By Prof. Roman Kuźniar
The Institute of International Relations, University of Warsaw
From the Polish perspective the future of NATO is good and certain - for one basic reason: We all need NATO. We need the Atlantic alliance to safeguard the national security of its member states as well as security and stability in the transatlantic zone and its immediate neighbourhood. No criticism directed against NATO questions this basic need. Criticism mostly refers to what is not part of the alliance’s initial mandate, i.e. operations not covered by Article 5 - the so-called out of area operations.
In its fundamental functions the alliance did not fail during the Cold War or after: It did safeguard the security to its member states. There is no indication that this might change in the future.
NATO will continue in the same way - provided it focuses on its primary tasks and resists the temptation to "do everything everywhere" and provided it will be able to learn quickly from its own mistakes.
NATO's biggest challenges
The biggest challenges now facing NATO are connected with its three tasks, here presented in order of their significance: Article 5; partnership with non-member states, including further enlargement; and crisis reaction, peace enforcement, stabilisation operations etc.
For Poland it is important that the primacy of article 5 of the Washington Treaty is reaffirmed. For the past years the alliance has dealt with many other security issues and, in the process, has taken so much upon itself that it has begun to transform itself into a collective security system. In Poland, a country situated on the borders of NATO, we value its primary role as a collective defence organisation. In order to reinvigorate NATO’s essence - not so much in a political but in an actual sense - contingency plans will have to be updated and NATO's defence infrastructure will have to be more evenly distributed among its member states – including those that joined NATO after the end of Cold War.
Non-military threats
The primacy of Article 5 is also necessary because there is a growing tendency to extend the concept of security to non-military threats. The question is whether and to what extent NATO should get involved in issues such as energy security, cyber terrorism, or climate change. NATO should not be an all-purpose alliance because, as the saying goes: A camel is a horse designed by committee. For the alliance to focus on its essence, i.e. on "collective defence", it will be necessary to apportion to the European Union a more significant role in the area of security. In some situations the EU has proven to be more effective than NATO, see the Caucasus war in August 2008. Regarding energy security the EU's potential is incomparably larger than NATO's. In the future both organisations will have to better co-ordinate their efforts. Plus: One country, Turkey, should not have the right to block the EU's access to NATO's resources. NATO’s resources belong to its members, i.e. they also belong to those NATO members that are members of the EU.
As for the second challenge, partnership and enlargement, this demands a wise combination of developing relations with Russia and, at the same time, improving the security situation of countries east of NATO's borders. It is in the interest of the alliance to maintain close relations with Russia and to collaborate on various security issues (e.g. terrorism, proliferation). However, the alliance should not tolerate Russia's policy of intimidation towards its smaller neighbours. Russia will have to observe certain principles and standards of international relations. We know that Russia has problems with that. Also, we cannot give the impression that, regarding NATO's eastward expansion, we are caving in to Russian pressure. Countries such as Ukraine or Georgia must have the opportunity to become members of the alliance. We have offered NATO membership to these countries - and even though they are not yet ready, and even though it is still hard to determine when they will be, we have to support them on the way.
The compromised the idea of a "global alliance"
Another challenge facing the alliance is to redefine its involvement in operations that go beyond article 5. Since the end of the '90s the concept of a "global alliance" has been popular within NATO. The alliance was, in a sense, supposed to replace the United Nations as a global security system. This kind of thinking was a reflection of the optimism in the West after the end of the Cold War. However, this did not take into consideration that our resources are limited and that our military presence is not necessarily welcome in all parts of the world. George W. Bush's administration has compromised the idea of a "global alliance".
The idea of a "global alliance" reached a high point during NATO’s Bucharest summit, in April 2008. In the final document there is mention of collaboration with countries such as Australia, South Korea, Israel, and Egypt. Yet, on the ground, the idea of a "global alliance" was badly defeated in Afghanistan as well as in the Caucasus. 2008 was marked by the heaviest losses in Afghanistan, both among civilians and NATO soldiers. Let me reiterate: The American intervention Afghanistan began in 2001, NATO's operation in 2003. There are numerous problems: The strategy of the operation is faulty and the West is not prepared to try and find a political solution. More importantly though, there is an inability to allocate more money, more soldiers and civilians to this operation. As for the Caucasus, NATO was unable to react to Russia's disproportionate use of force against a weak neighbour and prospective NATO member. One of the reasons for this was that NATO is reliant on Russia's support to transport supplies into Afghanistan. The vision of a "global alliance" has come up against political and financial barriers and we have reached the limits of our strategic capabilities.
The imperative of strategic circumspection
This brings us to the imperative of strategic circumspection. In certain situations the alliance may intervene in situations not mandated by articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty - but this must happen out of necessity, not a as a means to pursue a "global mission". Necessity means a real threat to peace and security, a threat that requires a military response authorised by the UN Security Council. Involvement in some security issues (and only security, not democracy or nation building) must be based on clear criteria, not global voluntarism. This has to find its place in NATO's new strategy. NATO was not created to establish political systems in foreign countries, or to conduct new opium wars.
These new challenges must be taken up during the process of work on the new strategic concept which will start after the NATO summit in Strasbourg and Kehl. Poland wants the alliance to accurately establish a hierarchy of its objectives and tasks. Those should be as follows: Article 5; stability and security all over Europe; and a redefinition of out of area operations – away from a "global alliance" and towards a policy of "selective and prudent involvement". Such an alliance will be in the best interest of the West, its member states, and Poland. Poland wants to help shape and strengthen such an alliance and it will invest in its political and strategic credibility. NATO must remain "our alliance" - there is no alternative on the horizon.