The instruments of bi- and multilateral nuclear disarmament and arms control are in a state of despair. Russia and the West have entered a new round of conflict. The US-Russian nuclear arms control and disarmament dialogue has stalled. East Asia is rattled by North Korea aggressively pushing forward its nuclear and missile programs. Beyond the bilateral and regional levels, frustration about the nuclear-weapons states' unwillingness to meet their own disarmament obligations under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has already led a majority of UN states to seek alternative venues to ban the risks and threats associated with nuclear arms
Which arguments could help to reinvigorate moral and political support for further nuclear disarmament? What can the international community do to move further with multilateral nuclear disarmament? How can Europe deal with its nuclear challenges against the background of a missing «grand deal» between NATO and Russia? How can the world better bridge the gap between the need for broader civil society engagement and the lack of interest in many societies?
This reader is the result of a one-year project funded by the Heinrich Böll Stiftung in cooperation with the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH). Under the label of N.EX.T. (Nuclear Expert Talks), fifteen early and mid-career scholars from Europe, Russia, and the United States gathered in Berlin in November 2016 to discuss the current state of disarmament and arms control and to devise concrete future concepts for overcoming the manifold obstacles in current politics.
Table of contents
- The Crisis of Nuclear Disarmament and Arms Control: What N.EX.T?
- Europe's nuclear woes: Mitigating the challenges of the next years
- What arguments motivate citizens to demand nuclear disarmament?
- Nuclear disarmament summits: A proposal to break the international impasse
- The future of US-Russian nuclear deterrence and arms control
- Amid high tensions, an urgent need for nuclear restraint
- About the Authors