Since the break-up of the Soviet Union a dialogue between German and Russian civil society organisations has been slowly but steadily evolving. (1) The opening of the Soviet (and later the Russian) political system allowed not only freer travel and exchange of opinions, but also made possible the establishment of a wide range of foreign nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) in Russia. Almost immediately, German organisations, like the GTZ, the Goethe Institute and the political foundations established subsidiaries in Moscow to support the democratic process. Their problem, however, was to find counterparts in the host country to work with, because there were very few NGOs in Russia in the first half of the 1990s. Those that did exist were weak, small and mostly local in character. Only a few of the civil associations dating from perestroika times survived the early transformation period. As a consequence, the work of foreign NGOs was mainly directed towards governmental organisations or organisations formally controlled by the government. While the German and Russian governments did rhetorically support dialogue between civil societies, it was at first severely hampered by the lack of the necessary societal institutions and structures in Russia.
In the course of the 1990s Russian NGOs (although nobody called them that at this time) developed and grew mostly in non- or pre-political arenas (2) and without much attention from the government. Where NGOs with clear policy preferences did exist, they sought and found their lobbying counterparts among the members of parliament and often directly inside state and bureaucratic structures (for example, the very influential presidential administration). Within state structures there were still, at that time, many former members of the Soviet opposition who had maintained strong connections to their former dissident allies who had stayed outside. (3) So NGOs could lobby their interests directely through this former allies inside the administrations, without using the political arenas.This situation began to change only in the early days of the first Chechen war, when Russian NGOs for the first time stood up in sharp political opposition to the Yeltsin government.
The Impact of President Putin’s “Steered Democracy”
Since taking office, President Vladimir Putin consequently pursued a policy to strengthen the vertical hierarchy of power within the state and to build a system of so-called “steered democracy”. According to this strategy only a strong state could resist the centrifugal forces that threatened the country, reintegrate Russia, and - in a controlled way - lead to the development of a democratic society.
The concept of steered democracy became reality inside the framework of the liberal Russian constitution, as the Duma elections on December 7th 2003 showed. The Putin-party “Unified Russia” won two thirds of all seats in the new parliament and is now able to change the constitution without needing the consent of the opposition. The liberal parties Yabloko and Union of Right Forces (SPS) failed to get enough votes to be represented in the new State Duma. After the parliamentary elections, there can be no reasonable doubts as to Putin’s re-election in the presidential election on March 14th, 2004. The arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovski, the major stock-holder in Russia’s biggest Russian oil company, YUKOS, and one of the so called “oligarchs”, in October 2003, too, can be seen as part of Putin’s strategy to strengthen his hold of state institutions.
The domestic policy of “steered democracy” has been accompanied by a more aggressive policy towards Chechnya. Backed by a large deployment of Russian armed forces, the Kremlin has pursued a brutal strategy (if it can be called strategy) of “rule and divide” with the Chechen leader Akhmad Kadyrov, who is cruel and a terrorist but loyal to the Kremlin. As the most recent terrorist attack on February 6th, 2004 in the Moscow subway showed, terrorism will persist on Russian territory even if it might be possible to put an end to the ability of Chechen separatists to act as coordinated armed forces.
President Putin’s policy of “steered democracy” has had important ramifications for the NGO landscape in Russia. Part of this policy is the idea of a corporate society with direct communication canals between the leader on the one side and societal organizations on the other. It contains an element of strong distrust towards functional elites, to which even the political parties are considered to belong. Since 2000 the Kremlin has been building a system to control all democratic institutions. This includes the business corporations as well as the electronic mass media, trade unions, legislature, and the court system. As a result, in today’s Russia there are very few autonomous political subjects left. Among those remaining are several NGO-associations like the “People’s Assembly” (4). These were able to preserve their independence through a process of cooperation with and opposition to the Kremlin, but only because, from the Kremlin’s point of view, they were lacking enough power to be a real challenge. Moreover, they have been a convenient tool for fights among different groups inside the Kremlin. Nevertheless, there have been and would certainly be in future attempts on the part of the Kremlin to get these NGOs under control as well. These attempts are, in a way, related to German-Russian relations.
The Role of the German-Russian Relations
In 2000 President Putin and the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder initiated the so-called “Petersburg Dialogue,” which had the declared intention to organize and support the dialogue between the civil societies in both countries. But from the beginning, the dialogue was confronted with the problem that both governments had quite different concepts of civil society in mind (see also the contribution of Christian Meier in this publication). The German side invited representatives of all relevant political groups and parties and even representatives from some NGOs. On the Russian side only people close and/or loyal to the Kremlin got invitations, although the German side had asked the Russians to invite others as well. At the meeting, Gleb Pavlovsky, an adviser to President Putin said, that there are no Russian NGOs because there is no Russian civil society.
But soon after the first meeting in St. Petersburg in April 2001, the Kremlin spoke for the first time publicly about forming a Chamber of Civil Society Organisations. In June President Putin invited the representatives of 30 carefully selected civil society organisations to the Kremlin. (5) In the end, the plans to form such a Chamber that, from the Kremlin’s point of view, would legitimately speak for the whole civil society failed, partly because the NGOs opposed it, partly because of contradictions within the Kremlin itself.
Without intending to, by supporting the Russian design of the “Petersburg Dialogue” and by softening its criticisms concerning human rights and the lack of democracy under Putin, the German government lent support to the restorative tendencies inside Russia. Partially responsible for this were the resounding changes in international politics after the terror attacks on New York City and Washington on September 11th, 2001. President Putin decided immediately – and against the advice of most of his deputies, political allies, and the foreign policy elite inside Russia – to join the US-led war on terrorism. (6) As a result, western officials toned down their criticism towards the Russian government regarding democratic development, human rights, and the rule of law. The cruel war and the permanent human right violations in Chechnya were mostly accepted as a part of the war on terrorism. While German officials gave assurances that they were continuing to demand in confidential meetings that the Russians observe human right standards, very few such words were spoken in public. To put it bluntly: German policy since then has concentrated on three issue areas: Stability, the war on terrorism, and the economy. (7)
Contrary to declared intentions, the West’s cooperation with Russia in the “war on terrorism” did not lead to a “civilizing” of Russian foreign policy. The result we see today is rather a trend towards a new form of imperialistic behaviour. This can be seen clearly in Russia’s policies towards its immediate neighbours, like Georgia, the Ukraine, and the Baltic States, which will soon become members of the EU. European and especially German officials tend to point to problems in Russia concerning human right standards, democracy and free media, but they are not willing to link these criticisms with conditioned cooperation in economic or military policy arenas. Often, Russian officials interpret this behaviour as a sign of weakness and prefer to discuss serious matters with the US. As EU-Commissioner Günther Verheugen acknowledged in December 2003 during a meeting in Moscow: “We have many action plans, but no action. We have great strategies, but no deeds. We have visions, but no practise.”
Demands on German and European Policies Toward Russia
As already indicated, Russian NGOs belong to the last independent, though weak, political subjects. Together with a few liberal politicians, they are the last internal critics of Russian nationalist, imperialistic, and bureaucratic restoration. It is not very far-sighted of western governments, who are in other cases stressing the strengthening of civil society as a way to achieve democratic transition and international security, to act so passively towards Russia and to neglect societal organisations. Open and public criticism of Russian domestic policy, which is becoming more and more authoritarian, is being voiced only by transnational NGOs and international organisations such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe. (8)
So how should German and European governments deal with Russia? First they should make substantial effort to strengthen bilateral and multilateral contacts on all levels: official, scientific, economic, and civil society. Within Russian society there is still a strong tendency to encapsulate itself, to be self-sufficient (“samodostatochny“). This tendency reinforces current developments which could be leading towards a new bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. In dealing with Russia, Europeans should leave no doubt that Russia is a European country, even if nobody seriously discusses a Russian membership in the EU. Russia is a member of the European Council and has accepted all obligations connected with this membership. The impact of these institutions on East European states is not sufficiently understood in the West.
If the aim is to promote civil society in Russia, to advance the causes of human rights, ecology, rights for minorities, tolerance, and gender democracy, building strategic partnerships with societal NGOs is a must. It is clear that this is not the exclusive responsibility of governments and international organisations. But they do have to make clear that civil society contacts play a key role in the western/German-Russian relations. And they have to bring this concern to the table when “hard” economic and defense-related issues are discussed.
No one disputes that contacts with the agents of the new Russian “steered democracy”, such as the Russian parliament and its leading faction Unified Russia, must be maintained. But one has to be aware that these institutions are controlled by the Kremlin. Even the experience with such a presumably “innocent” event as the German-Russian “Petersburg Dialogue” shows this very clearly. The nominal leader of the Russian delegation to the steering committee, former USSR-President Mikhail Gorbachev, does not make any significant decisions in the absence of the agents of the Kremlin. And he does nothing to hide this fact.
It may be useful to launch a profound discussion about the relationship between stability and democracy after the definitive end of the Cold War, i.e. after the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington D.C. on September 11th. Admittedly, many different voices have been heard on this topic in various forums, but so far their impact on policy has been rather weak. The red-green coalition agreement in Germany contains elements acknowledging these connections, but in everyday policy such concerns often fall victim to (geo-) political and budgetary considerations. The dialogue maintained at the state level is of inevitable importance, but it is the dialogue with critical civil society organisations that requires more support.
Remarks
- Much of the discussion in this article of civil society relations between Germany and Russia could also apply to European-Russian and, with some exceptions, US-Russian relations. But I will concentrate on German-Russian relations.
- As it is understood in Russia. That means, that the NGO did not want to take part in the election process and public policy. Even such highly political arenas like Human Rights the NGOs themselves are assuming as strictly non-political. The understanding of what means „politics“ or „political“ in Russia differs very much from that in the West.
- To give an example, the “Act about Rehabilitation of Former Political Victims,” which was approved by the parliament in 1993, was largely authored by experts from the human right organisation Memorial. There are many more examples in the fields of consumer protection, environmental legislation, and others.
- The People’s Assembly (Narodnaya Assambleya) is an association of about 50 leaders from leading Russian NGOs, like Memorial, Glasnost Defense Foundation, Social-Ecological Union, Moscow Helsinki Group and others. There are similar associations in other locations, for example in St. Petersburg and Perm.
- No political NGO dealing with issues like human rights, ecology, consumers protection or minority rights was invited.
- This was another very strong step towards re-rationalizing Russian foreign policy, which had been lacking under Yeltsin’s presidency due to a gap between old soviet doctrine and new Russian possibilities.„politics“ or „political“ in Russia differs exceptional from that in the West.
- First, Putin’s strengthening of the state and his stable and high popularity seem to guarantee the stable development of Russia. Second, he made Russia a partner in international security issues, so its military arsenals are no longer seen as a risk only. Third, the growing Russian economy, and especially Russian oil and gas resources, make Russia an essential trade partner in Western Europe’s and North America’s efforts to meet their energy supply needs, help diversify their energy sources, and become more independent of the Middle East oil countries.
- Inside Russia these international organisations are now often criticised as “western tools”. This happened in the case of the OSCE after it announced that the Duma election last December had been free but not fair.