The European (or “third”) pillar of missile defence is a planned component of the American national missile defence system, tasked with protecting the United States of America (and indirectly, their allies) from possible ballistic missile attack. The American missile defence system has been in development since the 1950s in various modifications, but it was not until the administration of the Republican President George W. Bush that it was expanded. In 2001, the United States increased funding for missile defence and withdrew from the Soviet-American Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM). That treaty, signed in 1972, restricted the distribution of missile defence capabilities.
In 2002, the USA began bilateral consultations with the Czech (Social Democratic) government on the possible positioning of a US radar station in the Czech Republic. The USA simultaneously initiated negotiations with Poland on the positioning of missile defence capabilities there. It is worth noting that initially Hungary was also considered as a possible host country for part of the American missile defence project. This sprinkling of US military bases throughout the countries of the former Warsaw Pact (as opposed to the concentration of these elements in a single country, such as a country with an already existing US military base) testifies at the very least to a potential geopolitical factor in the American administration’s decision.
Debate in the Czech Republic
The public debate on American missile defence and the radar base is primarily distinguished by a high degree of emotionality, which has polarised both camps (opponents and supporters) to the detriment of any factual or pragmatic discussion. Extreme anti-Americanism has been clashing with an obstinate Russophobia, while naïve pacifism has contrasted with a messianic faith in brute force. Too often the arguments for and against the radar base refer to the past, in order to avail themselves of every conceivable trauma from Czech history, instead of responsibly analysing the present and the future.
Indeed, just like in Poland, in the Czech Republic the subject of this debate has become Russia, not the alleged threat posed by the so-called “rogue” states against the American system as officially primarily intended. Supporters of the radar base perceive a possible American presence on Czech territory as a very valuable security guarantee and as the pinnacle of the country’s post-communist transformation, anchoring it in the West. Opponents of the radar base, on the other hand, reject any close (or superfluous) connection of Czech foreign policy with one or the other superpower. For historical reasons, supporters of the radar base do not trust security guarantees coming from the European continent and point to the non-existence of a common European security policy, while opponents of the base believe that membership in NATO alone, and indirectly EU membership, is sufficient to guarantee the country’s security.
Russia
The Russian reaction to the American plans must be perceived to a certain extent within the context of the “new” Russian foreign policy. While it is true that Russian concerns over the impact of the planned form of the third pillar – i.e., 10 missiles in Poland and a radar base in the Czech Republic – on Russia’s strategic nuclear force are baseless, that is not the case with regard to their concerns over the future form of the American system, which could undergo significant expansion and improvement. Such concerns are even more legitimate for China, which currently boasts less than 30 ICBMs.
The way in which the USA communicates and negotiates on missile defence with Russia (and by extension with the broader international community) is even more important in that it can either create or remove pretexts for Russia to withdraw from various important treaties, to fail to renew them, or to be unwilling to satisfactorily negotiate them, such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) or the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). The international tension surrounding American intentions in the area of missile defence will be reflected in the talks at the evaluation conference on the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2010.
NATO and the need for a broader policy
While most of the Czech media interpreted the conclusions of the NATO Bucharest summit as a “green light for the radar”, the truth is that the two relevant paragraphs of the Bucharest communiqué on missile defence are rather vague and can be analysed and understood in contradictory ways. The fact that the allies were not and are not completely united on the matter of the third pillar was indicated by the difficulty with which the phrase “substantial contribution” was negotiated (regarding the benefit the planned third pillar represents for the allies’ defence). The text of the communiqué basically postponed the political decision on the degree to which the third pillar of American missile defence will be incorporated into the NATO architecture until the April summit in 2009 or (most likely) even later.
The conclusions of the NATO summit in Bucharest recognise the existence of a threat from the proliferation of ballistic weapons. However, they also underscore that missile defence is only part of a “broader response” to this threat. Naturally, the proliferation of ballistic weapons in and of itself represents a real threat that would accompany nuclear weapon proliferation. In this connection, we must ask what the relationship is between missile defence and preventing nuclear proliferation. We must also ask whether we have truly done the maximum possible to ensure that international non-proliferation treaties are effective and that nuclear disarmament occurs rapidly, or whether effective diplomatic and communications channels have been opened with those countries which have been labelled as problematic. We must weigh all the pros and cons which the American plans involve, especially the danger of the militarisation of space, which features in the original strategy of America’s Republican Party known as “Brilliant Pebbles.” Last but not least, we must ask whether it is really necessary to invest billions of dollars in a system to foil threats which in the modern world will most probably materialise as small, violent actions using primitive (but frighteningly lethal) technology, not as ICBM strikes.
Missile defence does not address the causes of international tension and does not address terrorism at all. The causes are, primarily: Unequal access to and unfair distribution of natural resources; the dependency of economic growth on non-renewable resources; great economic and social disparities; unfair trade policies; human rights violations; the feeling amongst the inhabitants of some countries that they are being abused, violated, or forgotten by the rest of the world; ethnic, religious and cultural intolerance; lack of education; lack of freedom; and many other causes, including the psycho-emotional reasons that lead people to commit desperate acts.
USA
The new US administration of Barack Obama will not reverse American foreign policy as far as missile defence is concerned (all the more so in that the Secretary of Defense will remain, for a short time at least, Robert Gates, a backer of this project). However, for the time being it seems the future American administration will have a more sophisticated and less reactionary approach to solving international problems than its predecessor. The future president is more cautious on missile defence, primarily with regard to its effectiveness, which has yet to be confirmed. Also, because the US Congress significantly reduced the financing allocated to constructing the third pillar at the end of last year, it can be expected that the development and eventual location of the entire system will be postponed for several years.
The US government should primarily concentrate its energy on addressing the real roots of international tensions and strengthening the multilateral dimension of its relations towards international regimes, treaties, laws, and principles. Missile defence does not have to be repudiated a priori, but it should be moved to the research and development phase, and the time prior to its eventual unveiling should be used for a more intensive effort in the area of international diplomacy, negotiating both the future of missile defence and its relevance for addressing actual security threats. It is also essential that the European Union finally begin to concern itself with this matter and send the signal that it does have a foreign policy that is genuinely common to all its members.
Ondřej Liška is the Minister of Education, Youth and Sports of the Czech Republic and first deputy chairman of the Czech Green Party.