Pakistan, a State Riven Between Internal Dissent and External Pressure

There are many players and a host of factors that have taken Pakistan from the brink of a crisis, the bloodless coup of 1999, to the centre of a quicksand, the suspension of the constitution and fundamental rights in the first week of November 2007. Perhaps the world fears that as the country sinks deeper into crisis it will drag world peace with it by providing the terrorists with a safe haven against the forces of modernity.

It is not a simple task to pinpoint the factors that have plagued the state of Pakistan and brought about the present state of affairs. A detailed study of the country’s political history and its various phases of military rule might provide such an insight, yet the situation is far more complex to understand even for a citizen of Pakistan, let alone a foreign observer. However, an attempt can be made to develop an understanding of today’s problems by analysing the recent events that undermined the authority of the military ruler.

General Musharraf’s decline of authority started with his decision to remove the Chief Justice of Pakistan, Iftekhar Muhammad Chaudhry. Justice Chaudhry is by no means a judge who, under normal circumstances, would stand up to the might of a military ruler; and he is certainly not one who would be remembered for his professionalism. Yet he will be remembered for saying “no” to the general who ordered him to resign. Little had the military ruler foreseen that so many people who rally behind the chief justice and create public pressure that would eventually result in his reinstatement. When that happened, the country’s political environment began to change, as for the first time during his rule, General Musharraf was the object of public criticism. The government accepted the decision to reinstate the chief justice, but in the course of events relations between the judiciary and executive had reached a high level of confrontation.

In the past the superior courts had always maintained a mellow tone when hearing cases against the government. But following the restoration of the chief justice, the tone of the judges became aggressive and they began to challenge the government’s actions. The most prominent rallying point of such opposition became the case of the “missing people.” These “missing people,” more than two hundred in number, were picked up by law enforcement agencies and detained at undisclosed places and without any lawful authority. A majority of these people had been suspected to be involved with militant groups, but since the authorities had no evidence to prove this the courts – especially the chief justice – took a keen interest in these cases and demanded from the government to either produce the detainees along with the evidence or try to locate them. As a result nearly a hundred people were set free. The court even threatened to take action against the chiefs of the intelligence agencies, should the government be unable to produce the detainees in the court.

The government branded the extensive coverage of the missing people and the moving stories of the families affected as “unfair” journalism. This was not uncommon; the media had frequently been faced with criticism from the government, which, on the other hand, likes to boasts that it has granted broadcasting licenses to more than 40 private channels.

First came the government’s rift with the judiciary; it was followed by criticism of the media; and finally the increasing involvement of army officials in politics further damaged the reputation of the armed forces. Ask anyone about the professionalism of Pakistan’s army, and he or she will call it a bunch of real estate dealers. Being a member of the armed forces is now synonymous to being above the law. In a way, the state of emergency could not have come at a better time. Not only did it discredit Pervez Musharraf, it also created ripples in the country’s political environment, which, prior to that, had seen little political activity or challenges to the dictator.

The declaration of a state of emergency came at a time when the Supreme Court was hearing a number of cases against the government – one of them against General Musharraf for holding the office of president while at the same time still an army officer.  Court proceedings had indicated that of the eleven members of the bench, at least seven seemed to be convinced that the president should take off his uniform before contesting a re-election. Faced with near certain defeat in court, the government clamped down and suspended the constitution. It is interesting, in this context, that the Provisional Constitution Order (PCO), i.e. the declaration of the state of emergency, has been issued by General Pervez Musharraf – not by President Pervez Musharraf. The PCO gave several reasons for such a course of action, among them the decline of law and order, the role of the judiciary in the fight against terrorism, and the hostility of the media.

It is amazing to consider that General Pervez Musharraf declared a state of emergency, thus acting against his own government. Musharraf’s action as such was no surprise; what people like me wanted to see was how the government would react afterwards. And this is where the surprise began – the removal of judges, the closing down of all news channels, the detention of people demanding democracy and the rule of law. Another surprise was that the government did not seem to care about the religious right, treating them as allies. The police, now, is taking action against lawyers, journalists, political parties – but not against Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) whose head, Maualna Fazlur Rehman, is the leader of the opposition in the National Assembly and whose party governs the North West Frontier Province on the border to Afghanistan, i.e. the area where the Taliban are gaining more and more influence.

As the alliance between mullahs and military becomes more pronounced, all liberal parties move towards a direct confrontation with the government. This is true even for the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) that previously, after its leader Benazir Bhutto had entered into a dialogue with the military government, had been perceived as traitors. Now the PPP has announced that it will launch a mass movement to fight for the restoration of the constitution and an end to the state of emergency.

One frequently heard excuse for the imposition of a state of emergency has been the increase of militant activity and the frequent suicide bombings. But can the executive blame the judiciary and media for the decline of law and order? Above all it is the duty of the executive to uphold law and order, and it should not expect the judiciary to condone the unlawful detention of people who are not charged with any criminal act, or the media for exposing the failure of the government to deal with the militants.

The latest shock is that the president has announced amendments to the constitution that would stop future “interference” by the Supreme Court. As a first step the government wants to abolish the power of the Supreme Court to take action on its own accord. It is also expected that the government will close down the special forum for public complaints that was created by the deposed chief justice; on an average it  was receiving 500 complaints per day.

The media will close down in protest on November 9th; the Pakistan Peoples Party will launch a long protest march on November 13th; the lawyers’ protests continue; and the international pressure on the government is mounting; things have never looked so bad for General Musharraf.

Given the track record of General Musharraf one feels that his future course of action will depend on the role of the international community, as his support from the Western countries seems to outweigh the opposition against him within Pakistan.

Azmat Abbas is bureau chief at DawnNews, Lahore