Chernobyl/Chornobyl is once again becoming a risk – this time as a matter of policy. Russia is deliberately using nuclear power plants and electricity grids as leverage in its war against Ukraine. International rules fall short while the risk for Europe as a whole grows.
I. The Resurrection of Totalitarian Risk
The 1986 Chernobyl/Chornobyl* disaster was not an isolated technical accident; it was a systemic failure of the Soviet Union’s "totalitarian attitude" toward risk. In the Soviet nuclear complex, ideology outweighed physics, and secrecy was prioritized over public safety. For decades, the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone stood as a silent laboratory of memory, a reminder of what happens when a state treats nuclear energy as a tool of political prestige rather than a hazardous responsibility.
The Russian Federation’s occupation of Ukrainian nuclear sites is a direct inheritance of the Soviet disregard for human life.
Since February 24, 2022, this "totalitarian attitude" has returned to the European continent, but in a more weaponized form. The Russian Federation’s occupation of Ukrainian nuclear sites is a direct inheritance of the Soviet disregard for human life. However, unlike 1986, the current risks are being intentionally manufactured. We are no longer dealing with a system that fails to manage a disaster; we are dealing with a regime that uses the potential for disaster as a strategic asset.
II. Zaporizhzhia: The Frontline of Nuclear Blackmail
The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), with its six VVER-1000 reactors, is currently the most vulnerable industrial site in the world. Since its illegal seizure in March 2022, the facility has been operated under conditions that violate every international norm established since the Cold War.
The "Blackout" Weaponry
Nuclear reactors, even when shut down, require constant cooling. This cooling depends on a stable supply of off-site electricity. Russia has systematically targeted the high-voltage lines feeding the ZNPP. According to the IAEA Director General’s Statement on the Situation in Ukraine, the plant has suffered 12 total blackouts since the invasion began.
In each instance, the plant was forced to rely on emergency diesel generators - the "last line of defense." Following a 23-day period of heightened risk, the 330kV Ferosplavna-1 backup line was finally restored on March 5, 2026, under an IAEA-brokered local ceasefire. However, the IAEA Board of Governors Reports confirm that the electrical safety margin remains "dangerously thin" due to the degradation of the plant's switchyard.
The Human Component
A Manufactured Staffing Crisis Technical systems are only as reliable as the people operating them. Since the occupation, the ZNPP has been stripped of its specialized workforce. As reported by the Kyiv Independent, the plant is now left with just 22 licensed reactor operators - a fraction of the hundreds required for safe operation. By forcing out Ukrainian specialists and operating with a skeleton crew under extreme duress, the occupying regime has introduced a level of human-factor risk that no civilian safety regime was designed to manage.
The Militarization of Civilian Atoms
Under the "totalitarian" paradigm, the ZNPP has been transformed into a military base. IAEA monitoring missions (ISAMZ) have confirmed the presence of military trucks, explosives, and personnel inside the turbine halls. This violates the first of the IAEA’s Five Concrete Principles established at the UN Security Council: "There should be no attack of any kind from or against the plant."
III. Beyond ZNPP: A National Grid Under Systematic Siege
While the world’s eyes are on Zaporizhzhia, Russia has launched a broader campaign against the infrastructure supporting Ukraine’s three other operational NPPs: Rivne, Khmelnytskyi, and South Ukraine.
- The Statistics of Destruction: By early 2026, the number of strikes on Ukraine’s energy grid has reached critical levels. This is a calculated effort to trigger a "cascading failure" of the nuclear sector. When the grid is destabilized, reactors are forced into emergency shutdowns (SCRAM).
- The 2025-2026 Winter Campaign: This winter saw a record intensity of "engineered outages." In late 2025 and January 2026, the IAEA reported that several units at the Rivne and South Ukraine NPPs had to reduce power output to "essential levels" due to the destruction of transmission nodes.
IV. Chornobyl 2026: Legacy and Transparency
The Chornobyl site remains a risk factor. During the 2022 occupation, Russian troops demonstrated a terrifying lack of nuclear literacy in the "Red Forest." Today, even decommissioned sites remain targets.
Puncturing the Shield: The 2025 Drone Attack
On February 14, 2025, a Russian drone strike deliberately hit the New Safe Confinement (NSC). As documented by Greenpeace, the explosion punctured the roof of the $1.6 billion structure designed to contain radioactive material. This strike has paralyzed the mission to dismantle the unstable 1986 "Sarcophagus," as high radiation at the puncture site prevents immediate repairs. This attack underscores that even legacy nuclear infrastructure remains vulnerable in wartime.
Ukraine operates in stark contrast to its Soviet predecessor: it cooperates transparently with the IAEA and allows independent monitoring. These practices reflect a commitment to modern nuclear safety culture and deep lessons learned from 1986.
Chernobyl: 40 Years After the Disaster
40 years after the Chernobyl reactor disaster, Russia is once again jeopardizing nuclear safety in Eastern Europe with direct attacks on nuclear power plants in Ukraine. Our dossier highlights memories and current debates in selected countries.
V. The Failure of International Governance
The war in Ukraine has exposed a "vacuum" in international law. The IAEA, while essential for monitoring, has no mandate to enforce demilitarized zones.
- The Rosatom Loophole: Despite its direct involvement in the ZNPP seizure and the coercion of its staff, Rosatom remains largely unsanctioned by the EU due to dependencies in Hungary and Slovakia.
- The Redefinition of Safety: We must move toward a legal framework that treats "deliberate grid destruction" near nuclear sites as a crime against humanity.
VI. Conclusion: The Burden of Memory and the Necessity of Action
The Chornobyl legacy taught us that a nuclear cloud has no passport and knows no borders. Today, the safety of the reactors in Khmelnytskyi or Rivne is as vital to the citizens of Berlin or Warsaw as it is to those in Kyiv. Protecting Ukraine’s nuclear sector requires:
1. Air Defense as Nuclear Safety: Protecting the "arteries" of the NPPs to prevent station blackouts.
2. Strategic Decoupling: Fully removing Rosatom from the European supply chain.
3. Humanitarian Resilience: Supporting Ukraine’s decentralization of the energy grid.
The only way to prevent a second Chornobyl is to ensure that nuclear safety is inseparable from sovereignty, and that the only way to achieve this is through a Ukrainian victory.
*Editor's note: When referring to the historical event of the nuclear disaster, we use the spelling “Chernobyl” as established in the German language. When referring to the current situation, we use the transcription of the Ukrainian place name “Chornobyl”.
