By Maria Wągrowska
“Moving our country into a whole new geo-political area” - thus Jerzy Buzek, prime minister at the time of Poland’s accession to NATO, described the objective of membership ten years after the event. I believe this opinion expresses not only the quintessential meaning of NATO membership for a post-Communist country, not only the re-orientation of Poland’s foreign, security, and defence policy, but also the motivation for its later international activity. By joining NATO - and, five years later, the European Union - the country fulfilled its strategic objectives, directing its internal development towards a state more secure, democratic, and affluent.
Poland had several reasons to join NATO. Some of them, though perhaps in a changed form, remain valid. The main one is related to the uncertainty about the development of the situation in Europe - including the immediate neighbourhood of our country - in the first years after the cold war. Political elites originating from the anti-Communist opposition, from the Solidarity movement, from the Freedom Union (Unia Wolności - UW) and its successors, were convinced that it would be unfavourable to leave Poland as a buffer between blocs. In time, the post-Communists began to share this view. The option of neutrality was rejected, and so was the idea to hold a referendum about the future security status of the country. Neutrality or indecision about NATO could leave Poland in Moscow’s zone of influence, while the whole point of the post-1989 changes was to break away from Soviet dependence and later from Russia.
Fear of destabilisation towards the east
In Polish security policy - before and after accession to NATO - has been motivated by a fear that destabilisation might occur towards the east. In August 2008 many did claim that Russia’s campaign in Georgia indicates the growing significance of the military factor in security policy. Poland’s national security and defence doctrines, as well as declarations by politicians of all parties reflect that there is much concern about Russia’s possible moves and about regional repercussions of the crises in the post-Soviet region.
Another powerful reason for Poland’s accession to NATO was the conviction that an American presence would significantly increase regional security - be it because of destabilisation in the East, be it as a counterbalance against a re-nationalisation of security policies of West European countries, particularly Germany. At the same time, in the latter half of the 1990’s (1), there was a sense of satisfaction that Germany was rooted in Euro-Atlantic structures, and that it acted as our country’s “advocate” in the process of its integration with the West. (2)
Poland - the US' closest ally in Europe?
Still today, Warsaw is one of the US’ closest allies in Europe - as shown by the Polish involvement in Iraq and the acceptance of the American anti-missile system. Poland believes that, in case of danger, it can rely on support by the US. Nevertheless, most experts are critical of the fact that in the case of missile defence Poland did not seek a solution within NATO. Poland’s geo-strategic location, its experience of Warsaw Pact membership (during which the Northern Group of the Soviet Army was stationed on Polish territory), the pro-European views of almost all parties and opinion makers has led to the widespread conviction that there is no alternative to NATO membership.
When evaluating the membership, it is important to look at the factors crucial for the Polish perception of NATO. Poland did not easily consent to the so-called new functions of the alliance. The NATO’s transformation, i.e. its “out of area” missions, was initially treated with reserve. Our country joined NATO mainly for the security guarantees resulting from article 5 of the Washington Treaty. This changed - paradoxically - with the mission in Afghanistan. The 1.600 Polish troops in Afghanistan’s Ghazni province are seen as a sort of insurance - should we need to protect our own borders, Poland will be able to count on NATO’s support. In other words, Poland supports the alliance’s new missions, but - probably more than any other member country - it wants NATO to stay true to the purpose of joint defence. For example, Poland is interested in expanding the NRF (NATO Response Force), the alliance’s rapid reaction force. There is talk about the necessity to “balance” defence and missions abroad.
Polish troops in Afghanistan
In order to enhance the defensive function of NATO and, at the same time, Poland’s own status within the organisation, Poland wants to have more NATO troops and installations on its territory. The reasoning behind this is that NATO facilities on Polish soil will be defended by the allies and that they will level the differences in military status between “old” and “new” NATO countries. According to the 1995 study on NATO enlargement and declarations by Western politicians, NATO’s eastward expansion was not to be accompanied by an expansion of military infrastructure or by deploying large military units. The aim of such declarations was to mollify Russia. Russia’s resistance against NATO membership of former Warsaw Pact countries has never ceased, though its intensity varies. Much of Russia’s attention is focused on Poland, as the strategically most important country and the one with the highest military potential.
Due to all the above reasons, Poland is very much interested in a strong NATO, in close transatlantic ties, and in a further eastward expansion of NATO - especially into Ukraine.
Right from the start of the accession process, Poland’s security policy was wholly focussed on NATO. This has had a far-reaching influence on Poland’s stance on armament control and non-proliferation, on its strategic culture and the shape of its military - certainly to a much higher degree than the European Union.
Poland’s security policy wholly focussed on NATO
Poland’s military integration into NATO - based on the principles of interoperability and compatibility - is so advanced, that the Polish armed forces are practically incapable of independent operations. Some argue that the Polish military should become more self-sufficient, since, in case of an emergency, it may become necessary to operate independently for some time before the NATO help arrives. Poland’s army of 120.000 men and women is structured in such a way that it is able to maintain a balance between missions abroad and the protection of the nation. Experiences from foreign missions forced Poland to move towards a professional army (presently over 60% of army personnel are professional soldiers).
A lot of resources go towards the maintenance of infrastructure needed should NATO have to defend Poland. The Polish armed forces have certainly benefited from integration into NATO. NATO membership is a central part of Poland’s national interest. It has helped to overcome the division of Europe, has contributed to the stability of Poland and Central Europe, and has facilitated internal transformation, including democratic control over the army.
Presently over half of all Poles support NATO membership. In 2008, for the first time since 2002, support for NATO rose and reached 51%, while 45% of respondents considered it important to improve transatlantic relations. For Poland, as well as for Poles, the most important issue to do with NATO integration is the alliance’s credibility and effectiveness.
notes
(1) Co-operation with NATO formally commenced in December 1991. In January 1994, the Brussels summit confirmed the “open door” principle and initiated the programme of co-operation, “Partnership for Peace”. Poland was invited to membership talks in July 1997 at the Madrid summit.
(2) The contributions from Manfred Wörner, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Klaus Kinkel, and Volker Rühe are still remembered with appreciation.