Turkey is facing a COP full of contradictions: its climate ambitions and geopolitical strength are overshadowed by authoritarian politics and economic crisis.
“Climate change is becoming more severe with each passing year and will continue to do so. That is why we are taking further measures. We must not forget that this is a struggle. Everyone should know that, in the face of this insidious enemy, we are doing everything necessary and will continue to do so.”
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, host of COP31 and President of Turkey, spoke in no uncertain terms in July 2025 when asked about the devastating forest fires in the Aegean region. Murat Kurum, Minister for the Environment, Urbanisation and Climate Change and President of COP31, also did not hesitate to link the severe flooding in Istanbul in October 2026 to climate change. In the weeks leading up to COP, Kurum has made increasingly ambitious statements, calling on several occasions for the 1.5°C limit to be upheld and even – unlike his President – speaking of moving away from fossil fuels. He has publicly committed to shaping COP31 into a “strong implementation process”, thereby continuing the process initiated by the Brazilian COP Presidency in 2025.
Turkish Politicians Acknowledge the Challenges Posed by Climate Change
When asked about criticism of the government’s inadequate measures against forest fires and flooding, both reacted in a similar manner: one accused his political opponents in the opposition of spreading misinformation and seeking only to gain political capital from the fires. The other blamed the Istanbul city administration for uncontrolled urban growth, a lack of infrastructure and blocked riverbeds, which he said had cost lives.
The UN Climate Change Conference is coming to a country that has learnt to grasp the gravity of the climate crisis.
These episodes illustrate well where Turkey stands politically at present. The UN Climate Change Conference is coming to a country that has learnt to grasp the gravity of the climate crisis. According to surveys, more than three-quarters of Turks believe that climate change is real and dangerous. Turkey ratified the Paris Agreement in 2021. Since then, it has revised its NDC twice, passed a climate law in 2025, set a net-zero target for 2053 and launched the pilot phase of its first emissions trading scheme (2026–27).
This is also a response to the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which requires EU importers of certain carbon-intensive goods to pay for the greenhouse gas emissions contained therein. If they have already paid carbon prices for these emissions in the country of origin, these costs can be deducted. This would then preserve the competitiveness of their export goods.
Is the Largest Opposition Party Being Crushed?
On the domestic front, however, the battle against the opposition has dominated the political landscape in Turkey, ever since that March morning last year when the head of Istanbul’s city administration, Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, was arrested. He has been in custody ever since. İmamoğlu faces charges of corruption, espionage and much more. Even most AKP supporters have no doubt as to the real reason for his detention: he is – or rather, was – a threat to the President’s political future. His popularity had been soaring for months. In 2024, he won the Istanbul mayoral election again with an even better result than four years earlier; he was the designated candidate for the next presidential elections and was already leading in the polls.
Turkey’s political system has long been evolving towards ‘competitive authoritarianism’
In the weeks and months that followed, not only were hundreds of officials from the Istanbul administration dismissed, but mayors from İmamoğlu’s party – the main opposition CHP – and senior officials across the country were also removed from office and detained on charges of corruption, embezzlement of public funds and similar offences. Others are being co-opted; several CHP mayors have already switched sides. In the 2024 nationwide local elections, the CHP won all the major cities, including many AKP strongholds, and became the country’s strongest party once again for the first time since Erdoğan came to power. Political observers at home and abroad say that the AKP is now reclaiming the municipalities it lost by means of a subservient judiciary.
They see this process as taking on a new dimension. Turkey’s political system has long been evolving towards ‘competitive authoritarianism’: the government controls the vast majority of the judiciary. Under the super-presidential system, parliament has largely lost its powers of oversight, and its role is now confined mainly to rubber-stamping bills introduced by the executive with a government majority. The separation of powers continues to exist on paper, but has been effectively suspended in practice. The situation is no better with the ‘fourth estate’: even the largest TV channels and newspapers no longer dare to openly criticise the government on which they depend.
Where Is the Peace Process With the PKK Heading?
The analyses go on to suggest that, as the largest opposition party is being systematically dismantled, the element of competition is being lost. In other words: the government is attempting to ensure that, in the next elections – which must take place by May 2028 at the latest – an opposition candidate stands no chance and the ruling AKP party secures another clear victory.
The negotiations in the peace process between the banned Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Turkish state also point in this direction. In parliament, the second-largest opposition party, DEM, is negotiating on the Kurdish side in this process. After 40 years of armed struggle, the significance of this process cannot be overstated.
The government, however, reduces it to the disarmament of the PKK. It holds all the cards and appears to be ignoring the DEM’s demands for greater democracy and more rights for Kurds in Turkey. So far, the government has merely agreed to suspend investigations and criminal proceedings against PKK fighters for five to ten years. Despite everything, the process represents a major opportunity for the DEM. Consequently, its behaviour as an opposition party is rather cautious.
From the Ongoing Economic Crisis to the Biggest Financial Scandal
The government currently appears to be pulling all the strings. Yet it is losing public support. The ongoing economic crisis is the main factor here: for years, high inflation – well into double figures – has been eroding the purchasing power of the wage-earning majority of the population. Although gross domestic product is growing, it is primarily people with investment income and large companies who are benefiting from this. And now even investors are affected: in what is believed to be the biggest financial scandal in recent Turkish history, fraudulently inflated investment funds worth 18 billion USD have collapsed as too many investors sought to withdraw their money. Leading AKP politicians are directly or indirectly involved. The government is promising a full investigation and compensation. Observers do not believe the government can play this down: thousands of small investors fear for their savings. They come mainly from the AKP’s own ranks. The ‘Fon’ scandal is shaking the very foundations of the party’s support base.
Pressure on the government is therefore mounting, and it is attempting to divert it. Unlike many of its northern and eastern neighbours, Turkey has an active and diverse civil society. The pressure on organisations and individuals who oppose the government has never ceased, particularly since the so-called Gezi protests in 2013 and then following the attempted coup in 2016. But it has increased significantly again over the past year and a half. At universities, rectors’ posts – and indeed professorships – are being filled on the basis of political loyalty rather than academic qualifications, whilst critical academics are being removed or driven abroad. Yet climate protection policy, perhaps more than any other policy sector, requires free and critical research.
The Pressure on Critical Civil Society Is Mounting
Critical lawyers, journalists, artists and activists are being detained with increasing frequency. So far, however, it is not only environmental organisations but also human rights, women’s and LGBTI organisations that are operating within the law. The massive raids against LGBTI organisations and members of this community in September 2026 came as no surprise in themselves – the President and the government have long been publicly and vehemently criticising the LGBTIQ community as ‘enemies of the Islamic family’. However, the fact that nearly 80 people have remained in detention ever since, that they face the prospect of imprisonment, and that key LGBTIQ organisations are now set to be banned did come as a surprise. Many in civil society see this as a warning directed at themselves as well. A sense of resignation is spreading throughout these sectors of society.
Critical lawyers, journalists, artists and activists are being detained with increasing frequency.
The COP is therefore taking place at a time when civil society, the party-political opposition and even the government itself are under immense pressure, whilst the future of Turkey’s political system stands at a crossroads. The Turkish government is now hosting 85 heads of state and government in Turkey. The fact that the Turkish government was so determined to bring the COP to the country stems primarily from the geostrategic significance of this moment.
It may also alleviate domestic political pressure by serving as a catalyst for a positive development: Turkey enjoys good relations with Trump’s USA; it maintains a complex but functioning relationship with Putin’s Russia; it has no major geopolitical overlaps with China; it certainly feels courted by the EU, which regards Turkey as indispensable for its security and refugee policies; it is firmly established within NATO, which held its summit in Ankara a few months ago. The PKK is weakened and ready to disband; in Syria, the Kurdish groups have had to relinquish their sole control of the autonomous region of Rojava and have placed themselves under the authority of the new Syrian central government, with which Turkey, in turn, maintains good relations. Finally, its long-standing rival, Iran, has lost regional influence. Were it not for Israel’s growing ambitions and advances in Syria and the region, Turkey, as a middle power, would stand out as a leading regional power with an unblemished record.
A Commitment to Multilateralism?
The COP comes at just the right time. On the other hand, by hosting the COP, Turkey is also committing itself to UN multilateralism and to serious efforts to combat climate change under this umbrella. And it has set an example itself: it was only in 2021 that the Turkish parliament ratified the 2015 Paris Agreement. As President of COP31, Murat Kurum has embraced the mandate set out at COP30 that implementation must take centre stage. Turkey’s climate policy in practice will be judged against this in 2027 – not only in terms of its stated priority of zero-waste management, but also in terms of replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy. For only in this way does the goal of increasing the electrification of energy generation make sense for climate protection.
This is not necessarily consistent with Turkey’s continued granting of a large number of licences for mining and other extractive projects, which are causing considerable upheaval and conflict on the ground. Such voices will come together during the COP at a ‘People’s Climate Summit’ in Antalya, organised by three environmental platforms and more than a hundred non-governmental organisations and associations.
For Turkey, therefore, COP31 will be a COP of internal contradictions: it accepts rule-based procedures, yet for the most part acts outside the rule of law when dealing with any opposition. It has recognised the dangers of dependence on oil and gas and is working to become the most important hub for the transport of oil and gas between Russia, the Caucasus, the Middle East and Europe. At the same time, Turkey’s energy demand is rising enormously. Turkey has overtaken Germany as the largest producer of electricity from coal and plans to increase its capacity at coal- and gas-fired power stations by around 30 per cent by 2035. At COP31, too, the word ‘fossil’ will probably not make it into the final declaration.
