By Oleh Rybachuk
Ukraine has clearly made its geopolitical choice for full membership in the EU and the European collective security system. The NATO alliance has made its choice as well, at least formally, by declaring at the NATO summit in Bucharest that Ukraine will one day join its ranks. Both sides understand, however, that it may be a while until this vision become reality, as the level of commitment to this goal varies so greatly among NATO members.
For Ukraine, EU and NATO membership represent more than a step towards democratic reforms, a common market and collective security – they are a choice of values and identity. It is not Ukraine’s intent merely to protect itself from Russia. Ukraine’s success at creating a democratic and civil society already shows that it is not among those post-soviet countries that are struggling with basic democratic norms and are said to belong in the so-called “legitimate sphere of Russian privileged interests.”
But, regardless of how many times NATO officials repeat that Russia will be never allowed to influence their decisions on Ukraine’s membership, the facts show otherwise. At the moment, there is no common European and NATO policy towards Russia. As a result Russia effectively exploits differences between EU and NATO members and practically outmaneuvers them.
Russia’s support for a Ukrainian EU Membership
The most outspoken opponents of Ukrainian membership in NATO – Germany, France and Russia – have recently been trying to convince Ukraine to instead focus on pursuing EU membership. These declarations of genuine support of Ukrainian EU membership are belied by the typical off-the-record rhetoric of officials from Russia: “We don’t mind your EU aspirations because we know that you will never get there. They do not want you there. NATO membership is a more distinct reality and therefore we will do everything to make sure that it does not happen.” Russia nominally supports Ukraine’s bid for EU membership because it does not take those aspirations seriously. Moscow is fighting to gain dominance and total control over Ukraine and as soon as EU membership seems like a plausible reality, Russian support for it will disappear.
For Ukraine, EU and NATO membership are of a piece with its broad reforms in political, economic and security policy. Nonetheless, it is clear that the path taken by other post-communist states to the EU and NATO will not be made available to Ukraine. Indeed, Ukraine’s neighbors were encouraged to pursue membership almost immediately after the collapse of communism. This has not at all been the case for Ukraine.
Indeed, NATO has instead changed its criteria for membership over the last few years. NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP), which was previously a purely technical collection of reforms, has now been rewritten so that the requirements for entry are significantly more robust. A political decision regarding Ukrainian membership in NATO has been made to appear like a technical shortcoming: it is much easier to dismiss Ukraine’s ambitions as a result of a failure to meet MAP criteria. This situation has frustrated most of the pro-Western segments of Ukrainian society. On the contrary, those Ukrainians who hope for a return to the recent post-Soviet dependency on Russia have declared victory.
The future of Ukraine’s NATO membership
Ukrainian officials and public leaders greatly appreciate the efforts by our friends to help the country achieve its objectives. But these goals must be pursued with prudence and wisdom. This has not always been the case. For example, the Bush administration’s decision to strongly support Ukraine’s NATO aspirations stirred up more controversy than necessary. A lingering anti-American mood in Europe and the varying approaches of European countries towards Russia made Ukraine a hostage of Europe-Russia-USA relations. This is why it is very important that the new American administration under Barack Obama continues the policy of support for Ukraine’s NATO aspirations, but that it pursues that policy in a more cooperative way with its key European allies. This can hopefully lead to a greater support in the Western European capitols for Ukraine’s future membership.
Ukrainian views on NATO are at least as divided as the views of NATO members regarding the potential membership of Ukraine. On the other hand, public opinion towards NATO has steadily improved. The percentage of Ukrainians in support of NATO membership increased from about 18-20% in 2005 to about 28-30% today. Our neighbors’ experiences suggest that a concerted national information campaign could bolster that trend. Unfortunately, Ukrainian elites regularly manipulate and politicize the issue of NATO membership in order to fight parochial political battles. The Georgian war of August 2008 likewise contributed to the growing politicization of the issue and polarization within the society.
Europe can influence these debates, but unlike the United States or Russia, most European countries have not taken a strong public stand on this issue. It is time for that to change.
Oleh Rybachuk was former chief of staff to the President of Ukraine and Ukraine's Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration. Currently, he is chairman of Suspilnist Foundation.