NATO has gained in prominence in the last twenty years, contrary to the widely held expectation at the conclusion of the Cold War that the organization would fade from the international stage. NATO has only managed to secure its relevance, however, by changing its mission. Indeed, it has sought a wider politico-military charter, with a focus on everything from peacekeeping, to issues of WMD proliferation, to disaster-relief. Clearly, one of NATO’s new objectives is to bring peace and stability far beyond its own geographic area. But, NATO’s largest operation to date – its intervention in Afghanistan – proves that NATO can not yet accommodate its broadened appetite for engagement.
A new theater: NATO in Asia
In October 2003, the UN extended the ISAF mandate from Kabul to the whole of the country, two months after NATO assumed responsibility for the mission. NATO-ISAF military tasks include assisting the Afghan government to spread its authority across the country, conducting stability and security operations in coordination with the Afghan National Security Forces, monitoring the Afghan National Army, disarming illegal groups and supporting internationally sanctioned anti-narcotics efforts.
But, due to the inherent weaknesses of the Karzai regime and the complex political dynamics of the ongoing conflict, the US and NATO, together with the Afghan government, have been unable to produce many concrete results. As a recent report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies put it, "There is a widespread perception in Afghanistan that international aid monies are not reaching ordinary people and that corrupt officials and highly paid foreigners are responsible for this failure." Indeed, the Afghan public is becoming ever angrier at the role of the international community and its sympathy for Taliban and other insurgent groups is increasing.
In Pakistan, many have raised concerns over NATO’s taking charge of ISAF and have questioned the legitimacy of the organization’s engagement in an ‘out of area’ operation. They argue that NATO’s legitimacy rests on its status as a collective defense organization under the UN Charter. Pakistan finds it unsettling that NATO has assumed the role of a collective security organization – subsuming the essential function of the United Nations.
Pakistan is not alone. Many Asian states are likewise disturbed by NATO’s role in the region. While a number of important Asian states endorse NATO’s anti-terrorism and reconstruction role in Afghanistan, they are concerned over the fact that NATO members have such a disproportionate influence on regional issues and developments. Asia is a continent rife with pending and potential conflicts and NATO is an unfamiliar player. It’s not yet clear how far NATO, in pursuit of its own interests, intends to forcibly intervene in other regional conflicts. The intervention in Afghanistan certainly does not serve as a promising example of cooperation: NATO has not properly consulted with Afghanistan’s neighbors, all of whom have legitimate and long-standing interests there.
A failed strategy: NATO in Afghanistan
It is unsurprising then that NATO has failed to stabilize Afghanistan after seven years of extensive engagement. Rather, it has only aggravated the situation and spread destabilization to Pakistan’s border areas with Afghanistan.
NATO forces have made many critical mistakes. A few notable ones: they have ignored the impact of collateral damage, despite talk of winning Afghan hearts and minds; they have betrayed their promises of economic progress and presided over diminishing standards of living; they set up a government that discriminated against Pashtuns, the country’s majority ethnic group; they neglected the drug issue for temporary and tactical advantages; and they sought to impose western democratic values alien to the traditional local society.
NATO’s lackluster approach in Afghanistan and the unwillingness of its members to increase troop contributions has resulted in the strengthening of the country’s Taliban-led insurgency. Since 2007, there has been a marked increase in the violence in Afghanistan. NATO and the US military commanders have been attributing the surge in violence to Pakistan’s inability to stop cross-border infiltration of Taliban. But, Pakistan has done everything it reasonably can, including the deployment of more than 100,000 troops along possible entry points, the establishment of 400 border-posts, and the introduction of biometric identification checks.
Indeed, Pakistan itself accuses NATO of inadequately monitoring the other side of the border. There is no visible presence of NATO-US-Afghan troops controlling the cross-border movement of insurgents. Pakistan is also critical of NATO’s naive efforts to eradicate Afghan poppy cultivation. As it is, drug-related revenues are close to 3 billion US dollars per year, which amounts to one half of Afghanistan’s current GDP. NATO has done nothing to stem the linkage between narco-money and Afghan terrorism.
Moreover, three million Afghan refugees remain in Pakistan. These refugee camps are safe havens for Afghan Taliban and also causing instability in Pakistan’s border regions through their support of local extremists. Until the refugees are repatriated, there could be no viable solution to the problem of cross-border movement. Associated with the refugee problem is the issue of arms trafficking from Afghanistan to Pakistan, which is yet another source of continuing instability in the Pakistani border regions.
Cooperation with Pakistan
NATO and Pakistan have been steadily increasing cooperation since October 2005, when, in the wake of a devastating earthquake, NATO responded to a request from Pakistan and the UN launched for a large-scale humanitarian operation. NATO’s engineering and medical support contingent stayed in Pakistan for 90 days, and their assistance helped dispel some of the prejudices harbored among Pakistanis towards NATO. That operation subsequently paved the way for a substantive NATO-Pakistan engagement.
Since then there has been a regular exchange of high-level visits, which has helped to initiate a political dialogue for better understanding and also improved military-to-military cooperation. There are still some clear areas of tension between NATO and Pakistan – NATO is skeptical of the peace deals that Pakistan has entered into with its local Taliban and there are still occasional skirmishes involving cross-border shelling between Pakistani and NATO troops. But, NATO General Raymond Henault was right when he said in November 2006, “Pakistan is important to the security of NATO, but also NATO is important to the security of Pakistan.” Both sides are convinced that Afghanistan can only be stabilized in cooperation, through a combination of political, economic and military policies.
In all, NATO must learn that it has no choice but to cooperate with other multinational organizations, as well as major and regional powers in order to earn respect and legitimacy – after all, its membership only comprises a small part of the world and its core is still Christian and European. One only hopes that the Alliance can learn its lessons quickly enough to redeem the intervention in Afghanistan.