Today, a united Europe no longer means everyone at the same time. On key issues such as defence, digitalisation, and key technologies, alliances of the willing are needed – both within and beyond the EU.

In recent years, the EU has made major progress, for example on internal security, stabilising the eurozone, the Green Deal, and regulating digital markets. It also responded to the Russian war of aggression with unusual unity – with coordinated sanctions packages, a common energy policy, and clear support for Ukraine. Nevertheless, 75 years after the Schuman Declaration and 40 years after the signature of the Schengen Agreement, the European Union is at risk of being torn apart from the outside and blocked from within. To prevent this, we now need a Europe of different speeds and partnerships.
The EU is facing challenges of an unprecedented scale. The speech by US vice president JD Vance at the Munich Security Conference in February marked a clear turning point for Europe's view on its place in the world. It must recognise that its former patron saint America is not only retreating; it increasingly sees Europe as a competitor – if not an opponent. The Trump administration and ultra-libertarian US tech CEOs openly oppose the European model of liberal democracy coupled with a social market economy.
Germany often acts as a brake.
National egoism is paralysing the EU
While they increasingly fear the EU, European leaders also seem to have become afraid of their own effectiveness. Germany in particular has increasingly withdrawn from actively shaping the European project and often acts as a brake, for instance on defence policy, the Green Deal, and digital policy. Paris and Warsaw are now looking at Berlin with increasing irritation. A further warning signal was the European reaction to the American investment push initiated by Joe Biden as part of the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act. In response, member states could have put forward a common industrial strategy. Instead, their reactions were dominated by uncertainty and defensiveness.
At the same time, national egoism repeatedly paralyses much-needed reforms. When Viktor Orbán threatens to veto Council decisions and anti-European and anti-democratic forces shape European governments, it becomes clear that, often, collective progress in the EU simply isn’t possible. Positive majorities in the Council or Parliament are hard to come by. Instead, a coalition of naysayers dominates – even when it comes to urgent Commission projects. In this context, a major leap towards a European republic seems unlikely to trigger widespread enthusiasm, due to a lack of both credible narratives and visible representation.
We need states that move forward together.
Inaction brings risks
What is needed now is a workable approach to deepening within key areas. Fortunately, the EU has long provided the means for this. Within the framework of “enhanced cooperation”, states can take the lead – entirely in line with the mechanism that has already brought about the Schengen Agreement and the eurozone and thus contributed significantly to European integration. Primarily used as the last resort for crisis management in recent years – as with the Fiscal Compact, for example –, enhanced cooperation must now become the central instrument for deepening the Union.
Joint procurement and coordination within a European defence community, investment programmes for key technologies, the development of an independent digital infrastructure, and the establishment of international industrial partnerships: these goals can only be achieved by states that are willing to move forward together. They should be free to do so. And these coalitions should be open to cooperation with close partners such as the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Japan – as well as with new but key players in our multilateral world such as Brazil, India, and South Africa.
Repeated calls have been made to introduce a multi-speed Europe – including by Joschka Fischer [Green former foreign minister], who laid the foundations for it in the Convention on the Future of Europe. However, for fear of division, the idea mostly remained just that. Today, the risk lies not in divergence, but rather in inaction. Smaller states in particular – for example in the Baltic region or Central Europe – could gain greater influence through more flexible alliances than under a unanimity-based system. Last but not least, this approach opens the door to the rapid accession of the countries of the Western Balkans as well as Ukraine and Moldova.
Originally published in German in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1 July 2025.