation, to be linked to cooperation and input on migration policy projects.[16] The African continent is more than previously the focus of a range of cooperation fora, initiatives and projects targeting not only countries in the direct neighbourhood of the external European borders, but also the countries of origin and transit further afield, that are deemed «most affected by migration». In spite of a nascent rhetoric urging intensive long-term work to address the so-called root causes of flight, measures for the short-term reduction of «irregular migration» from the African continent have been high on the European agenda since 2015.

2.2 Joint solutions? – The Valletta migration summit

2.2Joint solutions? – The Valletta migration summit

By invitation of the European Council, an international summit on migration was held in November 2015. On the guest list were the heads of state of 36 African countries and representatives of the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the United Nations (UN), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). Building on existing cooperation between European and African states over more than a decade under the Rabat and Khartoum Processes, this conference aimed to «sound out» new cooperation possibilities and discuss «joint solutions» to «current challenges».[17] While the European states chiefly had cooperation over the expeditious returns of rejected asylum seekers in mind, the calls on the African side were mostly for more opportunities for legal migration to Europe. With European negotiations for a billion-euro refugee deal with Turkey underway, the African states were also strengthened in their calls for more money and visa facilitation in return for their migration policy efforts. Despite these varying objectives, the two sides reached an agreement during the preliminary negotiations, enabling the heads of states to present a final declaration at the end of the summit.[18] This declaration began by reiterating that saving human lives was the top priority. It also set out five objectives, all of equal value, for future European-African cooperation.

An accompanying 17-page action plan listed the five objectives in greater detail, with many sub-items.[19] It went into the most detail concerning the first objective, «addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement». In a departure from standard international political discourse, it did not draw an explicit distinction between flight (mainly for political reasons) and other forms of migration and mobility; but all forms of not explicitly welcome migration movements should be prevented at source. This would be achieved not only through DC measures and improving returns of nationals abroad, but would take, in particular, conflicts, crises and instability in the countries of origin into account, by supporting their rule of law and good governance. By contrast, there is only a short section on the second objective, that of «advancing legal migration and mobility possibilities», which talks vaguely about promoting regular migration and mobility channels between European and African countries for students, researchers and entrepreneurs. Within this process, negotiations on visa facilitation would be expressly linked to cooperation in other areas, such as improving returns and the reintegration of migrants from Europe (fourth objective). The third area, «preventing and fighting migrant smuggling, eradicating trafficking in human beings», contains, in addition to a reference to existing international conventions and the need to recognise and implement these, mainly a pledge to improve (digital) technologies and cooperation in this field. In order to achieve the fifth objective, «improving international protection and humanitarian assistance for people in flight», the asylum systems in the transit and host countries located along the routes and as close as possible to the starting regions of flight and expulsion should be developed and consolidated in cooperation with UNHCR.

In addition to these objectives, 16 specific initiatives were listed, to launch in the year 2016. Many of these initiatives are not new, but aim to improve, strengthen, feed into, financially bolster or regionally expand existing approaches and projects. As well as an explicit focus on countries that are greatly affected by migration in various ways, these initiatives particularly emphasise the bundling together of the various areas, whereby receiving funds for DC projects would be linked to cooperation in taking back migrants from Europe. The various lists on the individual objectives and initiatives already indicate what the priorities will be when it comes to the actual financing and practical implementation.

□ Table of contents – □ Summary – □ 1. Introduction – ■ 2. Migration policy context – □ 3. A new European funding instrument: the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa – □ 4. Where does the funding under the EUEmergency Trust Fund for Africa end up? – □ 5. Conclusion and outlook – □ Abbreviations – □ The Author – □ Imprint

3. A new European funding instrument: the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa

3.A new European funding instrument: the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa

To pay for the objectives agreed upon in Valletta, the European Commission created the «EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa» (the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa or EUTF) in the wake of the migration summit.[20] Trust funds are a relatively new European foreign policy instrument, which are used to make faster, more flexible and more comprehensive support funding available from the EU for defined priorities or in severe emergency and conflict situations.[21] Four EU trust funds have been set in place since 2013. They are managed centrally by the Commission. A board and operative committees make the final decisions on the distribution of funds.[22] No provision is made for parliamentary oversight.[23]

On the basis of the model of the EU's Bêkou Trust Fund for the Central African Republic and its Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (Madad Fund), the EUTF would also allow the EU and its member states to «enable a swift, common, complimentary and flexible response to the different dimensions of an emergency situation» and demonstrate their presence there.[24] The EUTF funding would benefit «particularly fragile» countries along the main migration routes. These include Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia in North Africa; Burkina Faso, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Côte d›Ivoire, Cameroon, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Chad in the Sahel and Lake Chad regions; and, in the Horn of Africa region, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. The primary objective of the trust fund is to promote stability in these countries and improve the management of migration. «Promoting economic opportunities, equality of opportunity, security and development» would feed into addressing the «causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration» in all three regions. To this end, projects with four different strategic objectives would be coupled together and promoted: firstly, economic programmes, particularly aiming to create jobs for young people and women and helping returnees to reintegrate; secondly, projects contributing to making basic supplies for the local populations more secure; thirdly, projects to improve migration management in the fields of preventing «irregular migration», returns, international protection and asylum, amongst others; and, fourthly, projects promoting good governance and rule of law and thus feeding into conflict prevention. This also includes projects to improve border management and tackle extremism.

To implement these various projects, the EU itself made €1.8 billion available in November 2015 from its budget, coming mostly from the European Development Fund (EDF).[25] Originally designed as a matching fund, the EU expected its member states to put a further €1.8 billion into the fund as well. By November 2015, however, they and other European donor countries, such as Norway and Switzerland, had fed in only a further €81.3 million.[26] Whilst the EU continually increased its contributions over the next three years, the member states remained well behind the expectations raised at the Valletta summit. By October 2018, the joint contributions to the EUTF stood at just €440 million[27], with Germany providing the largest contribution, of €160 million. By this point in time, the EU had already pledged more than €3.5 billion in total – including €2.8 million from the development fund alone. Contrary to plans, then, hardly any new money was made available by the European states to the EUTF, but the lion's share of its funding was redirected from the DC envelope under the EU General budget.

3.1 Taking stock of the implementation of the EUTF: initial evaluations and development policy criticism

3.1Taking stock of the implementation of the EUTF: initial evaluations and development policy criticism

Despite the lack of financial support from its member states, the European Commission sees the EUTF as an innovative instrument allowing for targeted support.[28] It emphasises the capacity for swift action and fast, flexible implementation of projects that the EUTF offers.[29] It explains that these are possible because unlike the formalised allocation of project funds from the EDF, for instance, the «national authorising officer» can be circumnavigated, so that allocation is possible directly from Brussels or by the EU delegations.[30] It also means, however, that the distribution of EUTF funds is not connected to the agreement of the African partner countries as is the case with the EDF, the source of most of the EUTF resources .[31] The eleventh evaluation of the EDF thus concludes that the role of the African states as regular partners in the implementation of the EDF has become downgraded to simple observers under the rules of the EUTF.[32] There are, moreover, concerns that the simplified and accelerated decision-making and distribution approach will water down the quality standards of the EDF. It would no longer be possible to assure the effectiveness and sustainability of development policy projects, as these are designed, approved and implemented in short order, instead of focusing on meeting the needs of the African countries. Monitoring of the implementation of projects under the EUTF is reportedly also no longer guaranteed.[33] There has not so far been any specific evaluation of the complete EUTF alongside this general assessment of the EDF. According to the European Commission, an initial interim review was scheduled for the end of 2018.[34] Regional monitoring for the Horn of Africa region took place in 2017 and something similar is planned for North Africa in 2018. Evaluations of the individual projects with details on information partners, agreements on objectives and target groups, finances and their implementation status, however, can be monitored online.[35]

Since the EUTF came into being at the end of 2015, a series of studies has furthermore been published, analysing and criticising the EUTF and the first steps of its implementation from a development policy point of view.[36] These studies have been published mainly by NGOs, some of which were even involved in the implementation of the EUTF. From this vantage point, they look at its objectives and functioning measured against conventional development policy projects such as tackling poverty, sustainability and ownership. Most of these studies therefore deal principally with the impact of the new financing instrument on the implementation of European DC – and not so much with its consequences for migration policy.

By and large, these studies share three central points of criticism: firstly, in the same way as the evaluation of the EDF referred to above, they find fault with the EUTF's focus on fast, flexible decision-making and funding mechanisms, which they describe as «quick fixes», rather than lining up on the long-term (development) needs of the African states.[37] Studies by Oxfam and Global Health Advocates (GHA), for instance, stress that the EUTF makes no provision for any formal, transparent allocation procedure for projects and implementation organisations and in fact express concerns that the selected organisations may use this new source of funding to pay for their existing projects.[38] Due to the opaque ad hoc allocation of implementation contracts, according to one study by the European Confederation of Relief and Development NGOs (CONCORD), it cannot be guaranteed that the human rights and development standards that are otherwise standard in DC will be complied with.[39] For instance, there are no plans for any analyses of the effects of planned projects on existing conflicts.[40] As well as these negative consequences, a study published by the DIE also claims that the effectiveness of projects as regards their own stated aims has not been verified.[41] Overall, the authors of the various studies principally share concerns that funds that were actually provided to support development policy projects such as tackling poverty will now be channelled into migration policy purposes. By means of the EUTF, they are for instance witnessing a growing influence of the European interior ministers on European external and development policy and fear that DC money will be instrumentalised for interior policy purposes.[42]

Secondly, a number of studies criticised the fact that the EUTF focuses on projects promising short-term results. They argue that even the name, «emergency» fund, suggests that the current situation is a sudden emergency calling for quick solutions. However, they argue that quick solutions are unlikely to have a long-term influence on development processes. Furthermore, the financial and technical assistance provided for is not capable of managing migration movements in the long term and tackling its structural causes, Herrero Cangas and Knoll argue.[43] According to studies by the DIE and CONCORD, both objectives are thus virtually unattainable through EUTF projects and the new financing instrument is therefore doomed to failure.[44] A study published by Oxfam sums it up as follows: European governments seem to expect quick results in areas where there are no quick solutions.[45] What is more, they also seem to disregard the general view that more «development» often leads to more migration in the first instance.[46]

A third common point of criticism of the studies is the fact that the EUTF focuses on countries along the migration routes to Europe and therefore the ones that are affected by potential returns. The projects funded are, they argue, benefiting neither the poorest countries and regions nor those taking in large numbers of people in flight themselves. This means that the EUTF funding goes to help people who are capable of fleeing or migrating, rather than those in the greatest need.[47] This puts it at odds with the traditional objectives of DC.[48]

As a rule, therefore, the studies published by NGOs and a number of research institutes in the field of development policy come to the conclusion that the EUTF, financed overwhelmingly out of DC funds, instrumentalises these funds for the migration policy and, in particular, the domestic policy objectives of European countries.[49] This means that they are no longer available for regular, regional development policy projects and are thus no longer benefiting the people who need them the most. Some of the studies refer to the EUTF as a new mode of DC, invoking a future trend of flexible, opaque ad hoc funding and the implementation of development projects, bypassing the affected states and civil society players.[50] The studies referred to above thus expressly indicate who is disadvantaged and circumnavigated by the new financing instrument. The question as to which actual content, countries and actors are being funded by the EUTF has, on the other hand, been discussed considerably less to date. This question will therefore be investigated in the following section on the basis of the actual allocation and distribution of EUTF funds.

□ Table of contents – □ Summary – □ 1. Introduction – □ 2. Migration policy context – ■ 3. A new European funding instrument: the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa – □ 4. Where does the funding under the EUEmergency Trust Fund for Africa end up? – □ 5. Conclusion and outlook – □ Abbreviations – □ The Author – □ Imprint

4. Where does the funding under the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa end up?

4.Where does the funding under the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa end up?

4.1 An overview of objectives, actors and regions

4.1An overview of objectives, actors and regions

Up to August 2018, the EUTF had supported 161 projects in 28 African countries. In this process, 3,055,657,493 euros[51] were distributed to a wide range of implementation partners. These were supposed to contribute to implementing the final objectives agreed upon in Valletta in November 2015, through a wide range of measures. As explained above, these include, firstly, «addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement» (or «addressing the causes of migration» for short), secondly, «promoting regular channels for legal migration and mobility» (advancing legal migration), thirdly, «preventing and fighting irregular migration, migrant smuggling and eradicating trafficking in human beings» (fight against irregular migration and eradicating trafficking in human beings), fourthly, «return, readmission and sustainable reintegration» (returns) and, fifthly, «improving international protection and humanitarian assistance for people in flight» (protection and humanitarian assistance).[52]

Table 1: Distribution of EUTF funding by objective [53]

Objective

Funding (€)

Share (%)

Addressing the root causes of migration

1,621,387,066

53

Protection and humanitarian assistance

595,356,000

20

Fight against irregular migration and trafficking in human beings

501,498,927

16

Returns

289,800,000

9

Advancing legal migration

20,000,000

1

Other (transport, technical support, etc.)

18,900,000

1

More than half of the EUTF funds, in other words more than €1.5 billion, is currently being spent on behalf of the new migration policy paradigm in favour of «addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement». This money funds many traditional development projects such as agriculture and craft projects, climate adjustment measures, strategies to improve food security and healthcare provision, as well as many economic activation programmes especially in the Sahel region, such as supporting small businesses, training programmes, entrepreneurship and other «soft skill» trainings, aimed primarily at young people and women. In the Horn of Africa region in particular, it also spent on projects to strengthen peace, security and rule-of-law structures at local level and combat corruption, as well as strategies to prevent extremism. What all these projects have in common is that they are mostly executed in regions that are particularly affected by migration. This could mean that the region is particularly affected by emigration, that it is located on a prominent transit route or in a border area, that migrants are stranded here or (are required to) return.

Additionally, one fifth of the EUTF funding, and therefore almost €600 million, is spent on «improving international protection and humanitarian assistance to people in flight». Primarily along the main transit routes and in North African cities, this money aims to improve protection for migrants and ensure that they have access to social and medical care. As well as emergency humanitarian assistance, this also includes projects aiming to support the integration of migrants in societies increasingly affected by transit and arrival, by supporting active anti-discrimination work.[54]

A further 16% of all EUTF funds are currently earmarked for the fight against «irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings». Out of a total of more than €500 million, projects to improve border management are being funded in all regions, in addition to individual conventional anti-trafficking campaigns[55]. This mainly includes developing and training state institutions, for instance through regional programmes such as the «Better Migration Management Programme» of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (German Society for International Cooperation; GIZ) in the Horn of Africa region and «Dismantling the criminal networks operating in North Africa and involved in migrant smuggling and human trafficking» of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). In the Sahel and Lake Chad regions, the programmes funded aim in particular to improve cooperation between existing security and police forces, as well as equipping them with new security technologies. In Senegal, for instance, this included the introduction of biometric passports.

Receiving just short of one tenth of the funds, a scant €300 million, the return and reintegration of migrants from Europe and along the main migration routes in Africa is the fourth strand to be supported. Most of the projects implemented by the IOM in Libya, Niger and many states of North and West Africa receive a reintegration component for people returning of their own volition and assistance for the communities taking them in. Most projects also provide for the development of state support structures in this area. In the Sahel and Lake Chad regions, they also seek to involve returnees in awareness campaigns concerning the dangers of «irregular migration».

Lastly, just 1% of the EUTF funding is spent on «advancing legal migration and mobility possibilities». In practice, this is restricted to expanding the Erasmus+ programme in West Africa and supporting freedom of movement within the North-East African community of states, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Beyond this, 1% of the EUTF funds is earmarked for the infrastructure of humanitarian and development policy work aiming for instance to ensure the transport of international personnel into the regions in question.

Table 2: Distribution of EUTF funds by actor [56]

Actor

Funding (€)

Share (%)

EU member states' implementing organisations

1,005,292,933

37

International organisations

868,714,000

32

NGOs

412,518,353

15

State actors of the African partner countries

335,873,927

13

Private actors (companies, etc.)

71,061,000

3

Other actors (universities, publishing companies, etc.)

9,400,000

> 0

According to current information on the EUTF website, the largest proportion of all funding so far distributed has gone to EU member states› implementation organisations. These include mainly the traditional implementation organisations from the field of DC, such as GIZ, the French agencies for international technical cooperation (Expertise France) and development (Agence Française de Développement), the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation and Development (AECID) and the Belgian Development Agency (CTB). Over and above this, several projects have also been implemented by cultural institutes of the EUmember states. EU institutions, on the other hand, have had barely any involvement in direct implementation.

A further third of the money under the EUTF is awarded to IOs. On the one hand, IOs from the conventional field of DC, such as the Development Programme (UNDP), hildren's charity (UNICEF) and Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations are involved. Mainly, however, the major UN organisations active in the field of migration and refugee policy, the IOM and the UNHCR, have benefited from the migration-policy oriented distribution of funds originally earmarked for DC. The IOM alone has been awarded very nearly €375 million from the EUTF.

A further 15% of the money goes to large NGOs, usually transnational in structure. This total, in excess of €400 million, was shared between organisations from the field of DC, such as Oxfam, Welthungerhilfe and SaveTheChildren, and organisations active internationally in assisting refugees, such as the Danish and Norwegian Refugee Councils.

Another 13% of the EUTF funding is transferred directly to state institutions of the African partner countries. This takes place either as direct state budgetary assistance in Ethiopia[57] and Somalia,[58] for instance, or by means of implementation agreements with state institutions such as the Haute Autorité à la Consolidation de la Paix in Niger,[59] ministries, including the Ministère de l›Education Nationale et de l›Alphabétisation in Burkina Faso,[60] communities such as the Communauté de Sant Egidi in Mali[61] and regional organisations such as North-East Africa's IGAD.[62]

With a share of 3%, only a small proportion of EUTF money goes to private actors. Most of these are companies active at the international level, such as the consultancy firm of the French Ministry of the Interior, Civipol,[63] which mainly offers services in the field of internal security, civil protection and government consultancy in the Sahel region. As well as security services, expertise in the fields of (responsible) corporate management,[64] research[65] and development cooperation[66] is also bought in. Finally, just under €10 million under the EUTF is awarded to projects with publishing companies,[67] universities [68] and other research institutions.

Looking at the total expenditure of the EUTF, then, it becomes clear that more than half of the money is actually spent on projects with the objective of «addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement» – although the contents of the projects vary greatly. This is carried out overwhelmingly by EU member states› implementation organisations, particularly by players active in the field of DC. Conversely, this also means that just under half of the money is being spent on other objectives. In both the thematic priorities of the projects and the configuration of the implementing partners, considerable differences can be seen in the three regions supported by the EUTF, North Africa, Sahel & Lake Chad and Horn of Africa. The following sections take a closer look at the kinds of projects – and their objectives – that are implemented in the different regions, and which actors are involved, and where.

Firstly, with just 24 projects and a share of 11% of all funding, the transit countries in North Africa have so far received only a small proportion of EUTF funds. Secondly, more than half of all projects are implemented along the main migration routes in the Sahel and Lake Chad regions. Nearly 50% of the EUTF funding has so far been spent here. Thirdly, with a good third of all projects and funding, the typical countries of origin in the Horn of Africa region take second place for support. There are, in addition, four trans-regional projects taking place in at least two out of the three regions. Of these, the project «Protection and sustainable solutions for migrants and refugees along the Central Mediterranean route», which is implemented jointly by the IOM and UNHCR in North Africa and the Sahel region, is the main beneficiary, with €150 million.

Table 3: Distribution of EUTF projects and funds by region

Region

Number of projects

Funding (€)

Share (%)

Sahel & Lake Chad

85

1,470,083,066

48

Horn of Africa

58

1,110,707,000

36

North Africa

14

329,753,927

11

Trans-regional

4

145,113,500

5

Total

161

3,055,657,493

100

4.2 North Africa: International organisations offer protection and assistance to people in flight

4.2North Africa: International organisations offer protection and assistance to people in flight

European attempts to persuade North African states to cooperate in migration and border control date back to the 1990s. France, Spain and Italy in particular urged the southern Mediterranean states of Morocco, Tunisia and Libya to introduce tightened border controls and restrictive legislation on residents, visa checks prior to departure (so-called «carrier sanctions») and readmission agreements. Most offered them «privileged partnerships» in return, in other (economic) areas, the lifting of sanctions or financial support. The more the North African states became aware of their strong negotiating position vis-à-vis the EU and its member states, however, the harder and more expensive it became for the latter to maintain and/or expand the European border regime in the Mediterranean. This became particularly apparent in autumn 2005, when hundreds of migrants scaled the three-metre-high border fence around the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla.[69]

Subsequently, in the framework of the GAM, new techniques of so-called migration management were introduced: (digital) border control technologies, various formats for the exchange of knowledge and information, training courses for security personnel and authority staff in newly created migration ministries and institutes, amongst other things, were rolled out. In practice, this «soft» outsourcing of migration and border control to North Africa was operated principally by IOs. Under this process, the IOM opened offices in most North African states in the late 2000s and immediately began to make a name for itself for providing technical assistance in «voluntary returns» and executing awareness campaigns designed to warn of the dangers of «irregular migration» and the trafficking in human beings. By the time of the political upheavals of 2011, it had established itself as a prominent advisory body in the introduction of national migration policies between Rabat and Cairo.[70] Only Libya remained difficult ground for the largely European employees in the service of global migration management for a long time. Due to a lack of security and state cooperation partners, the IOM and UNHCR frequently suspended their projects in post-Gaddafi Libya or implemented them from Tunisia and Egypt.

This is where most of the EUTF-funded projects in North Africa are to be carried out. The main objective in allocating funds is to «improve international protection and humanitarian assistance to people in flight». In Libya, this actually means such things as creating «migration-friendly services»,[71] improving a rights-based governance of migration at the local level[72] and creating access to shelter for stranded migrants and alternatives to the usual practice of detention.[73] As suggested by the programme title of a 90 million-euro project,[74] no a priori distinction is drawn between different forms of migration. Instead, safe spaces are to be created, in which this differentiation between different categories of migrants can be carried out and thus allow decisions to be made on their further access to rights, services and mobility opportunities on the basis of humanitarian, economic and security policy criteria.

The European view that there is an urgent need to create safe(r) places for migrants predates the scandal of the slavery-like conditions discovered in Libyan camps in December 2017. Whilst the humanitarian outrage at the undignified conditions dominates current debates, it is often also linked to the idea or wish to send the people rescued in the Mediterranean back there and to be able to outsource asylum procedures one day. This is by no means a new idea: by the mid-2000s, the idea of refugee camps in North Africa kept cropping up in European policy under various names, such as Transit Processing Centers, Regional Protection Areas, etc. So far, this has failed, mainly due to the consistent refusal of North African states to allow transit, protection or asylum centres of this kind to be built on their soil.[75] Using EUTF funding, far more persuasive and focused attempts are being made in the name of international protection and humanitarian assistance to create such places along the main migration routes. These are to be set up rapidly and without the involvement of African states, principally by IOs already active in the region. It remains to be seen how greatly the swift creation of shelters and the provision of humanitarian assistance by IOs along migration routes will impact on the perception of the transit countries in North Africa as safe third countries.

Table 4: Distribution of EUTF funds in North Africa by objective

Objective

Funding (€)

Share (%)

Protection and humanitarian assistance

171,430,000

52

Addressing root causes of migration

68,800,000

21

Fighting irregular migration and trafficking in human beings

57,223,927

17

Returns

32,300,000

10

Advancing legal migration

0

0

Other (transport, technical support, etc.)

0

0

Conversely, «addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement» takes second place in the North African countries, which are primarily seen as a transit region. Only just over a fifth of EUTF funding is spent on this objective. This is followed by «fighting irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings» with 17% and «facilitating returns and sustainable reintegration» with 10% of the EUTF funds. Unlike the calls of African heads of state and the target agreements of the final declaration of Valletta, not a single project supporting legal migration channels has been supported in North Africa using EUTF resources.

Table 5: Distribution of EUTF funds in North Africa by actor

Actor

Funding (€)

Share (%)

International organisations

166,550,000

50

EU member states' implementation organisations

103,380,000

31

State actors from the African partner countries

42,223,927

13

NGOs

20,700,000

6

Private actors (companies, etc.)

0

0

Other (universities, publishing companies, etc.)

0

0

As stated above, half of the EUTF resources in North Africa go to IOs, most of which have already been active in the region for a long time. Projects to support «voluntary returns of stranded migrants», provide information on the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings, to stabilise communities «at an increased migration risk» or to manage «mixed migrations» have existed there with greater or lesser degrees of success since the mid-2000s.[76] So far, they have mostly been directly financed by individual European states or by the EU. In the framework of the EUTF, IOs have now received more than €166 million to expand and continue their work. Around half of the money, which was actually intended for development policy purposes, goes to the pre-eminent migration organisation, the IOM. Despite its new status as a UN organisation, it continues to be more than 90% dependent on funding from external project funds for its operations.[77] With the nearly €90 million it receives from the EUTF for its projects in North Africa, it will be able to secure its active presence there for the coming years.

In second and third places of beneficiaries of EUTF funding in North Africa, the UNDP and UNICEF, on the other hand, are two IOs that usually carry out development projects. Although expressly referred to in the Valletta declaration, just 7% of the EUTF funds goes to theUNHCR. Consequently, «international protection and humanitarian assistance to people in flight» is to be provided as a priority in North Africa by the IOM, which is competent in migration matters, and not by the UNHCR, which is responsible for refugees, according to the official division of labour between the two UN organisations.[78] To this end, the IOM receives seven times as much funding as the UNHCR. The effect that this bolstering of the role of the IOM over that of the UNHCR will have on actual access to rights of asylum, practical protection and resettlement in the region remains to be seen. There is, however, the possibility that «protection and humanitarian assistance to people in flight» will be provided primarily through «voluntary returns» – the core business of the IOM – rather than by access to asylum and resettlement – the principal responsibility of the UNHCR.

Finally, as well as IOs, EU member states› implementation organisations from the field of DC particularly benefit from EUTF funding for North Africa. With more than €100 million, they receive around one third of the money. State institutions of the North African partner countries are directly supported with 13%. Only 6% goes to NGOs.

Table 6: Distribution of EUTF funds in North Africa by IO

International organisation

Funding (€)

Share (%)

IOM

89,600,000

49

UNDP

36,000,000

20

UNICEF

21,000,000

12

UNODC

17,200,000

9

UNHCR

13,000,000

7

ICMPD

5,550,000

3

4.3 Sahel and Lake Chad: European states take «Addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement» in hand

4.3Sahel and Lake Chad: European states take «Addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement» in hand

Unlike North Africa, the Sahel and Lake Chad regions have only recently appeared on the migration policy agenda of the EU. Whilst West African states have been involved in the European border regime since the mid-2000s,[79] the focus on the Sahel state of Niger and the Lake Chad conflict region is the result of constantly changing migration routes. With greater controls, financed by Spain and carried out by FRONTEX on the West African coastlines, the routes of sub-Saharan migrants have gone east, straight through the Sahara, to cross the Mediterranean from Libya. To stop «irregular migration and forced displacement» along these unpredictable, fast-changing land routes, from the point of view of the EU and its member states, the borders between the African countries should be better controlled and the causes addressed in the countries of origin. To this end, more than half of the projects financed by the EUTF focus on various countries of transit and origin between Mauritania and Cameroon. Nearly half of all EUTF funds – therefore almost five times as much as in North Africa – is spent on this region. The prominent transit countries of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso are the most important partner countries, with more than twenty projects each.

Table 7: Distribution of EUTF funding in the Sahel and Lake Chad regions by objective

Objective

Funding (€)

Share (%)

Addressing the root causes of migration

849,580,066

58

Fighting irregular migration and trafficking in human beings

351,175,000

24

Returns

147,350,000

10

Protection and humanitarian assistance

111,978,000

7

Advancing legal migration

10,000,000

1

Other (transport, technical support etc.)

0

0

With a share of very nearly 60%, projects aiming to «address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement» are in the forefront in the Sahel and Lake Chad regions. €850 million goes to support numerous projects to fight poverty[80] and to promote social integration[81] and economic empowerment[82]. These include conventional development projects involving agriculture and craft,[83] climate adjustment measures,[84] strategies to improve food security[85] and the provision of healthcare,[86] as well as, in the Sahel region in particular, many economic activation programmes, such as supporting small businesses, training programmes, training in corporate governance and other «soft skills», predominantly aimed at young people[87] and women[88]. In this way, the projects, which are carried out here in the name of fighting the root causes of flight, rarely aim to create structural changes in international political relations, for instance trade deals or agriculture and fishery policy. Instead, they work at the level of individual effort, activation and employment of people in the region, to discourage theirmigration ambitions to Europe.

A further quarter of EUTF funds in the Sahel and Lake Chad regions is spent on «fighting irregular migration, migrant smuggling and eradicating trafficking in human beings». As is the case in North Africa, another 10% of the money is earmarked here for «improving cooperation in returns». «Humanitarian assistance and protecting people in flight», on the other hand, receives just 7% of the funding. «Advancing legal migration» is the lowest priority in this region, receiving just 1%.

Table 8: Distribution of EUTF funds in the Sahel and Lake Chad regions by actor

Actor

Funding (€)

Share (%)

EU member states' implementation organisations

700,349,433

50

International organisations

273,430,000

20

NGOs

243,923,633

17

State actors from the African partner countries

145,000,000

10

Private actors (companies)

36,900,000

3

Other actors (universities, publishing companies, etc.)

2,400,000

0

Unlike the situation in North Africa, it is not primarily IOs that are entrusted with the implementation of projects in the Sahel and Lake Chad regions, but member states› implementation organisations in the field of DC from Europe that are responsible for «addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement» here. At more than €700 million, they receive half of the EUTF funding for projects in Sahel and Lake Chad. Of this, more than one quarter goes to French and German DC institutions, followed by Spanish (14%) and Belgian (13%) organisations, then actors from Italy (6%), Luxembourg (5%), Great Britain (3%), Portugal (2%) and Austria (1%). The EU itself also receives 1% of the funding through its police authority, EUROPOL.

Whilst French implementation organisations are traditionally particularly active in French-speaking West Africa due to France's colonial past, the German commitment is a more recent development, in the field of flight and migration at least.[89] Since 2015, GIZ[90] has been awarded an increasing number of contracts from the federal government as well as from the EU, aiming to support refugees and migrants in countries outside Europe or to support those countries› governments and civil-society actors in dealing with them.[91] Additionally, it implements an increasing number of projects aiming to reduce the causes of flight and migration. GIZ furthermore seeks positively to influence migration processes.[92] In view of the «challenges of the refugee crisis»,[93] flight and migration have become one of the organisation's most important fields of activity. In 2017, GIZ implemented more than 100 projects in this field worldwide. In 2016, the focus was still on projects in the Middle East, but its work has continued to expand on the African continent with the assistance of EUTF resources. For the execution of projects in the Sahel region and Lake Chad alone, GIZ receives nearly €180 million from the EUTF. Whilst it implements predominantly regional projects to improve migration management in North Africa and the Horn of Africa,[94] the EUTF-funded projects in the Sahel and Lake Chad regions serve principally to create employment and training places and to promote «economic empowerment» overall. In 17 countries between the Gambia and Cameroon, GIZ projects, with mottos such as «Successful in Senegal» or «Building a Future – Make It in the Gambia», aim mainly to offer young people and returnees prospects in their countries of origin and thereby discourage them from (further) plans to migrate to Europe.[95] In this region, then, their projects are classic DC instruments, such as income support and resilience, at the service of international migration management.

Unlike the situation in North Africa, IOs in the Sahel and Lake Chad regions receive only one fifth of the EUTF funding. Internationally active NGOs, many of which are headquartered in Europe, such as Oxfam, SaveTheChildren and Welthungerhilfe, play a greater role, receiving 17%. State institutions from the African partner countries receive 10% of the funding. Private actors, principally the consultancy service of the French Ministry of the Interior responsible for homeland security, civil protection and governance, Civipol,[96] get 3% of the funding. The African publishing company Africultures received less than 1% for a cultural project in schools in Nigeria.[97]

Whilst IOs and implementation organisations from Europe receive 80% of EUTF funds in North Africa between them, there is a broader overall range of players in the Sahel and Lake Chad region, which are particularly active in the field of «addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement». EU member states› implementation organisations, particularly from France and Germany, take the leading role here. In the Sahel and Lake Chad, the renationalisation of European development policy observed by Kipp and Koch in the framework of the EUTF came particularly clearly to light.[98] As the DC organisations involved in this context act mainly on the basis of migration policy logic and interests, their growing significance also refers to a renationalisation of European migration policy in a field that had hitherto been the most communitised or Europeanised, namely the «external dimension».[99]

Table 9: Distribution of EUTF funds for Sahel and Lake Chad regions to implementation organisations from Europe by country

Country

Funding

Share

France

207,600,000

29

Germany

179,780,000

26

Spain

101,876,233

14

Belgium

89,600,000

13

Italy

43,503,200

6

Luxembourg

35,900,000

5

Great Britain

21,000,000

3

Portugal

10,000,000

1

EU

10,000,000

1

Austria

8,000,000

1

4.4 Horn of Africa: A lot of money for state actors in Somalia and Ethiopia

4.4Horn of Africa: A lot of money for state actors in Somalia and Ethiopia

The third region in which projects are funded out of the EUTF is the Horn of Africa. Whilst this region, with its conflict-ridden history, has seen much humanitarian intervention and European DC over several decades, migration policy cooperation with its states is a relatively new field of action for the EU and its member states.[100] From a European point of view, many of the countries, such as Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia, are currently prominent countries of origin, others, such as Kenya and Uganda, are important intra-African regions of arrival. With 25 projects, most of the region's projects in numerical terms are implemented in Sudan, a country which is not only on the main transit route to the Mediterranean, but also one that receives large numbers of internally displaced persons. The distribution of EUTF funding in this region thus focuses mainly on countries that are strongly affected by migration trends in different ways.

Table 10: Distribution of EUTF funds in the Horn of Africa by objective

Objective

Funding (€)

Share (%)

Addressing the root causes of migration

690,007,000

62

Protection and humanitarian assistance

197,050,000

18

Returns

110,150,000

10

Fighting irregular migration and trafficking in human beings

93,100,000

8

Other (transport, technical assistance, etc.)

10,400,000

1

Advancing legal migration

10,000,000

1

As in the Sahel and Lake Chad regions, over 60% of EUTF funding is spent on «addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement» here. The main partner countries for the implementation of projects in this area are Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan. Unlike the Sahel and Lake Chad regions, these projects do not target economic empowerment and individual income generation as much as improving the resilience of rural communities.[101] Additionally, many projects in this area aim to resolve local conflict and improve state infrastructure, to prevent more people from fleeing the region.[102]

A further 18% of EUTF funds goes to «protection and humanitarian assistance for people in flight». This mainly concerns regional projects implemented along the migration routes of Somalia or Eritrea as far as Sudan.[103] As in the other regions, 10% of the EUTF funding (€110 million) is spent on projects aiming to improve returns of migrants. A further €90 million (8% of the EUTF resources for the region) is fed into «Fighting irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings». On the other hand, legal migration channels within the region[104] receive just 1% of the funding in the Horn of Africa.

Table 11: Distribution of EUTF funding in the Horn of Africa by actor

Actor

Funding (€)

Share (%)

International organisations

313,734,000

36

EU member states' implementation organisations

192,950,000

22

State actors from the African partner countries

168,650,000

20

NGOs

147,894,720

17

Private actors (companies, etc.)

34,161,000

4

Other actors (universities, publishing companies, etc.)

7,000,000

1

Unlike the situation in North Africa, the Sahel region and Lake Chad, the main donor countries of the EUTF are not building upon (post-)colonial connections or long-standing migration policy cooperation in the implementation of projects in the Horn of Africa region. EUTF resources are distributed more evenly between the various groups of actors in the Horn of Africa than in the other regions. Here, one third of the funding goes to IOs and 22% to EU member states› implementation organisations. These are followed, however, by a strikingly high number of state actors from the African partner countries themselves, with 20%. In particular, Somalia (€920 million) and Ethiopia (more than €655 million) are benefiting from the new European funding instrument, as they receive direct budgetary support to extend state capacities in the field of the employment market and the integration of refugees.[105] These are supposed to act as an incentive to develop the rule of law and security in the countries, thereby discouraging people from fleeing and, over the longer term, enabling numerous returns.[106] Additionally, Kenya and the North-East African regional organisation IGAD each receive €50 million from the EUTF.

Table 12: Distribution of EUTF funds in the Horn of Africa to state institutions in Africa by partner country

Country

Funding (€)

Share (%)

Somalia

92,000,000

55

Ethiopia

66,550,000

39

Kenya

5,000,000

3

IGAD

5,000,000

3

As in the other regions, in the Horn of Africa as well, a considerably smaller share of the EUTF funding is left over for NGOs, businesses and other actors, such as universities and publishing companies. Since, for capacity reasons, they tend to execute only individual projects and can manage only small amounts, this makes them more expensive and therefore less interesting implementation partners for the distribution of the millions of euros from the EUTF than major IOs or EU member states› implementation organisations. Overall, however, the EUTF resources are shared out in the Horn of Africa between a similar number of countries and actors. Here as well, most projects focus on countries along the migration routes to Europe, as well as on building capacities for the reintegration of returnees.

□ Table of contents – □ Summary – □ 1. Introduction – □ 2. Migration policy context – □ 3. A new European funding instrument: the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa – ■ 4. Where does the funding under the EUEmergency Trust Fund for Africa end up? – □ 5. Conclusion and outlook – □ Abbreviations – □ The Author – □ Imprint

5. Conclusion and outlook

5.Conclusion and outlook

The EUTF was instituted in 2015 for the purpose of implementing the objectives agreed upon at the Euro-African migration summit of Valletta. These include such a wide range of priorities as «addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement», of «fighting irregular migration, migrant smuggling and eradicating trafficking in human beings», «improving protection and humanitarian assistance for people in flight», improved cooperation in the returns of migrants from Europe and advancing legal migration possibilities. Although these five objectives were presented in the final declaration in Valletta as equal to each other, the new migration policy paradigm of «addressing the root causes of migration» has taken centre stage since the creation of the EUTF.[107]

To achieve these objectives quickly, effectively and comprehensively, the EU and its member states pledged immediately after the creation of the fund to provide a total just shy of €2 billion. Originally conceived as a matching fund, the sums promised by the European states subsequently fell somewhat below expectations.[108] At the time of writing, a good 95% of the EUTF has been funded out of the development policy envelope of the EU general budget. As has already been criticised by various parties, the implementation of the migration policy objectives laid down in Valletta has thus been paid for overwhelmingly out of money originally earmarked for DC projects.

As this study has demontrated beyond the empirical confirmation of this hypothesis, the five Valletta objectives have not been supported equally out of EUTF resources. More than half of all funding allocated to date has gone to projects aiming to «address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement». This is followed by «protection and humanitarian assistance to people in flight» and «fighting irregular migration, migrant smuggling and eradicating trafficking in human beings». A further tenth has been made available to «improve cooperation in returns» of migrants from Europe. Just 1%, on the other hand, has actually been spent on advancing legal migration channels, which is primarily in the interests of the African partner countries.

An examination of the actual distribution of the EUTF funding also makes clear that this money has not necessarily been spent in the poorest countries – as their origin in the EDF would imply, according to existing studies – but in countries from which particularly large numbers of people emigrate, such as Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia, or which are located on the main transit routes to Europe, such as Libya, Mali and Niger, and therefore take in many migrants themselves.

Looking at the actors who are benefiting, it was possible to demonstrate that only 13% of total funding went to support projects by state actors from the partner countries. In the Horn of Africa alone, considerable volumes of budgetary assistance to Somalia, Ethiopian and Kenya were evident. As regards the distribution of funding in the other regions, two different trends emerged: in North Africa, it is mainly the major IOs already present that are benefiting from the expeditious allocation of millions of euros from the EUTF. The IOM in particular has been able to strengthen and expand its presence in the region with the assistance of development policy funding. In the Sahel and Lake Chad regions, on the other hand, EU member states› implementation organisations in the field of DC have mopped up the lion's share of the EUTF resources.

Alongside various French DC organisations, the main beneficiary in this field is GIZ. It has received around €200 million from the EUTF for its 20 projects, spread across 23 countries.[109] With its prominent role in the implementation of the EUTF, it is not only consolidating its evolution from a national implementation agency into an active international service-provider, but is also strengthening its increasing significance for the practical externalisation of European migration and border policy to the African continent. The fact that member states› implementation organisations are being used opens up new opportunities for the European Commission and several European member states to channel resources quickly and flexibly to actors that work in practice in the same way as service companies, but which are, at the same time, closely anchored in the institutional and political contexts of individual member states. In particular, they enable the wealthier member states with (post-) colonial or close development policy relationships with African states not only to bring their influence to bear on the content and adoption of European migration policy, but also to expand and consolidate this influence as regards practical implementation on the African continent. The actual allocation and distribution of the funds under the EUTF thus clarifies not only current developments in European development policy (new focus on addressing the root causes of migration and flight, earmarking funds for migration policy projects, execution in countries that are greatly affected by migration), but also refers to the consequences of this process for migration policy: EUTF funds allow the EU and its member states, for instance by allocating projects to their own implementation organisations, to react quickly and flexibly to a situation that was perceived within Europe as a refugee and migration crisis. However, the projects financed in this way include neither a long-term nor a global strategy that seriously seeks to balance interests with those of the African countries of origin and transit. With the rapid and large-scale implementation of projects using emergency resources, therefore, a crisis mode of reaction and governance has been self-perpetuating since 2015 as the central approach of European migration policy.

□ Table of contents – □ Summary – □ 1. Introduction – □ 2. Migration policy context – □ 3. A new European funding instrument: the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa – □ 4. Where does the funding under the EUEmergency Trust Fund for Africa end up? – ■ 5. Conclusion and outlook – □ Abbreviations – □ The Author – □ Imprint

Abbreviations

Abbreviations

AECIDSpanish Agency for International Development Cooperation

AUAfrican Union

CONCORDEuropean Confederation of Relief and Development NGOs

CTBBelgian Development Cooperation

ECOWASEconomic Community of West African States

EDFEuropean Development Fund

EUEuropean Union

EUTFEU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa

DCDevelopment Cooperation

FAOFood and Agriculture Organisation

GAMGlobal Approach to Migration

GAMMGlobal Approach to Migration and Mobility

GHAGlobal Health Advocates

GIZDeutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH

IFRCInternational Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

IGADIntergovernmental Authority on Development

IOMInternational Organisation for Migration

UNODCUnited Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

UNDPUnited Nations Development Programme

UNICEFUnited Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

UNUnited Nations

□ Table of contents – □ Summary – □ 1. Introduction – □ 2. Migration policy context – □ 3. A new European funding instrument: the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa – □ 4. Where does the funding under the EUEmergency Trust Fund for Africa end up? – □ 5. Conclusion and outlook – ■ Abbreviations – □ The Author – □ Imprint

The Author

The Author

Inken Bartels, since May 2018 post-doctoral researcher in the DeZIM Project «ExiTT: Exit – Transit – Transformation» at the IMIS, Universität Osnabrück (Department Migration and Society). PhD at the Berlin Graduate School of Social Sciences, Humboldt Universität in Berlin (2012-18). Dissertation about transnational practices of migration management, an ethnography of the International Organization for Migration's projects in Morocco and Tunisia. Lecturer at the Institute of Social Sciences, Humboldt Universität in Berlin (2016-17) and in the Master Program «Migration and Diversity», Christian-Albrechts-Universität in Kiel (2017-18). Visiting Graduate Researcher at the European University Institute and the Istituto Italiano di Scienze Umane in Florenz (2013-14). Several research stays in North Africa (2013-15). Diploma in Political Science at the Otto-Suhr-Institut, Freie Universität Berlin and the Université de Provence Aix-Marseille I in France (2004-11).

□ Table of contents – □ Summary – □ 1. Introduction – □ 2. Migration policy context – □ 3. A new European funding instrument: the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa – □ 4. Where does the funding under the EUEmergency Trust Fund for Africa end up? – □ 5. Conclusion and outlook – □ Abbreviations – ■ The Author – □ Imprint

Imprint

Imprint

Editor:  Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung e.V., Schumannstraße 8, 10117 Berlin
Contact:  Kirsten Maas-Albert, Head of Africa Division E maas-albert@boell.de

Place of publication:  http://eu.boell.org/
Release date:  March 2019
Licence:  Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung.

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□ Table of contents – □ Summary – □ 1. Introduction – □ 2. Migration policy context – □ 3. A new European funding instrument: the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa – □ 4. Where does the funding under the EUEmergency Trust Fund for Africa end up? – □ 5. Conclusion and outlook – □ Abbreviations – □ The Author – ■ Imprint

[1]

This is the term most frequently used in the migration and refugee policy documents which the EU published in 2015. Dynamics of human mobility however comprise far more than these two categories and frequently change their motives and forms over time. Terms such as flight and irregular migration can be seen as attempts to differentiate, manage and govern what are in reality complex forms of migration. The use of the terms in this study therefore refers to the different discourses and political measures connected to them, rather than to two different empirical phenomena per se. See also the contribution by Ali Nobil Ahmad in Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (Hg.), Die Orangen in Europa schmecken besser. Über Fluchtursachen, ihre Bekämpfung, und was daran nicht stimmt, Demokratie, 48 (Berlin: HBS, 2018) <https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/endf_boell_dieorangen_in_europa_v01_kommentierbar.pdf?dimension1=division_demo> [08.10.2018].

[2]

See Leonhard den Hertog, Money Talks. Mapping the Funding for EU External Migration Policy, LSE, 2016, p. 28 <https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/LSE%20No%2095%20LdH%20Mapping%20Funding%20final.pdf> [31.07.2018]; Leonhard den Hertog, EU Budgetary Responses to the ‹Refugee Crisis› Reconfiguring the Funding Landscape, LSE, 2016, p. 1 <https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/LSE%20No%2093%20LdH%20on%20EU%20Budgetary%20Responses%20to%20the%20Refugee%20Crisis.pdf> [31.07.2018].

[3]

See EC, ‹Managing the Refugee Crisis: Immediate Operational, Budgetary and Legal Measures under the European Agenda on Migration›, 2015 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5700_en.htm> [31.07.2018].

[4]

David Kipp and Anne Koch, ‹Auf der Suche nach externen Lösungen. Instrumente, Akteure und Strategien der migrationspolitischen Kooperation Europas mit afrikanischen Staaten›, in Migrationsprofiteure? Autoritäre Staaten in Afrika und das europäische Migrationsmanagement, SWP Studie 3 (Berlin: Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, 2018), p. 18 [our translation].

[5]

See den Hertog, Money Talks. Mapping the Funding for EU External Migration Policy, p. 3; den Hertog, EU Budgetary Responses to the ‹Refugee Crisis› Reconfiguring the Funding Landscape, p. 2; see also the studies quoted in section 3.1.

[6]

The European Commission had also provided for a review in 2018, but no further details on this have so far been released.

[7]

‹Valetta Summit, 11-12 November 2015 Action Plan› <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21839/action_plan_en.pdf> [23.07.2018].

[8]

‹Valletta Summit, 11-12 November 2015 Political Declaration› <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21841/political_decl_en.pdf> [23.07.2018].

[9]

EC, ‹Communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration›, 2015 <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf> [31.07.2018].

[10]

See <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/migration_en> [31.07.2018].

[11]

See Martin Geiger and Antoine Pécoud, The Politics of International Migration Management (Basingstoke, 2012).

[12]

These were set in place for instance in the framework of so-called migration partnerships as migration policy incentives to cooperate with the countries of origin and transit.

[13]

See Bigo Didier, ‹Border Regimes, Police Cooperation and Security in an Enlarged European Union›, in Europe Unbound. Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union (New York, 2002), p. 213-39; Jef Huysmans, ‹The European Union and the Securitization of Migration›, Journal of Common Market Studies 38.5 (2000), p. 751-77.

[14]

See, amongst others, Sandra Lavenex, ‹EU External Governance in «Wider Europe»›, Journal of European Public Policy 11.4 (2004), p. 680-700; Maribel Casas-Cortes, Sebastian Cobarrubias and John Pickles, ‹Re-Bordering the Neighbourhood: Europe's Emerging Geographies of Non-Accession Integration›, European Urban and Regional Studies 20.1 (2013), p. 37-58.

[15]

See den Hertog, Money Talks. Mapping the Funding for EU External Migration Policy, p. 1.

[16]

Kipp and Koch, p. 12.

[17]

See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/11/11-12/ [01.08.2018].

[18]

‹Valletta Summit Political Declaration›, 2015.

[19]

‹Valletta Summit Action Plan›, 2015.

[20]

‹EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa›, ed. by EC, 2015.

[21]

See Volker Hauck, Anna Knoll and Alisa Herrero Cangas, ‹EU Trust Funds – Shaping More Comprehensive External Action?›, Briefing Note 17 (2016); Alisa Herrero Cangas and Anna Knoll, ‹The EU Trust Fund for Africa: A New EU Instrument to Accelerate Peace and Prosperity?›, GREAT Insights Magazine, 5.1 (2016) <http://ecdpm.org/great-insights/prosperity-for-peace/eu-trust-fund-africa/> [25.07.2018].

[22]

See ‹External Evaluation of the 11th European Development Fund›, ed. by EC, 2017 <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/edf-evaluation-final-report_en.pdf> [25.07.2018].

[23]

David Kipp, ‹Vom Notfall zum Regelfall – der EU-Treuhandfonds für Afrika›, SWP Studie (Berlin: Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, 2018), p. 15.

[24]

European Commission President Juncker on 15 November 2015, the Commission press release, online: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6055_de.htm [01.08.2018]. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-6056_de.htm in the German source text and http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-6056_en.htm in the EN version

[25]

In order to get the €1.8 billion together, the European Commission redirected funds from the EDF (€1 billion), the EDF Regional Indicative Programmes and National Indicative Programmes (€395 million between them), the European Neighbourhood Instrument (€200 million), the Development Cooperation Instrument (€125 million), the DG HOME budgetary line (€20 million), Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (€50 million) and the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (€10 million). See Hauck, Knoll and Cangas, p. 6.

[26]

Three million euros of this came from Germany. The biggest contributor was the Netherlands with €15 million, followed by Belgium and Italy, with €10 million each. See ‹EU Agenda for Migration›, ed. by EC, 2015.

[27]

See https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/content/trust-fund-financials_en [27.10.2018].

[28]

See ‹Communication on external aspects of the European Agenda of Migration. Towards a new migration compact›, ed. by EC, 2016, p. 4.

[29]

Ibid, p. 10.

[30]

‹EU-Sachstand Zusammenarbeit der EU mit afrikanischen Herkunfts- und Transitländern in Migrationsfragen›, ed. by DB, 2018, p. 8.

[31]

den Hertog, Money Talks. Mapping the Funding for EU External Migration Policy, p. 12f.

[32]

EC, ‹External Evaluation EDF›, p. 9.

[33]

Ibid.

[34]

See Deutscher Bundestag, ‹Antwort auf kleine Anfrage der Grünen zur Funktionsweise des Nothilfe-Treuhandfonds der Europäischen Union für Afrika‹, printed paper 18/13640, 2017, p. 10. No more detailed or up-to-date information on this subject is available.

[35]

See https://eutf.akvoapp.org/en/projects/ [22.09.2018].

[36]

See, amongst others, Clare Castillejo, Der Nothilfe Treuhandfonds der EU für Afrika und seine Auswirkungen auf die EU-Entwicklungspolitik, Analysen und Stellungnahmen (DIE, 2017); Andrea Stocchiero and Olivia De Guerry, Partnership or Conditoinality? Monitoring the Migration Compacts and the EU Trust Fund for Africa (CONCORD, 2018).

[37]

See Hauck, Knoll and Cangas.

[38]

GHA, Misplaced Trust: Diverting EU Aid to Stop Migration. The EU Emergency Trustfond for Africa (GHA, 2017); Elise Kervyn and Raphael Shilhav, An Emergency for Whom? The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa – Migratory Routes and Development Aid in Africa (OXFAM, 2017).

[39]

Stocchiero and De Guerry.

[40]

See also Kervyn and Shilhav.

[41]

Castillejo.

[42]

See, amongst others, GHA.

[43]

Herrero Cangas and Knoll.

[44]

Castillejo; Stocchiero and De Guerry.

[45]

Kervyn and Shilhav.

[46]

Ibid.

[47]

Ibid.

[48]

Herrero Cangas and Knoll; GHA.

[49]

See, amongst others, GHA; Castillejo.

[50]

Castillejo; Kervyn and Shilhav.

[51]

Sum total of all funding allocated to execute all projects begun by August 2018. This can be consulted by project online at https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/content/homepage_en [22.08.2018].

[52]

‹Valletta Summit, Political Declaration›, 2015 [Author's own translation].

[53]

The descriptions of the individual EUTF projects that can be seen online include information concerning the fulfilment of the objectives of the final declaration of Valletta towards which they are intended to contribute. See https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/content/homepage_en [22.08.2018]. In the event of missing or unclear information, the allocation is based on the objectives set out in the project descriptions. A number of projects are expressly allocated to more than one objective of the declaration. In such cases, a differentiation is drawn between the individual components set out in the project description and corresponding financial positions allocated to different categories. Projects that do not fit with any of the five stated objectives have been listed under Other.

[54]

See, for instance, the project «Vivre ensemble sans discrimination: une approche basée sur les Droits de l›Homme et la dimension de genre» from Morocco, https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/431 [22.08.2018].

[55]

See Rutvica Andrijasevic, ‹Beautiful Dead Bodies: Gender, Migration and Representation in Anti- Trafficking Campaigns›, Feminist Review 86.1 (2007), p. 24-44.

[56]

The project descriptions that can be consulted at https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/content/homepage_en include information on the implementation partners and earmarked sums they will receive for the contracts. In many cases, the sums actually distributed have also been listed. Wherever this is the case, these have been included in the calculation; otherwise, they are based on the anticipated distribution according to the project descriptions. If there is no information on the (anticipated) implementation partners, the projects have not been included in the calculation.

[57]

See https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/961 [22.08.2018].

[58]

See https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/960 [22.08.2018].

[59]

See http://www.hacp-niger.org; https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/119 [22.08.2018].

[60]

See https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/648 [22.08.2018].

[61]

See https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/123 [22.08.2018].

[62]

See https://igad.int/; https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/501 [22.08.2018].

[63]

See https://www.civipol.fr/en/#; https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/270 [22.08.2018].

[64]

See, amongst others, http://www.gkpartners.co.uk/index.html; https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/958 [22.08.2018].

[65]

See, amongst others, https://www.ecorys.com/; https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/151 [22.08.2018].

[66]

See, amongst others, https://www.sequa.de/en; https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/956 [22.08.2018].

[67]

In Nigeria, see http://africultures.com/; https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/115 [22.08.2018].

[68]

In the Horn of Afrika, see https://www.soas.ac.uk/ref-hornresearch/; https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/156 [22.08.2018].

[69]

Migreurop, Guerre Aux Migrants: Le Livre Noir de Ceuta et Melilla, 2006 <http://www.migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/livrenoir-ceuta.pdf> [22.09.2018].

[70]

Inken Bartels, ‹Practices and Power of Knowledge Dissemination — International Organizations in the Externalization of Migration Management in Morocco and Tunisia›, Movements. Journal for Critical Migration and Border Regime Studies, 4.1 (2018) <https://movements-journal.org/issues/06.wissen/03.bartels--practices-and-power-of-knowledge-dissemination-international-organizations-in-the-externalization-of-migration-management-in-morocco-and-tunisia.html> [08.10.2018].

[71]

See https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/425 [22.08.2018].

[72]

See https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/423 [22.08.2018].

[73]

See https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/426 [22.08.2018].

[74]

«Managing mixed migration flows in Libya through expanding protection space and supporting local socio-economic development», see https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/421 [22.08.2018].

[75]

See Bernd Kasparek and Vasilis Tsianos, ‹Back to the Future. Blair-Schily Reloaded›, Movements. Journal für Kritische Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung, 1.1 (2015) <http://movementsjournal.org/issues/01.grenzregime/03.kasparek,tsianos--back-to-the-future-blair-schily-reloaded.html> [22.09.2018].

[76]

Inken Bartels, ‹«We Must Do It Gently.» The Contested Implementation of the IOM's Migration Management in Morocco›, Migration Studies, 5.3 (2017), pp. 315-336.

[77]

Martin Geiger and Antoine Pécoud, ‹International Organisations and the Politics of Migration›, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 40.6 (2014), pp. 865-87.

[78]

UNHCR, ‹Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organization for Migration›, 1997 <http://www.unhcr.org/4aa7a3ed9.pdf> [08.10.2018].

[79]

See Philippe M. Frowd, ‹The Promises and Pitfalls of Biometric Security Practices in Senegal›, International Political Sociology, 11.4 (2017), pp. 343-59; Ruben Andersson, Illegality, Inc. Clandestine Migration and the Business of Bordering Europe (Oakland, CA, 2014).

[80]

See, amongst others, https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/87 [22.08.2018].

[81]

See, amongst others, https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/93 [22.08.2018].

[82]

See, amongst others, https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/650 [22.08.2018].

[83]

See, amongst others, https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/110 [22.08.2018].

[84]

See, amongst others, https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/641 [22.08.2018].

[85]

See, amongst others, https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/72 [22.08.2018].

[86]

See, amongst others, https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/113 [22.08.2018].

[87]

See, amongst others, https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/351 [22.08.2018].

[88]

See, amongst others, https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/69 [22.08.2018].

[89]

See Kipp and Koch, p. 14.

[90]

As a non-profit enterprise of the Federal Republic of Germany, GIZ is wholly state-owned. However, it is able to offer its services to private clients, other states, of the EU through its economic business arm, International Services. The EU has been an increasingly significant client in recent years. See Deutscher Bundestag, ‹Deutsche Gesellschaft Für Internationale Zusammenarbeit – Stand Der Fusion›, 2012.

[91]

See https://www.giz.de/de/leistungen/54734.html [22.08.2018].

[92]

See https://berichterstattung.giz.de/2017/unsere-arbeit-weltweit/flucht-und-migration/im-ueberblick-schnellen-schutz-bieten-und-langfristig-perspektiven-schaffen/ [22.08.2018].

[93]

https://www.giz.de/de/mediathek/39372.html [22.08.2018].

[94]

Most notably the «Better Migration Management Programme» in the Horn of Africa, see https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/horn-africa/regional/better-migration-management-programme_en [22.08.2018].

[95]

See https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/sahel-lake-chad/gambia/building-future-make-it-gambia_en [22.08.2018].

[96]

See https://www.civipol.fr/en/presentation-2/ [22.08.2018].

[97]

See https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/115 [22.08.2018].

[98]

Kipp and Koch, p. 16.

[99]

On this, see, amongst others, Petra Bendel, ‹Die Migrationspolitik der Europäischen Union›, in Zuwanderung im Zeichen der Globalisierung: Migrations-, Integrations- und Minderheitenpolitik, ed. by Christoph Butterwegge and Gudrun Hentges (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009), pp. 123-35 <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-91513-5_7>.

[100]

See contribution by Nimo-Ilhan Ahmad Ali in HBS, and Annette Weber, ‹Migrationsknotenpunkt Sudan/Eritrea: Enttäuschte Erwartungen - Widerstreitende Interessen›, in Migrationsprofiteure? Autoritäre Staaten in Afrika Und Das Europäische Migrationsmanagement, SWP-Studie 3 (Berlin: Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, 2018), pp. 23-35.

[101]

See, for instance, https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/215; https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/189 or https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/230 [22.08.2018].

[102]

See, for instance, https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/164; https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/676 or https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/142 [22.08.2018].

[103]

See https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/162 [22.08.2018].

[104]

See https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/501 [22.08.2018].

[105]

See https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/960 and https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/961 [22.08.2018].

[106]

See https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/t05-eutf-hoa-so-59_somalia_state_and_resilience_building_contract.pdf [22.08.2018].

[107]

See Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (ed.), Die Orangen in Europa schmecken besser. Über Fluchtursachen, ihre Bekämpfung, und was daran nicht stimmt, Berlin 2018.

[108]

See, amongst others, https://www.euractiv.de/section/eu-aussenpolitik/news/juncker-member-states-committed-too-little-for-africa-fund/ [22.09.2018].

[109]

See https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/partner/giz_en [22.09.2018].