Associate Professor at the Department of Government of Cornell University.
Reproduced with permission from the author and the East-West Center. The text below is an are excerpt from the full publication, originally published as Policy Studies 4, East-West Center Washington, 2004, pp. vii-ix.
Executive Summary
This paper examines Beijing’s Tibet policy over the course of the last two decades. It argues that the basic framework of Beijing’s Tibet policy did not change during this period. On the contrary, in congruence with earlier Chinese policy, Beijing’s stance on Tibet was at all times designed to ensure that the region and the people living there remained an integral part of China. Beijing’s position on Tibet has always been grounded by concerns about defending Chinese sovereignty—specifically its jurisdictional sovereignty—over the region. Indeed one of the essay’s main purposes is to highlight the extent to which the sovereignty issue, which has been surprisingly overlooked in the academic literature and policy analysis on Tibet, constitutes the central aspect of the current Sino-Tibetan dispute.
Looking beyond this fixed foundation of policy, the paper also finds that the way in which Beijing acted to secure its sovereign rights over Tibet has actually varied in a significant fashion over the course of two distinct phases. During the initial phase, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Chinese actions seemed to concede that jurisdictional sovereignty was not just a privilege to be invoked by Beijing and imposed on Tibet but rather a right that was at least partly contingent on the acceptance of Chinese rule by those in the region and the international community at large. While the paper takes note of the significance of this move—and reports that it raised the hopes of many that a new chapter in Sino-Tibetan relations had begun—it also contends that at no point in this period did Beijing budge on the fundamental issue of where the right to rule Tibet resided (in Beijing, not Lhasa, or even more emphatically Dharamsala).
During the second stage, which began in late 1987 and continues today, the essay reports that Beijing’s position on Tibet has been defined by highly critical discursive moves, pointed diplomatic activity, a renewed commitment to use force to silence all opposition to Chinese rule, and the utilization of economic development programs to augment such efforts. In taking such a stance Beijing returned to substantiating its claim of jurisdictional sovereignty over the region via policies of assertiveness rather than consultation. Regardless of the economic or political cost to Beijing, Chinese sovereignty over Tibet was to be defended, protected, and reinforced. Cutting against such a trend, there have been limited signs of a slight moderation in Beijing’s stance on Tibet over the last few years (especially in regard to the issue of talks with the Dalai Lama), and such moves have again created an air of cautious optimism about the future of Sino-Tibetan relations. The essay cautions, however, that insofar as Beijing’s fundamental position on Tibet has not shifted during this new period of détente the prospects for a real breakthrough on the “Tibet issue” remain quite remote.
The key analytical questions addressed in this paper seek to explain why Beijing is so adamant about securing its jurisdictional claims over Tibet; why it showed limited flexibility on jurisdictional issues at certain times; and the factors contributing to the sustained contraction in the Chinese position during the last decade. The explanations of these issues hinge on three factors: the underlying strategic value of Tibet to Beijing within the regional security dynamic; the persistence of historically conditioned, sovereignty-entered values in elite circles in China; and Deng Xiaoping’s policy of reform and opening. The first of these forces acts as a constant touchstone for all Chinese policies. Quite simply, China’s advantageous geographic position in South and Central Asia would be seriously undermined by the loss of Tibet. Therefore, straightforward national security concerns preclude any serious consideration of ceding China’s claim to Tibet. The second factor creates a level of concern about the possible loss of Tibet—and hypersensitivity to any internal or international developments that appear to jeopardize Chinese rule over the region—that far exceeds objective strategic calculations and infuses the Chinese position with a defensive hue. The third factor inadvertently introduced a new set of pressures for change. Initially Deng’s line created an opening for novel solutions to the unsettled situation in Tibet. At this juncture in the late 1970s the motivation for change was largely domestic, although international strategic considerations also played a role in framing the shift in Chinese policy. In contrast, it was the convergence of external pressures and internal opposition that caused the pronounced and costly contraction in Chinese practices during the mid-1980s (spurred by a surge in historically grounded nationalist narratives that crystallized China’s claims to Tibet). Such a turn was sustained in the 1990s by Chinese decision makers’ unrelenting commitment to overcome continued opposition within Tibet to Chinese rule (a movement that was given limited material support from external sources) and the perceived rise of new “self-determination” norms in the international arena.
The paper contends there are two especially significant aspects of these analytic findings. First, the causes of Beijing’s behavior are eclectic—integrating collective memory, pragmatic calculations, and external normative and material influences within its frame. Second, contrary to expectations derived from the theoretical literature on the diffusion of norms and the intentions of those pressing Beijing to change its Tibet policy (human rights INGOs, foreign governments, the Tibetan government-in-exile), external forces have tended to prolong Chinese intransigence over the “Tibet issue” (by deepening concerns about the loss of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet) and, arguably, have forestalled the implementation of a more flexible policy line toward the region. In other words: the motivation for change and innovation on the Tibet front has largely come from within China. While this finding does not imply that outside pressure cannot play a constructive role in resolving the Sino-Tibetan conflict, it does merit consideration on the part of those interested in Tibet’s future and suggests the need for a recalculation of how to engage China on this front.