The current Hungarian political system rests on Fidesz’s powerfully centralised party machine led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. His orders are beyond question within both his party and the government. As a consequence, every discussion on political outcomes in Hungary attempts to second-guess the intentions and read the inscrutable mind of the emperor.
Orbán’s potential rivals from within his party were eliminated long before the 2010 elections, and no party rival has made it into the government. Orbán has consolidated his power by handpicking Fidesz candidates for parliament, centralising the decision-making mechanism, the party and public finances. Fidesz’s remaining strongmen are regularly made to announce or defend controversial measures in order to erode their personal political capital and to commit them to the party line. There is no misalignment.
To cement Fidesz’s economic power, Orbán consolidated a circle of cronies, showering them with economic favours. In the meantime, the government neglected effective spending cuts in the most wasteful sectors while further squeezing the poor and pushing down the middle class. Despite manifest economic failure, Orbán has maintained the air of having a secret master plan for the economy.
Orbán has created a political religion. With it come emotions and the need for infallibility. He does not negotiate. And whoever does negotiate, does not decide. International and domestic pressure breeds defiance, failure and denial.
Orbán believes he is best in emergencies. Peace and reconciliation diminishes his power, and civilised cooperation has never worked out well for him. Furthermore, emergencies require extraordinary authorisation. In this spirit, he has clearly demonstrated that might is right, and has eroded the rule of law by taking a cynically legalistic approach to European values. He gets plenty of reinforcement and confirmation from his tight circle of trusted advisers, who are either too intimidated to mention dissenting views or too biased to contemplate them. Until 2014, we can only expect this combativeness and war rhetoric to worsen.
No right-wing opinion maker or civil, economic, political, or media actor can survive without his support. This powerful system of patronage can hardly be brought down from outside the party. Small wonder Orbán gets most worked up over speculation of internal dissent. Accusations of authoritarian tendencies are shrugged off with a smug smile. He cannot afford internal dissent.
By talking to the right, Orbán claims to shield society from even more exposure to the newly strong nationalist party Jobbik – essentially trying to put out the fire of radicalism with blatant populism. (This might prove to be an ideological gateway drug, though.) By acknowledging the agenda of the nationalists, however, Orbán alienates the political moderates within his own party. This should be his major concern.
There are two factions within Fidesz today. One is Orbán’s nationalist-populist wing (comparable to that of Poland’s Jarosław Kaczyński), and the other is a moderate conservative wing (cf. Donald Tusk’s Civic Platform) who thus far have been left out of government and have kept their reservations to themselves.
The calamitous resignation of President Pál Schmitt may have been a turning point in this tight party discipline. Fidesz moderates found it more than embarrassing – and it has compounded a plethora of grievances, such as the education law. They have never actively embraced Orbán’s anti-EU, anti-IMF populism and fiscal unorthodoxy – and their dissatisfaction is echoed among moderate Fidesz voters. If these moderates rebel against Orbán’s total control, they may assume those government positions which are presently allocated to politically lightweight Orbán-protégées.
The state of the opposition
At the moment, there is no viable alternative to Fidesz in sight. The opposition is scattered – ranging from the extreme right-wing Jobbik to various formations on the left. It has not yet benefited from the disappointed masses and public sentiment against austerity.
The present opposition parties lack a democratic structure, as each is headed by an authoritarian leader. In their present state, they cannot provide a democratic alternative to Fidesz because they labour under the misapprehension that beating Orbán on his own terms would give rise to democracy. But Orbán’s brand of populism rests on his personal talent in creating right-wing political myths and traditions where these were absent historically. This cannot and should not be imitated by today’s left.
Anti-Orbán sentiment and indecision may have reached a critical mass among voters, but mostly they are left politically homeless. Part of the reason is that every opposition party and political movement feels its time has come. They are wrong. They will need to form a coalition in order to challenge Orbán in 2014.
Today’s Socialists (MSZP) are toxic. Considering their devastating election defeat in 2010, remaining a major opposition force is an accomplishment in itself. But this is where their accomplishments end. Halfway through the term, they are still in an electoral ghetto for at least three reasons: 1) their corrupt reputation, 2) their lack of new faces, and 3) their open admission that they lied in order to win the 2006 elections. With the old party leadership still in place, the desire for reform is only verbal.
The Socialists’ original sin was attempting to beat Orbán on his own terms. The MSZP cannot be turned into a Fidesz – nor can the left’s political structure be centralised. They may have modernised their election logistics, but the core of the party remains untouched.
They do not control the political agenda anymore. They are left without a message and lacking an identity. They have lost their status as the little man’s party inherited from communism, and are finding it difficult to return to it post-Gyurcsány. Maybe they should not.
Another important lesson is that merely having an anti-Orbán agenda will not win elections. The situation is similar to that in Britain between 1979 and 1992, when Labour could never win as merely an anti-Thatcher party, or the Italian left being anti-Berlusconi but lacking any substance.
The green party (LMP) made it into parliament in 2010 with a promise of renewal, but failed to deliver to its mainly urban voters. Outside parliament, the newly strong movements (DK, Milla, Szolidaritás, 4K!) deserve attention. Among them, Milla appeared to have filled the gap in place of the disbanded liberal Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ).
Two routes for the opposition
The first is going red – with disastrous consequences for the country. This would entail playing on the emotions of the “little people” with minimum-wage populism, paternalism and a promise of even more unfounded welfare payments. It hopes to attract the most disadvantaged, who have lost out under Orbán. By playing the populist card, the opposition may hope to win without a programme. This, however, is not a real alternative. Orbán cannot be vanquished on social themes, anti-Roma, law and order, anti-Semitic, anti-banker and anti-corporate sentiment.
Even worse, by playing the populist card there is no room left to address the hard-to-convince social democratic, social-liberal middle classes. If one goes down that road, moderation is not even advisable. By winning one moderate voter, two are lost on the populist side.
The more difficult but only viable way is thus to address the social-democratic, mostly urban middle. To succeed, opposition parties must fulfil three conditions. Firstly, they must engage all social groups and regions, simultaneously integrating economic winners and losers, urban and rural classes.
A credible opposition party must also be willing and able to form a coalition – not by gobbling up other parties or competing with them, but by acknowledging the need for unity and supporting each other. To form a coalition, however, one needs credibility. The Socialists must face their past and stop playing the “lesser evil” card against Orbán.
The third condition is building up competence. To govern, an opposition force must have a programme. The lack of influence should not prevent expert policy groups from formulating a solution. It did not hurt during the regime change in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and it will not hurt now. In fact, a technocratic public policy group is already active, headed by former Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai.
Conclusion
Hungarian society is not used to democratic self-defence. Still, throughout 2011 it has proved itself capable. Street movements, student organisations, trade unions and Facebook groups have done what can be done in the absence of a complete political programme. The questions have been asked, but the answers will not be born in the street.
The responsibility of the opinion makers is great. These movements will need experts, crisis managers, organisers and diplomats. They will need to come up with an alternative, a way out of this crisis. They will also need to stay sober in the face of Fidesz rhetoric. The opposition must obey the rules of the game – especially because the government does not.
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László Lengyel, Chairman and CEO, Financial Research Institute, Budapest
Eszter Nova, Research Fellow, Financial Research Institute, Budapest