Which Europe do we want?
Fortunately, Europe is not held together by one thing but by many. Separately, they are not strong enough to create cohesion, however, once combined they are powerful enough to do just that. Recently, they have all been seriously damaged, which explains why the current crisis presents such a threat to the idea of Europe and its legitimacy.
The first thing that unites us is, crucially, the legacy of the past. Many people argue that the narrative of war and reconciliation has been forgotten or lacks sufficient appeal, especially among the younger generations. I disagree. Our past is essential in order to understand our present and our future. The past is the mirror we look into when we move forward and make decisions about the future.
How does the past work? First, to be European means being engaged in a continuous critical reflection of our past. This acts as a psychological and material self-constraint and limits the way in which all actors exercise power. During the current crisis we have seen this time and again. Despite the shift in power within the EU, all countries, not only Germany – though Germany is special case – have exerted considerable restraint and have refused to translate differences in economic power into political power. This does not mean that all states are equal or that decisions are not guided by underlying asymmetries of power. Nevertheless one has to acknowledge that, within the EU, the usual wrangling and power politics that frequently characterises diplomacy appears to be gentler and kinder than is usually the case outside of Europe. Consequently, and despite a massive shift in power from the periphery to the centre, and from some EU institutions (the Commission) to others (the ECB), the system has not collapsed.
Second, apart from shaping the rules of the game and acting as a brake on the natural power instincts of member states, the past provides a vision for the future and a method to get there. When it comes to power politics and hegemony, Europe “has been there and done that.” Therefore, its vision of international and European order is shaped by the desire to share power, pool sovereignty and create a richer and fairer world. It this sense, Europe offers the most advanced form of effective and enlightened multilateralism any group of countries has ever reached.
Europe is also united through a specific method of solving its differences. It is cumbersome, it is sometimes puzzling, even irritating, yet it reflects the existence of a largely consensual (multinational) rule of law. No matter what Eurosceptics say, the EU is not, like the Soviet Union, a prison of peoples; it is a voluntary union of sovereign states and citizens. And if it takes so much time to adopt decisions and effectively implement them, that is because the EU relies on reasonable governments and functioning national parliaments that are elected by largely rational citizens. Again, this is a factor uniting us Europeans.
A second set of things that brings us together is more material in nature. Even at the moment when the crisis has reached its peak, life within the EU carries more benefits than life outside of it. This does not mean that all benefits are evenly distributed among and within countries. Some countries benefit more from an open market than others, and entrepreneurs, professionals, and academics benefit more from integration than do shopkeepers, skilled workers in rich countries (afraid that their jobs will go south), or people with low skills. Inevitably, those who benefit least support the EU less than those who benefit most. Still, as the long queue of applicants at the door of the European Union goes to show, the overall deal of EU membership is highly desirable.
The current crisis is threatening all these pillars, which are fundamental for the survival of the EU. First, it has brought to the fore old stereotypes concerning national character, dividing Europe between diligent northerners and indolent southerners. Second, it has led to a re-emergence of past resentments, especially about Germany’s recent history. Third, it has upset the balance of power between Germany, France, and the UK, making the former more influential than ever and the latter two more irrelevant. Fourth, it has created an economic divide among member states, deepening the already profound structural differences between north and south.
Therefore, if Europe is to make it through the crisis and emerge stronger rather than weaker it has to nurture its past and continue defending its particular vision of the future and its method of solving problems – and it also has to do its utmost to maintain the political, institutional, and economic balance among its member states.
So what is the meaning of European solidarity? It means, as is the case regarding the welfare state (pensions, unemployment benefits), to promote a more cohesive society or, in the context of security (NATO’s article 5), to support one another when in need. Of course, solidarity requires clear rules and procedures, and even sanctions (not punishments) for those who abuse the system. In other words, solidarity has to go hand in hand with responsibility – and this is exactly the gap the EU is attempting to bridge today. The alternative would be a kind of social-Darwinist Europe, one where only the fittest survive and where markets decide who is to live and who is to die. This, however, is not what Europe is about. Under the current circumstances, it is fair to exchange financial support for structural reforms. In other words, there is nothing wrong with conditionality. The problem lies elsewhere: Without growth, the virtuous circle between domestic reforms and support from abroad becomes a vicious circle, one that makes the crisis a blame game – and this will undermine Europe’s position on the markets.
Without solidarity, social Darwinism will prevail, and Europe will break apart. It will not split into a two-speed Europe, which is more or less what we already have, but into two Europes, which is a completely different thing. In a two-speed Europe the goals are the same and based on joint decisions; the criteria and rules for shifting from one speed to the other are clear, transparent, and non-discriminatory. Two Europes, however, means that there is a core and a periphery, and moving from one to the other is impossible, either because the criteria are unfair (I can lose weight but not gain height), or because the rules allow members of the core group to veto the accession of new members. The problem with a Europe composed of two Europes is that relations between core and periphery will be bumpy (see the US and Mexico) and cause continuous fighting about the distribution of resources (trade deficits, foreign investment, exchange rates) and standards (labour, health, environment, borders).
Still, such a Europe composed of two Europes is not a completely unrealistic scenario. We are where we are now precisely because such dynamics have come into play. Today, the EU is threatened by all sorts of political, institutional, and economic imbalances. If we fail to correct them, we will split in two, either de jure or de facto. To prevent this, is the challenge ahead of us.
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José Ignacio Torreblanca is Senior Research Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and Head of the Madrid Office.
