Can the Baku-To-Belém Roadmap Put Global Climate Finance on the Right Path?

In short: The Baku-to-Belém Roadmap at COP30

• The Roadmap, set to be presented at COP30, seeks to lay out a plan to mobilize 1.3 trillion US dollars annually by 2035 for developing countries’ climate action, but risks becoming a non-binding report with limited impact, follow-through and accountability.
   
• The 300 US dollars billion NCQG goal agreed at COP29 was far below needs, weakening developing countries’ trust in the climate process and diluting developed countries’ finance obligations under the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement.
   
• Developing countries demand public, grant-based, new and additional finance from developed nations, while developed countries focus on mobilizing private capital, which risks deepening already unsustainable debt burdens and structural inequities.
   
• The year-long Roadmap process suffers from procedural weaknesses and limited transparency with the final report lacking binding targets and drawing heavily on parallel work by Brazil’s Circle of Finance Ministers.
   
• Critical issues under-addressed in the NCQG risk being further sidelined instead of uplifted: adaptation and loss & damage funding gaps, equity and justice principles, the quality of climate finance including improving concessionality and access, debt relief, and exploring innovative public finance sources (polluter-pays taxes, fossil fuel subsidy removal, wealth taxes).

Key Recommendations:

1. Center public finance provision from developed countries, with clear targets for mitigation, adaptation, and for addressing loss & damage.
    
2. Establish accountability mechanisms (binding timelines, clear responsibilities, monitoring, reporting) to move beyond a shelved report.
    
3. Scale multilateral climate funds (MCFs) and expand grant-based, concessional finance with simplified direct access for vulnerable communities and locally led initiatives.
    
4. Adopt innovative financing tools - polluter-pays levies, subsidy reforms, wealth and profit taxes - to generate predictable new public resources.
    
5. Advance structural reforms in the global financial system: debt cancelation and improved debt sustainability frameworks, fairer global taxation regimes and credit rating practices, and stronger developing country representation in the IMF/World Bank.
    
6. Ground the Roadmap in equity and justice, ensuring support prioritizes marginalized communities and aligns with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR).

When the Paris Agreement was approved in 2015, it laid out a bottom-up approach for countries’ nationally determined contributions (NDCs) to collective climate action that in the aggregate would keep global warming to 1.5C. Ten years later at COP30 in Brazil, the Baku-to-Belém Roadmap is expected to present how to scale up climate finance to developing countries to at least 1.3 trillion US dollars annually by 2035 to help bankroll their climate ambitions, help them build resilience to devastating climate impacts and support their just transitions away from a fossil-fuel driven, unsustainable development model in order to keep the Paris commitment alive. 

The process to develop the roadmap is a joint effort by the outgoing Azerbaijani COP29 presidency and the incoming Brazilian COP30 presidency. It was launched at the COP29 in Baku – part consolation prize and part diversionary effort – to avoid a total breakdown of the negotiations for a new collective quantified goal on climate finance (NCQG) and to hide the inadequacy of the last-minute, hard-fought decision of a new finance target set at 300 US dollars billion per year by 2035 for developing countries, which is to replace the old 100 US dollars billion annual goal after 2025. Developing countries had hoped for a much higher number to reflect their needs, such as the 5.1 - 6.8 trillion US dollars for up to 2030 identified in NDCs in the second needs determination report published in 2024. Expert calculations suggest that climate investments in emerging markets and developing countries (excluding China) must increase by 2.5 trillion US dollars annually by 2030 and 3.3 trillion US dollars annually by 2035, albeit from all sources, both domestic and international public and private finance. Science-based financing requirements would be even higher.

Disappointing NCQG Decision 

The NCQG decision at Baku was a huge disappointment for developing countries and many civil society observers.  Many have derided it as a weakening of developed countries’ obligations under the climate convention – the decision just commits them to ‘taking the lead’ in mobilizing the 300 billion US dollars instead of clearly outlining their responsibility to provide the public funding – and the abdication of the grand bargain struck in Paris that mandates developed countries to help developing countries with the financial support needed to implement their increased emission reduction commitments in national climate plans. The recent International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion reinforced the legal obligation of countries to provide climate finance at a level that makes limiting global heating to 1.5C possible. 

Rather than building trust in the climate process, the NCQG decision in Baku further weakened it

Rather than building trust in the climate process, the NCQG decision in Baku further weakened it at a time of peril for the future of the multilateral climate process with the UNFCCC struggling to stay financially afloat and relevant. This comes as the United States, historically the largest greenhouse gas emitter, under President Trump is leaving both the Paris Agreement and its fair share financial responsibilities for the provision of climate finance, including under the NCQG, behind. 

Developing countries’ doubts that the NCQG decision embeds developed countries’ good faith efforts, and by extension a lack of confidence in the Baku-to-Belém Roadmap intransparent and unclear process and likely outcome, is also evident in the third round of NDCs submitted right before COP30. Many of the new and updated developing country plans highlight just how much the realization of climate ambition outlined is conditional on finance support provided by developed countries. 

Centrality of Public Support

Developing countries have long maintained that as a matter of equity, and in line with the core principle of the global climate regime of common but differentiated responsibilities and respected capabilities (CBDR-RC), developed countries in acknowledging their historic responsibility for run-away greenhouse gas emissions should provide most finance under the NCQG goal, including a substantial core of the Baku-to-Belém Roadmap, as public finance. In contrast, developed countries have pointed to changed geopolitical realities after the Russian invasion of Ukraine requiring increased military spending (which reached new record levels in 2024) and fiscal constraints resulting in significant cuts to official development assistance and climate support as reasons why they cannot significantly increase their financial support, while urging to expand the contributor base for fulfilling the NCQG by pointing to the increased financial power of many emerging market economies. Their panacea is to push for the private sector to fill the widening funding gaps, including by demanding developing countries do more to create the domestic enabling environment through regulatory frameworks and establishing country platforms to attract and facilitate increased private investment flows.   

COP30 is thus likely to see a repeat of an agenda fight at this year’s Bonn session with its opening stalled for days as developing countries demanded adding a new agenda item focused on Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement, which establishes provision as an obligation, instead of centering climate finance discussions in the NCQG primarily on Article 9.3, which focuses on mobilization.

Against this backdrop, the Baku-to-Belém Roadmap is likely to fall short of expectations on several fronts – including civil society’s push for the Roadmap to acknowledge and correct for fundamental NCQG shortfalls, such as a focus on mobilization of private finance instead of one on public support and by not elaborating specific public funding targets for mitigation, adaptation or for addressing loss and damage.  Shortcomings are unavoidable both in procedure and substance.

Procedural Shortcomings of Roadmap 

Procedurally, the NCQG decision from Baku only envisions the delivery of a report by the COP29 and COP30 presidencies in Belém summarizing the work they have undertaken over the past year, but not the clear action plan with measurable targets and indicators, concrete time-lines, and outlining responsibilities of different actors as well as transparent accountability mechanisms that many feel is needed. 

For the NCQG implementation over the next ten years to increase scale, quality, access, inclusivity and affordability of climate finance for developing countries it has to focus substantively on addressing structural inequities, barriers and disenablers most developing countries face. These barriers were identified and analyzed during the NCQG technical process in a series of expert dialogues, naming in particular unsustainable debt burden, limited fiscal and policy space, the high cost of capital, unilateral trade measures or unfair global taxation regimes. They require a more fundamental reform of the multilateral financial and economic architecture with actors and processes, such as the multilateral development banks (MDBs) or the global debt, tax and trade regimes, largely outside the remit of the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement. Within the UNFCCC, it is primarily in the Sharm-el-Sheikh Dialogue on Article 2.1.c on aligning all financial flows with the Paris Agreement and in the UAE Just Transition Work Programme where those broader systemic issues can be discussed, although how they can and will be linked to the Baku to Belém Roadmap remains also unclear. The future of both negotiation streams – in particular how to move from dialogue to implementation – will be decided at COP30.

Currently, a formal decision by Parties to the Paris Agreement on the content of the Roadmap is not foreseen (beyond maybe a polite, but inconsequential simple ‘noting’ of the report). This impacts the usefulness of the Roadmap if it wants to be more than just another shelved report. On the one hand, without some form of COP30 consensus decision on at least some elements or recommendations from the Roadmap, such as potentially as part of an overall COP30 package in a cover decision, there is no guarantee that concrete actions will follow, let alone transparency and accountability through reporting and monitoring on when and by whom potential actions are taken. On the other hand, many countries as well as civil society observers have raised questions about the lack of transparency and inclusivity of the Roadmap development process. They are weary of giving the legitimacy and weight of the climate regime through a COP30 decision to a report, which is not the outcome of formal climate negotiations. 

Consultations and Submissions

Under the initial workplan for the Roadmap and its update, the two presidencies included consultations with and outreach to countries and as well as observers, such as during the Bonn climate negotiations in June and on the side-lines of other meetings such as the climate weeks in London and New York. They also invited written submissions in two rounds by Parties and observers based on guiding questions, with more than 210 formally submitted so far, although only about 30 from countries and country groups, while the rest is from non-party stakeholders. How the very divergent and often competing views of those inputs will be synthesized and taken up is unclear, and a daunting task before the report is expected to be released in late October in advance of COP30. It is also not clear what the combined weight of those formal submissions will be in influencing the Roadmap report, given that there are other inputs specifically commissioned by the Brazilian COP30 presidency, which clearly seems to be the dominating force among the two COP presidencies jointly responsible for delivering the Roadmap. The Brazilian team commissioned both work by a team of economists, as well as a report by the COP30 Circle of Finance Ministers as further inputs to the Roadmap, arguing specifically that the implementation of the Baku-to-Belém Roadmap will require the commitment of government actors in charge of economy and finance, with a central role to play for finance ministers in advancing the Roadmap recommendations both domestically and internationally.

Role and Weight of the Circle of Finance Ministers’ Input

While the Brazilian COP30 Presidency maintains that the COP30 Circle of Finance Ministers’ report, which was published during the IMF/World Bank Annual meeting in mid-October, will just be ‘one input’, it is hard to believe that its recommendations and findings will not get elevated consideration in the final Baku-to-Belém Roadmap expected to be released just before COP30. This especially since it is clear that the Circle of Finance Ministers’ work draws also heavily on prior findings and work done on climate-relevant finance by the Brazilian G20 in 2024, such as  the MDB Roadmap, as well as on prior analysis by the Independent High Level Expert Group on Climate Finance (IHLEG), which served in an advisory function to the Circle of Finance Ministers. The initiative is led by the Brazilian Ministry of Finance and invited the participation and input from finance ministries from 34 countries and the European Commission, including the finance ministers from previous COP21-COP29 presidencies, the host countries of the most recent biodiversity and desertification summits and the G20 presidency. However, this clearly represents just a subset of the countries under the Paris Agreement. 

Can the Roadmap Center Equity and Justice?

Substantively, the Baku-to-Belém Roadmap is likely to disappoint those hoping that it firmly frames its recommendations in equity and justice, especially the principles of CBDR-RC and polluter pays, as well as inclusivity, gender-responsiveness and adherence to and promotion of human rights. This would require prioritizing recommendations and concrete actions in the Roadmap for scaling up adequate, additional, predictable, non-debt inducing high quality and accessible financing for climate investments that responds not only to the needs and priorities of developing country Parties, but those of often marginalized and disenfranchised communities most vulnerable to climate impacts. 

The NCQG decision clearly acknowledged the need for scaling up public and grant-based resources and highly concessional finance for developing countries particularly for adaptation

First and foremost, the Roadmap should provide more clarity on the 300 billion US dollars NCQG core target of annually mobilized climate finance by 2035, including with respect to important elements not addressed in the NCQG decision. One missing element is the continued lack of a uniform definition of what can be counted as climate finance, or at minimum an exclusion list of what should not be counted (for example market-rate loans or carbon market proceeds as civil society networks argue), as climate finance provision is to be new and additional to other finance flows and should be highly concessional. Another missing element is a shared methodology for the grant equivalency of concessional loans (which are under the outgoing US$100 billion goal counted at full nominal value), thus not taking into account that a substantial amount of climate finance provided as debt, even at concessional rates, will flow back to developed countries. Most importantly, the Roadmap should clarify the role and scale of provision of public finance by developed countries and disaggregating the goal for mitigation, adaptation and for addressing loss and damage respectively. The NCQG decision clearly acknowledged the need for scaling up public and grant-based resources and highly concessional finance for developing countries particularly for adaptation - where the annual gap for fulfilling needs is estimated by some at 215 - 387 billion US dollars – and for responding to losses and damages, which in 2024 alone, the hottest year to far on record, were calculated at around 402 billion US dollars. Yet it failed to lay out how and when to supersede the insufficient Glasgow goal from 2019 for doubling adaptation finance by 2025 with a new more ambitious goal, such as the call of least developed countries for at least tripling adaptation finance flows by 2030. A push for a new adaptation finance target under the NCQG will also frame COP30 negotiations around the Global Goal on Adaptation and relevant implementation indicators. 

Increasing the Quantity and Quality of Public Finance

Centering public finance in the Roadmap not just in terms of quantity, but also quality of how that finance is accessed and disbursed would also require further elaboration of a plan for tripling the outflows of multilateral climate funds (MCFs) under the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement from 2022 levels by 2030 as mandated in the NCQG decision. As the majority of climate finance continues to be delivered as loans and many of the most climate vulnerable countries face unsustainable debt burdens that further limit their fiscal space and increase their cost of capital, the significantly higher concessionality of these climate funds in delivering climate finance to developing countries stands out (with 100 percent of the funding LDCs and small island developing states received in 2024 as grants). MCFs in particular have also the capacity to reform their delivery systems in the short run to increase the quality, equity and effectiveness of their climate finance delivery to benefit for example Indigenous Peoples, women and gender-diverse groups, or migrants and workers. The Roadmap should thus address another shortcoming of the NCQG decision by further elaborating and calling on the MCFs to adopt pathways for increasing, simplifying and enhancing direct access, including through devolved financing mechanism and decision-making, such as via small grant approaches, to address key barriers of access for locally-led and locally-owned initiatives, such as co-financing requirements, incremental cost approaches, collateral requirements or overly burdensome data or documentation mandates. This includes facilitating access to concessional finance for local private sector actors, such as micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) in developing countries as the backbone for country-owned, sustainable and transformational climate actions, for example to support food security through the financial inclusion of women-led businesses in the micro- or informal sector, where they are disproportionately higher represented. 

One way the Roadmap could highlight increasing concessional finance is by explicitly endorsing innovative sources for public finance in developed countries. Solidarity levies or applying taxes according to the polluter-pays principle such as through a climate damages tax introduced in OECD countries, taxing fossil fuel profits, phasing out fossil fuel subsidies or taxing wealth fairly, thus reflecting the disproportionate climate footprint of ultra-rich individuals and multinational corporations, could create hundreds of billions, if not trillions annually of new and additional climate finance for climate justice. 

Leveraging Private Capital as Panacea?

Whether these priorities highlighted in many submissions by developing countries and civil society will make it into the Roadmap is far from certain. Given the role and weight of the Brazilian Circle of Finance Ministers in the Roadmap development process, the Roadmap report could largely mirror at least the structure of the five priority areas identified by the Circle of Finance Ministers and their advisory circles, if not a substantial part of the content of the finance ministers’ report. It will center prominently on ways to mobilize private capital, including as the core tasks of public climate finance actors such as the MCFs and MDBs in using public resources to de-risk private sector investments through underwriting guarantees or blended finance structures in public-private partnerships, where the public sector takes first losses – and might be saddled with debt and even further reduced fiscal space if they fail. Such approaches are increasingly pushed not just for mitigation, but also for adaptation, including through insurance and risk-pooling structures despite concerns of diminishing affordability and insurability of such schemes. Furthermore, there are clear indications that leveraging expectations continue to be overblown, especially for countries like SIDS and LDCs facing the biggest structural hurdles to access finance, and that there is little evidence to suggest that blended finance can be effective where projects do not produce financial returns, which is the case for the majority of adaptation funding needs. And in the cases where they are, this might lead to privatization of essential services or infrastructure, ultimately transferring the costs to either governments or citizens in developing countries. 

The reform of the MDBs, a priority agenda of the Brazilian G20 Presidency in 2024, is bound to receive increased attention in the Roadmap, including by making them ‘bigger’ through efforts to optimize their balance sheet through adjustments to their the capital adequacy framework, which MDBs claim would allow them to increase their lending by up to 400 billion US dollars over the next decade. MDBs in Baku also promised to increase their climate finance delivery to developing countries from 75 billion US dollars in 2023 to 120 billion US dollars in 2030, with additional 65 billion US dollars mobilized in private capital – a significant portion of the 300 billion US dollars NCQG promised annually by 2035. However, the overwhelming majority of this would be in the form of loans, further increasing indebtedness, even if delivered as contingency credit lines or loans with debt suspension clauses in the wake of climate disasters. Like debt-for-climate swaps, these financial instrument innovations provide at best a temporary breathing space, but do not address the issue of unsustainable debt, forcing climate vulnerable countries to prioritize debt service over climate actions and reducing investments in public services such as social protection systems, health and education that increase the resilience of communities to climate impacts. A new approach to the debt sustainability framework (DSF) and analyses (DSAs) by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank is urgently needed not just to stabilize debt but to align debt repayment capacity with human rights, climate and sustainable development needs.

Structural Reforms to Global Financial Architecture

It remains to be seen, if the Roadmap is willing to push for the longer term structural reforms in the global finance architecture needed to make mobilizing the 1.3 trillion US dollars annually for developing countries climate action by 2035 a reality. For example, in looking at developing countries’ debt burden, will the Roadmap go beyond just recommending a review of the debt sustainability approach and embrace more structural reforms such as calls for a UN Debt Convention and a multilateral debt restructuring mechanism in support of comprehensive debt cancellation involving all creditors, sovereign and private? An understanding of the structural inequities embedded in the current global financial system draining financial resources from developing countries, to the tune of 2 trillion US dollars annually by some accounts, would force the Roadmap report to also tackle the oligopoly of just three credit rating agencies (S&P, Moody’s and Fitch) controlling the majority of global credit ratings and their power to downgrade developing countries, including for efforts to forego fossil fuel exploitation as in the case of Colombia. A Roadmap committed to calling out necessary structural reforms would have to endorse the UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation (UNTC) process as a space where polluters could be more effectively taxed and excessive corporate tax evasion and avoidance be addressed. And it would have to demand long-overdue governance and shareholder reforms in the international financial institutions to increase the power and vote of developing countries for example in the IMF, where a blocking minority by the United States since 2020 has prevented a further allocation of special drawing rights (SDR) in support of developing countries sustainable development and climate efforts.

The Baku-to-Belém Roadmap to be presented at COP30 can be more than just another report to be shelved 

The Baku-to-Belém Roadmap to be presented at COP30 can be more than just another report to be shelved by turning analysis identifying barriers, gaps and opportunities to scaling up climate finance support to developing countries to 1.3 trillion US dollars annually by 2035 into recommended concrete and targeted actions for specific actors and processes, inside and outside of the UNFCCC. Many of the recommended actions will not be new or surprising; most of them are known and their technical feasibility has been established. Ultimately, the success of the Roadmap will depend on the political will of all countries and actors to implement them over the next decade in a coherent manner across multilateral processes and institutions. Throughout such efforts, however, the responsibility remains for developed countries and the institutions and processes they control as shareholders or through policy setting to lead with ambition and urgency as a matter of equity and climate justice.