With the military invasion on February 24, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin made it clear that he is no longer interested in a cooperative European security order based on the Paris Charter. For the foreseeable future, the priority for EU Member States will therefore be to ensure security from Russia rather than security with Russia. In the past few months, Europe has set a course to contain and deter Russian aggression.
In the Versailles Declaration of March 2022, the EU Member States decided to fundamentally reinforce their defense capabilities and significantly increase their defense spending. Denmark held a successful referendum on joining the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), Finland has joined NATO, and Sweden is hoping to join soon1. NATO has strengthened its presence on the eastern flank and developed new defense plans for its entire alliance territory. Russia’s war of aggression has massively reinforced the importance of military aspects in European foreign and security policy. Though it is yet unclear when and how the war in Ukraine will end, there will be no return to the status quo ante with Russia, at least not as long as Putin is in office.
Less “win-win” and more of a “zero-sum” game
Another consequence of the Russian war of aggression is a changed European mindset with regard to foreign policy. Many policy areas, such as trade, competition, and research and technology, have evolved on the premise that international cooperation is generally beneficial for all parties involved. Even before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU had become disillusioned with this notion, not least due to China’s “mask diplomacy” during the Covid-19 pandemic or America’s secondary sanctions against European companies during Donald Trump’s presidency. The realization of just how fundamentally their own energy security depends on Russia, a country that exploits this dependency and instrumentalizes it in order to wage hybrid warfare, has been another wake-up call for European heads of state and government. Europe is now more aware than ever that it needs to be capable of independent action to protect its own interests and values. The European Commission now works to reduce asymmetric dependencies, build capacity in strategic sectors, and protect the EU from external coercion.
Unity despite diversity in the face of Russian aggression
However, the war has also forged unusual unity among the countries of the European Union. The EU used to struggle to speak with one voice on foreign policy issues. Now its members reacted resolutely, promptly, and flexibly. They imposed extensive sanctions against Russia, put together large financial aid packages, and cut through red tape to welcome and house Ukrainian refugees. Things that previously seemed unthinkable suddenly became possible. The EU financed weapons and equipment for Ukraine under its European Peace Facility, breaking with a decades-long taboo of not sending weapons to crisis regions. In December 2023, the EU decided to grant Ukraine and Moldova candidate status and open accession negotiations, thus initiating and driving the second major eastward EU enlargement.
Advancing the CFSP and CSDP
At the same time, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s staunch opposition to Ukraine’s EU accession exposes continuing deficiencies of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). European foreign policy operates according to the principle of unanimity. Though the Treaty of Lisbon obligates Member States to ensure loyal cooperation to achieve the highest possible degree of coherence in European foreign policy, the principle of unanimity is unenforceable in reality. On the contrary, it encourages states to use their veto to exert pressure and enforce concessions in areas unrelated to the vote at hand. In December 2023, Orbán leveraged his right of veto to unlock ten billion euros in frozen EU funds for Hungary in exchange for stepping out of the room during the vote on opening accession talks.
The focus of the reform debate is therefore, and rightly so, on how to prevent a total blockade of the CFSP in the future. A transition to qualified majority voting is a sensible proposal, but it requires the political will of all Member States, which unfortunately is currently not evident. In addition to fully exploiting the unused or underused potential of the Lisbon Treaty (including “constructive abstention” and “enhanced cooperation”), we should not stop there, but also consider options outside the formal EU framework to render the CFSP more capable of action.
Informal alliances of EU Member States
For example, instead of continuing to cave into Orbán’s financial demands in order to mobilize additional financial aid for Ukraine within the EU framework, the EU26 should find a way to circumvent Orbán’s veto, for example, by making the money available under an extra-budgetary financial package. In the past, an informal alliance of EU Member States was often the only way to pursue at least some form of joint foreign policy, as was the case in the E3+3 negotiations between six states and Iran regarding its nuclear program. The challenge is to collaborate in a way that strengthens the EU framework rather than undermining it. This can be achieved, for instance, by including representatives from EU institutions in the relevant formats. Russia’s war against Ukraine also exposed the blatant weakness of Europe’s defense capabilities. The cracks in European military capability are enormous, since Europe has been reducing it in recent decades. There is hardly any cooperation between European countries. Efforts to coordinate European procurement are falling flat. Many countries are going it alone, even though national budgets have increased. Because European production capabilities are often too slow to deliver in situations when shortages need to be resolved quickly, many European countries fall back on non-European solutions from the US or South Korea, which increases dependencies. The war has further reinforced the role of the US in Europe. Given the unclear future of domestic politics in the US and the fact that any future US administration is likely to strategically prioritize Asia, this is not a sustainable strategy.
Steering the European armaments effort
It is therefore essential to immediately enable Europeans to better protect their own security. We must finally overcome the pathological fragmentation of the European defense industry. By steering European armaments efforts and creating incentives, the EU could ensure that countries procure interoperable systems and that European armaments companies are not disadvantaged in favor of suppliers from third countries. The EU has launched commendable initiatives, including a regulation to strengthen the European defense industry by way of joint procurement (EDIRPA) and a regulation to drive ammunition production (ASAP). However, they lack the necessary financial strength and political backing among the Member States to bring about significant change. The EU is failing to leverage its potential as an “agent of empowerment” for European defense capacity by providing incentives to develop European capabilities that could also be used within NATO.
(1) Sweden officially joined NATO in March 2024. Prior to this, Sweden’s membership application was obstructed by Turkey and Hungary.
Dr Jana Puglierin has been serving as Head and Senior Policy Fellow at the Berlin Office of the European Council on Foreign Relations since 2020. Previously, she spent four years at the helm of the European Programme of the German Council on Foreign Relations. Among other things, she worked as a research assistant at the German Bundestag and at the Institute for Political Science and Sociology at the University of Bonn.