All Hands on Deck: Comprehensive Defence Planning Within NATO

The war in Ukraine is affecting its society as a whole. Two years after Russia’s full-scale invasion, 70 percent of Ukrainians reported that people close to them were fighting or had fought on the front lines; in a mid-2023 survey, 78 percent stated that members of their family or circle of friends had been wounded or killed in the war. Since 24 February 2022, martial law and general mobilization have been in force in Ukraine. The state of emergency has become part of everyday life, as basic societal needs must be met alongside military operations. This places enormous strain on society as a whole – whether in education, healthcare, or on the battlefield. Throughout the war, the Ukrainian armed forces have repeatedly faced material shortages; in the fourth (and soon fifth) year of the war, personnel shortages are becoming an increasingly acute problem.

In the fourth (and soon fifth) year of the war, personnel shortages are becoming an increasingly acute problem.

With growing concern for their own security, many European states and societies are following the developments in Ukraine closely. Since 24 February 2022, what had previously been an abstract threat posed by Russia has become tangible; while an expansion of the conflict is not inevitable, it cannot be ruled out either. In December 2025, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte warned in Berlin: “We are Russia’s next target, and we are already in harm’s way.” According to Rutte, not all NATO Allies have understood that they must prepare for a war on a scale reminiscent of the era of “our grandparents and great-grandparents.” Such a scenario shapes NATO’s national comprehensive defence planning just as much as the reality of hybrid attacks.

Is Germany at War?

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has brought the risk of war back into Germany’s public debate after decades of neglect in defence policy. In light of a large-scale war in Europe and ongoing hybrid attacks – targeting energy and transport infrastructure or democratic decision-making processes – the boundary between war and peace no longer appears as clearly defined. According to German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Germany is “not at war, but we are no longer living in peace either.” The NATO Secretary General made a nearly identical statement months earlier; Sweden’s Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson also used the same phrase at the annual conference “Folk och Försvar” (people and defence). Even more explicit was Estonia’s back then Prime Minister and now EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas one year after the invasion began: “The war against Ukraine is also a war against us.”

In Germany, unlike Russia’s geographically limited and partly covert aggression against Ukraine from 2014 onwards, the full-scale invasion in 2022 is widely perceived as a direct threat to its national security. Political and military decision-makers increasingly appear to share the assessment that Russia could attack NATO in the foreseeable future. Airspace violations by Russian drones and fighter aircraft point to a latent conventional threat to NATO’s territory. At the same time, Russia interferes in domestic affairs through a broad spectrum of hostile activities below the threshold of armed conflict. The German government has accused Russia of cyberattacks on air traffic control systems and of running a disinformation campaign during the federal election campaign; so-called Russian “disposable agents” have conducted espionage and sabotage operations across Germany.

The war against Ukraine has also led to a refocusing on the collective defence of all member states as NATO's core task.

Since 2014, Germany and many other NATO members have taken steps to adapt their societies to this new threat environment. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has made clear that so-called ‘old’ and ‘new’ threats now converge and are applied in a coordinated fashion. The war against Ukraine has also led to a refocusing on the collective defence of all member states as NATO's core task. These efforts are complemented by the EU, for example in the fields of military mobility and defence industry policy. Ultimately, however, responsibility for defence remains with the nation states.

In Germany, rising defence spending, new procurement initiatives, and structural reforms of the Bundeswehr and the Federal Ministry of Defence have been initiated since 2022. While the idea of a whole-of-society defence effort integrating military and civilian actors long received limited attention, Germany’s comprehensive defence planning is now being implemented and exercised. This aligns with NATO-wide developments. During the NATO exercise Red Storm Bravo in September 2025, troops were redeployed from Hamburg to NATO’s eastern flank, requiring effective civil-military cooperation within Germany. Earlier, in 2018, the much larger NATO exercise Trident Juncture, involving around 50,000 troops, simulated a collective defence scenario and tested Norway’s comprehensive defence system.

Comprehensive Defence Approaches in NATO

Under Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO members commit to “maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” Military operations must be sustained by civilian support; even in the worst-case scenario, a minimum degree of societal continuity must be ensured through joint state and societal efforts. In response to Russia’s hybrid warfare against Ukraine, NATO has returned to civil preparedness planning practices developed during the Cold War, now framed under the concept of resilience.

In 2016, NATO allies agreed on baseline requirements for national resilience, including government continuity as well as on energy, water, and food supplies. In mid-2025, NATO members decided in The Hague to allocate 1.5 percent of GDP annually to, among other things, civil preparedness and resilience. The vague definition of this target’s purpose has rightly drawn criticism. Nevertheless, these decisions underline that defence and deterrence within NATO are conceived in comprehensive terms.

With the accession of Finland and Sweden, the debate on whole-of-society resilience has gained new momentum, as both countries are widely regarded as role models for comprehensive defence practices. While it may be tempting to dismiss this as mere “hype,” there is a substantive core to this approach. A comparative analysis of national comprehensive defence models within NATO yields several insights relevant for Germany’s future planning. 

Voluntariness Has Its Limits

Across Europe, NATO armed forces face the challenge of increasing their personnel readiness in the event of an armed attack – in the medium term, this will affect a large portion of the civilian population. In Germany, a new Military Service Act entered into force on 1 January 2026, which (with the exception of the declaration of readiness and medical examination) adheres to maintaining the principle of voluntariness. Defence Minister Boris Pistorius emphasized his “preference for the Swedish model”, given that in Sweden only the most suitable and motivated young people enlist in the armed forces. However, voluntariness in Sweden is reaching its limits: rising personnel requirements have increased pressure on the relevant age cohort. By 2030, at least 10,000 conscripts are to be called up annually – twice the number of the previous decade. Denmark and Norway will also gradually expand their conscription systems, even though sufficient volunteers still come forward.

The Baltic states offer another example. In spring 2023, Latvia’s parliament decided to reintroduce conscription step by step. The Latvian Ministry of Defence had previously concluded that the “voluntary system has reached its capacity limit.” While, as in the Nordic countries, most recruits still volunteer, their numbers are insufficient, necessitating selection by lottery. In Finland, military service is mandatory for all male citizens; conscripts are integrated into the armed forces, trained for wartime responsibilities, and subsequently form part of the reserve. The age limit for reserve service is to be raised in 2026 in order to increase the total number of reservists to one million by 2031. Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced in 2025 the goal of building a “reservist army,” relying not on legal obligation but on voluntary military training for hundreds of thousands of civilians.

At Its Core, It Is All About Social Cohesion

Finland’s comprehensive security approach is rooted in the ideologically polarised Cold War, when the country pursued a policy of “spiritual national defence” to strengthen internal cohesion, armed neutrality and democracy formed its normative foundation. To this day, societal consensus is valued highly. Without mutual trust, society cannot endure. Psychological resilience is thus listed as one of seven core societal functions that have to be maintained.

In Sweden, the concept of psychological defence was rediscovered after 2014. In early 2022, an authority for psychological defence was established to strengthen societal resilience against disinformation and misinformation. In both Finland and Sweden, the defence readiness of the entire population is regarded as an integral component of national defence capabilities. Swedish planning documents explicitly reference Ukraine by emphasizing that maintaining basic services during wartime is essential to prevent trust in the state and defence readiness from being undermined.

Nordic comprehensive defence models demonstrate that military security (warfare) and social security (welfare) are not opposites but mutually reinforcing. Defence becomes a shared societal responsibility, fostering social integration; however, strong sociocultural pressure may also produce exclusionary effects.

Civil and Military Defence Are of Equal Importance

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has made comprehensive defence the new paradigm of national defence planning within NATO.

In his first government address, Friedrich Merz declared the goal to make the Bundeswehr “the strongest conventional army in Europe”. Following the reform of Germany’s debt brake in spring 2025, military defence can be financed through unlimited borrowing; more than 86 billion Euro was allocated to the Bundeswehr in 2025 alone. By contrast, spending on the civilian component of comprehensive defence remains significantly lower. Minister of the Interior Alexander Dobrindt therefore announced a “Pact for Civil Protection” and investments of 10 billion Euro by 2029.

Already following the 2021 flood disaster in the Ahr Valley, civil protection structures were strengthened; though in response to the Russia-Ukraine war, current planning predominantly focuses on military threats. The 2023 Overall Scenario for Civil Defence outlines a potential conflict trajectory beginning with hybrid attacks, culminating in combat operations on German territory. The 2025 edition of the emergency pamphlet of the Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK) mentions the possibility of war for the first time since 1990.

A similar orientation of comprehensive defence planning towards military requirements can also be observed in Sweden, potentially undermining civil-military cooperation. Civil actors are facing growing pressure to support military needs while being structurally disadvantaged. Sweden has taken extensive steps to rebuild civil defence: in 2022, a Minister for Civil Defence was appointed within the Ministry of Defence; in 2024, civil service obligations were activated in selected sectors (such as municipal emergency services and electricity supply) and are to be expanded upon in 2026. Meanwhile, spending on civil defence is set to increase sevenfold between 2022 and 2028.

Conclusion

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has made comprehensive defence the new paradigm of national defence planning within NATO. An armed attack on NATO member states now appears more likely. With some delay, Germany’s defence planning has begun to adjust to this changed threat environment. To ward off current and possible future threats, society as a whole is being called upon to do more. NATO allies such as Finland, Sweden, Latvia, and Poland demonstrate that even broader societal involvement is possible. In the years ahead, personnel and financial requirements for comprehensive defence will continue to rise, increasing pressure on society – especially on younger generations. Maintaining social cohesion should therefore remain a central priority.