by Ejaz Haider
Lahore, November 12, 2007
While it is extremely important to combat extremism and even more crucial to streamline Pakistan’s politics and acquire a consensus on stability, none of this translates into a loss of control of nuclear weapons or their unauthorised use.
In the middle of Pakistan’s political crisis, one question “coursing through Washington” – more through the western media, in fact – is whether Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is safe; or will remain so, the scare being this decade’s equivalent of “the Russians are coming!”.
Considering that Pakistan put in place a C2 (command and control) system for its strategic forces in February 2000, more than three years before India did, what should one make of this alarm in the West?
Let’s consider a few quick points within the strict parameters of nuclear strategy before moving to the politics of this angst.
The full spectrum of Pakistan’s C2 is based on C4I2SR (command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, information, surveillance and reconnaissance). There has been some scepticism about the lack of C4I2 infrastructure — given limitations of resources, technology and efficiency – in Pakistan (incidentally, also in India) and therefore the country’s inability to operate the full range of C4I2, eloquent though it seems on paper.
The problem with this approach is that it looks at South Asia through the prism of western nuclear doctrines (especially the case of the United States and then-USSR) which relied on launch-on-warning (LOW), only possible when all or a large part of the arsenal is fully deployed (warheads and delivery vehicles mated and on hair-trigger alert).
The hair-trigger postures necessitated a very complex C4I2 system: real-time intelligence (a combination of satellite and signal intelligence with input from human intelligence); counter-strike capabilities requiring retargeting procedures that would involve very complex computing solutions; and a host of other requirements.
None of this is required at this stage by Pakistan and India. Despite Pakistan’s “first-use” doctrine as opposed to India’s rhetorical “no-first-use”, its arsenal remains de-mated and de-alerted. (How risk may be managed through ambiguity is a separate debate and outside the scope of this piece.)
As for the various dilemmas (always/never; instability-stability paradox), they are built into the very possession of a nuclear arsenal; every state, advanced or backward, has to deal with them by the very fact of its possession of a nuclear arsenal. There is also an understanding (and acceptance) that there can be no failsafe C2 (for instance, the unauthorised loading of primed nuclear-armed missiles onto a B-52 bomber in the US and the aircraft’s flight in August this year).
Nonetheless, every precaution is taken, on the technology side (Permissive Action Links, nuclear codes etc) as well as on the human side (elaborate PRPs — Personnel Reliability Programmes, other security procedures that take care of the three possible scenarios of security breach: insider, outsider, and insider-outsider collusion) to ensure that the arsenal remains safe from falling into wrong hands. As for accidents, hundreds have occurred in the US and elsewhere and, if Charles Perrow’s ‘Normal Accidents Theory’ is to be believed, the possibility can never be eradicated. However, warheads are designed to withstand such possibilities.
If it is accepted that some dangers attend the very possession of a nuclear arsenal by a state, regardless of its nature, that all such states do everything possible to address those contingencies, that Pakistan, in the South Asian context, moved faster than India to secure its arsenal through a C2 system (copied by India), then what is it that is “coursing through Washington”?
This is where we move from the tangible parameters of nuclear strategy to more intangible factors: the AQ Khan episode; political uncertainty; and rising extremism.
These three factors, singly and in tandem, have been working to Pakistan’s disadvantage. The image they create is one of instability: the possibility of proliferation and the even more “dangerous” possibility of these weapons falling into the hands of extremists. The second assumes, not the degradation of the C2 system by some unauthorised group, but the capturing of the state itself by extremists which will automatically put them in charge of the system itself.
Given the conservatism of Pakistani society, the thought that Pakistan is fighting America’s war, the identification of that policy with the person of General Musharraf who is getting extremely unpopular, the reverses faced by the security forces in the Tribal Areas etc, there is a sense that this danger is imminent.
Nonsense. While it is extremely important to combat extremism and even more crucial to streamline Pakistan’s politics and acquire a consensus on stability, none of this translates into a loss of control of nuclear weapons or their unauthorised use. Let’s put it this way: (a) possession of a warhead by an unauthorised group is as possible in Pakistan as it is in any other country; (b) if a group does possess a warhead, it has no way of using it for various technological reasons and in the absence of a delivery vehicle.
But there is one big problem with this fear-mongering: it could result in dangerous policy miscalculations and that, instead of helping find a solution, could lead to more trouble. States are complex entities and problems in one area may not necessarily mean trouble across the board. But like Edward Behr’s reporter in Congo who went around asking Anyone here been raped and speaks English, western reporters these days are merely looking for sexy sound-bites from Pakistan. Going by this, the non-story about the likely possession of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal by this or that group offers the full range of S&M.
There is an obvious need to counter this. The Strategic Plans Division, very open though it is, should perhaps think about a strategy to publicise the intricate security system that is in place, with its redundancies and multiple tiers, to help put down the babble that has found its way into the western press.
Simultaneously, it must be understood that SPD alone cannot address this situation. The issue relates, at the broader level, to Pakistan’s image problem and that brings in many other factors including continuing political instability and lack of a succession principle.
Ejaz Haider is Consulting Editor of The Friday Times and Op-Ed Editor of Daily Times. He has written extensively on nuclear issues over the years. He can be reached at sapper@dailytimes.com.pk