There is much scepticism among Palestinian and Israeli commentators with regard to the Annapolis “International Meeting” as President Bush called it. From this perspective, all indications suggest that hardly any major breakthrough will be achieved to resolve the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians that has lasted for more than a century.
Yet, to place too much focus on the conference itself is somewhat misleading since it is now formally described by the US and others as merely the occasion to launch a political process expected to lead to the “two state solution” envisioned by President Bush. Hence the central question is what one can expect of such a process – and before the end of the US president’s term of office. To tackle this question is, in part, the function of the document both sides will agree on prior to the conference.
The negotiations that Israeli and Palestinian teams have held in the months preceding the conference show that, up to now, they are still far apart – a fact that will to a large degree determine the success or failure of negotiations after the conference.
In this situation, to hold a conference seems like putting the cart before the horse. It makes sense to hold a conference to seal an agreement at the end of a successful political process. But to hold a conference to start a process that may well end in failure appears rash at best. Should a vacuum be left as a result of a breakdown of negotiations it might well be filled with more violence. These are clearly the lessons of the failures of the Oslo process, including the Camp David talks held in July 2000.
Various European diplomats as well as other observers and commentators often claim that the nature of a final and stable agreement between Palestinians and Israelis is already known. This is in reference to the point reached in the course of the negotiations at Taba, Egypt, in January 2001, before they were called off by the then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and as summarised in a document by the European Union’s representative at the talks, Miguel Angel Moratinos. If that is the case, then what is standing in the way of such an agreement, given that the official position of the US and the vast majority of European countries is that the West Bank and Gaza, including East Jerusalem, constitute occupied territory?
The answer, in part, lies in the fact that Israel has been far too successful in warding off external pressure in favour of a withdrawal from Palestinian occupied territory. This is largely due to Israel’s influence in the US and on its policies in the region, on Congress and particularly on the present administration. As a result, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has become to a large degree a domestic Israeli issue, a political football to be kicked around by various parties and politicians, whose interests are local, electoral, narrow in scope, and quite often opportunistic, i.e. merely focused on political survival.
The present Israeli government is no exception. The prime minister, the defence and foreign ministers, as well as other politicians including those of the opposition, are all engaged in political brinkmanship. They are oblivious to any strategic view of where they are taking the conflict and of what the future of Israel in the region might look like. Indeed, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice herself recently warned Israelis that if the conflict persists, Israel will not only be facing Hamas. This was possibly meant as a reference to globalised Jihadist groups that will soon enter the fray in an attempt to destabilise the region. One may also add that the lack of a just and stable solution will continue to radicalise Palestinians and Arabs, a fact that will also leave its mark on relations with European countries. Over a year ago, in an internal report, the Israeli foreign ministry warned that continued occupation would make Israel a pariah state. The various boycott and divestment campaigns against Israeli goods and institutions are a harbinger of things to come should the occupation continue. The Israeli foreign ministry was able to recognise this, yet politicians have other priorities!
So much should be clear: Without an outside party playing a major role in the negotiations no peace agreement will be reached after the Annapolis conference. Condoleezza Rice seems determined to push through the process – even up to the point of putting her own reputation at risk. Still, a healthy dose of scepticism remains in order given the irresponsible record of the present US Administration in dealing with the conflict, and the splits within the Administration about how best to proceed.
It is unfortunate that the EU and major European countries have so far played a secondary role in pushing for a just and stable solution to the conflict. To say that the EU does not have a unified foreign policy misses the point. Major European countries have so far carried most of the financial burden involved in keeping the Palestinian Authority afloat, thus ridding Israel of its responsibility as an occupying power. Yet they had little to say concerning policy and the future of the conflict. To them applies the reverse of a popular saying: They have been paying the piper without playing the tune!
From the perspective of a distant and detached observer it may appear to be a tragic scene indeed: Everyone appears to be caught in a vortex from which no one can escape. Nevertheless, one would expect that at least the major powers would act responsibly and in their own long-term interests. The record of the US so far, particularly under this administration, offers no ground for optimism. It is therefore likely that, after the conference, we will witness a process of negotiations involving many hitches that will require more trips on the part of Condoleezza Rice – and ending without clear substantive results, or with partial arrangements that will just postpone a future round of violence. One can only hope that this prognosis is wrong. Yet, without external pressure to end occupation, Annapolis may well be a repeat performance of the Oslo process.
Dr. George Giacaman is director of The Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy (Muwatin, a project partner of the Heinrich Böll Foundation) and a professor at Birzeit University. He is co-editor of After Oslo (1998), and State Formation in Palestine (2004). A collection of his writings on the second Intifada will appear in 2008.