South Korea Faces Discussion and Concerns Regarding an ‘AI-Based Society’

Generative AI rapidly expands and discourse surrounding an “AI Basic Society” and the ambition to become one of the world’s “top three AI Powers” intensifies. However, AI is no longer simply a tool for industrial development. Its growing influence on democracy, human rights, and everyday life has made it a central social and political issue, while AI governance is emerging as a key public concern. Grounded in the history of Korea’s information rights movement, the IDR turns its attention to the contemporary crises of AI governance and democracy. In this interview, we spoke with Yeo-Kyeong Chang, Executive Director of the institute, about the evolution of Korea’s information rights movement, the demands civil society is raising from the perspective of digital justice in the age of artificial intelligence, and its perspective on the governance shaping AI policy-making. 

The Era of State Surveillance That Began with a Floppy Disk

At a time when “AI Basic Society” discourse is gaining momentum, the role of the Institute for Digital Rights seems important. Could you introduce why the institute was founded?

Yeo-Kyeong Chang: The emergence of Korea’s information rights movement is deeply connected to the country’s democratization. Under authoritarian governments marked by extensive state surveillance, the IT systems that began to spread in the 1990s were also utilized by the government as instruments of state power.

In 1990, a Korean army private exposed the military’s surveillance of civilians through files stored on floppy disks, shocking the public and leading to Korea’s first lawsuit on personal information privacy. In 1998, the Supreme Court formally recognized citizens’ rights over their personal data, making the relationship between technology, privacy, and democracy a major social issue in South Korea.

In response, a group of young activists came together in the 1990s to build critical oversight of how these technologies were being used. Since then, efforts have continued to advance rights-based approaches to digital technology policy, including the protection of personal information and data rights. To further deepen and expand this work, the IDR was established in 2015.

Fast Tracked AI Legislation and Civil Society’s Belated Concerns

A civil society coalition ‘AI Civil Action’ was formed in South Korea around late March in response to AI policy developments. What has been the AI Civil Action’s main focus?

Today, civil society faced growing uncertainty over how to respond to AI-related issues, while witnessing the rapid development and expansion of AI led by industry, governments, and global institutions. In response, civil society organizations came together to launch the “Civil Society Joint Action for Strengthening AI Accountability and Publicness” (AI Civil Action), with the aim of collectively developing strategies and responses.

AI Civil Action is currently focused most heavily on South Korea’s AI Basic Act. Like the EU, South Korea has moved forward with AI legislation, which came into effect on January 22, 2026. However, the law-making process, led by the Ministry of Science and ICT, not only excluded civil society participation but also resulted in significant shortcomings from the perspectives of human rights and safety. A major concern related to this is the broader governance structure surrounding AI policy.

The law-making process excluded civil society participation and resulted in significant shortcomings from the perspectives of human rights and safety.

Furthermore, the legislative process behind the Special Act on Data Centers illustrates the problem clearly. Despite the significant environmental impact of data center construction and its effects on local communities, the bill was passed without consultation with committees responsible for the environment. As a result, AI Civil Action only became aware of the bill after it had already passed the committee stage. Throughout this fast-tracked process, the views of environment-related committees within the National Assembly were left out. The process exposed serious problems in the governance structure surrounding AI policy.

AI Policy Should Be Social Policy, Not Just Industrial Policy

What concerns arise when the government and industry continue to dominate AI discourse primarily through the lens of efficiency and economic growth?

South Korea aims to become one of the world’s "top three AI powers" by boosting its national AI competitiveness. The civil society’s core argument is simple. AI policy should be treated as social policy, not just industrial policy.

The structure of the government’s AI Strategy Committee reflects the same problem. Groups representing citizens and workers were very limited, and roughly 80 percent of the committee members were men. Social policy agencies such as the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family and the Fair Trade Commission were also largely left out. Under this structure, it is difficult for AI policy to function as social policy. That is why we argue that the governance behind AI policy-making needs to change. Otherwise, AI policy will continue to prioritize industrial growth while social policy concerns remain sidelined.

AI policy should be treated as social policy, not just industrial policy.

The exclusion of civil society is just as serious. Civil society matters because it represents the interests of citizens and workers who are directly affected by technologies. However, there is a growing assumption that involving civil society slows down industrial development and weakens competitiveness. We believe this accelerationist mindset is itself a serious problem.

The Digital Justice Movement and Its Parallels with Climate Justice

The information rights movement seems to share important similarities with the climate justice movement. As you mentioned earlier, governance problems such as the exclusion of stakeholders and the one-sided prioritization of industry interests have also been widely criticized in the making of climate policy. 

The climate justice movement and the digital justice movement share important similarities. First, both seek to protect social values and citizens’ lives from the impacts of advanced technologies. Second, in both fields, citizens are struggling to secure meaningful participation within systems largely shaped by powerful industries and state-led agendas. Third, both movements are increasingly concerned with the idea of a “Just Transition” as an alternative framework. Within the digital justice movement as well, growing attention is being paid to the impact of artificial intelligence on employment, leading to calls for a just transition in the age of AI.

However, compared to the climate movement, the digital justice movement has not yet matured into a broad-based popular movement. In my view, two dominant ideas are shaping the current AI discourse. The first is the belief that AI development is essential to national economic growth and future competitiveness, reflected in ambitions to become one of the world’s “top three AI powers.” The second is the pervasive influence of technological determinism and the notion of technological neutrality — the assumption that technology advances rationally on its own, and that human intervention or regulation could hinder the potential benefits of artificial intelligence.

Unlike the climate crisis, the harms caused by AI have not yet become fully visible or widely recognized in everyday life. In response to this challenge, the OECD has begun compiling case studies documenting the negative impacts and side effects of AI. From the perspective of ordinary citizens, the concrete harms of AI may still feel distant compared to the tangible sense of innovation and convenience brought by generative AI technologies.

The risks of high-impact decision-making AI systems often remain latent and insufficiently scrutinized.

High-risk, high-impact decision-making AI systems constitute a significant portion of today’s AI applications, as they directly affect people’s rights, opportunities, and access to public goods. Yet for many citizens, the influence of these systems remains far less visible than the everyday innovations associated with generative AI. As a result, their risks often remain latent and insufficiently scrutinized.

Civil society therefore needs to continue monitoring and intervening in the operation of these high-risk AI systems. Over time, citizens are also likely to become more aware of the implications these technologies have for human rights and public safety.

The High Threshold for Information Rights Protection

Are there any notable examples in which civil society intervention has successfully influenced the governance or use of digital technologies?

There have also been cases in which civil society intervention prevented potentially serious harms. One representative example concerns an AI-based immigration screening system in South Korea.

The Ministry of Justice had promoted a project to install AI systems in airport immigration areas that would recognize passengers’ faces and movements in real time and identify and track what were defined as “abnormal” or “suspicious” behaviors. We regarded the project as a serious threat to human rights and succeeded in halting it through sustained public criticism and advocacy.

However, by the time the project was suspended, subcontracted technology firms involved in the project had already trained their systems using approximately 170 million immigration records. The data included facial images, nationality information, and other forms of personal data collected from people entering and leaving the country.

Ultimately, there seem to be clear limitations to responding only after individual cases and harms have already occurred. It appears that the broader structures of state administration and the judicial system themselves make it difficult to effectively protect digital rights and information rights.

Within large-scale technological systems, it is extremely difficult for individual rights holders to raise concerns and obtain remedies. This is especially true in legal proceedings, where the burden of proof typically falls on the plaintiff to demonstrate concrete harm. This is also why whistleblowers are regarded as critically important in digital rights and technology governance debates internationally. Many of the major controversies involving Big Tech companies in the United States and Europe became publicly known largely through the actions of internal whistleblowers.

At the same time, researchers themselves often face serious obstacles when attempting to investigate technology companies. In the case of Facebook, for example, researchers once conducted simulated advertising experiments spending money as advertisers themselves in order to examine potential biases in the platform’s advertising algorithms. In response, they received warnings that such activities could lead to legal action for interfering with business operations. Cases like this demonstrate how difficult it is for independent researchers to scrutinize the social impacts of Big Tech systems without strong legal protections and institutional support.

European AI Regulation and Korea’s Acceleration

Could you tell us your thoughts on the ongoing AI regulation debates in Europe?

Among the discussions surrounding the EU AI Act, what particularly drew our attention were the demands from civil society organizations for a human rights-based approach, as well as a series of UN documents addressing human rights principles in AI governance.

We worked to introduce the concept of a “Human Rights-Based Approach” into domestic policy discussions. One of the initiatives we participated in together with the National Human Rights Commission of Korea was the development of human rights guidelines for artificial intelligence. We conducted research and sought to contribute actively and participatory when the Commission formulated its policy recommendations. When the National Human Rights Commission released its AI human rights guidelines in 2022, the ongoing development of the EU AI Act also served as an important reference point.

What concerns do you have about the current global trend toward AI deregulation, particularly in Europe?

In reality, the global situation is not particularly encouraging. A broader trend toward deregulation is emerging, and even existing data protection frameworks may face significant weakening. For example, discussions surrounding the GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) increasingly emphasize reducing corporate compliance burdens and expanding data utilization, leading to calls for regulatory relaxation. The EU AI Act has also faced criticism for retreating from the level of ambition initially expected. Even provisions related to AI literacy obligations are now subject to debates over reduction or dilution within the European Union.

The “Dual Challenge” Facing Civil Society in the Age of AI

At the same time, within civil society, there also seems to be a growing demand not only to criticize and monitor AI, but also to actively utilize it in advocacy, education, and organizational operations. Yet concerns about technological dependence and uncritical adoption continue to coexist alongside these expectations.

This is truly one of the central dilemmas facing civil society today. We often receive two seemingly contradictory questions at the same time from different organizations and individuals within civil society. Many ask how generative AI can be effectively utilized. On the other hand, many are concerned about how to respond to AI’s impact on employment and labor. What matters, ultimately, is maintaining a balance between adoption and critique. Surveillance power increased significantly. At the same time, however, digital networks also expanded the capacities and organizational power of citizens. Civil society has therefore evolved by continuously negotiating between these two competing dynamics. It was within this context that the concept of ‘informational self-determination’ emerged. The ability of individuals to make decisions regarding their own data and technological environment is one of the central principles of digital rights.

For that reason, I believe there is a certain form of technological determinism both in forcing people to accept technologies uncritically and in demanding their outright rejection. What we emphasize instead is that civil society should engage with these technologies in a more participatory and interventionist way. From that perspective, we have also produced and distributed publications such as ‘generative AI guidelines’ for civil society activists.

The digital justice movement within civil society is currently navigating the tension between technological efficiency and critical democratic principles. In many ways, it remains in the process of developing through ongoing social debate and public deliberation. Over time, the impacts of AI will become increasingly visible and concrete within the everyday lives of citizens. In that process, what will be required is neither technological optimism nor fear-driven panic, but the creation of democratic and participatory structures through which citizens themselves can meaningfully intervene in and shape the direction of technological development.