To keep climate cooperation alive despite of geopolitical tensions, structured partnerships in EVs and batteries will serve both, the EU and China. In triangular partnerships Chinese manufacturing can be combined with European finance and ESG governance in third countries.
This article is part of a series on “EU-China relations: Bound by Clean Tech or Divided by it?”. The articles reflect the opinions of their respective authors and should be read in the context of this series.
Despite rising trade frictions and strategic distrust, climate and clean energy remain among the few areas where China-EU relations are still anchored in shared interests. Drawing lessons from solar PV, this article identifies three near-term cooperation pathways – EVs and batteries, green hydrogen, and third-country partnerships – that are both politically feasible and mutually beneficial.
Climate Cooperation as a Strategic Exception
China–EU relations face growing strains from trade disputes, technology restrictions, and geopolitical tensions. Yet climate and clean energy stand out as a domain of enduring shared necessity. China's “dual carbon” goals – peaking emissions before 2030 and neutrality by 2060 – align directionally with the EU's Green Deal target of climate neutrality by 2050. At the same time, mechanisms like the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), Net-Zero Industry Act, and preparations for COP31 in 2026 underscore that decarbonisation is no longer merely an environmental agenda – it is increasingly an industrial and security imperative.
From a Chinese perspective, Europe's “de-risking” is comprehensible but risks drifting into exclusionary protectionism, hindering global clean-tech diffusion and the energy transition. The key is not whether cooperation continues, but how to structure it for political acceptability, economic rationality, and mutual benefit.
China's advantages in manufacturing can complement Europe's strengths in regulation, finance, system integration, and innovation.
This article moves beyond simplistic debates about “de-risking vs. cooperation,” instead emphasizing pragmatic complementarities: China's advantages in manufacturing scale and cost efficiency can complement Europe's strengths in regulation, finance, system integration, and innovation. The solar photovoltaics (PV) case illustrates both collaboration's potential and pitfalls. Building on it, three near-term opportunities stand out:
- electric vehicles (EVs) and batteries,
- renewable hydrogen, and
- partnerships in third-country markets.
Solar PV Reflection – Climate Triumph and Cautionary Tale
Solar Photovoltaic (PV) exemplifies how global collaboration can accelerate climate progress – while also revealing how political backlash emerges when benefits are unevenly distributed. Over six decades, PV evolved from U.S. lab breakthroughs (Bell Labs, 1950s; NASA funding, 1960s), to oil-shock-driven R&D in Japan and the U.S. in the 1970s, and finally to Europe's 1990s–2000s feed-in tariffs in Germany and others that scaled markets and slashed costs.
No single nation “owned” PV; shared research, policies, and markets in different regions drove global progress. China entered later but strategically, absorbing global know-how and benefiting from early European subsidies, before leveraging domestic industrial policy and scale to build dominant capacity. Today, China controls over 80 percent of key segments across the PV supply chain, from polysilicon to modules.
From a climate perspective, this is a resounding success: costs plummeted, deployment exploded, and solar became the cheapest power source in many regions. Politically, however, Europe increasingly views PV as a case of strategic dependence and asymmetric value capture. The lesson is clear: international collaboration speeds innovation and scale dramatically, but requires safeguards for equitable, defensible benefits. Future China–EU ties must therefore prioritize managed interdependence – cooperation with safeguards – rather than unchecked integration.
EVs and Batteries – Managed Interdependence Instead of Trade Escalation
Electric vehicles (EVs) have become a stress test for China-EU economic ties. The EU's 2024 countervailing tariffs (ranging from 7.8 percent to 35.3 percent) on Chinese EV imports, citing subsidy concerns, prompted Chinese retaliation. Yet by early 2026, dialogue yielded a more pragmatic pathway: the European Commission issued guidance enabling Chinese exporters to propose price undertakings – model-specific minimum import prices, potential volume commitments, and EU-side investment plans – as tariff alternatives. This “soft landing” addresses European political concerns while avoid a spiral of mutual retaliation.
Meanwhile, industry integration is advancing. European firms like Volkswagen (stake in Xpeng; partnerships with Gotion High-Tech) and Stellantis (Leapmotor stake) are increasingly tapping into Chinese innovation and cost advantages. Chinese battery giants such as CATL, BYD, and EVE are also expanding their manufacturing capacity in Europe, creating local jobs while helping address EU capacity gaps.
de-risking without decoupling
A politically viable pathway shifts to structured integration: joint ventures, localized production, battery recycling under EU rules, and R&D on next-generation chemistries. With transparent safeguards on intellectual property, data governance, and sustainability standards, such cooperation enables “de-risking without decoupling” – Europe gains resilience and affordable EVs for Green Deal goals; while China secures stable markets and legitimacy via overseas investment rather than export dependency.
Renewable Hydrogen – Standards, MRV and Certification as a Pragmatic Entry Point
Hydrogen offers genuine complementarities between China and the EU, though cooperation will not be frictionless: As in EVs and solar, standards and certification are politically charged and closely tied to market access. Still, hydrogen remains one of the most plausible areas for structured collaboration because both sides have a strong interest in building a credible and scalable global market.
China brings scale and cost advantages in electrolyzer manufacturing; while Europe leads in regulatory frameworks, market design, and climate finance. The main hurdle is fragmentation: competing definitions of renewable and low-carbon hydrogen, inconsistent lifecycle accounting, and incompatible certification regimes, risk impeding trade and fuel greenwashing disputes. Cooperation on internationally aligned technical standards – carbon intensity methodologies, guarantees of origin, and robust MRV protocols – offers a realistic entry point that advances decarbonisation while limiting strategic exposure.
China has already taken a concrete step toward internationally legible hydrogen certification. In December 2025, Beijing released the Clean and Low-Carbon Hydrogen Evaluation Standard, China’s first industry-wide lifecycle carbon footprint standard for hydrogen. By shifting from qualitative “color labels” to measurable emissions metrics, it opens scope for partial alignment with EU benchmarks. Rather than pursuing full mutual recognition immediately, both sides could adopt a phased approach: piloting limited alignment in a small set of flagship projects, strengthening third-party auditing, and developing interoperable documentation for guarantees of origin and carbon intensity reporting.
Cooperation on certification can prevent hydrogen standards from becoming the next China-EU battleground.
Early projects already indicate what is feasible. Companies such as Envision Energy are developing integrated renewable hydrogen and ammonia initiatives designed for export markets. Combining Chinese manufacturing scale with European verification, standards, and financing can reduce costs while safeguarding environmental integrity, accelerating decarbonisation in steel, chemicals, and shipping. Even if large-scale hydrogen trade remains politically contested, cooperation on certification and MRV is a low-regret step that can deliver tangible progress and prevent hydrogen standards from becoming the next China-EU battleground.
Third-Country Collaboration – Triangular Partnerships for Global Impact
Perhaps the most politically viable arena for China-EU cooperation lies outside either China or Europe. Many emerging economies urgently need renewable energy, grids, storage, and industrial decarbonisation solutions, yet face severe financing constraints and infrastructure gaps. Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa will largely determine whether global climate goals remain achievable.
Both China and the EU are already active in these regions through initiatives such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the EU’s Global Gateway. Yet despite these efforts, the combined scale of funding remains far below what Global South requires. Increasingly, the key question is therefore not whether China and Europe compete for influence, but whether they can coordinate for greater impact – mobilising larger pools of capital, reducing project risks, and accelerating clean energy deployment where it is most urgently needed.
The key question is whether China and Europe can coordinate for greater impact.
Triangular models pair Chinese cost-effective equipment, engineering capacity, and deployment speed with European financing instruments, risk guarantees, and ESG frameworks. This approach aligns with Europe’s friendshoring strategy (geographic diversification) while leveraging China’s strengths in implementation. It also fits growing international calls for China-EU coordination to triple renewables by 2030, emphasizing local job creation, regional supply chains, and innovative blended finance mechanisms.
For host countries, such cooperation delivers affordable renewables, improved energy security, and industrial employment. For China, it strengthens credibility as a provider of global public goods. For Europe, it advances climate diplomacy while diversifying its strategic influence. Third-country cooperation is thus not only climate-effective but also politically strategic – providing a confidence-building platform even when bilateral trust remains strained.
A Pragmatic Agenda for Climate Cooperation Under Constraints
The solar PV experience shows both the transformative potential and the political fragility of clean energy globalisation. Going forward, China-EU cooperation must be shaped by realism: strategic competition will persist, but climate collaboration can still be preserved if it is designed around risk management and balanced value creation.
Strategic competition will persist, but climate collaboration can still be preserved.
Three cooperation pathways stand out in the near term: managed integration in EVs and batteries, standards-driven cooperation in renewable hydrogen, and triangular partnerships for clean energy deployment in third-country markets. None requires abandoning industrial competition, but all can generate tangible benefits while reducing the risk of political escalation.
From a Chinese perspective, cooperation is not charity or concession – it is strategic pragmatism. China’s industrial strengths can accelerate global decarbonisation, while Europe’s regulatory leadership can help ensure quality, sustainability, and long-term legitimacy. With COP31 approaching, China and the EU still have an opportunity to demonstrate that even in a fragmented world, climate leadership remains possible through cooperation grounded in shared interests and political feasibility.
Policy Recommendations
To keep climate cooperation viable despite geopolitical tensions, China and the EU should:
1. Institutionalize “risk-managed cooperation” mechanisms
Create early-warning channels and dispute-management frameworks to prevent trade conflicts in clean tech trade frictions from escalating into climate deadlock.
2. Promote structured industrial partnerships in EVs and batteries
Encourage joint ventures, localized production, and battery recycling cooperation to balance Europe’s resilience goals with China’s scale advantages.
3. Prioritize hydrogen MRV and certification interoperability as a pragmatic entry point
Cooperate on carbon-intensity methodologies, guarantees of origin, and third-party auditing, while piloting limited standards alignment for hydrogen trade.
4. Build triangular partnerships in third-country markets
Combine Chinese manufacturing and delivery capacity with European finance and ESG governance to accelerate renewables deployment in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.
5. Link cooperation with COP31 deliverables
Use COP31 as a milestone for announcing concrete cooperation packages – on hydrogen certification, battery circularity, and third-country finance – demonstrating that climate remains a stabilizing pillar of China-EU relations.
