CSW: Should We Stay or Should We Go?

The 70th session of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW70) took place March 9-19, 2026, at the United Nations Headquarters in New York, bringing together Member States, UN entities, and civil society organizations from around the world. CSW70 focused on the priority theme of “ensuring and strengthening access to justice for all women and girls” through the promotion of “inclusive and equitable legal systems”, the elimination of “discriminatory laws, policies, and practices”, and the addressing of “structural barriers” that prevent women and girls from exercising their human rights. At the same time, the session reviewed progress on the previous theme (CSW69)—women’s participation and decision-making in public life, alongside the elimination of violence against women and girls. 

In 2026, for the first time in the CSW’s 70-year history, the “Agreed Conclusions” were adopted by a vote rather than by consensus, following a request from the United States. Before the Conclusions were put to a vote, the US first proposed deferring their consideration, then called for the text to be withdrawn, and ultimately submitted eight amendments. These amendments opposed language on gender identity, reproductive health, intersectionality, diversity, equality, and inclusion. All eight amendments were rejected. The Commission proceeded to adopt its Agreed Conclusions, which set guidelines for more inclusive governance and improved access to justice, reinforcing the link between legal systems, social equity, and women’s and girl’s human rights. The text was approved by a vote of 37 in favor to one against (US) with six abstentions. 1

At the close of the session on March 19, the US introduced a resolution titled “Protection of Women and Girls through Appropriate Terminology”, which sought to define “gender” across all UN policy as referring to its “ordinary, generally accepted usage, as referring to men and women”, claiming this derived from Annex IV of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. 2 Belgium, on behalf of the EU, proposed a “no-action motion”, arguing the text “misquotes and contradicts” Annex IV and attempts to rewrite what was agreed over 30 years ago. The Commission approved the no-action motion, stopping the resolution from being considered. For the hbs delegation, 3 the moment unfolded from afar. By the second week of CSW we were no longer in New York, yet we followed the vote live, aware of how consequential the outcome could be. Had the motion failed, the resolution could have set a precedent for rollback of gender equality achievements on the highest multilateral level.

The Privileges and Insecurities of Attendance 

Parallel to the official negotiations, the NGO CSW Forum took place with hundreds of events and sessions organized by and for global civil society. Numerous government representatives, feminists, activists, researchers, and non-governmental organizations connected, discussed their work, experiences, best practices, and advocacy strategies within the above-mentioned themes. However, CSW70 revealed a persistent paradox in multilateral spaces. A forum dedicated to access to justice for all women and girls remains structured in unequal access, with participation shaped by gender, nationality, ethnicity, race, class, geopolitics, and mobility regimes.

The question of attendance at CSW70 was present in all discussions in feminist and LGBTIQ+ circles. Why? In the months leading up to CSW70, the US escalated tensions in Latin and Central America and together with Israel launched a war on Iran, which resulted in widespread protests and diplomatic strain. At the same time, the US introduced significant changes to its visa and immigration policies with a pause on immigrant visas for nationals of numerous countries and tighter screening requirements, reflecting a broader shift towards more restrictive mobility policies. Due to these geopolitical developments, safety and security risks for participants were heightened and added to the expected challenges and inequalities of visa procedures and border control for foreign nationals.

Well-funded NGOs and actors from the Global North have access to a multilateral platform, while marginalized communities remain excluded.

Participants in CSW encounter numerous challenges each year. Although the UN does not charge participation fees, taking part in CSW requires visas and travel to New York. Participants from the Global South—especially those from conflict-affected and postcolonial regions—face higher visa costs, restrictive visa procedures, higher rejection rates, and surveillance. On top of that, attendees must cover the costs of travel, accommodation, health insurance, local transportation, and meals. Staying in New York is expensive. All these inequalities, restrictive policies, current funding cuts, and disproportionate costs, given the varying economic standards across countries, create a system where well-funded NGOs and actors from the Global North have access to a multilateral platform, while marginalized communities remain excluded. 

Institutional structures also limit meaningful participation even for those present. Although NGO participation is critical, organizations must have ECOSOC consultative status with a limited number of representatives who compete for session slots. This produces a hierarchy where elite NGOs and individuals are prioritized over grassroots, Indigenous, or youth-led movements. At the same time, while some of the aforementioned NGOs cannot be allocated a parallel session slot to contribute their knowledge, experience, and perspective to CSW, some of the more privileged NGOs and actors have parallel sessions that sometimes deviate from the priorities of CSW altogether.

UN premises also impose strict rules on protest and political expression. Even accessories which could suggest some kind of political activism or declaration of identity are not allowed. And yet, while these impositions limit activist expression at CSW, they ironically do not enforce safe spaces. Activists from certain regions face risks due to political repression at home, while at the same time sessions at CSW can be accessed with minimal control, which invites anti-gender actors to join unannounced, disrupt sessions, and make the spaces unsafe for participants.

How Anti-Gender Actors Played a Role at the CSW

The presence of organized anti-gender movements alongside the official and civil society spaces of CSW70 highlights a deeper contestation over the CSW as a multilateral space for gender equality. The infiltration of parallel sessions is part of a broader strategic and organized transnational backlash against women’s and LGBTIQ+ human rights. Research by feminist organizations, including the Global Unit for Feminism and Gender Democracy, has documented how anti-gender movements are coordinated across borders and supported by well-resourced networks that mobilize around narratives of family values, tradition, and opposition to “gender ideology”. In the CSW70 context, this manifested not only in formal negotiations, but within the more progressive civil society spaces as well. The disruption of panels—particularly those addressing sexual and reproductive rights—signals an attempt to shrink already limited spaces for marginalized voices, undermining freedoms and rights while reinforcing exclusion under the guise of free speech.

CSWF is in fact a strategic counter-mobilization platform aligned with conservative and anti-gender agendas that reflects asymmetries in power and funding.

The emergence of the Conference on the State of Women and Family (CSWF) as a parallel counter-conference intensified this dynamic. The CSWF was presented as an official UN side event, featuring sessions organized by US-based C‑Fam, the Heritage Foundation, the French movement La Manif pour Tous, and the State of Burundi. Ultra‑conservative Christian organizations such as Alliance Defending Freedom and C‑Fam organized or co‑sponsored additional sessions with official delegations and Member States, both within the CSWF platform and in other associated spaces. In the words of the official CSWF website, the CSWF “provides an opportunity for leaders of UN members states, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and individuals from around the world to network, learn from one another, and engage in advocacy on behalf of women and their families”.

While presented as an alternative civil society forum, CSWF is in fact a strategic counter-mobilization platform aligned with conservative and anti-gender agendas that reflects asymmetries in power and funding. Anti-gender actors benefit from significant financial backing, political alliances with states, and access to institutional channels that allow them to operate within and alongside UN processes. This complicates the common assumption that feminist actors dominate CSW spaces. In reality, these spaces are sites of ideological contestation. At CSW70, this was evident when CSWF activists handed out flyers in front of UN spaces with information about the CSWF program that imitated the language used by feminist and LGBTIQ+ movements. For many progressive US-based organizations, CSW70 became both an international advocacy moment and a defensive effort against policies emerging from their own government, placing civil society actors in the unusual position of defending multilateral norms at the UN while navigating domestic political pressures.

The coordinated efforts disproportionately affect grassroots activists, Indigenous communities, young feminists, and LGBTIQ+ groups from around the world who often rely on parallel sessions to share their lived experiences. Participants from restrictive political contexts may self-censor for safety reasons and to avoid backlash, both within the CSW environment and upon returning home. The intrusion by anti-gender actors, the concurrent events of CSWF, and the general safety concerns, point to a critical shift—CSW is no longer a forum for advancing women’s and girls’ human rights and gender equality, but a contested political arena where these are renegotiated. 

CSW is no longer a forum for advancing women’s and girls’ human rights and gender equality, but a contested political arena where these are renegotiated. 

Should We Stay or Should We Go?

All of the aforementioned arguments lead to the question: is it even worth attending CSW in the future? While some feminist organizations and networks are questioning its relevance, others have fully withdrawn from CSW—out of growing frustration with CSW, in solidarity with others, in protest. They are rethinking engagement, openly critiquing the space, and advocating for more inclusivity, easier access, and improved safety and security standards. Organizations such as AWID have been among the most vocal critics. AWID does not advocate a full boycott, but it has argued that CSW is becoming less transformative and more procedural, dominated by state negotiations that disregard actual feminist demands. Other feminist actors such as Women Deliver has expressed a more pragmatic skepticism. They continue to engage in a “limited and intentional way”, but question the access, cost-benefit balance, and security aspects of participation.

Across these critiques, several common arguments emerge. Agreed Conclusions are often diluted due to political compromise, which leads to a sense that CSW does not lead to transformative commitments. Well-funded NGOs and actors from the Global North dominate, while grassroots, Indigenous, and Global South movements face barriers to access and influence. Some argue that CSW has shifted toward technocratic policy discourse without addressing issues such as capitalism, militarization, or colonial legacies. In addition, the increasing presence of anti-gender actors, both within official negotiations and civil society spaces, has made CSW less safe and productive.

However, others argue that as one of the few multilateral spaces available to feminist movements, CSW should be reclaimed and revitalized rather than abandoned. Disengagement risks ceding multilateral spaces to anti-gender and conservative actors and states. Although imperfect and constrained, CSW remains a strategic platform where agreements are negotiated and can have effects at the national level. Meaningful engagement requires advocacy within CSW while simultaneously building autonomous feminist spaces, redistributing resources, and challenging the structural inequalities of participation. In that sense, reclaiming CSW does not mean showing up in greater numbers, but transforming how the space operates—who gets access, how agendas are set, and how accountability is enforced—so that it becomes representative of the diverse feminist movements it claims to serve.

We cannot afford to be anything but radical now.

A forward‑looking approach will need to work on two fronts at once. While some will continue to show up at CSW to limit the damage, hold space, and prepare for moments when the forum may function as it once did, it is essential to invest in alternative, safer, and more progressive formats where ambitious agendas can evolve. Moving between these two fronts will require close coordination among activists across the Global South and Global North, along with an honest reflection on their respective roles and responsibilities. In the words of one of the participants of the hbs delegation, Najet Zammouri (Tunisian League for Human Rights), “a feminist response must be political, collective, and transnational, and must strengthen alliances across movements and engage with institutional spaces while critically questioning them.” 

As The Clash reminded us, if we go there will be trouble, and if we stay there will be double. In the world of multilateral spaces that is why we show up and claim our space whenever we can. As Jovan Ulićević (Trans Network Balkans), another participant of the hbs delegation said, “we cannot afford to be anything but radical now.”