EU-Russia relations are now at a crossroads and their future development will largely depend on the issue to what extent the parties will be capable of harmonizing, or else adjust their policies in the region of Europe with respect to the Eastern Partnership (EP). In this regard, we should keep in mind the Black Sea region and Central Asia as well as important issues in EU-Russia relations, but the priority nevertheless goes to the issues of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus.
We can definitely state that there’s been a sustainable transformation in Russian as well as European policies regarding these countries not only since the fall of the USSR, but also after the latest EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007, the “color revolutions,” and the “energy wars” since 2004.
Today, Russia declares at different levels that the region belongs to its “zone of interests or influence” and exhibits cautious reactions to outside attempts to influence developments here. Some statements by President Vladimir Putin at the Munich security conference in February 2007 could be seen as reflective of such sentiments by the Russian governors when he openly stated the readiness of Russia to oppose those activities of parties that it did not like. On the other hand, the Russian rulers have gradually come to understand the drawbacks of a forceful approach in relations with the countries in the region; they had tried simply to force dissenting counterparts to agree with their policies using different instruments. Such tactics damaged the Russian image abroad and strengthened the rulers in “dissenting countries,” which did not agree with the initial aims of the Kremlin. Today, the declared pragmatic policy is still under strong ideological influence, which can be explained by widespread “phantom pains” regarding the dissolution of the USSR and, to some extent, exaggerated (considering the reality) ambitions of Russian rulers and elites.
The EU’s policy toward the countries in the EP was and still is quite ambivalent. For a long period, the countries were at the periphery of the EU’s attention and were almost automatically linked to the “Russian issue.” From 2003 until 2008 there was an explosion of interest regarding Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, which however did not bring substantial results. But at the same time, the EU acknowledged the shortcomings of its decision in 2003 to develop one matrix for all of its neighbors. It then started the process of setting apart Eastern neighbors into separate group with a respectful new initiative, which is now called the Eastern Partnership. Although it should be mentioned that this separation happened mostly due to the activities of “advocate countries” inside the EU, like Poland, Sweden, and CEE countries. But as with the case of the European Neighborhood Program (ENP), the EU is now confronting the issue of heterogeneity in the EP, because the level of its relations with each country is quite different. Plans of those countries regarding the future of their relationships with the EU differ substantially as well: from the ambitions to become a member up to simple mutual beneficial cooperation without intervention in internal affairs.
EU-Russia relations: Achievements and future trends
Currently, EU-Russia relations are experiencing the next period of changes, which take into account global reformatting and the ongoing change of geopolitical architecture.
After the period of “great catastrophe” for Russia in the 1990s and disappointment in the West with development of democracy and society in Russia, there was an attempt at rapprochement between the West and Russia (especially with the United States) at the beginning of this decade. Putin, for example, in his speech in the German Bundestag shortly after the terror attacks in September 2001, offered an “energy for technologies” pact, but Russia received no official answer from the EU; although, unofficially, it indicated that for Russia there was no escaping. Later, the parties agreed at a summit in St. Petersburg in May 2003 on the establishment of four common spaces (1) : economic (an integrated market between EU and Russia as the final aim); freedom, security, and justice; external security; and scientific research and education, including cultural cooperation. In the area of energy, parties agreed at a summit in Paris in October 2000 on the establishment of an Energy Dialogue concentrating on oil and gas issues, energy efficiency, cooperation in uniting electricity networks of the EU and Russia, trade of nuclear materials, and security of their usage.
But these plans have not been executed to the extent wished by the two parties. As the results became apparent, there was substantial disappointment (mostly on the part of the Russians) and a return to tactics of competition. The Munich speech by Putin – a declaration on the readiness for a real partnership with the West, provided it fulfills some conditions, otherwise “we will have no other choice than to take the position of firm non-participation” – was a clear sign of such change.
However, in contrast to US-Russia relations, EU-Russia relations started to move onto a pragmatic track, minimizing ideological components. And some of the declared initiatives at that time or their elements were gradually implemented or served as a basis for rapprochement. (2) And adherents inside the EU of applying a containment policy toward Russia gradually disappeared. At the same time, we can state that since the middle of this decade, EU-Russia relations stopped being hostage to USA-Russia relations. At the summit in Khanty-Mansiysk in spring 2008, where the parties started negotiations on the conclusion of a new basic agreement, the EU declared that “EU-Russia relations will be based on equality and the new agreement will contain no unilateral commitments.” (3)
But this trend was stopped by the war in Georgia in August 2008 and the gas crisis in January 2009. In the Georgian case, Russia had for the first time expressed its disagreements with the West and the developments transpiring in its “own zone of influence” not with words but with force. After the gas conflict with Ukraine, Russia seemed less predictable in the eyes of EU partners, tending to use instruments of force in its disputes with neighbors due to the lack of “soft power instruments” and unable to fulfill its own vital obligations for the EU energy sphere. As a result, mutual trust decreased to the lowest level. But the next global financial-economic and civilization-ideological crisis forced the parties to step back from some radical positions and to start seeking possible compromises.
And the latest EU offer, Partnership for Modernization, during the last EU-Russia summit in May 2010 is certainly an answer to the current challenges but it could repeat the fate of previous initiatives (for example the four common spaces in 2003 or the Energy Dialogue in 2000), because real modernization is more the issue of concrete firms and entities than an issue for governments. It means that the logic of “Russian power verticals will find agreement with the EU’s” in a broad context will fail. But in the political context “rapprochement between power verticals” and establishment of convenient platforms (for example, the latest Merkel-Medvedev initiative on regular EU-Russia security consultations at the Foreign Ministry level) do make sense.
But each party here puts different emphasis on different approaches to the initiative: Russia is interested in high technologies, innovations, scientific research, and economic growth, whereas the EU pays more attention to democratic values, economic diversification, civil society development (in general, a reform of the institutional mechanism of the current Russian state, i.e., issues of laws, rules, norms, rule of law de facto). In this regard, the latest EU-Russia summit revealed the inability of both parties to change the situation qualitatively in order to obtain positive result.
Therefore, we confront a key question that the parties could not avoid: What level of integration or cooperation does each need? And we can state that neither Russia nor the EU have currently defined their strategic positioning in a new ambivalent world, where the role of the United States is changing, new powers are growing, and new challenges are arising quickly.
Based on the huge potential for mutual beneficial cooperation, many factors are pushing the parties toward serious rapprochement (for example, uniting resources in the economic sphere (4) – they complement each other – or in the energy field (5) could create a breakthrough in increasing global competitiveness). But the aforementioned uncertainty of the parties (especially on the EU’s part) and some tactical obstacles (mostly in mutual misunderstandings or offences, especially between Russia and new EU-member from CEE) is preventing this development. Solution of the visa issue (visa-free regime could dramatically speed up Russia’s reform process) could also give a sustainable impulse for real rapprochement between the parties.
EU policy regarding Eastern Partnership
Since the establishment of the ENP, the EU has been not very successfully in trying to “unite in one box” very different neighboring countries (i.e., to create a comfortable belt around the borders) and to develop a consolidated policy, which until now has failed due to different interests of countries. Besides conceptual issues (like where should the EU’s borders be; what and for whom could the EU offer assistance and vice versa; how should the ENP correspond with the EU’s global positioning), the huge obstacle was the difference in visions about the ENP by EU members regarding the status of neighbors (conflict between multilateral and bilateral tracks). The division of the Mediterranean Partnership and the Eastern Partnership as separate initiatives can be deemed as an attempt to solve these contradictions or even conflicts. Development of a Northern dimension in this regard could be taken by initiators of the Eastern Partnership as such a positive example.
The EU considers the following main tasks for the EP: attraction of partners toward the EU; promoting stability, good governance, and economic development of the countries. Common values – democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights and major freedoms, market economy, and sustainable development – should be the basis for the processes. From a strategic viewpoint, the partners should adopt or implement an institutional matrix of the EU (mostly at their own expense, in contradiction to CEE countries), but not get EU membership (“the door is neither closed, nor open”).
Four thematic platforms and six flagship initiatives should institutionalize the whole process. In general, platforms and flagship initiatives themselves point out the right priorities in relations and the emphasis on necessary reforms in partner countries. (6) Especially important seems to be development of civil society, which could really start a process of reforms that until now is being stalled. If the EU succeeds in establishing fruitful coordination between the Eastern Partnership, Black Sea Synergy (2007), and Strategy on Central Asia (2007), then we could speak about successes of the Union in the Eastern direction.
But the mere start of the initiative at the summit in Prague in May 2009 as well as preparations for the event (especially discussions on the initiative inside) demonstrated the EU’s current inability to conduct a single and sustainable policy on this issue in contrast to a number of bilateral tracks of EU members with countries from the region. Internal institutional crises (the Lisbon Treaty is still to be properly implemented; balance of powers inside the Union is changing) and the economic crisis in the EU are evidence that the EU is currently not capable of being a gravitational center for the countries of the Eastern Partnership as it was for CEE countries in the 1990s.
The necessity to conduct approximation to EU norms and standards at their own expense does not encourage both the elites and citizens in EP countries. It does not mean a fatalistic approach to the project, but points clearly to considerable risks for transformation – and having the EU as a guide – both within the countries and in their relations with the Union. But the key element for success of the EP will be an establishment of a real partnership in the triangle of the EU, the six EP countries, and Russia.
Russian attitude to Eastern Partnership now and prospects for future
The Russian attitude toward the EP has not yet been shaped due to the recent start of the initiative and discussions inside Russia. Discussants can be approximately divided into two parties. The first one considers the EP as a modernized EU instrument for pushing Russia away from the post-soviet space and as offensive on “Russia’s sphere of influence.” (7) The second group is convinced that Russia should utilize the platform both for joint cooperation with the EU and in the region, otherwise Russia will lose the chance of constructive cooperation in the proposed framework and the process of its extrusion to the northeast of Eurasia will go on. Currently in Russia, the opinion prevails that the EP constitutes no threat to Russia due to the underfinanced project and because it is some kind of substitute for full EU membership, i.e., a “waiting room forever.”
Official authorities first reacted cautiously and considered the EP an attempt by the EU to claim “its sphere of interest” with soft power instruments, or in other words to split (disintegrate) post-soviet space and to deliver CIS countries from Russian influence so that the latter would not deem this area as its own. So said the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at a press conference after the meeting of EU-Russia Permanent Cooperation Council on April 26, 2009: “We heard statements from Brussels that it’s not an attempt to create new zones of influence and not a process directed against Russia. We want to trust these declarations, although some of the EU’s comments disquieted us.”
Gradually, Moscow modified its tone to work toward improvements in EU-Russia relations and the Kremlin expressed satisfaction with the EU’s explanations that the “EP does not set against relations of its participants with Russia” and “interests of all parties in Europe will be taken into account and there will be no attempts to build new division lines.” In fall 2009, President Medvedev did not see any threat for Russia from the EP: “I don’t see anything special in this Eastern Partnership. And frankly speaking, any benefits as well. (…) I don’t see anything directed against our country.”
But recently, as the EP’s configuration becomes clearer and Russia starts to promote actively its own integration plans in the post-soviet area, the language has become tough once again. On May 13 this year, Lavrov quite clearly expressed Russian objections and concerns: “EU’s program Eastern Partnership can damage relations between Russia and those CIS countries” (in issues of associate agreements, FTA, energy independence and integration results in framework of CIS, EurasEU and Customs Union) and “Determinant condition for Russia’s participation in EP is taking into account our interests at early stages when project ideas are discussed.”
Actually, concerns of current rulers in Russia are indeed justified because in case of implementation of declared plans, the EP would damage seriously both Russia’s positioning (aggressive style with emphasis on the idea of recovery of former strength) and Russian integration plans in this area (despite the weakening of the EU, its gravitation power is stronger than that of Russia).
Confrontation or more cooperation – What is more probable?
The EU is currently experiencing the most serious crisis and, to some extent, it is about the future existence of the European project. The crisis is changing the power balances inside the Union considerably and the process will go on (for example, we can speak today about the end of French-German tandem as it existed since the 1960s until the middle of the decade). In Russia-EU relations, there exists huge ambiguity and uncertainty by both parties on further strategy, whereas differences between EU members on “Russian issues” harms nothing other than the “national-oriented” policy of the Kremlin with an emphasis on big actors. The role of the EP under such circumstances can be crucial for prospects of real rapprochement between the EU and Russia. Normalization and stabilization of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus should become to some extent an obligation of Russia and the EU, because geopolitical competition (for example, on issues regarding Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova) would be pure anachronism considering the realities of our time.
It is very difficult to forecast the development of the EP and relations between Russia and the EU in this regard, taking into account dynamic processes of change throughout the whole continent in many fields and ambiguous trends in the countries of the EP. But some trends we can fix, provided no force majeure happens.
Brussels will gradually extend its presence in the region, but due to lack of effective mechanisms for promoting its own interests, it will not exercise crucial influence on the vector of political process development there in the middle term. This can be explained both by the lack of resources and lack of a clear vision regarding desired results. Therefore, we now evidence a stalemate: Moscow’s resources of influence are decreasing and Brussels cannot use its resources.
In the middle term, conditions for attracting these countries into the legal field of the EU will be established. From the long-term perspective, more important than financial issues is the creation – within the framework of the EP – communication channels, socialization of post-soviet elites, and enhanced cooperation with civil society structures in EP countries. The importance of the EP lays not only in the possibility to draw elites to the EU’s side, but also in establishing conditions for the mobilization of opposition and civil society, and increasing the social activity in general. As a result, a structure that would connect both elites’ cooperation and humanitarian cooperation at lower levels could be created on the basis of the EP. Especially important in this regard will be the readiness of the EP countries to play along with both the EU and Russia in their rapprochement and not to botch this process.
But if both the EU and Russia keep their current approaches to the EP countries unchanged, there exists a huge potential for conflict, because they are sometimes very contradictory, for example: issues of regional energy markets; diversification of energy supplies; democracy and good governance according EU standards; convergence in the economic area (introducing EU technical standards in contradiction to Russian post-soviet ones). Besides, a major emphasis of the EP lays in its adoption of EU acquis, which is exactly the main challenge and risk for the current Russian power structure. What has become quite evident in a short time is a conflict concerning issues of free trade of partner countries with the EU on the one hand and Russian customs union on the other.
Therefore, until Russia and the EU settle those differences on a bilateral level, we can forget about their cooperation with regard to EP countries (resulting in a collision of the Russian hard power concept with EU soft power emphasis). If Russia continues the policy of “gathering back the lands,” the EP in its current form would constitute much more of a threat than even NATO enlargement. Both sides should make a conceptual choice: either real rapprochement with elimination of prejudices against each other (uniting efforts would enable both parties to at least preserve their global positions) or continue with harmful competition in the region. In this regard the factor of a third party (United States) and emergence of a fourth party on the horizon (China) should be taken into account.
There is a chance for success if both parties (especially Russia) steps back from the concept of a “zero-sum game” and holds onto a “win-win” approach. The previous policy of Russia and the EU in the region mostly led to a “Zugzwang situation” – parties cannot implement their strategies, but successfully block the policies of each other. Transition from competition strategy to cooperation strategy demands serious concessions from each party. At the same time, the EU, for example, should modernize its system of multilevel compromise, which leads to inflexibility during negotiations with third parties (due to long adjustment periods inside the Union), that is, such an approach (some kind of dictate while speaking on European values) makes it almost impossible to hold a fruitful discussion and ensure cooperation.
But, if the parties move toward real rapprochement, the EP could be a very comfortable test platform for this way, especially with regard to frozen conflicts in the region. Substantial obstacles nevertheless can create discrepancies between declarations (for example, ambitious declarations between the EU and Russia during the last decade and quite modest result in the end) and their implementation (for example, in issues of economic cooperation and visa-free regime). On the other hand, there exists a question of how competitive Russia’s initiatives to the EP countries are in comparison with the EU’s offers within the framework of the EP.
In general it means that there are two alternatives – either gradual convergence of the EU’s and Russia’s policies toward the countries, or a new period of competition. Then we could get an answer to the question of whether the EP can be a uniting platform for new relations between Russia and the EU, or whether it will be a source of discord?
(1) At summit in Moscow on May 4, 2005; respective road maps have been adopted.
(2) For example, on the “energy track,” the parties reached an agreement on the establishment of early warning mechanism at the summit in Samara in 2007. Later, on November 16, 2009, they signed a memorandum on early warning at the meeting of Coordinators of EU-Russia Energy Dialogue.
(3) The EU until this time had no experience of concluding such a treaty with a powerful and independent partner demanding special equal relations (previous traditional agreements were based on principles of political conditionality and “Europeanization concept”).
(4) Fifty-two percent of Russian trade turnover goes to the EU, and Russia is the third largest (after the United States and China) EU trading partner. In 2009 their trade turnover was equal to €181 billion, whereas the EU had a deficit equal to almost €50 billion. In 2007 the turnover was equal to €232 billion, whereas Russia’s positive balance was equal to €54 billion. From 2000 until 2007, Russian exports to the EU increased from €64 billion up to €143 billion, and imports from €23 billion up to €89 billion. So Russia moved from 10th to the 3rd place in the rank-list of the EU’s main trade partners.
Russia is the biggest oil, gas, uranium, and coal importer to the EU. In 2007, 44.5 percent of the EU’s total gas imports (150 bcm), 33.05 percent of the EU’s total crude oil imports, and 26 percent of EU’s total coal imports came from Russia. The export of raw materials to the EU represents around 40 percent of the Russian budget.
Until the end of 2008, foreign direct investment from the EU grew to €92 billion (Russian FDI to EU – €28 billion) and the EU represents 80 percent of cumulative foreign investments in Russia.
(5) Introduction of energy efficiency and participation of EU companies in exploration of new hydrocarbon resources in Russia is mutually very profitable. BUT bureaucratic obstacles and current Russian legislation on strategic production sectors and strategic deposits has hindered the process.
(6) The EU makes financial emphasis on institution building, regional and bilateral cooperation, and border management.
(7) The EP as the quintessential creation of a border around Russia or softly (politely) drawing away “Russian satellites” to the EU.