Policy Brief Egypt 1 – Security

Egypt's failing «War on Terror»
# Egypt's failing «War on Terror»

by Helena Burgrova

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Despite waging a «war on terror» for more than three years, the current Egyptian leadership has failed to provide lasting security. Instead of focusing on the real terrorist threats that do exist, the security approach was exploited to silence and remove political opponents and to squash resistance against authoritarian rule. The destruction of the Muslim Brotherhood has allowed Jihadist to dominate the Islamist field, while the heavy-handed approach in Sinai has alienated the local population without effectively eliminating the Egyptian sanctuary of the Islamic. German foreign policy should condition security cooperation with the Egyptian state on a focus on the real threats, and offer development support to help rebuild relations between deprived communities in Sinai and the Egyptian state.

Since the takeover by former army chief Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in 2013, Egypt has been waging a «war on terror». The counterterrorism campaign has, however, not made Egypt more secure. The reason is that the «war on terror» has, for a large part, been a pretext to legitimize the ousting of former President Muhammad Mursi of the Muslim Brotherhood in mid-2013, and to solidify the position of the post-coup leadership by purging real and imagined followers of the organization. Entangled in the long legacy of the conflict between the state and the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt under al-Sisi’s leadership continues to insist that fighting the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters is the only way to eradicate terrorism and establish security and stability in the country.

By the rigid focus on the Muslim Brotherhood as the main culprit and mastermind behind terrorist activities in Egypt, the Egyptian government suppresses a wide range of Egyptians whose complicity in terrorist activities is highly questionable.[1] The counterterrorism campaign thus appears less like a strategy based on credible evidence and more like a collective punishment of those who opposed Mursi’s deposition and/or protested the subsequent political developments. Meanwhile, existing terrorist formations such as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis/Wilayat Sinai (ABM/WS), the local franchise of the so-called Islamic State (IS) and the most lethal terrorist group in Egypt, have strengthened their position, and new Jihadi-terrorist groups have emerged.

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After an intense security campaign that peaked in 2015 with at least 100 counterterrorism operations per month on the Egyptian mainland (not counting Sinai), the authorities managed to dismantle many militant organizations and bring down the number of terrorist attacks there. Yet, they have not succeeded to eliminate the terrorist threat,[2] as was demonstrated most recently by the deadly attack on the Coptic St. Peter Church near St. Mark’s Cathedral in Cairo on December 11, 2016.

The government’s inflexibility and/or unwillingness to reassess the terrorist threat and the heavy-handed counterterrorism measures, which target scores of Egyptians beyond the perceived terrorists, affect the security outlook in the mid- and long-term. The radicalization of disenfranchised Muslim Brotherhood members along with other Egyptians, and the strengthening of the transnational terrorist networks of IS and al-Qaeda in Egypt are among the fallout of this misguided strategy and represent major destabilizing factors to be concerned about.

The Muslim Brotherhood, the imagined terrorist mastermind

Arbitrary arrests, forced disappearance, torture, death penalties, and extra-judicial killings including the massacre of at least 800 of Morsi’s supporters at the Raba’al-Adawiyya and al-Nahda Sit-ins in Cairo in August 2013 have made up the essence of the Egyptian counterterrorism campaign since July 2013. The Muslim Brotherhood, the major organized political force in Egypt and since late 2013 officially designated as a terrorist organization, has been its central target. Between January 2014 and January 2016, 71 percent of all counterterrorism operations on Egypt’s mainland were aimed at the Brotherhood. The average number of arrests of alleged Brotherhood members per month, which was above 500 during that period, dropped sharply in 2016 (to as little as 78 arrests in the first half of 2016), suggesting that by that time, the formal and informal networks of the organization had been largely destroyed.

Fueled by popular resentment towards the Brotherhood, especially in the early aftermath of the coup, and against the backdrop of the regional instability and the rise of Islamist extremism in Syria and Iraq, the security crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood was easily justified. Attacking the Brotherhood also had the clear – if questionable – advantage of guaranteed «successes». The Brotherhood’s strictly hierarchical structure and clearly defined membership base, along with its outreach programs through known social enterprises and the detailed intelligence that the Egyptian security forces had collected over decades made the movement an easy target.

Destroying the firewall against extremism

The security crackdown, unprecedented in its brutality and extent when compared to the Mubarak era, has left the once powerful organization in tatters. The group is organizationally and ideologically fragmented, which leaves its members susceptible to radicalization and/or recruitment by militants. In this respect, the crackdown appears to be a grave strategic error that is likely to create a blowback. The Muslim Brotherhood as known in past decades does not exist anymore. The members who have not been imprisoned or

5 Lynch, see En 1.
The Brotherhood has also lost most of its popular base. Hundreds of Brotherhood-related social enterprises, a core of its outreach activities, were closed down. The private assets of many Brotherhood members have been confiscated.

The massive repressions have also undermined acceptance for the leadership's doctrine of non-violence and its strategy for gradual change, leaving the organization groping in the ideological dark. According to observers with inside knowledge, the old guard is increasingly challenged by a younger generation that pushes for «effective action», i.e. selective use of violence as a means of retaliation against state authorities. These internal rifts and the ideological paralysis they generate undermine the Brotherhood's traditional capacity to act as a «firewall» that prevents extremist and jihadist groups from gaining ground in those parts of the populace who are potentially responsive to Islamist discourse. Either crushed as Brotherhood supporters or co-opted by the regime, such as the Nour Party, the sizeable Egyptian Salafi movement has not stepped into the void, either. Hence, the destruction of the Muslim Brotherhood has left the Islamist field open to far more extreme groups, some of which are prone to the use of violence and linked to transnational terrorist organizations such as IS and al-Qaeda. All of which makes the Egyptian Islamist scene an ideal recruitment base for militant Jihadi organizations.

Whereas under Mubarak the Brotherhood offered an outlet for non-violent Islamists and competed with al-Qaeda over members, today's Brotherhood is not in the position to control even its own members. Disenfranchised members of the Brotherhood, who advocate more radical solutions to the current crisis, become susceptible to the notion of «effective action» offered by militant organizations. Although the non-violence doctrine still appears to be a dominant discourse among the Brotherhood membership, Ammar Fayed,
a former activist with the movement, reports that a significant number of disillusioned
Brothers took up arms and joined homegrown militant groups.\textsuperscript{15} Other reports state that a
small faction of Brotherhood members has also joined Jihadi groups in Syria.\textsuperscript{16}

**Radicalization in the context of the «War on Terror»**

The harsh security campaign, which leaves no space for peaceful political participation
and tolerates no challenge to al-Sisi’s leadership, has also given militant groups a cause to
legitimize their violent attacks. They now can appeal to a common sense of injustice shared
by many Egyptians.\textsuperscript{17} «Retaliation to oppression» appears as a legitimate cause. The steep
rise in terrorist attacks carried out mostly by a number of newly mushrooming home-grown
militant organizations, such as \textit{Ajnad Mīr}, the «Allied Popular Resistance Movement», or
\textit{Al-Murabitūn} shows the radicalization some Egyptians underwent. According to Egypt
Security Watch, the number of terrorist attacks in the Egyptian mainland surged from 109
in 2013 (of which 88 came after Mursi’s ouster) to 205 in 2014 and 653 in 2015.\textsuperscript{18}

Radicalized Egyptians have been also attracted by the regional rise of Jihadi organizations,
including IS. The Soufan Group estimates that there are between 600 and 1000 Egyptians
who left for Syria and Iraq to join jihadist groups.\textsuperscript{19} Those numbers may appear low when
compared to Tunisia (between 6000 and 7000 fighters in a population of less than 15
percent of that of Egypt), yet the factors that might explain the difference fail to reassure.
Travel restrictions for the main transit countries (Libya and Turkey) that were imposed in

\textsuperscript{15} Fayad, En.7.
\textsuperscript{16} Eric Trager (2016): «The flow of Islamist fighters from Egypt to Syria, and the Sisi government’s
   November 2016).
\textsuperscript{17} TIMEP, En. 2, p. 16.
\textsuperscript{18} TIMEP, En. 4.
   into Syria and Iraq». Available at: http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_
   Egyptians who went to fight in Syria see: Sherif Mohy El Deen(2016): «Youth radicalization in Egypt
   and the complicated relationship to violence», Arab Reform Initiative, p. 4–5. Available at: www.arab-
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December 2014 and since expanded[20] made it difficult for Egyptian Islamists to reach Syria or Iraq. Moreover, the growth of domestic militant organizations may have offered a sufficient outlet for Egyptians ready to take up arms – which may explain the resilience of the Sinai-based IS-affiliate Wilayat Sinai despite a high number of reported casualties.

Egyptian prisons – incubators of militancy

Egyptian prisons are a ticking security bomb. At a time when Egyptian authorities jail people for as little as a Facebook post, the overcrowded Egyptian prisons with thousands of incarcerated Muslim Brothers, radical Islamists, revolutionary youth, but also genuinely non-political Egyptians, are places of shared grievances. As such they offer excellent conditions for a new generation of extremists to emerge. Based on the accounts of former prisoners radicalization and recruitment efforts by IS are rampant behind Egyptian bars (see also chapter 2 of this publication). IS targets above all younger inmates who appear to be easily susceptible to its radicalization efforts.[21] It exploits lack of maturity and ideological firmness, along with disillusionment over the Brotherhood’s dealing with the crisis, and the humiliating conditions in the prisons.

By manipulating Islamic narratives and exaggerating IS’ successes, recruiters take advantage of the poor religious education and frustration of the prisoners, for whom IS becomes a savior-warrior.[22] As far as prisoners’ accounts suggest, the prison authorities appear not overly concerned about these efforts. IS militants, Jihadis, Muslim Brotherhood members,


secular revolutionaries as well as a large number of young people imprisoned by mistake share the same cells which considerably facilitates radicalization.[23]

The rise of the Egyptian branch of the Islamic State

The security crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood encouraged the Jihadi organization Ansar Bayt Al-Maqdis (ABM) to focus on targeting the Egyptian state. Despite deep ideological differences with the Brotherhood, for the extremists deploying a rhetoric and practice of «retribution» held the prospect of breaking into the Islamist mainstream and garner support and recruits from the debris of their organization. Dozens of attacks on security officials and institutions in Northern Sinai are claimed by the group, in addition to bombings and assassinations on the mainland, including the attempted assassination of Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim in September 2013.[24]

In November 2014, ABM pledged allegiance to IS and became known as Wilayat Sinai («Province Sinai», WS) of the self-declared Islamic State. Initially, that step occurred along with an ideological schism between IS supporters and al-Qaeda loyalists, which weakened the group as the latter faction split off to found a new formation known as al-Murabitoon. The remainder of the group, however, has improved its capabilities remarkably since. Operations have grown bolder. In July 2015 WS attempted to seize Sheikh Zuwayyid, a Bedouin town on the border with the Gaza Strip, by coordinated raids on at least five military checkpoints and a police station. 70 soldiers and civilians were left dead.[25]

A few days later the group claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Italian consulate in Cairo. Apart from attacking security officials and facilities with mounting frequency and lethal impact, the newly re-branded group has increasingly attacked civilians, too.[26] In addition, beheadings of Sinai residents accused of acting as informants has become a


26  TIMEP, En. 4.
routine practice to deter locals from cooperating with the authorities.\(^{27}\) Perhaps the most high-profile attack claimed by WS has been the downing of a Russian passenger plane en route from Sharm el-Sheikh in October 2015, which killed all 224 passengers and crew on board. According to WS, the attack came as retaliation against Russia's involvement in the war in Syria. It also delivered another major blow to Egypt's already suffering tourism sector. Tourist arrivals shrank by almost 50 percent in the wake of the attack and have yet to recover.\(^{28}\) Despite massive counterterrorism operations targeting Sinai militants, WS continues to carry out attacks destabilizing the country. According to Egypt Security Watch the group has claimed to have carried out 251 attacks in Northern Sinai in the first half of 2016, raising the average of attacks per month to 48, compared to 28 per month in the last half of 2015.\(^{29}\) The believed logistical and operational WS connection with the IS stronghold in Libya based on a network of small fishing boats supplying the Sinai militants with money, weapons, and most likely also fighters, is thought to have played a role in the rise of ABM/WS activities.\(^{30}\)

Sinai – between Terrorism and Insurgency

In Northern Sinai, the Egyptian authorities have failed to secure the support of the local, mostly Bedouin, population, in their fight against the Jihadis. This failure stems from the damages that the campaign inflicts on local communities, and from a long legacy of neglect that informs their attitudes towards state authorities. Cairo-based rulers have always viewed Sinai as a security buffer zone between the mainland and Israel, inhabited by a population that cannot be trusted. Since Israel's withdrawal from Sinai in 1982, little money and effort has been spent to develop the area except for the tourist resorts in the southern coastal areas. The local Bedouin population, routinely portrayed as criminals, smugglers, and/or militants by the media, are not allowed to profit from the revenues of the tourism sector in the seaside resorts. Due to prevalent employment discrimination, the majority of jobs in the tourism sector are assigned to non-Sinai Egyptians. Bedouins are also banned


\(^{29}\) TIMEP, En. 4.

\(^{30}\) Awad, En. 28.
from owning land or joining the armed forces.\(^{31}\) It is thus not surprising that Sinai Bedouins do not identify with the state as strong as Egyptians on the mainland.\(^{32}\)

Several waves of heavy-handed security campaigns have alienated the local population further. Northern Sinai has effectively been turned into a war zone where the civilian population is trapped. Tanks, helicopters, F-16 jets, and military check-points supported by harsh measures including up to 16-hour curfews, shoot-to-kill policy, and arbitrary house searches have constituted the essence of the counterterrorism campaign in Sinai. Shelling, missile attacks and air strikes conducted by the Egyptian forces at believed militant targets and hideouts come at a high price for Sinai inhabitants.\(^{33}\) Between July 2015 and July 2016 the Egyptian authorities reported 2,529 alleged terrorists killed and 2,481 arrested in Northern Sinai only. These numbers contradict the estimates of the number of militants operating in the area, which do not exceed 1,000,\(^{34}\) and are further belied by the fact that they failed to stop further attacks. Thus, it appears likely that these numbers are inflated by adding victims who are actually not militants. As noted by human rights activists, a number of civilians, especially in the counterterrorism context in the Northern Sinai, is postmortem declared to be «terrorists» to legitimize the extra-judicial character of their death.\(^{35}\) Destruction of houses and agricultural land, forced evictions, mass arrests, arbitrary detention, and torture\(^{36}\) have further contributed to create an overwhelming impression that the purpose is collective punishment rather than providing security. The Egyptian authorities are not trusted. The state symbolizes violence. So do the security forces deployed to counter terrorists, who the locals view as occupiers rather than protectors.\(^{37}\)

The sweeping security measures notwithstanding, the militants have not been defeated. From a security perspective, the estrangement of the Bedouin and their resentment against the Egyptian authorities goes a long way to explain this failure. It is estimated that up to


\(^{33}\) Afify, En. 33.

\(^{34}\) TIMEP, En. 4, p. 21.


\(^{37}\) TIMEP, En.2.
300 Sinai residents joined the ranks of the militants.\textsuperscript{38} Given their knowledge of the local terrain, including hideouts in mountainous areas and the tunnel infrastructure linking the area to the Gaza Strip, as well as their local bonds, they represent a significant asset that enhances the logistical and operational capabilities of the militants.

The current regional developments are likely to pose an additional challenge to Egypt’s counterterrorism efforts. The recent IS defeat in the Libyan Sirte, which was considered to be the central IS outpost in Northern Africa, might increase the pertinence of the Sinai IS-branch as an alternative base. IS’s ongoing retreat from its Syrian and Iraqi strongholds may also expedite the return of Egyptian jihadists equipped with combat know-how and radical views. All of which may likely radicalize the Egyptian militant scene and escalate violence even further.

Policy recommendations

Counterterrorism will be an essential part of the mutual cooperation between Germany and Egypt as stipulated in the security agreement (Sicherheitsabkommen) signed in July 2016.\textsuperscript{39} Policy makers need to be aware of the liabilities that come with such cooperation, including the eventuality that German agencies may become unwitting enablers of abusive practices. From a strategic perspective, the challenge will be to provide support for Egyptian counterterrorism efforts while mitigating the detrimental effects of the current strategy and its negative implications for human rights and political freedoms. With this in mind, the following steps/policies are recommended:

\begin{itemize}
  \item The terrorist threat in Egypt is tangible and, given the involvement of transnational terrorist organizations, not an exclusively domestic issue. It is therefore important for Germany to support legitimate counterterrorism efforts conducted by the Egyptian authorities.
  \item Such cooperation needs to be alert to and avoid becoming entangled in the current tendency to exploit a discourse of counterterrorism for political ends.
\end{itemize}


While highly problematic from a human rights perspective, Egypt's counterterrorism efforts are also counterproductive in terms of effective security. They have arguably produced more enemies than they contained. In the framework of the security cooperation, German policymakers must impress on their Egyptian counterparts that providing channels and platforms for the peaceful expression of dissent must be an essential part of any sustainable security response.

The overcrowded Egyptian prisons are liable to become a breeding ground for extremism and radicalization. Germany should discreetly lobby Egypt to improve the disastrous prison conditions and to release political prisoners to counteract these tendencies. There is also a potential for both countries to exchange existing know-how on how to address Islamist radicalization in prisons.

With regard to the alarming situation in Northern Sinai, it appears essential that the Egyptian authorities move from a counterterrorism approach focused on repression to a counterinsurgency strategy that prioritizes (re)building the trust of the local population and strives to separate terrorist groups from communities with legitimate grievances. German policymakers may facilitate such a transition by holding out concrete support for infrastructural and development projects that improve services and provide employment for the local population.

To repair relations between local communities and the government, Germany may offer support and know-how in conflict mediation efforts through specialized organizations with relevant experience.
The Author

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