Analysis
Armenia is often seen as a role model in the South Caucasus, especially when it comes to democratization. But this development is accompanied by a increasing personalization of power, weakened institutional autonomy, and a deeply polarized political landscape.
As Armenia approaches its parliamentary elections in June 2026, the country is often seen as a success story in terms of democratization in the South Caucasus. Compared to neighboring Georgia, where the 2024 elections marked a decisive turn towards authoritarian consolidation, and Azerbaijan's entrenched autocracy, Armenia continues to exhibit pluralism, electoral competition and a degree of political openness. The legacy of the 2018 Velvet Revolution, which brought Nikol Pashinyan and the Civil Contract party to power, continues to influence both domestic and international perceptions of Armenia as an exception to the rule in the region. According to Freedom House, Armenia remains the most free and pluralistic country in the South Caucasus.
Armenia’s current trajectory appears comparatively stable in geopolitical and security terms. Despite the defeat in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020, the ruling Civil Contract party secured victory in the 2021 snap elections, reaffirming its political dominance. Since then, Pashinyan has pursued a strategy of normalization with Azerbaijan, with a peace agreement likely to be finalized if he wins a third electoral mandate. This process, alongside tentative steps towards reopening the Armenian-Turkish border, has contributed to a relative de-escalation of security risks compared to previous years.
Armenia is not simply consolidating democracy, rather, it is undergoing a process of hybridization.
Meanwhile, Armenia is gradually repositioning itself within emerging regional connectivity frameworks. The proposed “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), which would link mainland Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhichevan through southern Armenia, illustrates the country’s potential transformation into a transit hub connecting Europe, Asia, Russia, and Iran. Coupled with closer engagement with the European Union, these developments reinforce the image of Armenia as a state moving towards greater openness and regional integration. Unlike Georgia, where the consolidation of power by Georgian Dream has been widely criticized for being electorally manipulated and supported by Russian influence, Armenia continues to sustain a formally competitive, albeit highly polarized, political environment. The EU’s support for the Armenian government, including electoral assistance and measures aimed at countering Russian influence, further highlights this difference.
Yet this narrative of democratic progress and geopolitical opening risks obscuring a more complex and less linear reality. Armenia is not simply consolidating democracy, rather, it is undergoing a process of hybridization, in which formal democratic institutions coexist with increasing personalization of power, weakened institutional autonomy, and a deeply polarized political landscape. Therefore, the key question is not whether Armenia remains democratic, but what kind of democracy it is becoming under conditions shaped by war, displacement, and shifting geopolitical alignments.
From Revolutionary Legitimacy to Personalized Governance
The political order that emerged in Armenia after the 2018 Velvet Revolution was rooted in mass mobilization and a strong anti-oligarchic mandate. It represented a moment of societal unity and democratic expectation, in which political legitimacy was derived from collective action and the promise of institutional transformation. However, nearly a decade later, this revolutionary legitimacy has gradually been transformed into a form of personalized governance centered on Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, as the leading face of the Velvet Revolution.
This transformation can be understood as a shift towards plebiscitary leadership, in which political authority is continuously reproduced through direct, emotional communication between the leader and society, rather than through institutional mediation. Pashinyan’s dominance in Armenia’s political communications landscape, particularly through social media, has fundamentally reconfigured the relationship between leadership and institutions. With an audience reach that reportedly exceeds 120 million views per month on Facebook alone, he has become not only the central political figure but also the primary agenda-setter in the public sphere.
His style of governance is characterized by constant public visibility, direct contact with people and performative accessibility: engaging with citizens in the streets, interacting informally in public transport, commenting on a wide range of political and social issues, and projecting an image of immediacy and proximity to everyday life. These practices resonate with broad segments of the electorate and reinforce the perception of a leader who remains directly connected to “the people.” At the same time, they contribute to a restructuring of political communication in which traditional intermediaries - political parties, parliament, and even segments of civil society - are increasingly bypassed or marginalized.
Checks and Balances on the Executive Remain Weak
While this model has proven electorally effective, it carries important structural consequences. Political legitimacy becomes increasingly centered on the figure of the leader, while responsibility for governance outcomes is unevenly distributed and often deflected. Institutions such as parliament, political parties, and other intermediaries risk losing their autonomy, increasingly functioning as reactive bodies that respond to the Prime Minister’s statements rather than acting as independent actors. In this sense, Armenia shows features of a delegative form of democracy, where electoral victory is interpreted as a broad mandate to govern, accompanied by relatively weak institutional checks and balances on executive power. A useful parallel can be drawn with Georgia in the late 2000s, particularly during the period preceding Mikheil Saakashvili’s second term: a post-revolutionary government that was still drawing on the legitimacy of systemic change, but which was becoming increasingly concentrated around a single political figure, operating in a manual style and within a highly polarized environment.
The post-war context has further reinforced these dynamics. The defeat in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War followed by the forced displacement of Armenians from the region in 2023, has profoundly affected both political legitimacy and societal cohesion. Rather than diffusing authority across institutions, these crises have intensified the centralization of political responsibility, while simultaneously narrowing the space for dissent and critical engagement.
Public discourse is marked by escalating personal attacks, mutual delegitimization, and the normalization of increasingly aggressive rhetoric.
The personalization of governance creates inherent vulnerabilities. By positioning himself as the central actor across virtually all domains of political and social life, Pashinyan becomes directly associated with both successes and failures of governance. His reluctance to accept criticism further exacerbates this dynamic, contributing to the erosion of institutional trust and reinforcing a political culture in which contestation is increasingly personalized rather than programmatic. This environment has contributed to the deepening of polarization in Armenian politics. Public discourse is marked by escalating personal attacks, mutual delegitimization, and the normalization of increasingly aggressive rhetoric.
Over time, such dynamics may lead to political fatigue with omnipresent leadership, as parts of society become increasingly disillusioned with a political system perceived as dominated by a single figure, while failing to adequately address the key challenges facing society, most notably socio-economic concerns. More importantly, the continued marginalization of institutions undermines the long-term sustainability of democratic governance, as it weakens the very structures required to ensure accountability, and maintain political pluralism.
Division and Lack of Orientation Within Civil Society
The growing polarization in Armenia is not confined to party politics, but is equally visible within civil society, which has become increasingly divided and lacking clear direction. Those who once stood together during the Velvet Revolution are now divided into competing camps, reflecting deeper uncertainties about the country's political trajectory. One group continues to support Prime Minister Pashinyan, not necessarily out of unconditional approval, but due to a perceived lack of viable alternatives. For these actors, the opposition is associated with pro-Russian positions, oligarchic interests, and a potential rollback of the gained achievements since 2018. According to this perspective, supporting the current government is viewed as a defensive measure intended to safeguard democratic progress and the autonomy of civil society. A second group adopts a critical stance towards both the government and the opposition. While sharing concerns about the legacy of previous regimes, these actors increasingly highlight what they perceive as authoritarian tendencies within Pashinyan’s governance, including pressure on independent media, intolerance of dissent, and the role of executive dominance in deepening political polarization. For this group, the central problem lies not only in the weakness of the opposition, but also the government’s contribution to the erosion of democratic norms.
Alongside these two more defined positions, a third, less consolidated group has emerged from among the original supporters of the Velvet Revolution. This group is characterized by growing disillusionment and political fatigue. While some of its members have shifted towards supporting opposition actors, despite their reservations, others have withdrawn from active political engagement at all. Rather than forming a coherent alternative, this group reflects a broader sense of uncertainty, fragmentation, and disorientation within the democratic field.
Who Carrys on the Ideals of the Velvet Revolution?
These divisions are closely linked to the structural transformation of civil society after 2018. In the immediate aftermath of the Velvet Revolution, many civil society actors entered government positions, trying to contribute to reform processes but also blurring the boundary between state and society. While this facilitated short-term institutional change, it also weakened the autonomy of civil society and its ability to act as an independent watchdog. A similar pattern emerged in Moldova following the 2021 victory of the Party of Action and Solidarity led by Maia Sandu, where the integration of civil society actors into the government contributed to a similar blurring of boundaries between state and society. Over time, some of these individuals left the government and distanced themselves from politics, while others remained within state structures. The result is a civil society that appears vulnerable, fragmented, and only partially capable of shaping political discourse.
Crucially, Armenia lacks a democratic program and political force that can consistently and coherently articulate and advance the original ideals of the Velvet Revolution. No political force has successfully occupied the space between the dominant ruling party and the discredited or weak opposition. This vacuum allows the government, but particularly the Prime Minister, to dominate not only institutional politics, but also the broader discursive landscape. Key issues such as war and peace, relations with the European Union, and the redefinition of national borders under the notion of “Real Armenia” are largely framed from within the executive. These are deeply sensitive questions, tied to identity, historical memory, and competing visions of the state. Yet instead of being debated within a pluralistic and inclusive framework, they are increasingly shaped within a polarized and leader-centered communicative environment.
Post-War Statehood, Narrative Reconfiguration and Democratic Discontent
To assess Armenia’s current political trajectory, it is important to acknowledge that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has undertaken a significant shift in the country’s strategic orientation following the 2020 war and the loss of Nagorno Karabakh in 2023. By advocating for a peace agreement with Azerbaijan and the normalization of relations with Turkey, his government has sought to align national policy with these new geopolitical realities. This repositioning challenges long-standing historical narratives and reflects a shift towards a more pragmatic, security-oriented approach. If successful, it could contribute to a more sustainable stabilization of Armenia’s regional position. According to International Republican Institute data, the share of Armenians identifying national security as their primary concern dropped from 44 percent in June 2025 to 21 percent in February 2026. This suggests that the government’s emphasis on normalization and de-escalation has at least partially reduced the perception of an immediate external threat.
While Pashinyan presents his approach as a pragmatic response to past failures, he largely attributes responsibility for the outcomes of the war and the current situation to previous governments.
At the same time, this policy shift is accompanied by significant tensions in political discourse. While Pashinyan presents his approach as a pragmatic response to past failures, he largely attributes responsibility for the outcomes of the war and the current situation to previous governments. His own role in these developments is rarely acknowledged, which risks undermining political accountability and public trust. Even more troubling are the elements of official rhetoric that have targeted displaced Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh, including statements suggesting that they failed to defend themselves․ Such framing represents a particularly sensitive and problematic development. It reflects a broader pattern observed in post-conflict contexts, where vulnerable groups become the focus of blame in efforts to stabilize political legitimacy. In the Armenian case, this not only deepens social divisions but also complicates the already difficult process of integrating the displaced population into society.
Young Voters Perceive National Politics as Distant and Unresponsive
This top-down and often declaratory mode of communication further exacerbates these tensions. Rather than engaging society in an inclusive dialogue on deeply painful and complex issues such as territorial loss, identity, and future security, political messaging tends to follow a binary logic: acceptance of the Prime Minister’s approach is equated with realism and responsibility, while criticism is framed as opposition to peace. This limits pluralistic debate and reinforces a polarized environment in which alternative perspectives are marginalized. The personalized and emotional governance style of Nikol Pashinyan makes any criticism of his policy to be perceived as a direct humiliation of the Prime Minister, closing off any space for critical discourse. These dynamics are not unique to Armenia. Similar patterns can be observed in Georgia, where the ruling elites have framed opposition forces as aligned with external threats or as proponents of instability. In Armenia, a comparable narrative has emerged, with the government positioning itself as the guarantor of peace while depicting opposition actors as proponents of war. Although in Georgia there is a more systematic policy of arguing that opposition and civil society are serving "external interests" in Armenia the war and peace narrative is used against opposition. This personalization and simplification of political discourse risks diverting attention from substantive policy debates.
As a result, key questions remain insufficiently addressed: how to reinterpret the legacy of the Velvet Revolution, how to ensure the sustainability of democratic reforms, how to improve socio-economic conditions, and how to integrate Karabakh Armenians as full members of society rather than as a perceived burden. Public opinion data consistently indicates that issues such as unemployment, low wages, housing, and healthcare remain among the population’s primary concerns, yet these receive comparatively limited attention in political discourse. These trends are particularly visible among younger generations. According to both Socioscope and International Republican Institute findings, individuals aged 18-35 are the most undecided voters and often perceive national politics as distant, polarized, and unresponsive. While they remain active at the local level, engaging in environmental, social and community-based initiatives, they show limited interest in national political processes. This creates a paradox: a generation that is socially engaged but politically disconnected, reinforcing a trend towards an intentionally apolitical civil society.
Consequences for the EU
For the European Union, Armenia’s current trajectory presents both an opportunity and a dilemma. Brussels has increasingly positioned Armenia as a key partner in the South Caucasus, particularly in light of Georgia’s democratic backsliding and the broader goal of reducing Russian influence in the region. In this context, the EU’s strong political support for Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and the Civil Contract party reflects a strategic choice to back what is perceived as the most viable democratic force in the country and the region. However, this alignment carries inherent tensions. By associating democratization, peace efforts with Azerbaijan, and closer relations with Europe so closely with the current government, external actors risk reinforcing personalized legitimacy rather than supporting institutional pluralism. As a result, not only the domestic reform agenda but also Armenia’s European trajectory becomes closely tied to a single political actor.
Although gradual steps towards diversification, such as changes in border management, are underway, broader economic and strategic decoupling from Russia will be both costly and long-term.
At the same time, the narrative of rapid European integration, which is actively promoted by the Armenian government, including through legislative initiatives, remains constrained by structural realities. Armenia continues to be a member of the Eurasian Economic Union and is heavily dependent on Russia economically, infrastructurally, and in terms of security. Key sectors such as energy, gas supply, telecommunications, and railway infrastructure remain closely linked to Russian actors, while a Russian military presence continues to exist in the country. Although gradual steps towards diversification, such as changes in border management, are underway, broader economic and strategic decoupling from Russia will be both costly and long-term.
This creates a growing gap between political discourse and material conditions. While the government promotes a forward-looking narrative of European integration, the structural constraints on such a trajectory are only partially acknowledged. The EU, for its part, has shown limited willingness to challenge this narrative directly, partly to avoid undermining the Armenian government during the sensitive pre-election period, and partly due to competing priorities, such as the war in Ukraine and enlargement processes with Ukraine, Moldova and the countries of the Western Balkans. Yet this silence risks reinforcing unrealistic expectations, which could over time erode domestic trust and the credibility of external partnerships, particularly with the EU.
Need for a New Social Contract
These internal and external dynamics converge in a broader question about Armenia’s democratic future. It is unlikely that the outcome of the 2026 elections will resolve the structural challenges facing the country. Even if Civil Contract remains the most viable option in terms of de-oligarchization, relative pluralism, and a decreasing dependence on Russia, concerns persist about the potential consolidation of a more majoritarian and executive-centered model of governance after the elections.
At the same time, Armenia operates in a highly challenging regional environment. Ongoing geopolitical tensions, including Russia’s war in Ukraine, instability related to US-Israeli war against Iran, and the military dominance of Azerbaijan and Turkey, place additional pressure on domestic political processes. In a region where Azerbaijan represents a consolidated autocracy and Georgia is experiencing increasing centralization of power and authoritarian state capture, Armenia faces the difficult task of resisting broader regional trends while maintaining its own democratic trajectory.
In this context, the central challenge goes beyond electoral competition. Armenia faces the need to renegotiate a new social contract to address the fractures produced by war, displacement, and political polarization. This includes the integration of Karabakh Armenians into the social and political fabric of the state, the acceptance of new geopolitical realities, and the development of a more inclusive and less confrontational relationship between the state and society. Such a transformation would require a shift away from a political culture shaped by personalization, manual rule, antagonistic discourse, and performative politics towards one grounded in institutional accountability, substantive policy debate, and meaningful civic participation. It also necessitates the emergence of credible democratic alternatives capable of challenging the ruling party without being automatically delegitimized as pro-Russian or anti-state. The elections themselves will therefore be less a decisive turning point than a test of democratic resilience: whether Armenia can move from the charismatic legitimacy of the Velvet Revolution towards a more institutionalized and sustainable democratic order.
