As Syria enters a fragile post-conflict phase, Europe must embrace a human-security-driven strategy that centers inclusive governance, economic recovery, and the rights of refugees. The stakes, for Syrians and for Europe, are too high to remain reactive.

As the Middle East spirals into a regional confrontation between Israel and Iran, a new Syria is gradually taking shape with bits of the initial post-Assad optimism still lingering. However, some of the challenges facing Syria, whose stability is vital for both regional and global politics, will turn insurmountable unless there is a surge in international support for economic recovery and political stability. Despite some relief created by the lifting of EU and US sanctions, the persistent socio-economic crisis, foreign military actions within its borders, and a fragile quest for national unity have pushed the transitional government headed by Ahmed al-Sharaa to seek international partnerships to preserve Syria’s territorial integrity and revive its collapsed economy. Furthermore, although the US has lifted the terrorist designation of HTS, the continued designation by the EU creates a legal conundrum on economic and political engagement with Damascus. The following article argues that Europe must abandon its reactive posture and adopt a proactive, human-security-centered strategy: one that moves beyond rigid conditionality and responds to the complex realities on the ground. To support Syria’s fragile transition toward a durable peace, the EU must:
- Depoliticize refugee return and anchor it in a human security framework;
- Extend economic aid beyond sanctions relief and bring legal clarity to its counterterrorism designations;
- Prioritize inclusive governance by engaging with minorities but also new authorities.
Only then can Europe meaningfully contribute to a post-conflict future grounded in dignity, stability, and shared ownership in Syria.
Syria Today
Despite efforts by the interim government to reunite Syria’s diverse ethnic and religious populations and thus consolidate state power in Damascus, prospects for inclusive and representative governance remain elusive. While many analysts and policymakers welcomed the National Dialogue Conference held on February 25, 2025, there was also notable criticism of its flawed participatory and representative structures. The interim constitution that was announced afterwards seemed hastily drafted and cemented a highly centralized presidential system, sidelining meaningful parliamentary authority and excluding clear pathways for pluralistic party formation.
Beyond that, violence between armed groups that formed during the Assad regime continues to erupt. The most recent suicide attack on a church in Damascus showcased once again the deeplying ethno-religious tensions in Syria. Landmines and unexploded ordnance also remain a lethal hazard in post-conflict areas, causing over 600 casualties since December - one third of them children. Furthermore, according to a 2024 World Bank report, Syria lost half of its GDP in the past decade and over 90% of the domestic population suffers from multidimensional poverty. The United Nations estimates that the humanitarian crisis in Syria currently renders 16.5 million people in dire need of assistance. The deepening geopolitical rivalry between Israel and Turkey, two regional military powers with pivotal but conflicting interests in Syria, also poses a grave risk for regional stability and trust in the Damascus government to protect its citizens from external threats.
Europe’s Involvement to Date
Until the EU lifted sanctions on Syria in May – following the US decision a week earlier – European governments remained hesitant in implementing concrete policies for Syria's reconstruction. This, despite the diplomatic momentum that the EU tried to create through immediate visits by a duo of French and German foreign ministers and later their Italian colleague to Damascus, as well as the EU High Representative for Foreign Policy’s participation at the Aqaba meetings on Syria.
At the outset, the EU dithered for months on the temporary suspension of sanctions imposed on the Assad regime for certain sectors. By contrast, the bloc was respectably quick in pledging nearly €2.5 billion in recovery and humanitarian aid in Syria. Ultimately, if it had not been for the permanent lifting of all sanctions in May, 2025, the uncertainty whether Europe would economically engage with the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the paramilitary group that ousted Assad and since claimed governance in Damascus, would have persisted at the detriment of the Syrian people. With full sanctions relief, the Syrian government now has a real chance to rebuild the country and complete a political transition that includes the country’s diverse groups.
Moreover, the sluggish efforts to unify the “Syria policy” within the bloc demonstrated that European leaders have long struggled to understand how important it is to support political stability in Syria. Instead, overly simplistic and racist debates about a “mass refugee return”, which is also legally unviable, were pushed by far-right voices across the continent and dominated the news headlines. European policymakers should not underestimate the high risks and stakes associated with a “total collapse” of the Syrian state. An increased likelihood of violence will continue to deter many Syrians to even consider returns. The recent, state-linked mass violence towards the Alawite and Druze communities underscores the fragility of Syria’s social cohesion, characterized by decades-long sectarian politics.
A Human Security Approach Must be at the Forefront
The polycrisis in Syria requires European leaders to adopt a “Syria policy” that contains a broader, people-centered security framework for addressing the intersectionality and interdependence of the perils the country is imminently facing. The general imperative of a human security approach is to prevent the decoupling of discourses surrounding a conflict (e.g. on transitional justice, international humanitarian law, and socio-economic development), in order to underscore “two overall notions of individual and community ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from fear’, and as a corollary, the right to dignity”. In other words, a human security perspective demands a shift from the dominant state-centered security paradigms, i.e. often based on a “realpolitik” of military and economic power and an intrinsic distrust between nations, to a more holistic understanding of conflicts with respect to their impacts on individuals and communities. More critically, the emphasis lies on the protection of humans against pervasive threats to their well-being such as ongoing or re-escalating armed violence, intentional targeting of civilians and public infrastructure, climate-related disasters, or politicization of aid, health, or food-related policies.
Viewing each of these challenges in isolation bears the risk of neglecting the interlinkages between human welfare and sustainable peacebuilding. It also mistakenly presumes that subjective experiences of insecurity are not as essential to the much needed empathic transformations of preexisting conflict narratives, which are consistently reproduced by socio-economic deprivation and intergroup violence, breeding further mistrust. To avoid a limited mode of thinking, EU policymakers should draft a comprehensive, long-term post-conflict strategy involving governance reforms and transitional justice, while simultaneously answering to the more acute needs of individuals and communities, such as access to clean water and sanitation.
In the foreign policy context of the EU, failure to strategize a collective vision and to account for broader human security implications have previously contributed to a protracted conflict in post-Gaddafi Libya. As debates on how to curb migration at any cost dominated the discourse at the time, individual member states struck deals with militias, exacerbating migrant trafficking and permitting the violent overhaul of an already weakened state apparatus. In order to avert similar catastrophes in Syria, European countries must unite under the flagship of the EU, in order to conceptualize a new human security policy for Syria’s future. In light of the return to hard power politics and increased militarization in global affairs, there is an opportunity for Europe to set a precedent and charter a different course in Syria:
1) Politicization of Refugees Is a Fatal Mistake
Shortly after the fall of Assad, many European countries announced that they suspended the processing of new asylum applications from Syrians. Austrian authorities even initiated full-on refoulement proceedings by sending out letters to roughly 40,000 Syrian refugees, stating that their grounds for asylum will be reassessed.
It is evident that many European states have held intentions to deport refugees back to Syria, and there is in fact a significant number of Syrians expressing a desire to return. Although there has been a considerable surge in the number of returns to Syria since December 2024, it is likely that these trips have mostly been temporary, mainly to evaluate the conditions on the ground. Despite recent hopes that the threat of political persecution, which has been a legitimate basis for asylum for many Syrians, may have disappeared following the regime change, other major obstacles to human security remain that deem wide-scale forcible returns a misguided policy. On top of the aforementioned resurgence of ethnic violence and the ongoing humanitarian crisis, the Syrian economy is in no shape to take in potentially hundreds of thousands of returnees. Massive shortcomings in infrastructure, energy, agriculture, and water access provide severely limited livelihood opportunities, with an unemployment rate of one in four, according to UN estimates. In addition, the country faces an immense housing shortage due to decade-long in-fighting and destruction, which would only be aggravated by a sudden population influx.
Such contextual conditions increase the sense of insecurity perceived by many Syrians in Europe. Therefore, any tangible strategy on repatriation must be informed principally by the lived realities of populations who will be the most affected by enforced returns. At present, politicization of refugees by far-right governments and opposition parties across member states risks creating a state of “unnecessary panic” and polarization in refugee communities, while also establishing a troubling pattern in relations with Damascus and other regional partners by instrumentalizing refugees in geopolitical calculations. On the practical side, forcible refugee returns en masse, or policies that aim to incentivize voluntary returns by paying a “bonus” to possible returnees, would also be seemingly ineffective due to the risk that the returnees could very quickly become refugees again after experiencing first-hand the constraints on human welfare in Syria. One should also consider that since 2013, many Syrian refugees in EU member states have long entered the path of permanent residency or naturalization, already untying their continued residence in host countries to the future of their refugee status. Instead, proper repatriation must follow international guidelines for individual reevaluation of asylum grounds. A safe and dignified repatriation process necessitates the creation of fundamental, durable, and stable conditions for human security in advance for the Damascus government to expedite the reintegration of returnees, including measures for job security, housing, access to social services, and absence of state and intergroup violence. This could also entail introducing “some level of circularity” within EU asylum statutes, enabling Syrians to conduct “go-and-see visits” and support financial and knowledge transfers back to Syria while simultaneously retaining the ability to sustain socio-economic ties with host countries without the loss of status. A joint EU-Syria monitoring force, supported by UN agencies or other independent international bodies, could be an effective instrument to regularly assess return conditions, track reintegration outcomes, and ensure compliance with agreed human security benchmarks.
Syria’s path for redevelopment must be determined by Syrian’s themselves. However, there should be commitment by former host countries to foster sustainable human well-being in Syria. Otherwise, promises by far-right politicians on mass exodus of Syrians from Europe are not just hopeless expressions of wishful thinking, but also endanger the formation of a coordinated European framework for Syria and the long-term human security in the country.
2) Economic Support Must Continue Following Sanction Relief
Syria’s economy was on the verge of collapse prior to Assad’s departure, but the new regime also continues to face immense challenges to revive the economy. The rapid crash of the Syrian pound coincided with the ousting of Assad in December 2024 and has worsened the ongoing hyperinflation and widespread poverty since then. The new administration has also failed to deliver its pledge to increase the salaries of civil servants by 400% – to instill broader trust in the transitional government – and many remained unpaid as of March 2025. In order to mitigate the compounding liquidity crisis, Damascus limited money supplies and received a promise from Qatar to pay public-sector salaries. However, the contractionary monetary policy exacerbated the preexisting confidence crisis and gave way to a considerable increase in black market trading.
In this context, the EU’s decision to permanently lift its sanctions on energy, transport and financial services marks a clear break from its previous reluctance to ease economic restrictions on Syria – a delay that had long contributed to the issue of “regulatory overcompliance”. In fact, the country had been isolated from Western markets even prior to the eruption of the civil war in 2011, making it one of the most economically restricted countries for decades. If the country would have remained detached from global trade through upholding sanctions, the cash-strained administration in Damascus could have been given the inadvertent incentive to resort to illicit trade routes, as continuously seen under Assad rule. With the sanctions gone, the interim government must now seize this opportunity to establish the rule of law and introduce inclusive governance structures, which would be much harder to legitimize if basic economic needs of Syrians are not met.
Nevertheless, it is disconcerting that the EU, in an all too familiar pattern of deferring to Washington for its Middle East policy, appears to have waited for a definitive shift from the Trump administration on sanctions before advancing its own position on comprehensive sanctions relief. This hesitation is especially striking given that Europe, as Syria’s immediate geopolitical neighbor, bears a far greater burden from continued instability – be it in the form of refugee movements, economic disruption, or regional insecurity – than the more insulated United States. Accounting for the Trump administration’s retreat into transactionalism at the expense of a rules-based diplomacy, the EU must emancipate its Syria policy from US dependence and assert an autonomous, values-driven approach grounded in international law and human security to build up credibility and influence in shaping a post-conflict regional order. Otherwise, this will further jeopardize the EU’s reputation globally as a principled, sovereign partner for global development initiatives. Instead of calibrating its Syria mission to the political temperature in Washington, the EU has to understand its own responsibilities and commitments in the stabilization of the region and guaranteeing human security.
While the lifted sanctions should help alleviate immediate economic concerns, Syria requires enormous funds to actually rebuild. It is therefore essential to further reduce the restrictions on financial flows into the country by encouraging European investments into various sectors in Syria such as telecommunications, energy, and infrastructure. Without sufficient economic prospects, many young Syrians will likely re-embrace war-time patronages to armed-groups, which would overwhelm the already strained social protection structure in Syria and perpetuate sectarian violence. This would not only undermine the credibility of the EU's commitment to help rebuild Syria, but also de-center, contrary to the premises of human security, the economic and welfare concerns of the very populations the EU purportedly wants to protect. Many times during the civil war, Syrians have already demonstrated their ability to find localized solutions in numerous crucial areas, which provides a strong basis for the EU to increase its financial assistance. Particularly in the energy sector, where reliability of energy transmission is dwindling at best and energy supply remains one of the largest hurdles. Syrians’ endeavors during the civil war to localize energy supplies through solar panels exemplify the immense potential for rebuilding.
Given the economic despair the interim government finds itself in, central powers in the region, such as Turkey and Qatar, have already stepped in to cement their influence in the changing geopolitical energy landscape. Therefore, the EU must assert a unique position on growing the country’s already expanding renewable energy sector, especially solar, to ensure its long-term energy independence, while also working in parallel with Turkey and Qatar to fulfill near-term energy demands. In other vital sectors such as shipping and banking, there have already been promising signs for economic activity following the dismantling of sanctions, which marks opportunities for European companies and Syrian businessmen in diaspora to capitalize on.
Another major issue challenging the economic revitalization Syria desperately needs is the decade-long brain drain resulting from the war. Fiscal considerations aside, protracted sanctions have long hindered significant operational flexibility for civil society and aid groups active in Syria. Despite the remarkable achievements of Syrian civil society initiatives abroad in coordinating humanitarian assistance and providing other resources to the dispersed population, the loss of knowledge, capital, and skills relating to capacity-building has set the country back for years, if not decades.
One sizable barrier facing the members of the Syrian diaspora in this regard is the ongoing designation of HTS as a terrorist organization, which makes collaborating with the new authorities regarding redevelopment efforts a legal quandary. Quite ironically, the members of the terrorist-designated administration were hosted at this year’s Brussels Conference on Syria and by Macron in May, highlighting the confusion in European decision-making toward Syria. It should also be noted that the US recently decided to lift HTS’s terrorist designation as a recognition, in the words of the Secretary of State Marco Rubio, of “the positive actions” taken by the new government. Upsettingly, this impasse showcases yet another strategy of deferral to US foreign policy by the Europeans. As the ambiguity within the EU’s diplomatic apparatus regarding the classification of the HTS-filled administration remains, many Syrians living abroad are rightfully afraid of the potential legal ramifications of being associated with the new government. Thus, to foster an authentic capacity-building by Syrians themselves, EU member states should reconsider the terrorist designation. Only by holistically examining the implications of such policies on Syrians domestically and in diaspora, the EU can guarantee a human security environment.
From this perspective, the reassessment should complement the sanctions relief to avoid further legal contradictions within the EU counterterrorism law, but occur in tandem with clear, enforceable, and targeted conditionalities e.g. on delivering inclusivity in governance and combating terrorism by other extremist groups, such as a re-fortifying ISIS, to ease working with Damascus on wide-ranging issues, particularly regarding humanitarian aid and institution-building. But if the contingency-planning fails, the EU must also be prepared to pause the normalization process, while maintaining some structural mechanisms to re-direct economic aid to the wider population. Conversely, some experts argue that short-term legal waivers for dealing with the regime for reconstruction and humanitarian aid could be implemented, while the broader terrorist listings are maintained until HTS fully severs ties with al-Qaeda and ousts naturalized foreign fighters from key state positions.
Regarding the question of possible conditionalities and snapback mechanisms for permanent sanctions relief, no official roadmap with a list of demands conditioned for sanction relief has been announced yet, aside from numerous statements by European officials on commitment toward inclusivity and respect for human rights that leave space for vague interpretation. As the EU foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, noted in her announcement of sanction relief, it is only reasonable for the EU to expect certain inclusive governance reforms that protect religious minorities and marginalized groups, should such relief policy be accompanied by meaningful restructuring from the decade-long sectarian Baathi rule. On the other hand, one must not forget that the initial EU sanctions were imposed on the Assad regime – not on the country itself as a whole or the current interim government – for supporting terrorism, instability, and waging a ruthless war against his own citizens. Therefore, in order to avoid an extensive use of the EU’s snapback mechanisms for sanctions as a preemptive accountability measure that may produce the same “collective punishment” effects on all populations as previous sanctions on Assad, the EU must leave no room for uncertainty and articulate its expectations on minority protection and inclusivity more clearly. Here, the existing mechanisms for targeted, instead of sweeping, sanctions on groups violating human rights and enacting violence must be the primary norm.
The human security paradigm posits that cultural barriers to inclusion and peaceful coexistence intersect with economic barriers. Therefore, before Europeans can start to see considerable achievements in overcoming cultural barriers, they also must take steps to increase the economic prospects for Syrians.
3) Inclusive Governance Is the Cornerstone of Syria’s Long-Term Stability
Though HTS has repositioned itself as a more moderate, pragmatic governing body in an effort to shed its extremist roots, its approach to the rights of women and minorities remains the clearest measure to see whether genuine reform is indeed underway. There is already legitimate skepticism worldwide of HTS’s commitment to its departure from its divisive practices in the past, as evidenced by the harsh treatment of women in HTS-controlled Idlib. There are also reports of sexual abuse against Kurdish women under a HTS military commander who was recently elevated to a key military position by the new government. Moreover, the recent escalation of sectarian violence against the Druze community, as well as the stalled efforts to integrate the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to Syrian state institutions following an agreement in March, cast doubt on the Damascus government’s ability to sustain peaceful coexistence among Syria’s various groups. Confirming these reservations, many international observers, including the EU leadership and member states, repeatedly stressed to the interim government that enjoyment of safety and equal rights by all Syrians – irrespective of their faith, ethnicity, or gender – should be a building block for transitional justice and constitutional reform.
If the EU is to be serious about human security in Syria, empowering diverse voices is not a secondary task but a central mechanism for reinstalling trust, resilience, and legitimacy in post-conflict scenarios. In the Syrian context, the achievement of this goal comes with certain complications. On the one hand, a certain degree of local autonomy must be granted to Syria’s various ethnic and religious minorities, especially concerning religious practice and language education. Furthermore, the presence of women in governance and civil society networks must also be amplified, particularly since women have borne the brunt of the ongoing economic crisis, but also because the country practically needs every Syrian to participate in the process of rebuilding and economic recovery. On the other hand, as Syria remains fragmented along the geographic blocs created by the warring parties that originated during the civil war, the threat to permanent stability in the country looms large. As clashes between government-affiliated groups and armed militias from within minority communities persist, many from these communities fear exposure to more HTS-linked sectarian violence in the case of full disarmament and integration into the central government. This creates tension between the efforts to decentralize power in Syria to facilitate local governance, and to consolidate state influence to preserve territorial integrity. Additionally, prolonged sectarian violence risks inviting renewed foreign intervention which could further deepen the country’s fragmentation.
European governments do not have answers yet on how to foster a people-centered transition and inclusive reforms in Syria. As noted earlier, the preemptive strategies vis-à-vis Damascus such as previously upholding the sanctions against the Assad regime, though well-intended, do more harm than they actually protect the marginalized populations. These communities are often the ones most affected by violence that results from socioeconomic deprivation and distrust in state institutions. While such tentative policies are based on legitimate concerns and are aimed to achieve long-term security guarantees for the marginalized groups, the EU should also acknowledge some meaningful steps taken by the interim government.
For example, the newly announced 23-member cabinet included nine individuals from Syria’s largest minority communities - Kurds, Druze, Christians and Alawites - constituting roughly the actual size of the non-Arab, non-Sunni population of the country. Some observers also noted the significance of a former extremist leader letting women dress freely in his cabinet. Similarly, following the deliberate massacre of Alawite civilians in March, a special committee investigating the government-linked crimes led to the arrest of some 30 people, indicating some resort to accountability.
However, such measures are clearly not sufficient to conclude that HTS’s intentions are indeed substantial and not just performative. To illustrate, the composition of the government itself bears some problematic implications. First, there was only a single woman present in the entire cabinet, albeit welcomed by many Syrians as a considerably progressive voice from the Syrian-Christian community. Besides, some members of the minority communities resent that their appointed representatives lack genuine political legitimacy among their constituents, with the most consequential omission being the Kurdish-led SDF, which remains excluded despite its territorial control over the northeast. The Druze community overwhelmingly expressed a similar concern that the Druze appointee is not representative of the community’s spiritual leadership nor its armed groups. In this sense, the current transition process marks a reluctance by the centralized power structure under al-Shaara to share real authority with political rivals and independent actors in the short run.
Nevertheless, for the long-term transition to succeed, Syrians must believe in the willingness of the regime to allow for broader representation once the rather acute worries of “destructive factionalism” and reversion to civil war are warded off. One should also bear in mind that the new government brings little governing experience – especially the cabinet members affiliated with the HTS. Under these circumstances, Europe may lack hard power in Syria, but it still holds significant diplomatic and fiscal influence.
Therefore, the need for a more capable governance should precede pursuing large-scale democratic transformations at this current stage. This means that, at the outset, Europeans should engage with the new government constructively, not prescriptively, so that it is able to deliver on its political and economic promises, which is an essential precondition for it to gradually earn domestic legitimacy across Syria’s diverse and historically marginalized communities, despite the evident shortcomings in its current representational framework. This could mean empowering experienced and ambitious Syrians living abroad and domestically in the capacity-building efforts, where the EU can provide funding and both logistic and normative experience, e.g. for electoral mechanisms, infrastructure projects for telecommunications and energy, and reversing the brain drain through reopening of universities and private businesses. By encouraging inter- and intragroup dialogues, Europeans can also empower meaningful progress, e.g. on women’s rights. The National Dialogue Conference in February, 2025 demonstrated that the lack of awareness of other groups’ struggles remains a major obstacle for many Syrians. The shortcomings of the Conference also illustrate how formal processes, when lacking genuine intercommunal understanding and broad-based participation, risk reinforcing existing divisions rather than paving the way toward inclusive state-building. Therefore, through an approach that enables Syrians to engage directly with their government, but also empathetically with each other, Syrians can be given a real opportunity to initiate a more inclusive, pluralistic constitutional process at the end of the five-year interim period.
Meanwhile, European officials should also divert from policies that treat minorities and women as monoliths and recognize the diverse voices within these communities, but also the intersectionality of their adversities, ranging from economic constraints to faith-based oppression, that form their subjective experiences of insecurity. It goes without saying that many Syrians’ fear a state-building process rooted in rigid factionalisms, which could turn their country into another Lebanon. Similarly, it should not be forgotten that unchecked minority rule based on sectarianism and the repression of the Sunni majority in Syria were key factors that led to the uprising against Assad back in 2011. More crucially, Europeans should heed to the claims made by many local and international analysts that Israel is selectively instrumentalizing the Druze community to keep Syria divided. This requires bolstering a unified standard of international law against the Israeli incursions in Golan Heights and recent airstrikes, as well as pressuring both Ankara and Tel Aviv to avoid further military escalation in the region.
Finally, the EU and its member states must highlight, both in meetings with the new government and in official communiques, the pivotal role the Syrian independent civil society played during the civil war and how their continued participation is essential in shaping the post-conflict trajectory of their country. In most cases, such civil society organizations are more apt to determine the challenges and propose solutions. By engaging with these local actors, the EU can gain on-the-ground information about the day-to-day problems Syrians are facing and assist them in rebuilding the country’s educational system, increase the worldwide awareness of its challenges, and codify the preservation of local culture and diversity in the emerging political system.
Conclusion
It is clear that no one is waiting for Europe to show proactive leadership with regards to Syria’s future. Regional actors have already stepped in to fill the power vacuum, and Syrians themselves are navigating the difficult path of rebuilding with limited support. If Europe continues to act only in response to others and hides behind a fading transatlantic consensus and vague conditionalities, it risks becoming irrelevant in shaping Syria’s future. Yet a meaningful European role is still possible: one grounded not in coercive or transactional leverage but in the principles of human security. This requires shifting from a logic of containment and punishment to one of support and capacity-building. To this end, Europe should not wait for perfect political conditions to miraculously emerge, but rather help create them through a responsible, incremental involvement that empowers Syrian communities and institutions. More importantly, Europe must help ensure that this fragile post-conflict moment becomes a genuine turning point, not only for Syria’s territorial and political integrity, but for the restoration of dignity, stability, and hope for its people.
This article first appeared here: us.boell.org