Comprehensive defence encompasses both military and civil preparedness – both of which are inextricably linked. Yet the civilian side continues to lag behind. Three key areas of action show how Germany can close this gap in its security architecture.
Defence today is more than a military task. Russia's attacks on Ukraine's basic civilian services and population, as well as on critical infrastructure and societies throughout Europe, show that operational readiness of the armed forces alone is insufficient. European states require a comprehensive defence posture grounded in resilient military and civilian structures and supported by a robust society.
This is particularly true for Germany. As NATO’s central logistical hub, the country must ensure smooth coordination across state authorities, the private sector, civil society, and the armed forces in times of crisis. Yet Germany’s defence posture remains imbalanced: while the military pillar of comprehensive defence has made progress, civil preparedness continues to lag significantly behind. This gap is dangerous. If the civilian pillar fails in a crisis, it would not only undermine the operational effectiveness of German and allied forces, but also disrupt essential state, economic, and societal functions – from civil protection, to the supply of energy and food as well as healthcare systems.
The additional fiscal space approved by the Bundestag after the early federal elections offers an opportunity to elevate civil preparedness to a level commensurate with today’s threat environment. To achieve this – and to finally implement the long-agreed concepts of integrated security, comprehensive defence, and civil preparedness – a strategic shift in thinking is required across government and administration. The focus should be on three key areas of action:
1. Strengthening the Strategic Direction: From Fragmented Security Policy to Political Risk Prioritisation
Germany’s first National Security Strategy, adopted in 2023, marked an important step in reorienting the country’s security and defence policy amid its Zeitenwende. It outlines the deteriorating international security environment, introduces the concept of “integrated security,” and identifies key areas of action. Yet it remains incomplete: unlike the strategies of many partner countries, it is not based on a national risk assessment that systematically prioritises threats to core state, economic, and societal functions. Nonetheless, such prioritisation is imperative in order to derive strategic guidelines that form the basis for coherent government action and transparent communication of risks to the public.
This is particularly true for strengthening national defence and resilience – an undertaking that requires coordinated action across nearly all ministries, the federal states, and a wide range of economic and civil society actors. Without a shared risk framework, there is no common reference point for setting priorities, allocating responsibility, or enabling cross-ministerial and federal-state coordination.
As a result, Germany’s comprehensive defence still resembles a patchwork shaped by federalism and the “ministerial principle” – the principle whereby each ministry independently manages its own portfolio – rather than a coherent national undertaking. Despite existing concepts and guidelines, civil preparedness continues to receive significantly less strategic attention and direction than the military component.
Beyond short-term plans, however, the Council’s impact will depend on its ability to provide strategic direction and foster coherent action across ministries and levels of government.
Since any strategic orientation of security and defence policy inevitably involves prioritising certain risks and threats – while deprioritising others – it must be carried out at the highest political level and in close coordination with the states.
The newly established German National Security Council (NSC) provides an institutional anchor for this. Despite its limited staffing, it is the first body mandated to integrate internal and external security as well as civil and military defence. In principle, the NSC is well equipped for this task. It brings together nine ministries, includes the federal states, and allows for the involvement of civil society and academic expertise. At its inaugural meeting in November, the Council adopted an action plan on countering hybrid threats – an important signal that underlines its role at the intersection of internal and external security and its ambition to strengthen civil-military coordination.
Beyond short-term plans, however, the Council’s impact will depend on its ability to provide strategic direction and foster coherent action across ministries and levels of government. As it cannot override either the ministerial or federal principle, this will only succeed if it establishes a shared understanding of risks.
A national risk assessment would be the necessary starting point for this – but not the end goal. What ultimately matters is the political definition of Germany’s core security interests, allowing threats to be identified, prioritised in a transparent manner, and communicated through the next National Security Strategy.
2. Strengthening Civil Preparedness Planning: From OPLAN DEU to Comprehensive Civil-Military Defence
With the classified Operational Plan Germany (OPLAN DEU), the Bundeswehr developed a structured planning instrument that incorporates civilian support requirements and civil-military interaction. On the civilian side, however, no comparable operational framework exists. Civil preparedness remains largely confined to identifying roles and responsibilities, without translating them into concrete planning assumptions for federal, state, and municipal authorities or for other actors within the civilian pillar. This also affects emergency services, the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW), critical infrastructure operators, logistics companies, and civil society organisations.
As a result, capabilities remain vague, responsibilities blurred, and planning gaps unaddressed. Given the breadth of tasks and the diversity of actors involved, civil preparedness remains reactive, fragmented, and difficult to steer.
This is particularly problematic given the dual function inherent to civil defence. On the one hand, it must support the armed forces; on the other, it must continue to fulfil its own core tasks independently of military operations such as protecting critical infrastructure, ensuring supply chains, and maintaining essential state functions. The Bundeswehr’s OPLAN DEU covers only one of the two dimensions. A coherent civilian planning framework does not yet exist.
Civil preparedness remains largely confined to identifying roles and responsibilities, without translating them into concrete planning assumptions for federal, state, and municipal authorities or for other actors within the civilian pillar.
This is problematic for two reasons. First, the civil planning gap directly affects military planning and readiness: civilian support to the armed forces can only be as reliable as the resilience of the civilian system itself and its ability to fulfill its dual role. If civil structures collapse under the strain of parallel demands, the military will be forced to assume civilian tasks which would fall within the remit of civil defence. This ties up resources that are then lacking elsewhere and weakens overall defence capabilities.
Second, civilian planning is in the civilian sector’s own best interest. Its value lies less in the final document than in the planning process itself: it involves stakeholders, creates interfaces, clarifies communication channels, and translates the predominantly conceptual understanding of civilian defence into operable structures. This results in robust civil-civil planning that specifies personnel, material, and infrastructure requirements and ensures integration into a functioning civil-military framework.
Only a well-coordinated civilian pillar that understands its own capabilities and limits can act as an equal and effective counterpart to the military in crisis situations.
If such independent planning is not carried out – whether through default or through functional failure – comprehensive defence risks evolving into a model in which the civilian component is subordinated to the military, thereby fostering the militarisation of civilian structures.
However, establishing such a planning process requires additional capacities, particularly within the federal and state interior ministries, which must assume a coordinating role. Only then can civil preparedness evolve from a diffuse responsibility landscape into a strategically guided and operationally effective pillar of Germany’s comprehensive defence.
3. Fostering a Risk Culture: Strengthening Communication and Empowering Society
Civil preparedness depends on resilient structures that can respond flexibly and adaptively to crises. Aside from material and infrastructure, the human factor plays a decisive role. Only an informed and involved society is capable of acting in crisis.
Germany currently lacks a well-developed risk culture that promotes open dialogue, shared responsibility, and the development of critical skills. Although threats such as war, sabotage, or hybrid attacks are increasingly discussed, their implications are rarely communicated in a clear manner – or are communicated in a way that hinders rather than facilitates genuine societal debate. As a result, the specific challenges often remain abstract, the limits of government support unspoken, and individual responsibilities poorly understood.
The introduction of the term Kriegstüchtigkeit (readiness for war) and initiatives such as the recent preparedness guide published by the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK) provided important impetus. Yet all these efforts remain fragmented. What is missing is a systematic, comprehensible, and realistic approach to risk communication across all levels of government. Such communication must not only inform, but also encourage people to take precautions, get involved, and take responsibility in the event of an emergency. Citizens, companies, municipalities, and institutions must understand the threat environment, the limits of state support, and their own scope for action. Only then can they prepare effectively and contribute meaningfully to comprehensive defence. This sense of agency is a core element of societal resilience: the ability to confront risks proactively rather than responding with passivity or panic.
Citizens, companies, municipalities, and institutions must understand the threat environment, the limits of state support, and their own scope for action. Only then can they prepare effectively and contribute meaningfully to comprehensive defence.
Public willingness to engage should not be underestimated. Around 1.7 million people in Germany already volunteer in civil protection and emergency response. Surveys show that younger generations, in particular, are willing to assume greater responsibility for their own security. This potential must be actively harnessed.
Given the wide range of personnel requirements within comprehensive defence, the reintroduction of conscription can only be one element among many. Extending it to women or introducing a compulsory year of community service would be worth debating; however, such steps would require constitutional amendments. All the more important is the targeted strengthening of existing civil-society structures and the creation of low-threshold engagement formats – such as weekend training courses, self-protection programmes, or the establishment of a federal civil defence association modelled on the reservists’ association. Such measures would help turn comprehensive defence into what it must ultimately be: a whole-of-society endeavour, grounded in solidarity, intergenerational fairness, and broad societal participation.
Conclusion
Germany is faced with mounting security challenges – military, infrastructural, and societal. Yet its defence posture will remain incomplete as long as the civilian dimension is not strengthened with the same strategic resolve as the military one. The concepts already exist, institutional foundations have been laid, and financial resources are available. What is lacking is implementation: coherent, binding, and politically led.
A more resilient comprehensive defence will not emerge from isolated measures, but from strategic prioritisation, clear operational planning, and a society that is informed, prepared, and engaged. This requires more than a shift in public attitudes – it demands a change in political and administrative thinking: a shared understanding of risks, a willingness to assume responsibility, and the capacity to act across institutional and federal boundaries.
