There is an obvious and vast gap between the hopes and expectations that were raised at the time of the Madrid Peace Conference in the fall of 1991, which essentially inaugurated the peace process in the Middle East, and what is expected from the conference in Annapolis later this month. To understand why these expectations differ so much, it is instructive to compare the political climate now and then, and how the ground was prepared for either of the two meetings.
How does this compare to Annapolis? Obviously, the international scene has changed dramatically between the autumn of the year 1991 and this autumn. But what are the essential elements that form the backdrop to the upcoming conference?
- the scope is limited and focused on the Israeli-Palestinian aspect of the conflict;
- the United States are no longer capable to perform the role of the “honest broker” which they played between 1991 and the year 2000 (when the peace process finally broke down in the wake of Camp David), in particular since Washington considers Israel’s suppression of the second Palestinian Intifada to be part of the Global War on Terror, and has authorized the various Israeli governments – implicitly and explicitly – to deal with the Palestinians solely as a military and security issue;
- for all practical purpose, some of the Arab states directly involved in the conflict with Israel have been excluded from the preparations and preliminary discussions. Formally speaking this could be justified by evoking the existence of the follow-up committee for the Arab Peace Initiative that was set up during the last Arab summit in Riyadh. However, such an approach willfully ignores how divided the Arabs are on crucial issues, among them possible approaches to relations with Israel;
- a lack of serious international involvement, which becomes obvious through the ominous absence of several heavy weight players on the international scene. This is not restricted to the parties of the quartet, but extends to states of whom significant contributions for the development of the Palestinian areas after a possible Israeli withdrawal are expected, such as Japan. But even if we look at the positions of the quartet, it is possible to speak of different levels of enthusiasm and support for the conference: from reserve (Russia) over qualified support (European Union) to wholesale subscription (the US, who conceived the idea and is hosting the meeting).
To sum it up, a number of regional forces and states have been prompted into pre-emptive hostility for the conference, and are prepared to see to its failure. Worse, the way the American diplomacy floated the idea prompted important countries in the region, irrespective of their disposition towards the idea itself, into a tacit alliance capable to thwart any results that those convening in Annapolis may achieve.
We may think here of Hamas first and foremost, but also other Palestinian forces who consider that this meeting, in addition to marginalizing them within the Palestinian camp, will only lead to more Palestinian concessions for the benefit of Israel. Iran, Syria and the Lebanese Hezbollah are also on this list, forces that whose potential to affect the regional situation should not be underestimated. Syria, for instance, has still territories occupied by Israel, while Israelis and Americans are still wrangling about whether the issue of Syria will be tabled at all.
To return to the differences in the genesis of the two conferences, Madrid and Annapolis, there are two important aspects to add: one, the administration of president George Bush (the Father) had committed itself to initiate a peace process in the aftermath of the Gulf War and the liberation of Kuwait, in order to compensate the Arabs for the loss of an important element in the strategic balance with Israel with the defeat of Iraq. The new conference on the other hand is meant to offer “the moderate Arabs” (in the parlance of the US) a symbolic gift in response for them siding with America in its conflict with Iran and what it describes as “Arab extremists”. However, this symbolic gift contains a grave strategic danger for the Arab political system: it transforms the divisions in the region from differences over the conflict with Israel and, essentially, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to a division between those who support the US and those who support Iran. This division has the potential to lead to internal divisions, most likely in the form of sectarian conflict, in a number of Arab states that are composed of minorities – and it appears that the US have no intention to do much about it.
Two, the ceiling of the conference is extremely low with regard to the Palestinians. While Madrid clearly adopted the decisions of the United Nations as the legal basis for the negotiations, meaning that all sponsors of the meeting accepted that the objective of the peace process would be an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories according to the resolutions of the Security Council, Annapolis is taking the road map and George Bush’s vision to establish two states on the territory of mandate Palestine as the essential template for the proposed new process. This is a tremendous setback: taking the UN-decisions as essential frame reference firmly grounded Madrid in the principles of international law, with all the protection that this provides for the weaker party, the Palestinians. The character of the road map, on the contrary, is largely contractual, geared towards an agreement between the two parties outside the framework and the protections of the standards of international law – which puts the Palestinians at a serious disadvantage. It is also a piecemeal approach – and yet, not one of its provisions has ever been applied.
We may add that the motives of the current American administration behind to call for such a conference appear questionable, after they have been ignoring the Palestinian issue for all those years, and after all we heard about George Bush’s need for “some achievement” in the Middle East in order to appease Republican voters disenchanted with the deteriorating situation in Iraq. Also, it appears disingenuous, sixty years after the first Arab-Israeli war, to go back to square one of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and again discuss principles and definitions that should be considered givens by now. Finally, the endless Israeli-Palestinian differences over a common draft for what may turn into a final declaration indicate that both sides are too weak to achieve even a minimum of consensus. This weakness becomes even more dangerous with the new, last minute condition whereby Israel wants the Palestinians to accept that it is a “Jewish State”. Have we ever heard of any state demanding another state – leave alone a people under occupation – to recognize one of its cultural or religious qualities? Obviously, what is behind this request is the Israeli intention, once again, to compel the Palestinians to recognize its original right to establish a Jewish State, and thus to forgo any claims or compensation related to the displacement of the Palestinian refugees in 1948 – at a time where Palestinians need to apply for permits from the Israeli army to get to work, or even to go home.
Does any of this give us reason to believe that this conference will succeed? Does it help to even make it happen?
Houssam Itani is the opinion editor of the Lebanese Daily Al-Safir.