Soon after 2000, the European Union (EU) began to aspire to an increasingly robust role in conflict prevention and resolution in the South Caucasus. It sought to expand its role in the Georgian-Abkhaz, Georgian-Ossetian and Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution efforts. A turning point for its engagement was the 2008 Georgian-Russian war. The EU’s speedy response to that crisis was impressive and the Union has been actively engaged in addressing that conflict since.
But, despite a relatively robust engagement, the EU’s conflict resolution efforts have had mixed results. Numerous external challenges limit what is possible, such as Russia’s security and political stakes in the region; the intractability of the Georgian-Abkhaz, Georgian-Ossetian and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts; and the conviction among elites on all sides that compromise solutions are more costly than the continuation of conflict. But the EU has also had to face assorted internal political and bureaucratic obstacles that seriously limit its impact.
Among them, it has had to accommodate other agenda with its conflict resolution role, such as the military and energy security of its member states, and bilateral relations with the region’s countries and with Russia. It has so far failed to develop effective strategic links between its conflict resolution efforts and its separate bilateral relationship with each of the countries involved. As a mediator, especially in the Georgian-Abkhaz/Ossetian context, its has been significantly affected by its state-centric partiality. Politically understandable though the EU’s determination to respect Georgia’s territorial integrity may be, its rigid restatement in practical policies has impacted on the EU’s acceptability as a mediator to the Abkhaz (and Ossetians).
I. The EU’s Growing Interest
As enlargement into the former communist world shifted the EU’s boundaries eastward, and ultimately beyond the Black Sea, security and stability in the new neighborhood has become a priority over the past decade. Conflicts hitherto seen as relatively marginal to Europe’s security needs were suddenly much closer to home. Given the potential for a regional escalation given Russia’s role in all of them and Turkey’s military alliance with Azerbaijan, Europe expanded its focus to take note of the Georgian-Abkhaz, Georgian-Ossetian and Nagorno-Karabakh hotspots.
Frozen though they seemed at the time, they also posed a risk to the bloc’s energy security. Any flare up would potentially threaten the only transit corridor for Caspian/Central Asian energy resources located between Russia and Iran. This shift in the EU’s policy focus also broadly coincided with some conflict resolution resources freeing up in the Balkans as the situation there became more stable.
The August 2008 Georgian-Russian war further reinforced the awareness in Brussels (and Washington), that European stability should not be taken for granted. The South Caucasus remains volatile to-date, despite the appearances that after 2008 the conflicts have frozen over yet again, possibly with more sinister intractability.
The three cease-fire regimes – on the Georgian-Ossetian, Georgian-Abkhaz and Nagorno-Karabakh divides – now basically lack external support or even oversight. Hostile troops are stationed within kilometers of each other in all three conflicts and armament levels are growing. As far as Georgia’s conflicts are concerned, Russian Federation is now directly involved. In case of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s respective military alliances with Russia and Turkey continue to pose risks of a regional conflict were fighting to resume.
It is in this context that the EU is working to strengthen its conflict prevention and resolution in the region. These efforts have significantly improved as compared to some 5-7 years ago. But the EU might further benefit from reviewing its efforts to-date to capitalize on its growing institutional understanding of engagement in the region. In particular it could usefully engage in a more critical examination of the shortcomings of its approach to date, with a focus on the internal constraints that inhibit it from playing as effective a role as it aspires to.
II. Conflicts involving Georgia
Prior to 2008, the EU’s conflict resolution involvement was mostly indirect or contextual, supporting the OSCE/UN-led official peace processes, focusing on rehabilitation, development of conflict areas and confidence-building programmes, including support to peace-building and conflict transformation initiatives.
In 2003, the post of an EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus was established under the CFSP/ESDP, tasked, inter alia, to support conflict resolution. (1)
In 2004/2005 the EU incorporated Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in its European Neighbourhood Policies (ENP) and signed its ENP Action Plans with them in 2006. A conflict resolution agenda only occupied a prominent role in the Georgian AP. But given this was negotiated with Tbilisi, while Abkhazia and South Ossetia were not privy to any ENP discussions, the odds for this instrument’s conflict resolution impact were relatively low. Conflict-related agendas were largely missing from APs with Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The EU has taken a much more direct conflict resolution role since 2008. As the Georgian-Russian war broke out, the French president Nicolas Sarkozy, on behalf of the French EU presidency, mediated ceas-fire plans in August and September 2008. The EU also mobilized significant financial resources for relief and post-war reconstruction in Georgia. (2)
Since then, a number of EU institutions represented in Georgia has sought to address the conflicts in one way or another:
- The EU delegation now plays an embassy-type role for the Union, in addition to the more technical function it had already played as a Commission delegation.
- The EUSR for the South Caucasus (since 2003) seeks to contribute to the prevention and resolution of conflicts.
- The EUSR for the Crisis in Georgia (appointed in September 2008, and concurrently EUSR for Central Asia) is tasked to deal with the Geneva multiparty negotiation, a mechanism that brings together representatives of the Georgian, Russian, Ossetian and Abkhaz sides, under the joint chairmanship of the EU, OSCE and UN.
- The EU Monitoring Mission, an ESDP mission, has monitored the ceasefire arrangements since October 2008 on the Georgian-controlled areas, but with no access to Abkhazia or South Ossetia.
- In addition, the EU Institute for Strategic Studies, the EU’s in-house think tank, provides analysis on the conflict situation but also a forum for dialogue activities, mainly on Track II.
- The EU has also set up an international fact-finding mission into the circumstances of the August 2008 war.
While this appears on the face of it to be a robust third-party intervention, the EU’s achievements have been mixed.
There are many objective factors that limit the scope for a breakthrough in the EU’s conflict resolution role – such as Russia’s military, political and economic stakes in the region, including in Abkhazia and South Ossetia; the overlapping of the Georgian-Russian and Georgian-Abkhaz/Georgian-Ossetian levels of conflict; an apparent absence of a mutually hurting stalemate that might prompt a resolution on all these levels; or the intractability of the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts and the inherent difficulty of dealing with political status questions in conflicts about self-determination and territorial integrity.
But the problems are not just external – many political and bureaucratic factors within the EU undermine the effectiveness of its engagement.
Political Limitations
The EU has been divided over Georgia – and even more so over Russia. Divisions between the political positions of different member states run deep and are motivated by different bilateral preferences on issues ranging from the states’ own national or energy security, to what vision of the EU’s foreign policy each member state has, to NATO enlargement and the recognition of Kosovo. Agendas such as democratisation, human rights or conflict resolution have at times been subject to security and political considerations.
Russia continues to cause a deep rift between member states. A group of states including the three Baltic republics, Poland and the Czech Republic, backed by Sweden and to a degree also Finland, motivated mainly by security fears and objections to Russia’s heavy-handedness in its neighborhood, favour a hard-headed policy. The Germans, French and some southern members - with strong trade links, a strong reliance on Russia’s gas or, in case of Greece, an Orthodox affinity - favor non-contentious cooperation.
The depth of this rift has recently been somewhat mitigated by a combination of new EU institutional arrangements, NATO’s de facto suspension of its eastward enlargement plans, the Obama Administration’s reset policy, Russia’s interest in modernization and the global economic crisis and a downturn in oil and gas prices. These may have opened avenues for greater EU-Russia cooperation, although security and conflict resolution matters are yet to get high on the agenda.
Member states also differ in approaching Georgia – both in terms of the conflicts and its domestic political reforms. The newer and northern member states tend to focus on the geo-strategic levels of conflict in Georgia; if concerned with the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts, they tend to emphasize Russia’s role in them. Only some among the older EU member states have sought an approach focusing also on the local level of conflict, addressing deep-seated grievances inherent to the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian situation. Reviews of Georgia’s democratization performance and its conflict resolution policies have been softened by those who see relations between Georgia and the West through the prism of relations with Russia.
Largely as a result of the varied political approaches of its member states, the EU has been relatively toothless in many of its conflict resolution efforts in Georgia.
Particularly striking is the EU’s meek reaction over Russia’s blatant non-compliance with the cease-fire agreements of 2008. Russian troops withdrew from Georgia proper by 15 October 2008 as the ceasefire required, but far higher numbers of Russian troops than agreed remain stationed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in breach of the agreements. Moscow has solidified its military presence in both regions it now considers independent. Brussels may be raising this issue with Moscow in private meetings, but there has been a surprising absence of public calls by the EU for Russian compliance.
In this situation, the EUMM’s impact is likewise relatively limited. Due to its lack of access to the Abkhaz and Ossetian sides, it does not comprehensively oversee the ceasefire regime. It does, however, contribute to conflict prevention, despite being an imperfect mechanism, as it establishes a monitoring presence on one side and internationalizes the conflict somewhat, while also dampening some of the security fears of the Georgian side. Its support to the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism, a forum for representatives of sides to discuss security issues, has been very beneficial.
The EU is also struggling to inject nuance into its policies on conflict resolution matters - given Russia’s role in Georgia’s conflict and the unequivocal support to the Georgian side in terms of its territorial integrity. The Georgian ‘State Strategy towards Occupied Territories’ of January 2010, and its accompanying Action Plan of June 2010, outline Georgia’s policy towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia and emphasize “cooperation through engagement”. The EU has been supportive: it has provided political backing and practical consultations and expertise to the Georgian State Ministry on Reintegration, responsible for the policy’s development.
And while this initiative is innovative, it is not problem-free, nor is it sophisticated enough to secure real progress in the conflict resolution process. For one, the Abkhaz and Ossetians complain the Strategy’s framework of ‘de-occupation’ is unacceptable to them and undermines any potential cross-conflict work. Additionally, the implementation mechanisms of the Strategy are developed in a draft document that has recently raised deep concerns. The draft ‘Modalities for Engagement of International Organizations and International NGOs in the Occupied Territories of Georgia’ document outlines what are in effect very strict control mechanisms for any international engagement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia; if adopted in its current form, it will contradict the proclaimed cooperation spirit. The international community, unhappy with those modalities though it may be, finds it difficult to counter Georgia’s assertive conflict resolution policies given Russia’s paramount role in these conflicts.
The EU and Russia have agreed to disagree about Georgia. But without the necessary capacity to take on contentious issues, there is also little space for creative policies. The EU’s fall back position is unquestionable support to Georgia’s territorial integrity. This is sensible, especially given that anything short of such support would be tantamount to sanctioning Russia’s use of force to redraw international borders. But the Georgian-Russian agenda has overshadowed the Georgian-Abkhaz/Ossetian issues, leaving minimal space for tackling these conflicts’ original dilemma of territorial integrity vs. self-determination.
Political status questions - the EU/US offering full backing to Georgia, while Russia supports Abkhaz/Ossetian independence - have hijacked most conflict resolution efforts. The EU, in its attempts to provide Georgia with unwavering, has been too slow to grasp the moment and genuinely engage Abkhazia’s population (3) in an apolitical way and regardless of the region’s final political status, to counter its drift into Russia.
The half-hearted attempts to engage the conflict regions have been fraught with difficulties. Practically fleshing out the EU’s ‘non-recognition and engagement’ policy towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia, championed by the EUSR for the South Caucasus, has taken the EU a long time. Its implementation has been no less politically bumpy; status issues, interpreted widely enough, have trickled down to very practical questions of travel documents, issuance of Schengen visas for Abkhaz and Ossetian holders of Russian passports, etc. These hurdles have complicated confidence building and civil society peace building efforts.
Institutional Hurdles
On the bureaucratic front, the different EU institutions involved have not always been on the same page. Their mandates and policy lines should be better coordinated. The Lisbon Treaty reforms are bound to improve this over time, but will not be sufficient on their own. The EU institutional reforms will not address the differences between state interests of EU members.
The coordination and cooperation between the different EU institutions in Georgia has not always been smooth. There are, however, significant improvements in their cohabitation in comparison to the period after August 2008 when observers complained of ‘turf battles’ between the bureaucracies.
Still, the applicable adage is that of bureaucratic politics theory, namely ‘where you stand is where you sit’.(4) While sharing the same broad objectives, these actors have different interests , in accordance with their mandates and approach. This has often resulted in suboptimal performance or scattered perceptions of the EU’s role on the ground.
With the Lisbon Treaty in force and the European External Action Service in the process of being established, a re-design of the institutional structure is underway. These reforms will solve some of the bureaucratic hurdles in the longer term. But during the transition period to a fully operational European External Action Service, the flux of change is compounding existing problems; the de facto mandates of the relevant EU institutions are further weakened by the current state of flux as well as portfolio and staffing changes.
The EUSR posts have been particularly impacted by this uncertainty. Their mandates have now been rolled over twice (5), amidst discussions about the EU getting rid of its special representative for the region. But EU’s conflict resolution efforts have different needs than political, trade or democratization agendas.
Even when fully up to speed, a ‘double-hatted’ full EU delegation to Georgia will have few prospects of impacting on conflicts that are in essence regional. (The EU should draw lessons from its EUMM effort – its de jure Georgia-wide mandate is simply not effective in areas Georgia does not control and where the EUMM has no access). The South Caucasus conflicts should continue to be addressed by a regional EU representative who will be able to, at a minimum, secure access to all sides, and negotiate potential confidence building measures, incremental though they may be.
III. The EU’s Role in Nagorno-Karabakh
The EU’s role in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is much less prominent that in conflicts involving Georgia. The EU is not a party to the talks about Nagorno-Karabakh. Negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan are facilitated by Russia, US and France as chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group. The EU has not sought to secure a role in the deadlocked official process.
It has also hardly used its bilateral political muscle to prompt Armenia and Azerbaijan to work towards a compromise-based peace. As mentioned above, conflict resolution agendas hardly figure in the ENP Action Plans negotiated between Brussels and Armenia and Azerbaijan respectively. The EU has minimal, if any, leverage over Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan, flush with oil and gas revenues and increasingly oblivious to the international community’s probing eye or pressure.
The EU has mainly sought to impact indirectly, in support of the OSCE led process. The South Caucasus EUSR has been an important contact, keeping Brussels up-to-date on conflict developments and providing a port of call for the sides. Similarly to the situation in Georgia, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is regional; an EU institutional link with equal access to Baku and Yerevan, and the potential to access Stepanakert, is needed.
Recently, the EU has started supporting civil society peace-building activities in the Nagorno-Karabkh context. This is an important first, the EU had hitherto avoided a deeper substantive involvement in support of peace-building relating to Nagorno-Karabakh. The EU has also been strategic in the implementation of this intervention, which is managed by the Delegation in Tbilisi to avoid political hurdles of bringing in delegations to Yerevan and Baku.
IV. Bilateral and Conflict Resolution Agendas
Conflict resolution efforts are only a small part of the EU’s engagement with all the South Caucasus countries and Russia. A wide range of their bilateral agendas are, however, directly relevant to conflict resolution – for instance, military and law enforcement reform; trade, including that of military equipment; and also broad democratization and pluralism debates, including on freedoms of the media and expression.
The bilateral settings present a good opportunity for the EU to impress on the sides the need for conflict resolution progress in the broadest terms and to champion sound policies that might at least foster a favorable conflict resolution environment, if not compromise approaches to conflicts. But the EU has not made effective strategic links between bilateral negotiations, and its conflict resolution - and particularly mediation - efforts to press for conflict resolution progress. Among reasons for why the EU typically falls short of taking robust enough conflict-related policy positions in its bilateral ties is the fact that it has allowed its internal divisions to undermine the leverage it could bring as mediator.
There are many potential pitfalls to developing strategic linkages between the EU’s bilateral and mediation agendas, not the least that asymmetries exist between parties to conflict and no conflict-related conditionality is likely to be effective in the case of Azerbaijan or Russia. But, even so, the two processes could be better strategically coordinated.
In terms of its engagement with Abkazia and South Ossetia, the EU can counter some of these regions’ reservations by a deeper and more even-handed engagement, while not compromising on its support for territorial integrity. To counter their perceptions of it’s partiality the EU should foster further engagement with constituencies in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to provide an alternative to their ever-speedier drift into Russia. Technical support to engagement policies will have limited impact if not coupled with strong political backing. It can expand more energy on an interest-based approach to mediation that would, in a comprehensive and strategic way, address root causes of the conflict as well as legacies of past abuse, and seek to transform the overall conflict-resolution environment.
V. Conclusion
The EU has significantly stepped up its conflict resolution role in the South Caucasus in the last couple of years. However its efforts continue to be hampered by suboptimal political heft and financial resources, and internal impediments. Yet no other international actor is in the position to play a more effective and more robust role in the official mediation process at this point. The EU should seek to draw lessons from its past engagement to overcome some of the institutional and political hurdles that limit its impact. It should not let a legitimate insistence on territorial integrity stop it from more effective engagement with the break away regions. It should better leverage its bilateral agendas with Russia and the Caucasian countries to achieve the conflict resolution efforts it seeks. And it should make maximum use of the Lisbon treaty institutional innovations to bring a more unified and effective focus to its efforts. Only then will began fulfilling its potential as a force for peace and stability in the region and on its own periphery.
(1) Although strengthened in 2006, the main role of the EUSR vis-à-vis the peace processes was that of providing support. Additionally, as part of the EUSR’s efforts, a small Border support team was set up in 2005 to monitor the Georgian-Russian border.
(2) Up to €500 million was pledged for these goals in October 2008. ‘Overview of EC assistance to people affected by conflict in Georgia’, EC Delegation to Georgia website, http://www.delgeo.ec.europa.eu/en/programmes/rehabilitation2.html.
(3) South Ossetia is much smaller, much less viable as an entity and since 2008 has been basically off limits to Westerners. Attempts to engage South Ossetia are much less developed than in case of Abkhazia.
(4) A. Graham and P. Zelikow (1999). Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Longman.
(5) For six months in the case of EUSR for the South Caucasus, and for six and twelve months in case of the EUSR for the Georgia Crisis.