He is not the first minister to be sacked by Vladimir Putin. But none have been recently dispatched as ignominiously as Minister of Defence Anatoly Serdiukov (Serdyukov), even though he was very close to the Putin clan. As a matter of fact, it was this closeness that had elevated Serdiukov to high office in the first place. In 2000, following a less than dazzling career as a furniture dealer, he married the daughter of Viktor Zubkov. Back in St. Petersburg Zubkov had served as a second-in-command to the then deputy mayor Vladimir Putin. When Putin was promoted to a Moscow job his former deputy was promoted to head Russia’s inland revenue office. During Putin’s second term as President, Zubkov became Prime Minister. In 2008 he had to yield his post to Putin following Dmitry Medvedev’s elevation to President, but stayed on as first deputy Prime Minister. Serdiukov followed in Zubkov’s wake, first joining the tax office and then taking over from Zubkov as its director until February 2007 when Putin appointed him Minister of Defence.
A sudden fall from grace
In view of this family career Serdiukov’s sudden fall from grace, and especially his public humiliation, call for an explanation. How come Serdiukov was found in his underwear at the apartment of his colleague, Yevgenia Vasilieva – who until last summer had been in charge of the Ministry of Defence property – during an early morning house search in mid-October 2012? Few in Russia believe that this could have happened if it hadn’t been officially sanctioned from “above”. Mrs Vasilieva, euphemistically referred to as a ‘close acquaintance’ of Serdiukov by the daily Kommersant, is accused of having stolen nearly 3 billion roubles (around 75 million euros) through fraudulent real estate transactions and of channelling the monies into foreign bank accounts.
At the same time, the underwear offers the simplest explanation of Serdiukov’s abrupt fall: Serdiukov had gradually grown apart from his family (in both senses of the word). It was the family that had enabled him to rise to the top and it was the family that has now taken him down. However, matters are probably more complicated than that. There is probably no simple explanation that would account for everything, especially since we are moving dangerously close to the thin ice of Kremlinology. In this case a number of factors are likely to have come together.
Putin appointed Serdiukov Defence Minister in 2007 so that he would push through the army reform that had long been boycotted or, rather, sabotaged, by the generals and the military and industrial complex, and so that he would make every part of the Russian army operational again, not just its nuclear forces. The far-reaching reforms (this is not the place to discuss their success or lack thereof) made Serdiukov plenty of enemies in the army. In addition, Serdiukov had purchased modern weapons systems – such as the French Mistral rocket cruisers – from abroad, scorning less modern Russian-made systems. It is unlikely that he would have done so without Putin’s approval.
A signal to everyone in the inner circle of power that nobody is safe
Under normal circumstances this kind of conflict within the power elite would probably have been sufficient to explain Serdiukov’s sacking. But, firstly, the circumstances are not normal. The Kremlin continues to be concerned about the protests of the past winter and spring. Putin’s ratings have been going down. Even the little boost that followed the presidential election in March has long evaporated. His ratings are now worse than before the election, and the trend is downward. And second, the public humiliation cannot be explained by power struggles alone. In the past people who were no longer needed could at least expect to be rewarded with a cushy job.
Serdiukov’s sacking might send a double signal. On the one hand Putin has shown the outside world that he is finally and seriously intent on dealing with corruption that has become endemic. However, that would require that criminal charges be brought against Serdiukov and not just against his “acquaintance” Vasilieva, currently under house arrest in her two-million-euro, thirteen-room, apartment on the Arbat. Whether this will happen is far from certain. So far criminal proceedings have not been initiated against him although his dacha was searched last week. Should he choose to punish Serdiukov, Putin would send a second message to his own people. Since nobody in his inner circle has so far fallen from grace, Serdiukov’s imprisonment would signal to everyone in the inner circle of power that nobody is safe.
A major economic and political crisis seems inevitable
Why should this kind of warning be necessary at this point? Why is Putin clearing his front lines? The crossing is getting rougher. Practically every analysis of Russia’s political and economic situation assumes that a major crisis in the not so distant future is inevitable. The necessary reforms, which would result in cuts in social benefits, would be extremely unpopular. That is another reason for the escalating repression. In the past it was possible to resolve most social and political problems with money but that is getting increasingly scarce. In this kind of crisis, so the popular Russian wisdom goes, the rulers have to rely on three forces: the secret service, the police and the army. The secret service is Putin’s fiefdom. The police, under the new Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev, seem to be broadly loyal. But the Kremlin may have been concerned that the army might not have followed Serdiukov (i.e. his patron Putin). It was no accident that Putin chose as his new Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, the second most popular politician after himself, and probably the sole top Russian politician not involved in any corruption affair.
Rumours about Putin's health condition
Apart from the impending economic problems there is another major question that has lately been haunting most analysts: Is Putin sick? And if so, how seriously? “Haunt” is the correct word here, for nobody has dared to address the issue directly. The first rumours appeared in September, following Putin’s "flight with the cranes". The Moscow daily Vedomosti was the first serious paper to raise the issue in early November, its front page and editorial providing a meticulous list of all Putin’s planned foreign visits that he had cancelled since September and the rare trips (three in October) that he had made from his dacha on the outskirts of Moscow to the Kremlin. Putin’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov felt duty-bound to publicly calm the rumour mill by claiming Putin had suffered a minor sports muscle injury, nothing grave, and that he had reduced the frequency of his trips to Moscow in order to cause less aggravation to Muscovites resulting from road closures and traffic jams.
The gossip reached boiling point by the time of the St. Petersburg Dialogue in mid-November in Moscow. Russian journalists from the Kremlin pool shook their heads with concern about the President's serious (according to reliable sources) state of health. Photographers enjoying close access to the presidential body were told to home in on any signs of illness. Putin’s somewhat crooked body posture, even while sitting, was noted, leading to claims that his generously cut suit concealed a corset. The corset was held to confirm the mounting suspicion that there was something wrong with Putin’s back. But what was it? The rumours range from a slipped disc (diagnosis: painful but not dangerous) to sarcoma of the spine (diagnosis: he has only a limited time left to live).
However, what does all this have to do with Serdiukov? Should Putin be suffering from an illness that could take him out of circulation at least temporarily, for example for some complex surgery, it might explain why he started consolidating his power.
To sum up again: Serdiukov constituted a weak link in Putin’s system. He had done his job, which was to shake up the army by brute force. His personal escapades had estranged him from the Putin Clan. Under his leadership corruption in the defence ministry may have reached a degree even more outrageous than in other areas. In addition, Serdiukov was one of the least popular politicians (and not just within the army) on Putin’s team. All things considered, his downfall served a dual purpose: of closing ranks and of providing a popular scapegoat.
Is any of this certain? Of course it isn’t. The only thing we can be sure of is that things won’t be boring.
Jens Siegert is head of the Heinrich Böll Foundation's office in Moscow.