Hybrid Warfare and Comprehensive Defense: Learning From Ukraine

Rethinking Security at Café Kyiv

At this year’s Café Kyiv, organized by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, one of the most urgent questions facing Europe took center stage: how can open societies defend themselves in an era of hybrid warfare? The panel discussion - jointly hosted by the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, Gender in Detail and Vitsche - was moderated by Irina Shulikina, CEO of Vitsche. She opened with a clear message: Europe is undergoing a profound strategic redefinition.

For decades, Western European security was understood primarily in military and territorial terms. Defense meant armed forces, alliances, and borders. Russia’s war against Ukraine has demonstrated that contemporary confrontation extends far beyond the battlefield. Hybrid warfare targets societies from within - undermining institutional trust, destabilizing critical infrastructure, eroding economic resilience, and exploiting democratic openness. The front line, as Shulikina emphasized, is no longer only geopolitical; it is societal.

Ukraine’s Experience: From Hybrid Destabilization to Comprehensive Defense

Ukraine is a stark example. Long before February 2022, the country faced sustained hybrid destabilization - cyberattacks, disinformation, political interference - culminating in full-scale military aggression. Under existential pressure, Ukraine has been compelled to rethink the architecture of defense. What has emerged is an evolving model of comprehensive defense: a whole-of-society approach integrating military preparedness with civic resilience, strategic communication, gender perspectives, and democratic participation.

Philosopher Tamara Zlobina approached this concept through both theory and lived experience. As she noted, quoting Jenny Holzer, “The beginning of war will be secret.” For Zlobina, Russia’s war did not begin in 2014 or 2022, but much earlier - quietly and strategically. In the early 2000s, Ukrainian media space gradually shifted toward Russian content after Vladimir Putin consolidated power and Russia regained economic strength. Through media ownership and cultural influence, narratives were shaped long before open aggression began. Many Ukrainians were exposed to Russian propaganda for decades without recognizing it as such.

Her second point followed naturally: when tanks appear, earlier battles have already been lost. Russia’s aggression exemplifies 21st-century hybrid warfare - combining propaganda, political interference, and narrative management on the international stage. At global forums such as the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting and the Munich Security Conference, leaders speak of the erosion of the rules-based order. But, she stressed, that order did not simply collapse; it was deliberately undermined over time.

Yet Russia ultimately failed in its cognitive warfare inside Ukraine. NATO analyses describe cognitive warfare as targeting the ability to think, trust, decide, and act. When the full-scale invasion began, many expected Ukraine to fall within days. Instead, society mobilized. Citizens did not wait for the state - they acted. The attempt to paralyze the population failed.

In Ukraine, civic engagement - from volunteer logistics to digital coordination - became decisive for resilience.

From this followed a central lesson: no state can manage such crises alone. Even highly functional democracies depend on active citizens. In Ukraine, civic engagement - from volunteer logistics to digital coordination - became decisive for resilience.

Zlobina also addressed preparedness. Ukraine, she acknowledged, was not sufficiently prepared for full-scale invasion. Personal and institutional readiness had to develop under immense pressure. Comprehensive defense therefore rests on both levels. Nordic models - particularly in Sweden - recommend that households maintain at least three days’ worth of food and water. In prolonged blackouts, electricity failures would disrupt water supply, communications, heating, and food access - far beyond what the state could immediately compensate for.

Comprehensive defense serves two purposes: strengthening civil sectors such as logistics, energy, and healthcare, and recognizing the non-military dimensions of hybrid warfare - from election interference to infrastructure sabotage. Focusing solely on military defense leaves societies exposed. Ukraine’s system remains a work in progress, built largely through decentralized volunteer networks. Yet this bottom-up resilience has proven powerful, and Zlobina’s research initiative seeks to connect Ukrainian lessons with Western institutional experience, focusing on gender mainstreaming.

Sweden’s Total Defense: Institutionalized Resilience

Olga Nemanezhyna turned to Sweden’s total defense system and its relevance for Europe. Sweden’s model is not limited to the military; it encompasses military defense, civil defense, and the responsibility of every individual, agency, business, and municipality. It begins in kindergartens and extends to tax authorities. Defense, in this understanding, is not a sector - it is a societal framework.

Defense, in this understanding, is not a sector - it is a societal framework.

The system rests on three core principles: shared responsibility across state, private sector, civil society, and citizens; peacetime preparedness for wartime resilience; and trust as infrastructure. Institutional trust is treated as a strategic asset, as vital as physical infrastructure. Civil defense spans economic security, communications, energy, finance, public order, transport, education, and migration governance. Resilience is institutionalized rather than reactive.

Ukraine’s resilience, by contrast, developed under acute pressure. Yet it is reshaping Europe’s understanding of preparedness. Nemanezhyna identified three lessons: spontaneous social mobilization, the central role of local authorities, and the gendered dimension of resilience. Ukrainian municipalities have operated on the front lines of evacuation, civil protection, and energy continuity. Women serve as soldiers, medics, volunteers, and leaders while sustaining care infrastructures. Ignoring gender dynamics, she argued, weakens operational effectiveness. Gender mainstreaming is not merely a value-based agenda; it is a matter of defense capacity and sustainability.

The Baltic Perspective: From Resilience to Resistance

Lithuanian security expert Dalia Bankauskaitė expanded the debate by introducing the concept of resistance alongside resilience. In NATO discussions, attention often focuses on military vulnerabilities and infrastructure gaps. Yet cognitive, psychological, and narrative dimensions remain underappreciated. Strategic communication and the battle over perception are central arenas.

Traditional resilience frameworks ensure that a state continues functioning during crisis. Societal resilience goes further: it concerns the willingness of individuals and communities to act - to adapt, endure, and ultimately move beyond survival toward renewed stability and prosperity.

Societal resilience concerns the willingness of individuals and communities to act.

Across the Baltic Sea region, resilience is increasingly discussed together with resistance: readiness to defend values, identity, and democratic foundations. In times of uncertainty and shrinking predictability, insecurity deepens. When societies lose the ability to imagine a future, long-term planning erodes and polarization can grow. Community, Bankauskaitė emphasized, is the pivotal bridge between individuals and state.

A Societal Resilience Survey across NATO’s eastern flank reveals striking findings. Ukrainians rank exceptionally high in community and societal resilience, often leading the comparison with the Baltic States, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Georgia. Yet they score significantly lower in hope. War compresses time horizons; people live in short intervals rather than long-term perspectives. Sustained willingness to act depends on a clear vision of the future, belonging, inclusivity, social cohesion, well-being, and opportunities for self-realization - conditions built in peacetime.

Responsibility towards Ukraine, Rethinking Security: The German Perspective

Bringing the discussion to Germany, Franziska Brantner reflected on political responsibility and public perception. She began by acknowledging that Ukraine’s fight for freedom is inseparable from Europe’s own. At the same time, she called for precision in language. In Germany, she argued, it is more accurate to speak of hybrid attacks rather than hybrid war, as the term “war” implies that armed forces would be used in response. What Germany faces are targeted attacks on infrastructure, institutions, and public opinion.

The objective of such attacks is societal destabilization - eroding trust in democracy and weakening support for Ukraine. Narratives once limited to political fringes, such as calls to resume Russian gas imports, have moved closer to the mainstream. Propaganda, she stressed, should be named clearly: not “fake news,” but lies.

The desire for stability cannot replace clear-eyed analysis.

Germany has broadened its understanding of defense, expanding investments to intelligence and civil protection alongside military spending. Yet challenges remain: federal coordination is complex, and critical infrastructure protection uneven. Franziska Brantner raised concerns about selling strategically important energy assets to non-European investors and argued they should remain under European control.
A key lesson from Ukraine concerns mobilization beyond the armed forces. Comprehensive defense requires mapping civilian skills in advance - programmers, logistics experts, medical professionals, engineers. A voluntary skills registry established in peacetime could strengthen preparedness without militarizing society.

Reflecting on why Germany and other Western European states were slow to recognize Russia as a strategic threat, Brantner pointed to psychological and historical factors: nostalgia, economic interdependence, and the belief in a special partnership. Confronting this misjudgment demands emotional and intellectual honesty. The desire for stability cannot replace clear-eyed analysis.

From Spontaneous Resilience to Systemic Defense

In the concluding exchange, panelists addressed Europe’s fragmented threat perception and the challenge of institutionalizing spontaneous civic resilience. Zlobina cautioned against simplistic explanations. Even Ukraine, despite deep familiarity with Russia, did not expect full-scale invasion. Societies often refuse to believe that extreme aggression is possible. Denial can be more comforting than confrontation.
Bankauskaitė emphasized that historical memory, geography, and economic ties shape threat perception differently across Europe. Russia’s long-term soft power strategy has contributed to a fragmented perception landscape - even within NATO. Without shared understanding, coordinated action remains difficult.

For Zlobina, the first step toward institutionalization is conceptual clarity. “Comprehensive defense” must become central to security thinking. As long as defense is framed narrowly in military terms, democracies risk remaining vulnerable to hybrid attacks across informational, economic, and cognitive domains. Naming hybrid warfare is strategic, not rhetorical. Sanctions, she noted, are themselves instruments of hybrid warfare - evidence that Europe is already engaged.

Nemanezhyna highlighted practical measures: honest communication between governments and civil society, stronger municipal involvement, deeper engagement with businesses, and trusted bridges between institutions and citizens. Preparedness should neither be alarmist nor postponed. The time to systematize resilience is now.

Comprehensive defense is not a technical adjustment but a societal transformation.

From the Baltic perspective, comprehensive defense is a continuous state-building exercise. Strong, aligned institutions and societies are less likely to be attacked. Lithuania’s preparations to host a German brigade by 2027 illustrate how defense planning can strengthen infrastructure and societal confidence. Russian propaganda portraying foreign troops as “occupation” has found little resonance; for many Lithuanians, their presence symbolizes sovereignty and security.

As the session concluded, one message stood out: comprehensive defense is not a technical adjustment but a societal transformation. It requires shared threat perception, institutional reform, civic engagement, and a forward-looking vision. Above all, it demands the courage to confront uncomfortable truths - and the determination to build democracies capable not only of surviving crisis, but of shaping the future.

Disclaimer

The discussion built on insights from a series of expert reports by the Ukrainian NGO Expert Resource “Gender in Detail”, examining Ukraine’s emerging practices of comprehensive defense through a gender-mainstreaming lens. The project highlights how women’s participation and gender perspectives strengthen societal resilience and the effective use of human resources in defense.

Speakers:

• Tamara Zlobina, Philosopher and Head of the NGO Expert Resource Gender in Detail
• Olga Nemanezhyna, Resilience strategist and co-author of the report Gender Mainstreaming in Comprehensive Defense in Ukraine, Swedish International Liberal Centre
• Dalia Bankauskaitė, Security policy and strategic communication expert (Kyiv/Riga)
• Franziska Brantner, Member of the Bundestag and Co-Chair of Alliance 90/The Greens

Moderation:

• Iryna Shulikina, Vitsche.