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Since 2009 unprecedented diplomatic activity persists between Moscow and Ankara: In February 2009 Abdullah Gül was the first incumbent Turkish head of state visiting the Russian capital Moscow. In turn President Medvedev was the guest of his counterpart Abdullah Gül in May 2010. The meeting between Premier Erdoğan and Premier Putin in Sochi in May 2009 was followed by Putin’s visit to Turkey in the very same year and the return visit of Erdoğan and his Foreign Minister Davutoğlu in Moscow in January 2010.
Turkish media regularly reported these visits with benign accounts of a number of agreements both countries allegedly signed. However, if one dares to learn more on these Turkish-Russian cooperation efforts, it is noteworthy how little is leaked out about the actual substance of the accords.
A strong bilateral co-operation seems particularly likely, if interests of actors coincide or complement each other. But while Russia’s interest is determined by the struggle to consolidate its power at the beginning of the 21st century, including the use of hydrocarbons as a foreign policy instrument, Turkey on the other hand has lately tried to establish itself as a regional power and wants to be perceived as an emerging power in the international arena.
In Turkish-Russian relations there are some common interests – such as increasing economic integration – as well as several differences. With regard for instance to the Cyprus conflict and the Caucasus, Turkey and Russia still find each other at odds with one another. Attempts to find a solution for these regional conflicts, such as the Turkish-led Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform, did not prove particularly effective so far.
Increasing economic relations – with Russia having the edge over Turkey
With regard to the economic realm, Turkish-Russian relations developed into a substantial factor. With a trade volume of 25 Billion dollars, Russia became Turkey’s second most important trading partner. However, Turkey struggles against a trade deficit that is clearly to its disadvantage. Above all, this can be traced back to its import of hydrocarbons from Russia: Gas and oil make up the biggest share of all exports from Russia to Turkey.
The fear that the end of the Soviet Union would lead to competition between Russia and Turkey over influence in Turkic speaking lands in Central Asia did not materialize. Nevertheless, access to Caspian and Central Asian oil and gas reserves is still of great significance for both actors.
Turkey strongly dependent on Russian energy
The first intergovernmental agreement on Turkey’s gas supply by Russia dates back to 1984 and Turgut Özal’s reign of government. Two years later the first trade agreement between the state-owned Soviet operator Gazexport and the Turkish Botaç was established. The Cold War did not prevent NATO member Turkey and the Soviet Union from doing business. Since the 1990s Russian gas export to Turkey multiplied once more. In 2008 almost two thirds of Turkey’s domestic gas consumption was covered through imports from Russia. On top of that there is a 40 percent share of oil imports – numbers that reveal Turkey’s strong dependence on energy imports from Russia. These figures should not go down very well with Turkish decision-makers.
In light of Turkey’s dependence on Russian energy input one might assume that Turkey endeavors to find alternatives and to diversify its energy supplies. However, a recently secured agreement regarding the construction of a nuclear power plant by Russia points into another direction. Russia’s rejection of alternative energy supply routes through the Caucasus and Turkey’s wariness of increased gas imports from Iran due to respect for its relations with its American and European partners might have also been pivotal factors behind this decision.
The Russian energy giant Rosatom is supposed to build the first nuclear power plant in the Anatolian town of Akkuyu – a step that should deserve special scrutiny. Besides an ever increasing dependence from Russia and the basic skepticism towards nuclear power – given existing alternatives – Turkish civil society is appalled by the plant’s location: an earthquake-prone area. Furthermore, the question of permanent disposal of nuclear waste remains unsolved. Reassurances by the Turkish government that nuclear waste would be sent back to Russia currently founders on the adverse reality of Russian laws.
Visa-free travel so far wishful thinking
The mutual lifting of the visa regime is regularly demanded, especially by Turkish officials. Despite earlier announcements about visa free travel, the implementation had previously failed due to the lack of a readmission agreement for illegal immigrants, only signed in 2011. Visa free travel would especially benefit Turkey with regard to its export of goods to and tourist inflows from Russia. The Turkish Mediterranean coast is in fact an increasingly popular travel destination for Russian tourist. Russia however has health safety concerns with regard to food imports coming from Turkey and so far did not signal to yield to Turkish demands.
Likewise a stronger co-operation in the humanities can be observed – for instance the agreement on mutual access to state archives and first cross-national research projects on the final stages of the Ottoman Empire in the early 20th century.
Nevertheless co-operation efforts do not reach the magnitude that media reports try to suggest in a rather populist fashion. The announcements of dozens of new accords geared towards the media rather seem to aim at enhancing Turkey’s standing and to secure international attention.
Perceived contradictions of Turkish foreign policy
The Turkish-Russian rapprochement lines up in a myriad of recent foreign policy initiatives by the Erdoğan government and especially since Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu assumed office two years ago. Turkish foreign policy hit the headlines in Turkey and the international arena monthly in 2010. Frequently Turkish foreign policy also raised the specter of contradicting interests: for example Turkey’s zero problems with neighbors policy in the case of Iran is seen as conflicting with the interests of a NATO member and European Union candidate country. Given this diverse set of interests, it remains to be seen whether Turkey is able to establish itself as a major player on the global stage.