Foreign policy has emerged as central in the 2026 U.S. midterm elections. Trump’s war against Iran and the rapidly rising cost of living are already dividing the MAGA base. In November, Americans will have their say at the ballot box.
Despite the United States’ global standing, foreign policy has been understood to play a minor role in U.S. midterm and presidential elections. A growing body of literature, however, suggests that foreign policy plays a larger role than previously thought, particularly due to the interconnectedness of issues. Global events have local ramifications. Arguably, the ongoing war in Iran has lent further credence to this argument, with the conflict contributing to and exacerbating widespread domestic drivers in the United States–the feeling of a widening and insurmountable economic gap tied to the cost of living crisis, the dislike of entanglement in costly overseas wars, and the ongoing generational shift regarding U.S. policy towards Israel underway since the Israel-Hamas War. More so than in previous midterm elections, foreign policy has become emblematic of issues driving American voters. For some Americans, these foreign policy challenges can no longer be separated from their day-to-day lives, leading to a breaking point for many Americans that will impact how they vote.
Looking back at the last midterms, held in November 2022, the world was in a very different state and foreign policy held a lesser importance in voters’ minds. The world was coming out of a global pandemic, travel and tourism were slowly resuming, and post-pandemic economic recovery was going well in the United States. Russia’s renewed aggression against Ukraine and February 2022 invasion–although a watershed moment for European security and with profound implications for NATO, the European Union, and Germany–did not factor heavily into the 2022 midterms. In part, this was due to broad bipartisan support for the conflict, with nearly two thirds of Americans supporting military assistance to Ukraine. This high and broadly bipartisan support for Ukraine meant that foreign policy did not serve as a determining factor between candidates in the minds of most American voters.
That’s changed. Foreign policy is not the deciding factor for voters–instead it’s primarily the economy and the cost of living crisis–but foreign policy is contributing to these factors more than in the past. The war with Iran sent shockwaves across global energy markets, harkening back to similar crises of the 1970s, with a direct impact on U.S. consumers. Record-breaking prices at the gas pump have led to higher transportation costs causing prices to go up across the board. For Democrats and progressive politicians, tapping into the kitchen-table issues concerning most voters has yielded results–with most looking to New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani’s playbook on affordability as one potential avenue. Midterms campaigns are seeing candidates focusing on these issues and possibly linking them to wider foreign policy developments. This has been most apparent with the Trump administration’s war of choice in Iran.
The War of Choice in Iran: A breaking point for most Americans?
To understand the impact of the Iran conflict in the upcoming U.S. midterms, it is worth looking at the origins of the war and public sentiment surrounding the conflict. Relations between Iran and the United States have been antagonistic since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The two sides have no formal diplomatic relationship, instead their relationship is defined by punctuated bilateral or multilateral negotiations. The United States leads a robust sanctions regime that has contributed to the isolation of the Iranian economy. Iran has been a recurring foreign policy focus for successive U.S. administrations seeking to respond to Iran’s missile and nuclear weapons program, support for regional terrorism, human rights violations, deepening coordination with Russia and China, and Iran’s frequent attacks on key U.S. allies in the region, particularly Israel. Trump in particular has focused on dealing with Iran as both a foreign policy imperative and a cornerstone of his ongoing legacy-building efforts.
Iran has been a fixation of MAGA since Trump’s first administration. In his first term, despite being surrounded by pro-war advisors, the U.S. only narrowly avoided going to war with Iran. He has been far more willing to use military force in his second term. The June 2025 strike on Iranian nuclear sites, which ended after 12 days and eroded Iran’s nuclear capabilities, did not end the country’s nuclear ambitions. After the Venezuela operation in January 2026 that led to the capture of Maduro–which saw no U.S. casualties and accomplished its primary goal–Trump felt particularly emboldened to use force against Iran. With a strong push from the Israeli Prime Minister, reflecting the Israel government’s long-held view of Iran as a threat, the United States began a costly military conflict in February 2026. This war–which can be understood as a war of choice due to its questionable urgency–is costly in every sense: in terms of civilian lives, global economic disruptions, erosion of norms of conflict, and the dramatic draining of U.S. military stockpiles. Importantly, this conflict saw Trump break one of his most core ideals of not beginning another overseas “forever” war.
Public approval for the conflict was low from the start, the lowest in Gallup’s history (since the 1980s) of tracking U.S. engagement overseas. Even the Iraq and Afghanistan wars started at a higher level before plummeting in approval as they went on. In part, the low approval rating for the Iran conflict can be understood as the result of a lack of communication and imprecision about U.S. goals and long-term plans for the country and region, stories related to the mistreatment of servicemembers on U.S. aircraft carriers in the region over many months, and the loss of American troops’ lives.
The Trump administration failed to clarify its messaging as the war progressed, leading to questions over whether this operation’s primary purpose is to benefit Iranian protesters, whether Congressional approval was needed, as well as the timeline for engagement. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz–which handles about one-fifth of global oil shipments, fertilizer, and LNG–has sent economic shockwaves across the world. Although the worst impact has been on east Asia, particularly Japan and South Korea which receive 80% of their oil via the Strait of Hormuz, the costs of the war are being felt at home.
The considerable lack of public support for this war also reflects the economic realities facing most Americans in their day to day lives. This conflict has been immensely costly at a time when Americans are struggling to make ends meet. At the time of writing, the cost of the war for taxpayers is approximately $38 billion. A further $67 billion was requested from Congress by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, in part to cover the cost of restocking munitions. And this translates to American pocketbooks. While the impact has been comparatively muted in the United States given it is the largest oil producer and a net exporter of oil, U.S. consumers have largely borne the brunt of the economic fallout of the war. Gas prices have surged to record highs in the short-term. In the long-term, the economic effects of the conflict have barely begun to impact U.S. consumers. Fertilizer shortages will only be felt in 2027, the war is contributing to the recurring challenge of inflation, and the job market remains uneven.
For Trump’s supporters, many (but not all) of whom are opposed to foreign conflicts, the decision to launch a war with long-term global and domestic economic consequences has proven costly. His base widely does not support the war, with many of his supporters breaking with the MAGA movement over it. From May to July, MAGA supporters who felt the war was worth the cost fell from half of respondents to a third. Trump’s handling of the economy is similarly facing low support, with only about 30% of adults holding a favorable view, in large part due to the war. As his base splinters over the war, Americans will have an opportunity to express their opinions via the ballot box this November.
The Generational Shift on Israel
Foreign policy is also contributing to internal divisions within the Democratic Party. The party is split between the more progressive camp–often simplistically, associated with the rise of the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA)–and the centrist establishment Democratic Party. Although bread and butter issues are top of mind, foreign policy has emerged as an unlikely test for candidates. Their foreign policy views have become a proxy for their willingness to stand up to establishment forces. This has further contributed to the breakdown in the distinction between foreign policy and domestic policy. This is most reflected in the dramatic shift in discourse around US-Israel relations in the last few years.
Previously considered the third rail of foreign policy, support for the Israeli government has waned considerably. According to a Pew Research poll, more than half of American adults (53%) have an unfavorable view of Israel. Decades of broad bipartisan support for Israel is reaching a nadir. An entire generation of Americans, who have only known Israel as a dominant regional power and through its policies towards the West Bank, the treatment of Palestinians, and involvement in the U.S.-Israel war with Iran, are now openly questioning the security guarantees and support by the U.S. government. For many American voters, U.S. military support for Israel has implicated the United States in the destruction and suffering of the Palestinian people.
Some Republicans who favor an isolationist or more restrained U.S. foreign policy have also struggled with its relationship with Israel, particularly amid reports the Israeli government persuaded the United States to begin its unpopular war against Iran. American conservatives who view China as America’s primary geopolitical adversary in the near- and long-term feel the United States’ unconditional support for Israel has been at the cost of preparedness for a looming conflict with China.
In part, this shift is also generational. The nationwide protests at U.S. universities in early 2024, especially in April and May, were the most visible signs of popular discontent with the current U.S.-Israel relationship. Surveys show that younger Americans are not only more supportive of the Palestinian people, but were also critical of the U.S. support for Israel and the Biden administration’s handling of unconditioned support. This critical stance also reflects a growing fatigue among younger voters for foreign policy more broadly. In a wide-ranging study of youth perspectives, a few interesting trends emerge that show younger generations are less interested in an active U.S. foreign policy role. They are not seeking a purely isolationist approach–while they are opposed to U.S. conflict intervention, they support U.S. humanitarian aid and international cooperation. As an example, newer generations feel less threatened by China and seek engagement rather than conflict. This trend crosses party lines, with those under 35 placing international issues near the bottom of their priority lists. Europeans need to prepare for a Democratic party that is more inward looking.
Growing Discontent – How Bad Will it Be?
For the reasons outlined above, foreign policy plays a larger role in this year’s U.S. midterms compared to the previous midterms. The growing connectivity and intertwining of foreign and domestic policy adds a further layer to policymaking. Multiple global conflicts have resulted in knock-on effects, contributing to or exacerbating ongoing domestic crises that are more tangible to voters. This upcoming midterm will likely prove to be a breaking point for many Americans–however what remains to be seen is how this break will manifest and what the wider foreign policy implications will be as a result.
