Reflections of H.E. Mr. Armen Martirosyan, Ambassador of Armenia to Germany on the 11th Annual Foreign Policy Conference “Europe’s East. Ideas for the EU”s policy vis-à-vis its eastern neighbors”
Recently a number of discussions dedicated to the Eastern policy of the European Union took place in Berlin. It proves that the whole region of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus in particular is of interest and importance to the EU. The Conference on “Europe’s East. Ideas for the EU”s policy vis-à-vis its eastern neighbors” organized by the Heinrich Böll Foundation on October 7-8, with the participation of prominent experts and politicians representing the EU and participant states of the Eastern Partnership program, also attempted to elaborate on this important initiative of the EU. I certainly don’t aspire in this paper to comprehensively present this multifaceted topic (and neither did the Conference, in my opinion), but would rather like to share some ideas on it.
Although we don’t perceive it literally, it was very inspiring to learn that some participants hold the opinion that the doors for EU membership should not be closed to Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. In the meantime, almost all panelists shared the view that the level of engagement of the EU in the South Caucasus, compared with the US and Russia, is low and the EU should be more active in its policies towards these states. These kind of judgments are quite popular and could be interpreted by the fact that it is much easier for a single country to design and implement regional policies than for a group of countries. Even though the EU is not just a simple group of countries but an alliance of like minded states, within that alliance the national interests are not always totally compatible and therefore policies of countries vary accordingly. It concerns not only various aspects of domestic policies (as the recent economic crisis has revealed) but also international affairs. It is of no surprise that varying assessments and approaches towards some contemporary issues of international affairs may cause frictions and variant readings within the EU. No doubt that effective implementation of the provisions of the Lisbon treaty would strengthen solidarity among the EU member states and facilitate not only the convergence of their goals, but also homogeneity of policies.
The ongoing deliberations on the European security system once again revealed the complexity of this issue, and the discussions on whether to improve the existing security system or to introduce a new one (as suggested by Russia in particular) will most probably last for a while. The western partners perceive the proposal of the Russian President Medvedev first and foremost as a tool to prevent the further enlargement of NATO. The comment made by the Russian Ambassador Mr. Grinin at the Conference as of: “we broke down the Wall but you put up a new one” to a certain degree reflects Russian disposition on this issue.
Some flawed comments made at the Conference on Russia’s attitude towards the EU`s initiative, the European Partnership, have illustrated still existing misgivings of some participants. Admittedly, this program had not caused particular enthusiasm in Russian expert society as a whole, but interpreting its attitude towards the EP as hostile is irrelevant. In the meantime, some statements of Russian politicians display a notable similarity between the United States` and Russia’s world outlooks: the apparent geopolitical vector in foreign policies of these countries is ubiquitous and still of high importance for both. As opposed to that, stands a rather technocratic vision of the EU, which sees its eastern mission as more or less neutral geopolitical enterprise. As we view it, the main goal of the EP is to modernize the periphery of the EU and to bring many aspects of the former into compliance with the requirements of the latter. Admittedly this approach is not shared by all EU members, some of which are inclined to pursue more of a geopolitical agenda which is quite close to the US vision. It is not accidental that these new member states have occasionally attempted to use their status in both western alliances, the EU and NATO, for addressing bilateral problems with Russia (pipelines, rights of Russian minorities etc.) and to requite for old resentments with former “step mother country”. Hopefully, the latter is a residual symptom, and will relieve soon, unless unexpected turbulence zones shake the historical memory of new generations to reset their mindset to the “traditional” mood. Undoubtedly, to improve relations, the worldly wisdom of the old members of both alliances is crucial. In this regard, an invitation extended to President Medvedev to attend a NATO Summit is a timely initiative and hopefully would contribute to improvement of Russia’s relations with the Euro-Atlantic alliance.
For obvious reasons, the panel on “The lessons of the war in Georgia” was very topical for the region. It was quite expected that panelists justified actions on both sides of the war in terms of international law, with pro-Georgian speakers arguing that Georgia acted to prevent the secession of both Ossetia and Abkhazia, while Russia was forced to protect ethnic Ossetians and Russian peacekeepers from attacks.
I cannot but agree with some speakers that the issue of IDPs and refugees sometimes irrelevantly is manipulated in the region. Quite apart from other primary considerations, the absence of an estimated number of individuals of both categories, the absence of conditions for their safe return, absence of any guarantees for their non-violent coexistence with other nationalities, the desperate and sometimes aggressive mood of these people turn the painful issue of refugees into political profiteering.
It is noteworthy that the discussions underlined the expediency “to engage secessionists into European politics”. No doubt that this timely suggestion will help politicians from non-recognized states to better comprehend realities and the spirit of the times.
In the meantime, despite the timid attempts to draw lessons from the Georgian war in 2008, some panelists mostly kept talking about who was more to blame for the start of the August war, what was the role of external actors, etc. No doubt that retrospective scrutiny of these issues is important for policy-makers in the EU. On the other hand, only impartial and comprehensive presentation of “lessons learnt” will make these very lessons relevant and valuable for the EU in the conflict areas of its Eastern neighborhood.
The claims by some panellists that the “timely and effective steps of the European Union allowed to contain the war” are unfounded or at least very inflated. It is obvious that the war was first of all contained in time and territory due to the completely disproportionate military-political potentials of the conflicting parties. This very factor would deter any return to military confrontation in the future provided that there are no entangling alliances complicating the matter.
In this regard, the likeness of the situation preceding the August war and the current state of Nagorno Karabagh dispute is obvious: dramatic military build up of the parties concerned, refusal of one conflicting party to sign an agreement on the non-use of force (Georgia and Azerbaijan respectively), the presence of thousands of desperate refugees, etc. Such striking similarities coupled with the militaristic rhetoric of Azerbaijan are threatening the fragile peace and may transform the “frozen conflict” into an open military confrontation. In the absence of active military actions, only in summer of 2010 two dozen soldiers (read innocent boys) from both sides were killed by snipers. If God forbid, war starts tomorrow in Nagorno Karabagh, the consequences would be disastrous for the entire region and beyond. Stockpiled armaments and more or less the same weight categories would lead to protracted military actions between Armenians and Azeris. With all due respect to the international mediation, I doubt that it would be able to extinguish the fire in 7-8 days and contain it territorially. Even though Azeri refusal to sign the non-use of force agreement can somehow, and at a stretch, be explained (such agreement is fraught with risks to solidify the status quo unless some counter measures are introduced), the calmness with which the international community perceived the refusal of Azerbaijan to remove the snipers from the contact line and the following inaction was totally inappropriate. The unchanged rhetoric of Azerbaijan with their everlasting references exclusively to one principle of international law (territorial integrity), the wilful interpretation of the right of peoples to self-determination, combined with the total negligence of other fundamental principles (refraining from the threat or use of force and peaceful settlement of conflicts) do not contribute to peace talks. It is not out of place to mention that according to article #9 of its Constitution “The Azerbaijan Republic rejects a war as a means of infringement on independence of other states and way of settlement of international conflicts.” As they say, comments are needless.
An opinion that the EU lacks tools for more active and effective contribution to the peaceful settlement of disputes has often been referred to recently. At present, the most essential mission that the EU can fulfil in this regard is to implement confidence-building measures. Traditions of the EU to make use of soft power to this end are well known, and existing formats and arrangements allow this. Thus, the Declaration by the European Council on the Eastern Partnership states that “the Eastern Partnership will help to build trust and develop closer ties among the six Eastern partners themselves.” On May 7th 2009, the heads of states adopted the Joint Declaration on Eastern Partnership, where they committed to “further promote stability and multilateral confidence building.” Persistent refusal of Azerbaijan to engage in any regional cooperation with Armenia and relevant reservations introduced in this regard to all EU regional initiatives have become business as usual in the eyes of international community, although all of the above-mentioned have violated the pledges of our neighbouring country. In the meantime, it is obvious that this policy of disengagement is not only detrimental to the peace process, but also undermines the whole concept of the Eastern Partnership initiative of the EU.
An idea to replace France, as a Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, with one common EU vote has been articulated recently on different occasions. I’d rather consider it as premature simply because the EU itself still lacks solidarity on various issues of contemporary affairs. Let alone that nobody has asked the opinion of the parties of the conflict in this regard.
By no means have I attempted to justify the present inability of the parties concerned to reconcile positions on the NK dispute. There is no doubt that negotiating parties are first and foremost responsible for the current situation and further developments. Regrettably, quick fix solutions are not available. Things are not as good as we would like them to be, but they can get worse. The role of the leading experts should not be confined to the discussions about the efficiency of existing formats and arrangements or the establishment of new ones. I do believe that to create a minimum level of trust among the conflicting parties and to avoid further deterioration of the situation, existing formats and available tools could be utilized more effectively. Successful realization of small and well-timed steps, like the removal of snipers from contact line, would not only serve this righteous goal but might save the lives of young soldiers on both sides.
Yesterday another young Armenian soldier was shot by an Azeri sniper at the border. His family suffered an unrecoverable loss. I will not be surprised if we hear very soon about retaliation. This savage vengeance deepens mistrust between people and further alienates them. Minsk Group Co-chairs are busy with summing up their special visit to the region and preparation of the next meeting between Armenian and Azeri Presidents. I rather thought, why shouldn’t Germany revive the urgent proposal for the removal of snipers from the contact line? Not only does Germany have enough influence, but two core elements of its foreign policy: commitment to multilateralism and balance between interest-based and value oriented policies, have enabled this country to become an honest broker and mediator in global and regional affairs. The recent election of Germany for a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council does not only prove my words, but also issues an outright invitation to a more active role in urgent international affairs.
By Armen Martirosyan, Ambassador of Armenia to Germany