Schwarzenberg’s Mission to the Middle East
The Czech EU Presidency has begun more abruptly than the Czechs ever wanted. At the very moment the country took up the “sceptre” of the presidency, the conflict between Hamas and Israel in Gaza was in full blaze, and the Czech Republic immediately had to react to. Czech politicians were not able to follow the EU’s diplomatic line immediately. Unlike the majority of Western European politicians, who stressed that Israel’s reaction was disproportionate, the first statements by the Czech prime and foreign ministers clearly blamed Hamas for the conflict.
Right after the start of Israel’s offensive in Gaza the atmosphere in European circles was such that the Czech representatives had one option only, that of trying to attempt immediate European mediation. Without lengthy preparations, Czech Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg set out as the head of a diplomatic mission to the Middle East on January 5, 2009. However, at home, the importance of this step was not much appreciated. Almost all Czech newspapers wrote unflatteringly of Schwarzenberg’s mission. For example, the headline in Hospodářské noviny read that “Schwarzenberg failed”, while Mladá fronta Dnes announced that “Czechs have nothing to show”. This response was rather startling; it would have been naïve to think that Schwarzenberg could have forced the warring sides to agree on a ceasefire when they were not interested in ending the fight. Prior to his departure, Schwarzenberg said that his mission would be about fact-finding - he wanted to gather information and prepare the ground for further negotiations, a completely realistic estimate of the Czech and European options.
Have the Czechs failed ?
Israel’s rejection of Schwarzenberg’s plan for a quick ceasefire was labelled a Czech failure. The demand for an immediate halt to the fighting was a European mantra the Czech minister had to accept if he wanted to give the impression of representing the opinions of the EU as a whole (even though in diplomatic language there is a difference between an immediate and a quick ceasefire).
It was practically certain that the Israelis would reject an immediate ceasefire, just as it was certain they would reject the proposal to place observers in Gaza. Why? These proposals, at the time, did not correspond to reality. Israel began Operation Cast Lead in order to achieve long-term security for its border regions, not to conclude a ceasefire as soon as the EU (which is not threatened from Gaza in any way) called on it to do so.
How unrealistic the European proposals were is demonstrated by the international units the EU proposed to deploy in order to maintain the ceasefire. If even highly-motivated Israeli units have not succeeded in stopping Palestinian rockets, it is hard to imagine that foreign units would be able to do so. The presence of international units only makes sense once the basis for a long-term ceasefire has been laid.
Gaza: ceasefire vs. "credible presence"
Instead of monitors, the Israelis proposed what it called a “credible presence” at the borders. This would consist of the presence of front line units which would actively seek out and destroy the tunnels through which weapons are smuggled from Egypt into Gaza. The presence of weapons financed by Iran and Syria is one of the main causes of the current crisis. As one Israeli diplomat told the Financial Times, “the question is what the units proposed by the European Union will do when members of Hamas start shooting at them. Will they take notes and write a report, or will they go after the attackers?" This anonymous diplomat responded to another question as follows: “If it turns out to be necessary for the members of foreign military units to pursue the attackers, then show me the country that will send its soldiers or police officers to Gaza." It is clear that musings over whether to send in troops are often only a rhetorical device used by diplomats who want to show that they are doing something. No one is prepared to send their own men and women into Gaza or to risk their own credibility. As became apparent over the next few days, one of the main problems was finding a scheme to prevent the smuggling of weapons which would suit Egypt, as it did not want the presence of foreign troops on its territory.
Whether the Czech mission - or the ones by Sweden or France - were successful may become clear in the future. Plus: Some aspects of Schwarzenberg’s trip may remain secret.
Lack of experience
However, there is no doubt that the Czech position was a difficult one - and for three reasons. In the first place, the Czech Republic is seen as a small, inexperienced country. The number of sceptical commentaries about it in the European press is not exactly encouraging. Even though Minister Schwarzenberg gives the impression of an experienced, balanced man with a rather cosmopolitan style, he does not have much diplomatic experience. Often, to conduct important negotiation requires a great deal of experience accumulated in the course of many crises and an apparatus that has been refined over many years. Unfortunately, the Czech Republic has none of these. The diplomatic weight of the Czech Republic naturally cannot exceed the strength of its economy, its military, or its population, and it cannot be compared to countries with populations of 60 million such as Britain or France.
The second reason is that the Czech Republic has been perceived for a long time as a state inclined towards friendly relations with Israel. This is often erroneously interpreted to mean that Czech policy is hostile to Palestinian interests, which is not correct. The Czech Republic and all other European countries hold that the only solution to the problem is the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state within reasonable borders and a resolution of the refugee problem. Yet, the Czech Republic differs from other European countries in saying out loud that it will not be possible to move forward until terrorism, corruption, and other problems of Palestinian society are resolved.
In the final analysis, many of the other post-communist EU member states share a similar point of view, which makes them comparatively more sober when evaluating the situation in the Middle East. These countries have no current power interests in the Middle East, as France does. They do not suffer from guilty consciences over a colonial past and are not host to large minorities of refugees. Unfortunately, the directness which has been characteristic of Czech policy in the Middle East in past years now seems to be an obstacle. Of course, Czech diplomats very often say things which need to be said, even in the interest of the Palestinians. It is possible that this will prove to be the Czech EU Presidency’s greatest contribution to a resolution of the crises in the Middle East.
Sarkozy's solo performance
A third complication for the Czech mission was the trip by French President Nicolas Sarkozy to the Middle East. Sarkozy’s solo trip received much more attention from the international community than Karel Schwarzenberg’s mission. On the one hand this is completely understandable. Many people do not understand the complicated structure of the common European foreign policy. To explain who the main spokesperson for the EU is and why - whether the foreign minister of the presiding country, the commissioner for external relations, or the high EU representative for the common foreign policy – is, even for the initiated, sometimes a hard nut to crack. Room for any European mission to negotiate is always restricted by the necessity to find a compromise between the 27 member states and the 27 complicated administrative apparatuses through which the members create their positions on foreign affairs.
The goal of the French president’s trip, especially when conducted by such a self-confident, voluble person as Sarkozy, is clear. The French president seized the opportunity at a moment when everything in Washington was focused on the changing of the guard. Sarkozy, in keeping with his political style, called for a large Middle East summit hosted by France to revive the stagnating peace process. The question is whether Sarkozy’s initiative can succeed once Obama presents his plan for the Middle East.
The common European foreign policy has suffered further damage. One member state has overshadowed the other 26 and, as a result, completely weakened the EU’s efforts. The conflict in Gaza has offered the Europeans a unique opportunity to demonstrate that the EU has means at its disposal that are not to be ignored. The opportunity has been wasted. Instead the weaknesses of the common European foreign policy have been demonstrated once again. Only one member state has to start its own initiatives and the common EU foreign policy is left completely defenceless.
Jan Fingerland is a commentator for Czech Radio 6.
Irena Kalousová has a degree in European Studies from Cambridge University. She is currently working as project co-ordinator for activities related to the Czech EU Presidency at the Heinrich Böll Foundation’s Prague office.
