Obama’s Change and the New Role of the European Union
By Patrick TomczakThe enlargements of NATO and the European Union in the past decade have contributed to a process that sandwiches former Soviet republics between the EU’s eastern borders and the Russian Federation. From today’s point of view, it seems surprising that in the 1990s the Eastern European and Southern Caucasian countries – namely Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia – were not bright spots on the radar screen of the EU’s foreign policy. At that time, the war in the Balkans and its aftermath supposedly attracted more attention. Nonetheless, immediately following the breakdown of the Soviet Union, these today called ‘In-Between States’ were sources of potential and concrete unrest and instability, despite Russia’s role as a peacekeeper, which was not questioned or even touched by Western powers.
For the European Union, the once neglected ’frozen conflicts’ in the post-Soviet space have become, after the recent 2004 and 2007 enlargements, an important issue of its foreign policy. In this regard, the EU’s main instruments are the “European Neighborhood Policy” and its concretization for the In-Between States, the “Eastern Partnership Initiative”, as well as the “Black Sea Synergy Initiative”. Due to shared borders and geographical proximity to the countries beyond EU’s eastern borders, they are now considered eminently significant with respect to important sectors such as energy, migration, and democratization.
US Foreign Policy…
In order to understand the setting of the current neighborhood policy of the European Union, the reinterpretation of the US’s foreign policy under Barack Obama plays a major role: The US engagement in and on behalf of the countries in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus is longstanding. However, with regard to international security, the relative importance of the region has suddenly increased following the events of 9/11 and the impressive political changes in Tbilisi and Kiev. The Bush administration was one of the strongest supporters of the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia and the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine. In the aftermaths of disputed elections, these spectacular series of political protests and uprisings seemed to demonstrate the will of a broad majority of the people and the new elites to orient their countries towards more democracy and integration in Western organizations. The Bush administration highlighted the fundamental achievements of these “beacons of liberty” and pushed, to the chagrin of the Russian Federation, their accession process of NATO membership. All this culminated in partnership programs such as the so-called “Membership Action Plan” with Georgia and the Ukraine, which were proposed at NATO’s Bucharest summit in spring 2008.
…and the New Administration in Washington
However, recent changes in the American government have transformed the direction of US engagement. The Obama administration follows a pragmatic course in its foreign policy and admits a crucial role to “key centers of influence”. In this sense, the new US “National Security Strategy”, published in May 2010, clearly breaks with unilateral approaches and promotes dialogue with regional powers. Furthermore, international security, especially concerning Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, as well as climate change and nuclear disarmament are now high priorities. In the context of these major objectives, the United States needs Russia as a reliable partner.
It is also important to note that under the new administration, American multilateralism remains instrumental and represents not a value in itself; Obama has made comparatively big concessions towards Russia. Rhetorically, he insisted on “resetting US-Russian relations”; practically, he nullified plans for a ground-based missile defense system in Poland and Czech Republic, which were actively supported by former President George W. Bush. Moreover, the Obama administration is now more cautious towards the integration of Georgia and Ukraine in Western organizations – mainly NATO structures – and, as a further sign of a foreign policy change, the arms and military equipment export to Georgia, which peaked in 2008 with 72.3 billion US-Dollars, fell to zero in 2009. Simultaneously, US-Russia relations have become more cooperative, which is especially visible in the recently-signed arms reduction treaty “New START”, which may be seen as one of the biggest foreign policy achievements of the new administration so far.
What are the Consequences for the In-Between States?
The Russian-Georgian War of August 2008 – which mainly took place on the territory of the disputed Georgian region South Ossetia – was still an issue all over Eastern and Central Europe, when the described ‘Grand Strategy’ of the Obama administration created uncertainty and irritations. As a first reaction to Washington’s ’turn-around’, famous Central European ex-presidents and politicians, such as Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel, criticized Washington’s ‘laissez-faire policy’ towards Moscow in an open letter published in the Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza in 2009. In this letter, the authors referred mainly to historically-based fears of a disappearing protection against an ‘imperial-acting’ Russia.
However, while the critical voices came mostly from politically stable and economically prosperous Central Europe, the more fragile states beyond EU’s borders merely commented on the US change in priorities. Assumingly, the first use of military force of post-Soviet Russia outside its own territory was still too present in the consciousness of the local intelligentsia and the political elite. The events in South Ossetia have reminded the whole region that NATO membership for ex-Soviet Republics remains more than a delicate issue for Moscow and that Russia is willing to destabilize its “near abroad” with military operations, if necessary. Hence, the latest agreement between the Ukrainian president Yanukovych and his Russian counterpart Medvedev concerning the lease extension on Russian Black Sea naval facilities on the Ukrainian peninsula Crimea until the year 2047 can be seen as an expression of the current ‘atmosphere of concession’ towards Russia.
The US’s Change in Priorities and the Responsibility of the European Union
Although paradoxical, it is important to highlight that the US’s cooperative-pragmatic turn towards Russia constitutes an opportunity rather than a threat for the countries beyond the eastern borders of the European Union. Even though regarded suspiciously, the future of the In-Between States will mainly depend, in the long run, on overcoming geopolitical rivalry and establishing working relations among the key players. Nevertheless, the United States is still considered by Moscow as a military power and partly as the old adversary – as shown, for instance, in the harsh reaction of Russia to the US push for a NATO adhesion of Georgia and Ukraine. In contrast, the EU is portrayed less as a potential rival. Therefore, under the aegis of Brussels, a dialogue between all involved governments could be established aiming a peaceful transformation towards more stability and higher standards of human rights and democracy.
However, the current design of the “Eastern Partnership Initiative” shows that the European Union is still undecided about, on the one hand, the aim to guarantee sovereignty and freedom of alliance for the In-Between States and, on the other hand, the fact that Russia cannot be put aside in the creation of a sustainable policy framework for the entire post-Soviet space. To that point, the “Eastern Partnership Initiative”, introduced in May 2009, presents the biggest structural problem, since it excludes Russia – on the pretense that it avoids tension within the region. Nonetheless, Brussels needs to understand that an inappropriate foreign policy towards the Eastern Neighbors could trigger a “competition on integration” between Russia and the European Union. It is therefore imperative to replace suspicion with an atmosphere of cooperation through concrete projects including, if possible, Russia directly, within the framework of an integrative New Ostpolitik.
In this context, Ukraine is the most important state. Although it is currently stable and the largest country in the region, Ukrainian society is torn between the European Union and Russia.
Pragmatically it is, from the EU’s point of view, prudent to respect existing geopolitical constraints to a certain extent, but at the same time it is necessary to push for as much integration as possible in the structures of European political institutions. If the EU is able to overcome the historical and cultural polarization between “East” and “West” in Ukraine, it might be possible to enlarge an integrative New Ostpolitik with its other Eastern neighbors as well.
Future Prospects: Political Integration and its Inherent Problems
Nevertheless, there are at least two main obstacles concerning the future of an effective New Ostpolitik. The first is the lack of a coherent approach of the EU member states. The continuum of the EU’s foreign policy towards Russia and the other Eastern neighbors, represented by the extreme ends of Poland and Germany, is well known and contains probably still a core of truth. This might not yet be immutable. Germany, and more recently France, traditionally followed a ‘Russia first’ policy, and have ‘discovered’ the other countries of the Eastern neighborhood. Within their national foreign policies, Berlin and Paris are trying to find ways to bind them closer to the European Union and to reassess their previous priorities. Moreover, the Treaty of Lisbon, which went into effect in December 2009, presents in this context a sensible way of encouraging greater EU policy coherence; however, its practical application needs to be demonstrated. In the future, the Eastern neighborhood will, therefore, become an important challenge to the capacity of Brussels to act in a concerted and efficient way.
The second obstacle lies in the current integration framework of the Eastern neighbors. Concerning the potential and noticeable conflicts in this region, the main problem remains that – as opposed to the situation in the Balkans – the EU is not (yet) willing to offer real admission opportunities. And beyond that, even a long term abolition or liberalization of visa requirements is at the moment illusionary, due to the strong opposition of some member states. However, without concrete incentives and admission options in the long run, it seems nearly impossible to convince the political elites and the people of the importance of an orientation towards the European Union. Therefore, the success of supporting political stability and pushing for real changes in democracy and human rights standards in the region will remain at least questionable. The increasing willingness in the US-Russia relations could, nonetheless, serve as a great chance for the EU to construct a sustainable New Ostpolitik.